

International Reserves and Policy Space in Latin America

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
Some Stylized Facts

- Before the Crisis
 - Capital Account Liberalization in the 1990s
 - Intense Reserve Accumulation by Emerging Countries
 - Long Experience with Balance of Payments Crises and “External Constraints”
 - Experience with IMF Adjustment Programs (1990s: and the rise of Structural Conditionalities

Cont.

- But Some Reserve Accumulation Was Byproduct of Other Processes
 - Inflows of Large Amounts of Foreign Financial Investments (in a context of CA Liberalization)
 - Neo-Mercantilist Policies: Net Exports as Engine of Growth


Traditional External Fragility Indicators



Counter-Cyclical Policies in LA

- All Major Economies in the Region Were Pro-Active
- Conventional Fiscal and Monetary Policies (fiscal spending, lower interest rates, etc)
- Non-Conventional Policies
 - Release of Required Reserves
 - Use of State-Controlled Banks
 - Sectoral Policies (Construction, Exports, Auto Industry)
 - Social Policies


The Crisis and Its Aftermath: Quick Recovery




New Features

- Implementation of Anti-cyclical policies
- No Loss of Reserves, despite weak Current Account (Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, Peru)
- Most Significant: No Capital Flight by Residents
 - Protection by Reserves?
 - Nowhere to go?


No Loss of Reserves



Cont.



Concl.



Accumulation of Reserves as Defensive Device

- Deflationary Impact on World Economy: Similar to Domestic Liquidity Preference
- But
 - No Scheme for Supplying International Liquidity in case of need
 - Liberalization of Capital Account Increased Balance of Payments and Exchange Rate Volatilities
 - Cost of IMF Support (Policy Meddling) is Excessive
 - Paradox: Best Policy under Globalization is still “Each One for Oneself”