REFORMING DEPOSIT INSURANCE
The Case to Replace FDIC Protection with Self-Insurance

PANOS KONSTAS
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The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) currently insures bank deposit balances up to $100,000. According to some observers, statutory protection creates moral hazard problems for insurers because it allows banks to engage in risky activities. As an example, moral hazard was a key contributor to huge losses suffered when thrift institutions failed during the 1980s.

This brief by Konstas outlines a plan to reduce the risk of government losses by replacing insured deposits with uninsured deposits and eliminating some of the costs of deposit insurance. His plan proposes a self-insured (SI) depositor system that places an intermediary between the lender (saver) and borrower (bank) in the credit-flow chain. The FDIC would guarantee saver loans and allow the intermediary to borrow at the risk-free interest rate if the intermediary’s bank deposit is statutorily defined outside the realm of FDIC insurance. The risk is therefore transferred to depositors (intermediaries); thus creating incentives for depositors to earn a rate of return at least equal to the cost of borrowing plus a risk premium based on the risk profile of banks.

Konstas’s plan uses the Federal Home Loan Bank (FHLB) as a financial model but replaces the Office of Finance (OF) with a Self-Insured Depositors’ Financing Office (SIDFO). His plan creates additional advantages, such as maximum funding efficiency (e.g., economies of scale), and there is virtually no risk of loss for the U.S. government. The shift of guarantees from bank debt to SIDFO debt would dramatically decrease the FDIC’s odds of losses from bank failures.

Konstas expects that intermediaries handling large funds would be apt to invest in SI certificates of deposit (CDs) and to leverage capital for the sake of rate spreads. These intermediaries would become SI depositors because they would have the option of raising funds at rates equal to...
SIDFO’s cost of borrowing and they could earn wider interest-rate spreads on investments than they could by raising funds on their own.

The advantages for lenders (savers) and borrowers (banks) that switch their status from FDIC-insured depositors to SI depositors depend on capital requirements, the SIDFO lending rate, and the spread between the lending rate and the rate on existing accounts. Konstas notes that the uninsured SI depositors would need to adjust their returns for the risk of bank failure. He also notes that accounts with interest rates above the SIDFO lending rate would have the incentive to convert to SI deposits. Using 1998 Call Report data to compute interest-expense ratios for time and savings deposits, Konstas estimates that approximately 10 percent of all funds in the U.S. banking system would convert to SI CDs.

As always, I welcome your comments.

Dimitri B. Papadimitriou, President
January 2006
Reforming Deposit Insurance

Introduction
Although deposit insurance protects depositors against loss, it also creates moral-hazard problems for the insurer. “Moral hazard” is the tendency of those with insurance to take less care and put forth less effort to avoid risks than they would if they had no insurance. Deposit insurance therefore allows banks that engage in riskier activities to obtain insured deposits at risk-free interest rates, since all costs of bank failure fall on the insurer. Another aspect of moral hazard is that insurance often provides a motive for bank managers, especially when threatened with insolvency, to take on additional risks. Empirical studies show that moral hazard was a key contributor to the huge losses suffered when thrift institutions failed during the 1980s.  

Some observers believe that regulators can sufficiently contain the moral-hazard problem by increasing bank regulation and surveillance, offsetting moral hazard with financial penalties for excessive risk taking, requiring banks to hold more capital, and intervening sooner at failing banks to minimize losses. Others, however, have asked whether the moral-hazard malady may not in fact reflect the inherently destabilizing effect of deposit insurance protection—an effect that can be countered only if the protection itself is removed or drastically reduced. This brief looks at the problem and offers a solution in the context of the latter view.

There are two kinds of deposit protection—statutory and implicit. Statutory protection occurs when the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) insures deposit balances up to a certain amount, currently $100,000. Implicit protection occurs when regulators resolve bank failures at no loss to any depositor, and when banks become insolvent but are not allowed to fail. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 (FDICIA) attempted to limit this type of protection, basically by making it harder for regulators either to use
failure-resolution policies that protect uninsured depositors or to invoke
the too-big-to-fail argument during a failure.²

The argument for removing implicit deposit protection is that if
depositors consistently suffer losses during failures, they will become sen-
sitive to the actions taken by their depositaries and will require premiums
according to risk. Such an outcome would dull banks’ incentives for undue
risk taking because higher risk would translate into higher premiums for
uninsured funds.

This brief suggests a way to reduce deposit protection—not by affect-
ing the implicit protection for deposits above $100,000 (as FDICIA did),
but, instead, by affecting the statutory type of protection for deposits
below $100,000. Specifically, this brief outlines a plan that would make it
advantageous for banks to replace some of their insured deposits with
uninsured deposits. The brief compares the existing credit-flow chain with
what the chain would be under the proposed plan; explains how the
Federal Home Loan Bank (FHLB) system is the financial model for the
proposed plan; defines the population from which the new self-insured
depositors would be drawn; sets the parameters and criteria for conversion
to self-insurance; calculates the amounts likely to be converted; and pro-
vides specifics on the benefits to be conveyed and the risks to be curtailed.

The Federal Credit-Flow Chain
To understand more fully the problems and limitations of FDIC insurance
and the ways that my plan would address them, consider first the two types
of federal credit-assistance—direct loans and loan guarantees. Both types
are evident in the program for student loans: the government can offer a
loan directly to a student, or it can guarantee a loan that another party (e.g.,
a bank) has made to the student. In terms of risk exposure, there is no
difference between the two, for if a given lending is structured half as direct
loan and half as loan guarantee and the student later defaults, the govern-
ment will lose equally on each half. The budgetary effects of these programs
are also similar: federal spending (outlays) and the deficit (or surplus)
increase by the amount of the net cost to the government (defined as the
present value of expected disbursements over the life of the loan less
the present value of expected collections) for both direct loans and loan
guarantees. But the impact on the national debt of the two programs is different. Under direct loans, the national debt would rise by both the net cost amount and the amount of U.S. Treasury borrowing that is necessary to finance the direct loan; whereas the debt would rise by the net cost figure only with guarantees. Furthermore, there is a cost disparity between funds that the government provides and funds that it merely guarantees. When the government borrows funds to provide for direct loans or other outlays, it does so by using the central financing mechanism of the U.S. Treasury; i.e., it raises funds in large amounts at a time, in highly liquid securities, and totally on a risk-free basis, thus ensuring that the needed funds are raised at the lowest cost possible. In contrast, when banking institutions raise funds to make guaranteed loans, they proceed by issuing types of debt obligations that vary in size, risk, and marketability. Often, raising the funds involves the use of branch offices. As a result, the cost of funds to institutions making guaranteed loans is significantly higher than the government’s cost of funds in making direct loans. For the borrower, this difference in cost of funds means lower costs under direct loans than under loan guarantees. To minimize the discrepancy, the government has instituted central financing mechanisms that copy the model of the Treasury for most loan-guarantee programs under its auspices. In the case of student loans, the central mechanism is the Student Loan Marketing Association (Sallie Mae). Through Sallie Mae, banks can raise funds for student loans almost as cheaply as if they borrowed the funds from the Treasury at cost.

Federal deposit insurance is a loan guarantee program.³ It guarantees that the money a depositor loans to the bank will be repaid by the insurance fund, up to the statutory limit, if the bank is unable to make payments. Deposit insurance therefore shares the traits of other loan guarantee programs: insured deposits do not count as outlays in the U.S. budget, nor are they included in the national debt; only the net disbursements to fund losses and purchase assets of failed banks are recorded as federal outlays and enter the national debt total. And in terms of risk exposure, the government assumes as much risk by insuring deposits (loans) to banks as it would have if it had made the loans directly to banks out of its own funds. However, unlike other loan guarantee programs, deposit insurance has not devised a central financing mechanism to enable banks to raise funds more economically.
How the current system of deposit insurance works is depicted in panel A, Figure 1. The government, via its agency, the FDIC, guarantees loans that savers (depositors) make to banks. Since government assumes all the default risk, the bank gets to borrow money at the risk-free interest rate. To compensate for the assumed risk, banks must pay assessment premiums sufficient to cover insurance losses and FDIC operating costs and to maintain the reserve fund at a mandated ratio. These are flat-rate premiums for all banks in a particular risk category, and may or may not match the underlying risk in a bank’s activities. This means that some banks are overpaying for deposit insurance whereas others are underpaying.

As noted above, a major flaw in this system is the moral-hazard problem. Moral hazard can emerge because the insured depositors lack a motive for monitoring the viability of their depositaries, or because some bankers who are already benefiting from underpriced assessment premiums may decide to further exploit the advantage by taking on even more risk. Either way, increased risk ultimately means more bank failures and greater losses for the insurer.

To minimize the moral-hazard occurrence and at the same time make bank funding more cost-efficient, I propose a plan that is outlined in panel B, Figure 1. This plan is not designed to replace the present system or to limit the FDIC in any way. The FDIC would continue to insure deposits (other than those of the proposed plan) up to the legal limit, and would retain its existing supervisory and regulatory authority and functions with respect to insured banks. In addition, the banks’ participation in the proposed system would be an option, not a requirement.

The difference between my plan and the current system is the placing of an intermediary in the credit-flow chain, with the initial lender (the saver) serving as lender to the intermediary and the intermediary serving as lender to (depositor in) the bank. The FDIC would guarantee the saver’s loan to the intermediary to the effect that if the intermediary could not repay its debt, the FDIC would repay it. This guarantee would enable the intermediary to borrow at risk-free interest rates. But the guarantee would also dictate that the intermediary’s deposit at the bank be statutorily defined outside the realm of FDIC insurance. This constraint means that the deposited funds would remain at the bank at the depositor’s own risk. I call these depositors “self-insured” (SI) depositors. To ensure that SI
**Figure 1** Current and Proposed Insurance Systems

**A. Current System**

1. FDIC guarantees (assumes default risk for) the saver’s loan to bank.
2. Saver lends to (deposits funds in) bank at the risk-free rate.
3. Bank pays the FDIC an assessment premium.

Shortcomings: Moral-hazard problems; small-deposit funding of banks.

**B. Proposed System of Self-Insured Depositors**

1. FDIC guarantees (assumes default risk for) the saver’s loan to SI depositor.
2. Saver lends to SI depositor at the risk-free rate.
3. SI depositor lends the bank the loan proceeds plus equity at own risk; charges bank own cost of funds plus a risk premium.

Advantages: Bank risk priced into bank’s cost of funds; incentives for depositor discipline; less risk of loss for the government.
depositors are able to meet the “own-risk” obligation, they would have to combine a certain amount of their own money with the money they borrowed, so that if the bank in which the package was deposited failed, it would be the depositor’s money that was used up first to absorb losses before loss spilled onto the guarantor of the borrowed portion. To remain viable, SI depositors would need to earn a return at least equal to their cost of borrowing plus a risk premium based on the risk profile of the bank.

An Example Comparing the Current and Proposed Plans

To see how this would work, suppose that you have $80,000 and I have $40,000. Under the present system, if we each deposited our money in an account at an FDIC-member bank, both accounts would be insured and both would be entitled to compensation at the risk-free interest rate plus a premium based on the size of the accounts, given that larger accounts embody greater economies of scale for the borrower. There is widespread evidence that larger accounts attract higher rates. Banks routinely present this information in their lobbies, in newspapers, or on the Internet. Table 1 is an example of interest rates paid on certificates of deposit (CDs), as advertised in a bank’s website on July 17, 2000.

On this basis and given the same time to maturity, assume that the bank will pay 4.10 percent on your account and 4.00 percent on mine. In the proposed plan, however, we would have the option of lending to each other under the same guarantee that we now have at the bank. That is, if you loaned me your $80,000 and I agreed to certain conditions, the FDIC would guarantee that it would repay your loan if I could not repay it. It follows that, since the guarantee would be the same, you would be willing to lend me the money for the same interest rate that you would lend money to the bank. The conditions to which I would have to agree would be (1) deposit the loan proceeds at an FDIC-member bank, and (2) do so at my own risk. To fulfill the second condition, I would be required to combine some of my own money with the loan proceeds and invest both parts in bank deposits. The FDIC would say how much of my money would be combined with the loan. If all $40,000 were needed, that would mean that I could finance a $120,000 deposit asset with one-third equity and two-thirds debt—a capital-to-assets ratio of 33.33 percent. Since SI accounts
would not be eligible for FDIC coverage, all of the $120,000 would be subject to loss in case of default. Thus, if the bank with the money failed and depositors were subjected to a loss of, say, 10 cents per dollar of deposit, I would lose $12,000, all of which would be taken from equity. (In contrast, if $120,000 was deposited under current FDIC rules, the depositor’s loss would be $2,000 and the FDIC’s loss would be $10,000.) If the loss was 33.3 cents per dollar, the entire capital would be wiped out, although enough would still remain in my account to pay off the loan. But if the loss exceeded 33.3 cents—if it was, say, 35 cents—what would be left in my account would not be enough to pay the loan, and the FDIC would be called upon to make good on its guarantee and cover the deficit between the loan value ($80,000) and what remained in the account ($78,000). Still, the $2,000 loss would be less than the $35,000 that the FDIC would have lost if the $120,000 account had been insured.

Why would I want to undertake the loan under these conditions? If I put your money and mine as a sum in a single account, the bank would pay more on that account than it would on separate accounts. Assume that the bank would pay 4.15 percent on the larger account. I would then be

### Table 1 Relationship Between Account Size and Interest Rates on Certificates of Deposit (in percent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CD Maturities</th>
<th>1,000– 9,999</th>
<th>10,000– 24,999</th>
<th>25,000– 49,999</th>
<th>50,000– 74,999</th>
<th>75,000– 99,999</th>
<th>100,000– 249,999</th>
<th>250,000– 499,999</th>
<th>500,000 or more</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3–6 months</td>
<td>5.45</td>
<td>5.50</td>
<td>5.55</td>
<td>5.60</td>
<td>5.65</td>
<td>5.70</td>
<td>5.75</td>
<td>5.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6–9 months</td>
<td>6.00</td>
<td>6.05</td>
<td>6.10</td>
<td>6.15</td>
<td>6.20</td>
<td>6.25</td>
<td>6.30</td>
<td>6.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9–12 months</td>
<td>6.05</td>
<td>6.10</td>
<td>6.15</td>
<td>6.20</td>
<td>6.25</td>
<td>6.30</td>
<td>6.35</td>
<td>6.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1–2 years</td>
<td>6.50</td>
<td>6.55</td>
<td>6.60</td>
<td>6.65</td>
<td>6.70</td>
<td>6.75</td>
<td>6.80</td>
<td>6.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2–3 years</td>
<td>6.50</td>
<td>6.55</td>
<td>6.60</td>
<td>6.65</td>
<td>6.70</td>
<td>6.75</td>
<td>6.80</td>
<td>6.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3–4 years</td>
<td>6.45</td>
<td>6.50</td>
<td>6.55</td>
<td>6.60</td>
<td>6.65</td>
<td>6.70</td>
<td>6.75</td>
<td>6.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4–5 years</td>
<td>6.40</td>
<td>6.45</td>
<td>6.50</td>
<td>6.55</td>
<td>6.60</td>
<td>6.65</td>
<td>6.70</td>
<td>6.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5–6 years</td>
<td>6.35</td>
<td>6.40</td>
<td>6.45</td>
<td>6.50</td>
<td>6.55</td>
<td>6.60</td>
<td>6.65</td>
<td>6.70</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: www.pffbank.com/rates/rates.html.*
able to increase my return both because I would earn more on my own money (4.15 percent instead of 4.00 percent) and because I would realize a positive spread between what I would pay you (4.10 percent) and what the bank would pay me (4.15 percent) on the money I had borrowed. Since I would be financing the deposit asset at the ratio of $2 of debt for each dollar of equity, the return to equity would be $1(0.0415) + 2(0.0415 − 0.0410) = 4.25 percent, or 25 basis points more than I would have made if I had invested just my money alone.

Of course, the additional return would have to be weighed against the loss that I would incur if the bank failed. How much of a loss could I assume and still justify the borrowing? The equation for such loss ($x$) is $1(0.0415 − x) + 2(0.0415 − 0.0410 − x) = 0.040$. In this case $x = 0.00083$. This means that if I thought the risk of failure with a loss to depositors of less than 8.3 cents per $100 of deposit was small (less than 50 percent), becoming an SI depositor would make sense; otherwise, I would be better off as an FDIC-insured depositor at a 4.00 percent rate.

Suppose now that you, with $80,000, are the SI depositor and I, with $40,000, am the lender. Under the 33.33 percent capital-to-assets ratio, the $80,000 of equity could support $160,000 of guaranteed borrowing for an SI deposit of $240,000. Assume that the bank paid 4.20 percent on this (larger) SI deposit. In borrowing the $160,000, you would have as one alternative the borrowing of $40,000 from me at a cost of 4.00 percent and the borrowing of $120,000 from another lender at a cost of 4.15 percent (thus bringing your average cost of borrowed funds to 4.11 percent). The return to equity then would be $1(0.0420) + 2(0.0420 − 0.0411) = 4.38 percent, or 28 basis points more than you would make as an insured depositor. The higher return would enable you to attain a higher break-even point between SI and insured deposits than was feasible in my case.

Solving the equation $1(0.0420 − x) + 2(0.0420 − 0.0411 − x) = 0.0410$ for $x$ produces a value of 0.00093, meaning that the bank could fail with a loss to uninsured creditors of up to 9.3 cents per $100 of deposit (compared with 8.3 cents in my case) and you would realize the same net return you would have as an insured depositor. Since the likelihood of the bank failing with a 9.3 cents loss is more remote than it failing with an 8.3 cents loss, you would be more apt to invest on a self-insured basis than I would.
Consider now that after borrowing my $40,000 at a cost of 4.00 percent, you borrowed the rest in separate $40,000 blocks from three other lenders like me at the same cost. The return to equity would now be $1(0.0420) + 2(0.0420 – 0.0400) = 4.60 percent, or 22 basis points higher than if you had borrowed the $120,000 in a lump sum. The higher return would raise the break-even point for SI deposits. Solving the equation $1(0.0420 – x) + 2(0.0420 – 0.0400 – x) = 0.0410 gives a value for x of 0.00167. You could now justify investing in SI funds even if you assumed a possibility of failure with a loss to depositors of up to 16.7 cents per $100 of deposit.¹

The Federal Home Loan Bank as a Financial Model

As discussed above, each SI depositor would be borrowing separately in order to raise the needed funds. In terms of earnings, smaller depositors would be at a disadvantage to larger depositors because of the economies-of-scale limitation. Another limitation that would be incurred under individual borrowing is that each SI account could remain self-insured only up to its capital, leaving the FDIC (as the guarantor of the SI depositors’ lenders) responsible for losses in excess of that capital.

These problems could be overcome if each depositor borrowed the funds through a central financing facility rather than borrowing the funds by themselves. Such a “Self-Insured Depositors’ Financing Office” (SIDFO) would issue securities in amounts to meet the needs of all SI depositors (see panel A, Figure 2).

The FDIC would guarantee the lenders (the buyers of the securities) to SIDFO against default, and this guarantee would enable SIDFO to raise its funds at risk-free rates. The funds raised would serve as loans to SI depositors after they post the required capital. The SI depositors would use the proceeds (together with their capital) to buy CDs. The CDs could be in maturities as needed by the banks. (As an example of how a bank might seek to structure its borrowings, see Table 1.) This would tend to minimize SIDFO’s interest-rate risk. SIDFO’s lending rate to SI depositors would be based on three factors: SIDFO’s own cost of borrowing, the expenses of operating SIDFO, and the costs during failures when the loss exceeded the SI depositors’ equity. The third factor would render SI accounts wholly self-insured.³ The SI depositors’
Figure 2 Comparison between Proposed Insurance System and the Federal Home Loan Bank System

A. Proposed System

1. FDIC guarantees (assumes default risk for) the saver’s loan to SIDFO.
2. Saver lends to (i.e., buys securities of) SIDFO at the risk-free rate.
3. SIDFO lends to SI depositor at cost (risk-free rate) plus own operating expenses and excess loss from insolvent SI depositors.
4. SI depositor lends to bank at own risk; charges bank own cost of funds plus a risk premium.

Additional advantages: Better system implementation; maximized funding efficiency (economies of scale) on both borrowing and lending sides; virtually no risk of loss for the government.

B. Federal Home Loan Bank (FHLB) System

1. Government implicitly guarantees the saver’s loan to OF.
2. Saver lends to (i.e., buys securities of) OF at near risk-free rate.
3. OF lends (transfers funds) to Federal Home Loan Bank at cost (near risk-free rate).
4. FHLB makes secured (collateralized) loans to thrifts or banks; charges thrift or bank own cost of funds plus own operating costs, OF costs, and costs for FHLB regulator.

Disadvantages relative to SI system: No incentive for market discipline; risk premium not included in bank’s or thrift’s cost of funds; failure losses shifted to government (FDIC); more government infrastructure and regulation; higher cost of funds for thriffs and banks.
lending rate to a bank would include their cost of funds plus a perceived risk premium.

The FDIC-sponsored SI-depositor system would parallel the financial model of the Federal Home Loan Banks (FHLBs). Panel B, Figure 2 is a chart of the FHLB system. In that system, the guarantee is effectuated through the government-sponsored enterprise status of FHLBs, which allows them a $4.5 billion line of credit from the U.S. Treasury. The FHLB equivalent of SIDFO is the Office of Finance (OF). The OF sells (through a network of underwriters and discount dealers) and services consolidated obligations (bonds and discount notes) to fund the operations of all 12 FHLBs. The bonds and notes are the joint-and-several liabilities of all FHLBs: if any particular FHLB becomes insolvent, the remaining FHLBs have to pick up the insolvent bank’s obligations. This feature is similar to that in the SI system whereby future SI depositors would absorb the loss from an insolvent SI depositor. The counterparts of SI depositors are the FHLBs.

Why, then, set up a new system when we have a similar one already in place? There are three reasons. First, although SI depositors and FHLBs would both hold loan assets of similar default risk, only the former could realize loss in a failure. FHLB loans (called advances) are collateralized—indeed, over-collateralized—with the high quality of member assets, so that when a bank or thrift fails, no loss incurs on the advances. The loss is shifted instead to the member’s deposit insurer. Hence, with no risk on loans, the FHLBs have no reason to conduct due diligence. Second, in pricing the advances to members, the FHLBs include the cost of borrowing through the OF and add their own operating costs to it, as well as the costs of the OF and those of their regulator (the Federal Housing Finance Board). But the intrinsic risk of the member—the all-important factor in the moral-hazard issue—is not included in the price; indeed, at any given time all members are charged the same rate by their FHLBs. Finally, since the prospective SI depositors would already exist (see below), there would be no need to create new entities and to pass on the costs of operating and regulating them to banks.
The Population of Self-Insured Depositors

Where would the SI depositors come from? Currently the usual sources of funds to banks, thrifts, and other financial intermediaries are CDs, checking accounts, and savings deposits. These sources are often referred to as retail sources because the funds come directly from individuals, often in small amounts through branch networks. In contrast, wholesale sources—federal funds, jumbo CDs, brokered deposits, and FHLB advances—are raised in large amounts, mainly from other financial institutions. Where, in this environment, would the SI CDs fit?

Because of their leveraged position, SI CDs would not be suitable for the small savers. A household, for example, would not likely convert the family savings into an SI CD when, as suggested in note 5, a 10-percent failure loss would wipe out the entire savings. Instead, the institutions now handling large funds would be the parties most apt to invest in SI CDs. This group includes banks, thrifts, insurance companies, credit unions, and various types of stock and money market mutual funds. Such institutions are already involved in intermediation, borrowing in the financial markets and lending in the same markets after first setting aside a portion of the borrowed funds as capital. This process allows them to leverage up their capital and capture interest-rate spreads between borrowing and lending rates. As SI depositors, these institutions would likewise be leveraging their capital for the sake of rate spreads and would be taking the same risks as all intermediaries. For example, if an intermediary and an SI depositor both invested the same amount of money (under the same leverage ratio) in an uninsured debt of a certain bank that later failed, both would stand to lose an equal amount of capital. The point is that by becoming an SI depositor, an intermediary would neither be entering a new business nor taking a risk to which it was not accustomed.

What benefits would these intermediaries secure as SI depositors that were not available to them already? The answer would be the option of raising funds at rates equal to SIDFO’s cost of borrowing. No intermediary would be able to raise market funds as economically as SIDFO unless the intermediary was able to back its borrowings 100 percent with capital and to issue debt in quantities as large as those for SIDFO. The FDIC’s guarantee to SIDFO’s lenders would negate the need for a 100-percent
capital constraint, making it possible for SIDFO to borrow at government-equivalent credit ratings. SIDFO would likely pass the quantity test because it would be raising funds for all SI intermediaries. Consequently, by becoming SI depositors with the ability to raise funds from SIDFO at cost, the intermediaries could earn wider interest-rate spreads on their investments than they would as regular intermediaries raising funds under their own names.

Moreover, funds raised through SIDFO would likely be raised in larger blocks than funds borrowed under an intermediary’s own name. Consider, for example, an intermediary that currently acquired a $1 million bank CD but used 10 separate accounts of $100,000 each to finance it. As an SI depositor (given a 10-percent capital constraint), the intermediary could fund the purchase by combining just one of these accounts with $900,000 of borrowing from SIDFO, thus eliminating nine of its accounts along with their associated service costs. This line of reasoning applies equally to banks: a bank now funding a $1 million loan through 10 separate deposit accounts could eliminate most or all of these accounts by just borrowing a big lump sum from a single SI depositor. Raising SI funds in the desired amount could follow the pattern used by the FHLB system. A bank could approach an SI intermediary for the desired amount of borrowing, and when the price was agreed upon, the intermediary would turn to SIDFO to finance the transaction. This process would not differ much from the way banks now raise advances from their FHLB (except that, in the case of SI funds, a bank could bargain with lenders all over the country instead of with just one district lender that charges the same regardless of borrower creditworthiness).

**Parameters and Criteria for Conversion to Self-Insurance**

To find out why and when banks and investors would find it advantageous to switch their status as depositors from FDIC-insured to self-insured, one must stipulate certain parameters (“why?”) and recognize certain criteria (“when?”). The parameters for “why” would consist of the capital ratios on SI accounts, the SIDFO lending rate, and the bank-failure risk to SI depositors. The criteria for “when” would be the SIDFO lending rate and the relationship between that rate and the rates paid on existing accounts.
Parameters for “Why?”

As noted above, the three parameters that would establish why a switch to SI status would be advantageous are capital requirement, the SIDFO lending rate, and the spread between that rate and the rates on existing accounts. For capital requirement, I assume a ratio of 10 percent, which is equivalent to the current requirement by the regulators for well-capitalized banks. This ratio means that a depositor could borrow $9 of funds from SIDFO for each $1 of equity. The SIDFO lending rate would be based on the borrowing experience of the OF in the FHLB system. In 1998 the interest cost on $329.4 billion of average balances of FHLB-consolidated obligations was 5.53 percent. After considering that SIDFO would likely be able to borrow somewhat cheaper than OF because the guarantee of SIDFO securities would be explicit (in contrast to the implicit guarantee of the OF obligations), and after including 2 basis points for the costs of operating SIDFO (based on the OF experience), the stipulated SIDFO lending rate is 5.50 percent. But since SI depositors would be uninsured, they would need to adjust their returns for the risk of failure by the bank. This risk would vary from bank to bank, but for all banks it is assumed to be equal to the ratio of the FDIC’s provision for losses to insured deposits. This ratio was 0.02 percent in 1998.7

For illustration, consider a bank in which depositors currently earn 5.60 percent on CDs. After risk and taxes, these depositors should be at earnings parity not only with depositors in other banks but also with investors in other instruments, such as commercial paper, Treasury and government-sponsored enterprises (GSE) issues, and tax-exempt issues—otherwise they would not be where they are. Likewise for investors in the other instruments: they, too, could transfer to banks if they felt they could earn more there.

Suppose that one of these depositors switched to SI status. The depositor would then earn the CD rate of 5.60 percent on the $1 of equity and, on each of the $9 of borrowing from SIDFO, would benefit from the 10-basis point spread between the CD rate and SIDFO’s lending rate of 5.50 percent. But the SI depositor would need to deduct for the cost of possible failure by the bank. Suppose that in this case the perceived cost was the same as the industry average of 2 basis points. Thus, the return (SIr) for the SI depositor would be SIr = 1(0.0560 – 0.0002) + 9(0.0560 – 0.0550 –
0.0002) = 6.38 percent. The depositor would now be netting 78 basis points more than previously.

Would the SI depositor be able to keep that 78-basis point benefit? Most likely not. The accrued extra return would place the depositor out of equilibrium with other (non-SI) depositors in the same bank, with depositors in other banks, and with depositors and investors outside the banks. These non-SI depositors would quickly realize that they, too, could increase returns by securing positions as SI depositors. However, a bank has only a finite need for borrowed funds, and SI accounts could be established only with banks. The non-SI depositors, as they competed with each other to secure a portion of the more profitable SI deposits, could succeed only in raising prices on SI issues and driving down their interest rates. Rates would keep going down until equilibrium was reached between SI and non-SI investors. This point would occur when the interest rate paid by the bank gave the SI depositor, on a net-of-risk basis, the same return as before the depositor’s conversion to SI status. That interest rate would be 5.53 percent. With such a rate the depositor would effectively earn a net return of \((0.053 - 0.0002) + 9 (0.053 - 0.0550 - 0.0002) = 5.60\) percent. This would reposition the SI depositor to earnings parity with non-SI depositors, while saving the bank 7 basis points \((0.0560 - 0.0553)\) from what it was paying earlier.

The underlying premise of these conclusions is that the SI depositors would not have the power to secure more than competitive returns. There are three reasons: (1) SI funds would constitute only a small portion of the aggregate market for funds—a market that would include not only other types of bank funds but also private, government, and municipal issues; (2) the SI funds would not be an addition to, but a replacement for, bank funds (there is no reason to expect that access to SI deposits would cause banks to expand their assets); and (3) the demand for SI funds could derive only from banks, whereas there would be no limit as to the parties that could supply such funds. In other words, the demand for SI funds would be limited and the supply unlimited, giving banks a high degree of monopsony power and the ability to capture all of the surplus value created from the conversion of existing deposits to SI deposits.
Criteria for “When?”

The criteria for determining when depositors would switch to SI deposits would be the SIDFO lending rate and where that rate stood relative to rates paid on existing accounts. Depositors would not be interested in SI CDs unless the rates earned on their current accounts were higher than the SIDFO lending rate. With the rates higher, it would pay to switch to SI CDs because the depositors would be earning positive spreads from the rates paid for SIDFO borrowings and the rates received on SI CDs from banks. By the same token, no bank would want to exchange any of its existing accounts on which it was paying interest below the SIDFO lending rate for SI accounts requiring interest above that rate. For both depositors and banks therefore only accounts currently carrying interest above the SIDFO lending rate would have possibility for conversion to SI deposits.

The Deposit Amounts Likely to Convert

What amount of money are we talking about? Given the parameters and criteria set forth above, roughly how much money in bank deposits would be likely to become self-insured instead of FDIC-insured?

To estimate the funds that would convert to SI deposits, data are needed on accounts within each bank now paying more than the SIDFO lending rate of 5.50 percent. However, interest-rate data on an individual-account basis are not available. We use, instead, the average interest-expense ratio on deposit accounts for the bank as a whole. The interest-expense ratio is defined as annual interest expenses on deposits divided by average quarter-end deposit balances for the year. Banks with interest-expense ratios above 5.50 percent would find it profitable to convert to SI CDs.

Call Report data were used to compute interest-expense ratios for time and savings deposits for all banks in 1998. It turned out that numerous banks had expense ratios above 5.50 percent, but only on time deposits. On savings deposits, no banks had ratios above 5.50 percent. Thus, we can infer that all SI funds would come from time deposits. As shown in Table 2, there are two types of time deposits: deposits in accounts of $100,000 or more and deposits in accounts of less than $100,000. For time deposits of $100,000 or more, there are 4,535 banks that had expense ratios above 5.50 percent with issues of $213.1 billion in CDs. This amount would convert
to SI CDs and would lose the partial FDIC coverage of $100,000 per account. For deposit accounts under $100,000, the 4,597 banks with ratios above 5.50 percent contain funds amounting to $320.3 billion, all under FDIC coverage. These funds would also convert to SI status and would lose their FDIC protection. Accordingly, the sum of funds in SI accounts in the banking system would likely come to $533.4 billion; all subject to risk at the account-owners’ expense.

For CDs both above and below $100,000, the total converted to SI status would be $533.4 billion, consisting of $53.3 billion of depositor equity and $480.1 billion of borrowing from SIDFO. It should be noted that banks switching to SI CDs would be smaller on average than banks not switching, suggesting that most SI deposits and their benefits would be captured by smaller banks.

**Benefits Conveyed and Risks Curtailed**

As shown in Table 2, the cost to banks with CDs less than $100,000 and expense ratios above 5.50 percent (banks that would be slated to convert to

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**Table 2 Amounts of Time Deposits Converted to SI Deposits and Associated Interest Costs, 1998 (in millions of dollars)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Deposit Amounts</th>
<th>Interest Expenses</th>
<th>Average Interest Cost (in percent)</th>
<th>Number of Banks</th>
<th>Assets per Bank</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Banks with Expense Ratios above 5.50%</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current Time Deposits of $100,000 or More</td>
<td>213,147</td>
<td>12,552</td>
<td>5.90</td>
<td>4,535</td>
<td>597</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>As Converted to SI Deposits</td>
<td>213,147</td>
<td>11,851</td>
<td>5.56</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current Time Deposits under $100,000</td>
<td>320,286</td>
<td>18,720</td>
<td>5.84</td>
<td>4,597</td>
<td>388</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>As Converted to SI Deposits</td>
<td>320,286</td>
<td>17,789</td>
<td>5.55</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtotal</td>
<td>533,433</td>
<td>31,272</td>
<td>5.87</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>As Converted to SI Deposits</td>
<td>533,433</td>
<td>29,643</td>
<td>5.56</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Banks with Expense Ratios below 5.50%</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current Time Deposits of $100,000 or More</td>
<td>183,198</td>
<td>8,023</td>
<td>4.38</td>
<td>4,132</td>
<td>653</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current Time Deposits under $100,000</td>
<td>439,052</td>
<td>22,513</td>
<td>5.13</td>
<td>4,109</td>
<td>881</td>
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<tr>
<td>Subtotal</td>
<td>622,250</td>
<td>30,536</td>
<td>4.91</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation*
SI deposits) is $18.7 billion in interest costs in order to maintain $320.3 billion worth of CDs—a rate of interest of 5.84 percent. How much would the banks need to pay their depositors to induce them to switch to SI CDs? If (again) the SI depositors could secure only competitive returns, the answer is 5.554 percent. At that rate, the SI depositors would earn 
\[
(0.055554 - 0.0002) + 9(0.05554 - 0.0550 - 0.0002) = 5.84 \text{ percent},
\]
bringing them on par with the rate earned before they switched to SI CDs and the rates currently earned by other (non-SI) investors. The banks, however, would have saved 28.6 basis points (0.0584 – 0.05554) as a result of the SI switch. Likewise, it was determined that the interest cost would decline from 5.90 percent to 5.56 percent for banks with CDs above $100,000 after the shift to SI CDs. Combining the banking groups (those with CDs below $100,000 and those with CDs above $100,000) results in a rate decline from 5.87 to 5.557 percent. The cost for $533.4 billion of SI CDs would fall from $31.3 to $29.6 billion with the lower rate, thus improving the banks’ net interest margin by 31 basis points and raising their return to equity by 3.6 percentage points (given their 8.5 percent capital ratio in 1998). In addition, banks would save conversion by meeting their funding needs with fewer SI accounts and by not paying assessments to FDIC on SI deposits. And the SI intermediaries would benefit by being able to borrow money from SIDFO in larger amounts and at a lower cost.

Of the $533.4 billion in SI CDs, $391 billion would have been insured (i.e., $320 billion of SI CDs switched from accounts below $100,000 plus an estimated one-third of $213 billion of SI CDs from accounts above $100,000). The FDIC would shed liability for the $391 billion of insured bank debt (deposits) and assume liability for $480.1 billion of SIDFO debt.

Yet shifting guarantees from bank debt to SIDFO debt would dramatically decrease the FDIC’s odds of incurring loss from bank failure. First, the SI depositors’ pricing of bank risk into the cost of funds would prompt banks to lower their risk profile—for example, by improving the credit quality of assets or taking fewer interest-rate risks. A lower risk profile would mean fewer bank failures, hence smaller losses for the FDIC.

Moreover, the SI plan would further distance the FDIC from failure loss by imposing additional barriers before losses could occur. At present the FDIC can incur losses when banks default. Under my plan, however, not only a bank must default, but also the SI depositors must become insolvent, and
SIDFO must experience a loss and become defunct before the FDIC suffers a loss. A bank becomes insolvent when its capital reaches zero. SI depositors, on the other hand, would not default until the bank’s capital is negative and equivalent to the SI depositors’ capital requirement (10 percent in this case). For SIDFO to incur a loss, the bank’s capital must be negative by more than 10 percent. (Note that under FDICIA, regulators could close failing banks with positive capital ratios.)

With respect to how SIDFO could become defunct and how the FDIC could incur a loss, consider a scenario in which SIDFO sustains heavy losses year after year so that it is required to increase its lending rate in order to recoup its losses. Since SIDFO would be a monopolist, it would face the entire demand curve for SI lending (Figure 3). As the lending rate moves from $P_1$ to $P_2$ along the price axis in order to recover the SIDFO...
losses, some SI depositors along the downward-sloping demand curve would be compelled to drop out of the system (from Q₁ to Q₂). Other depositors would remain in the system until the lending rate rises again before dropping out (from Q₂ to Q₃). As the SIDFO losses continue to mount, the lending rate would climb to the point where the demand curve touches the price line (P₄). At this point all SI depositors would drop out of the system and SIDFO would become defunct. The FDIC would be liable for all losses sustained by SIDFO during the last year of its life.

**Summary and Conclusions**

Deposit insurance renders deposits at different banks equally attractive and perfectly secure. This effect can lead to unjustified risk taking by banks because raising funds for riskier, higher-yielding assets costs no more than raising funds for less risky, lower-yielding assets. One way to limit this problem is to rely on uninsured depositors to price bank risk into banks’ cost of funds.

This brief offers a plan to increase the amount of uninsured deposits. At present there is one government-guaranteed lender (depositor), one recipient of guaranteed credit (bank), and one level of risk capital (bank’s equity) protecting the guarantor (FDIC). In the plan offered here, the recipient of the guaranteed credit would still be the bank. However, no loan guarantee would be given to depositors with a bank. Instead, the guarantee would apply to investors who bought the securities of a central financing office (SIDFO) that made equity-secured loans to financial intermediaries (SI depositors). The intermediaries would then invest the proceeds in uninsured bank deposits. Under these terms, the government would get more protection against loss (SI depositors’ capital) and the SI depositors would have to monitor their banks aptly and demand premi-ums based on risk to avoid loss and earn a competitive return.

Significantly, unlike other proposals (e.g., subordinated notes), this plan does not mandate that banks issue and assume any specified amount of SI-deposit liabilities. A bank would issue SI CDs only if the cost would be less than raising funds from other sources. My analysis indicates that only the larger time deposits paying interest above the SIDFO lending rate would meet the criteria for switching to SI deposits. Savings and similar
retail deposits would not qualify because banks could secure such funds at a cost below the SIDFO rate. I estimate that some $533 billion of time deposits would convert to SI CDs—about 10 percent of all the funds in the banking system in 1998. The interest cost on the SI CDs would be less than the cost of the funds that would exchange into SI CDs. The reason for the lower cost would be, basically, the centralized SIDFO financing arrangement. The large-scale, FDIC-guaranteed borrowing of SIDFO would effectively ensure that banks could raise SI funds at a price close to funds raised under the more cost-efficient, direct-loan method.

Another aspect of the plan relates to insured-deposit funding and undue risks for deposit insurers. Some proposals (generally referred to as narrow-bank proposals) limit an insurer’s risk by regulating which banks can insure deposits and what use is made of the deposits. From this perspective, SIDFO may be seen as a huge narrow bank: it would take in insured deposits and would deliver them to banks via the SI middleman without raising concerns for insurers about failure risks and moral hazard. Such risks and worries would become the exclusive possession of SI depositors. Unlike other narrow-bank designs, SIDFO would not impose any limitations on where the banks could invest the borrowed SI funds. Again, SI depositors would apply any constraints through their risk premiums.

Acknowledgment

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Notes

2. To learn more about FDICIA and its effects, see Lemieux (1993) and Benston and Kaufman (1997).
4. These examples also demonstrate how pricing according to risk would be arrived at.
5. For example, under a 10 percent capital ratio, an SI depositor would lose 100 percent of posted capital if the bank failed and depositors lost 10 cents on the dollar. If the loss exceeded 10 cents on the dollar, the excess would fall on future SI depositors through the higher SIDFO rate, instead of the FDIC rate.
7. For this assumption to be meaningful in determining the switch between SI and non-SI depositors, we must also stipulate that, in terms of depositor preference, SI depositors would be equally senior to non-SI depositors. Junior status would transfer the risk away from non-SI depositors, rendering the failure risk ratio assumed above pointless.
8. Although a bank would be considered to have switched all accounts to SI status, its average expense ratio of 5.50 percent may well incorporate as many accounts earning more than 5.50 percent that merit a switch to SI status as accounts earning less than 5.50 percent that do not merit a switch. As noted in the text, it may be more precise to estimate the likelihood of switching on the basis of individual accounts but such data do not exist. I therefore adopt the average-expense method, under the assumption that the accounts with average ratios below 5.50 percent that are wrongly assumed to switch to SI CDs would likely be offset by the accounts with average ratios above 5.50 percent that are assumed not to switch.
9. The author notes that his conclusions do not necessarily reflect the views of the FDIC.
References


Panos Konstas retired as a senior economist from the FDIC in 2005 after 34 years of service. He also worked as an economist at the U.S. Treasury Department and the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, and taught economics at two universities. His research and publications include topics in money and capital markets, monetary economics, government-sponsored credit programs, banking industry issues, and deposit insurance reform and regulation. He received B.A. and M.A. degrees in economics from Michigan State University and a Ph.D. in economics from Oklahoma State University.
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