

THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS: CAUSES. BAIL-OUT. FUTURE.

L. Randall Wray

Levy Economics Institute and
University of Missouri - Kansas City

www.levy.org; www.cfeps.org;

wrayr@umkc.edu

Causes of the Collapse

- The Minsky Moment
- Minsky's Stages
 - Money Manager Capitalism
- Financialization, Layering, Liquidity
- Fraud and the Real Estate Bubble
- Shredding of New Deal Reforms
- Bubbles, Goldilocks and Budgets

Minsky Moment

- Financial Instability Hypothesis
- Investment Theory of the Cycle and Financial Theory of Investment
- Hedge → Speculative → Ponzi
- Big Bank and Big Government Rescue
- Stability is Destabilizing

Boom and Bust


- 1980s Thrift & Bank Crises
 - Thrifts and Commercial real estate
 - Banks and LDC debt
- 1980s Leverage Buy-outs
 - Michael Milken and Junk Bonds
- 1990s New Economy and Nasdaq
 - “Irrational Exuberance”
- 2000s Residential Real Estate
 - Subprimes; foreclosures
- 2000s Commodity Markets
 - Quadrupled oil prices; food riots; starvation

Each follows the pattern and each crisis is worse than the previous

A Minsky Half-Century?

- Stages Approach: 57 Varieties
 - Commercial capitalism
 - Finance capitalism
 - Paternalistic (Managerial-Welfare State) capitalism
 - Money Manager capitalism (predator state, financialization, ownership society, neoliberalism, neoconservatism, shadow banking)
 - Stability bred instability
 - Accumulation of financial assets/liabilities
 - Globalization
 - Securitization
 - Self-supervision

Decreasing Weight of the Banking Sector




Financialization, Layering, Liquidity


- Rising share of profits and value added going to financial sector.
- Layering debt on debt on debt.
 - Positions in assets financed through very short term (overnight) borrowing.
 - Asset mkts and institutions tightly linked in complex ways
 - Liquidity and hedges were a mirage
- Casino-like speculation dominates.

Financialization of the U.S. Economy

Financial Industry Share of Corporate Profits and Value Added (1955-2010)



Total Financial Liabilities Relative to GDP




Sources: *Historical Statistics of the United States: Millennium Edition* (Tables Cj870-889, Ca9-19, Ce42-68, Cj787-796, Cj748-750, Cj389-397, Cj437-447, and Cj362-374), *Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial Times to 1970* (Series X 689-697), NIPA, Flow of Funds (from 1945).

New Home Finance Model

- Jimmy Stewart's Thrift: loan officer, bank teller, home appraiser; public recorder.
 - Loans held to maturity
- New more “efficient” Wall Street model:
 - Involves broker, appraiser, lender, servicer, MERS, securitizer, credit rater, rocket scientists and proprietary models, MBS trustee, CDOs squared and cubed, CDSs and monolines, investors, traders, accountants, lawyers, lender processing services; robo-signers and document “recovery” services (forgery).
 - Model: originate to distribute, pump and dump, foreclose and resell.
 - Capitalizing unrealizable home values.


Mortgage Transaction without Securitization or MERS

Pre-Securitization & Pre-MERS



** Sub process involving lender transfer of note and deed not shown.*

Dan & Teri Securities Transaction Process Reverse Engineered version 4.1



Mortgage Transaction w/ Securitization and MERS

- 40 Pts of Level One Failure
- Repeated data entry of loan values etc.= Chances for Error
- No identified standards of operation
- No unifying change control authority
- Multiple Systems with various control, data entry procedures requirements

Real Estate Bubble and Fraud

- Like Shrek's onion: Every link in the Home Finance Food Chain was fraudulent:
 - Appraisers, brokers, lenders, MERS recording, investment bank securitizers, trusts, CDOs squared and cubed, CDS bets on failure, accounting firms, ratings agencies, and servicers.
- Most fraud was on part of lenders, and now servicers.
- Fed recognized growing fraud as early as 2000; FBI warned in 2004 "epidemic of fraud".


WHY????????????

- Why the complexity and fraud at every layer?
- Model was flawed from beginning: could not have been profitable; interest payments could not cover costs,
 - Needed mortgages @ 120% of value to book fees,
- Complexity essential to hide accounting fraud.
- The beauty of a Casino: the house always wins.
 - \$10T of homes → tens of trillions of dollars of bets.
- Foreclosure was inevitable, desired, outcome: bet on failure then reboot thru foreclosure and to hide the fraud.
- Galbraith: The Great Crash. Like 1929 investment trusts.

Shredding of New Deal Reform

- Deregulation, de-supervision, self-supervision
- Rising inequality
- Falling wage share
- Rising consumer debt
- Fiscal constraint

Wages and Salaries, % of GDP



Financial Bubbles, Goldilocks and Budgets


- Greenspan “Put”; Bernanke “Great Moderation”.
 - No bubbles in sight. Fundamentals are strong.
- Reality: biggest debt, equity, commodity, and real estate bubbles in history.
- Propped up by Big Government and Big Bank—No cleansing through debt deflation dynamics.

GFC 2007: It all started with Goldilocks

- 1996: US Federal Government begins surpluses; continued for 2.5 years.
- Clinton projects surpluses for next 15 years.
 - All Government debt will be retired.
 - Fuels securitization
- Private debt explodes. Why? The Three Balances.
- The Meaning of Zero:

0=Private Balance + Government Balance + Foreign Balance

Sector Financial Balances as a % of GDP, 1952q1 to 2010q4



■ Domestic Private Sector Balance

■ Govt Balance

■ Capital Account

Bail-out!

- Fiscal Stimulus \$800B.
- Hank Paulson \$800B. Don't ask, don't tell.
 - Toxic asset purchases, capital injections
- Fed: Unprecedented effort
 - Peak \$1.7 Trillion
 - \$29 TRILLION cumulatively


Unusual and Exigent Circumstances

- Liquidity or Solvency Crisis?
 - Bagehot: lend w/o limit, against good collateral, at penalty rate
 - Banks relied on extremely short-term finance, questionable assets → refusal to roll-over: solvency problems → liquidity crisis
- “Liquidity provisions” through alphabet soup facilities
- Let’s Make a Deal!
 - Treas-Fed Negotiations, bridge loans, “orderly solutions”
 - Subvert mkt processes, force losses on owners, rescue creditors
- Fed’s Special Purpose Vehicles subvert 13(3) constraints
 - Lending to SPVs to lend and buy toxic waste
 - And to Real Housewives of Wall Street through nonrecourse loans
- QE 1, 2.....3?


Accounting for the Bail-out

- Act of Congress and FOIA by Bloomberg
- How to measure? Peak versus Cumulative
- Peak: Dec 2008, \$1.7 T
- Cumulative through Nov 2009: \$29,000,000,000,000
 - Individual institutions funded up to two years
 - 20% “conventional” to depository institutions
 - 80% “nonconventionable” (nondepository, markets, assets)
 - 40% “questionable” by 13(3) restrictions: \$11T
 - Highly concentrated among biggest domestic and foreign institutions
 - These figures exclude QE

Select Fed Assets, 1/3/2007-9/2011




Select Fed Assets, 1/3/2007-3/1/2012




Institution Totals Accross All Facilities

Over \$400 Billion



Total Institutional Participation, excluding CBLS



Almost 84% involved just 14 institutions!

Summary: \$29,785,420,000,000

Conventional			Unconventional		
Facility	Total	Percentage	Facility	Total	Percentage
TAF	\$3,818.41	12.8%	CBLS	\$10,057.4	33.77%
TSLF/ TOP	2,005.7	6.7	ST OMO	855	2.87
			PDCF	8,950.99	30.05
			Bear Stearns Bridge Loan	12.9	0.04
			Maiden Lane I	28.82	0.10
			Maiden Lane II	19.5	0.07
			Maiden Lane III	24.30	0.08
			AIA/ ALICO	25	0.08
			AIG RCF	140.32	0.47
			AIG SBF	802.32	2.69
			AMLF	217.45	0.73
			CPFF	737.07	2.47
			TALF	71.09	0.24
			GSE	169.01	0.57
			MBS	1,850.14	6.21
TOTALS	\$5,824.12	19.55%		\$23,961.48	80.45%

End Game for Money Manager Capitalism

- Renewed problem at major banks could set off GFC 2.0
- Radical euthanasia: major banks will fail.
- Managed funds will fail: pensions, sovereign wealth funds, mutual funds, insurers, hedge funds.
 - That is a good thing!
 - Minsky's "simplification" of the financial system.
- Will emerge with little private debt, massive government debt → robust financial system; Constrained with new laws, supervision.
- Return to underwriting, hold to maturity.
- Financialization replaced with New Deal 2.0: Higher Wages, Full employment, Domestic Consumption.

THANK YOU

L. Randall Wray, Levy Economics Institute and University of Missouri—Kansas City

www.levy.org; www.cfeps.org; wrayr@umkc.edu

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