In his State of the Union address President Obama acknowledged the plight of unemployed Americans and promised to make jobs the number one focus in 2010. A move toward full employment, he said, would lay a new foundation for long-term economic growth and ensure that the U.S. government creates the necessary conditions for businesses to expand and hire more workers.

Past efforts by the Obama administration to save jobs have included stabilizing the financial system, tax cuts for small businesses and working families, and the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act. In spite of these efforts, however, one in 10 Americans still cannot find work, and seven million jobs have been lost over the last two years.

According to Research Scholars Rania Antonopoulos, Kijong Kim, and Thomas Masterson, and Senior Scholar Ajit Zacharias, the government needs to identify useful projects that have the potential for massive public job creation, and to select investments that maximize job creation both immediately and equitably. In this brief, they conclude that social sector investment, such as early childhood education and home-based care, generates more than twice the number of jobs as infrastructure
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spending and almost 1.5 times the number of jobs as investing in green energy (Figure 1). In addition, it is relatively more effective in providing jobs to people with the least education. Thus, the social and psychological impacts of social care investment are beneficial for both the recipients and their communities.

Using input-output analysis and a microsimulation model, the authors find that the relatively high labor intensity of investing in the social sector is particularly beneficial for women (new jobs are concentrated in teaching, child care, and home health care), low-income households, and people with limited education. The social sector also creates more absolute jobs requiring some college education and geared toward the middle and top income groups (Figure 2).

The authors note that the government has focused on rescuing Wall Street and the banks—the main beneficiaries during times of economic prosperity—rather than low-income households, who continue to lose their homes and their jobs. While Obama’s proposals are part of the solution to mitigating double-digit unemployment, he seems to have overlooked the relative job creation effects of comparable investments in various sectors of the U.S. economy. The authors therefore recommend a second stimulus package, one aimed at state and local governments that currently lack the resources to deliver increased levels of social care.

For the complete text, go to www.levy.org/pubs/ppb_108.pdf.

New Strategic Analysis

Getting Out of the Recession?

GENNARO ZEZZA
March 2010

Research Scholar Gennaro Zezza updates the Levy Institute’s previous Strategic Analysis (December 2009) and finds that the 2009 increase in public sector aggregate demand was a result of the fiscal stimulus, without which the recession would have
been much deeper. He confirms that strong policy action is required to achieve full employment in the medium term, including a persistently high government deficit in the short term. This implies a growing public debt, which is sustainable as long as interest rates are kept at the current low level. The alternative is an ongoing unemployment rate above 10 percent that would represent a higher cost to future generations.

The author’s approach to the dynamics of real GDP is based on analyzing the components of demand, such as consumption, which needs to be financed by disposable income or borrowing; and net exports, which depend on the dollar exchange rate.

Zezza develops a baseline scenario (Figure 1) using the latest projections by the International Monetary Fund for real GDP growth in major U.S. trade partners and by the Congressional Budget Office for government revenues and outlays under current policies. Insufficient growth in all components of aggregate demand imply that unemployment will hover around 10 percent, while output slowly recovers to a growth rate of 2.5 percent and the federal deficit declines to 5 percent by 2015. Government debt, however, will rise by 30 percent of GDP, since the deficit remains large relative to the GDP growth rate. This baseline scenario is unrealistic, says Zezza, because the projected path for fiscal policy under current legislation underestimates government deficits.

Using more plausible assumptions about fiscal policy, Zezza derives an alternative scenario that assumes permanent tax cuts and a larger increase in government outlays related to both expenditures and transfers to the private sector. As shown in Figure 2, the unemployment rate declines to 7 percent, output grows at least 3 percent after 2011, and the government deficit remains high relative to GDP, with public debt growing by 101 percent by 2015. Monetary policy is assumed to keep interest rates at a very low level, and the recovery in output, driven by public expenditure and transfers, results in the current account balance stabilizing at 4 percent of GDP.

The alternative scenario, where the growth in output comes from increasing public debt, is preferred to the baseline scenario, where unemployment is persistent. An expansionary fiscal policy will sustain output and employment, but it will also cause the external balance to deteriorate. And since this scenario perpetuates international imbalances, a different growth strategy is needed.

For the complete text, go to www.levy.org/pubs/sa_mar_10.pdf.
No Going Back: Why We Cannot Resolve Glass-Steagall’s Segregation of Banking and Finance

JAN KREGEL
Public Policy Brief No. 107

The U.S. Congress passed the Banking Act of 1933 (aka Glass-Steagall) to correct the abuses of the national banking system that stemmed from the involvement of commercial banks in securities underwriting, which allegedly contributed to the Great Depression by fueling rampant speculation. The purpose of the Act was to prevent the exposure of commercial banks to the risks of investment banking and to ensure stability of the financial system. One proposed solution to the current financial crisis is a return to the basic tenets of this New Deal legislation.

Senior Scholar Jan Kregel provides an in-depth account of the Banking Act, including the premises leading up to its adoption, its influence on the design of the financial system, and the subsequent collapse of the Act’s restrictions on securities trading (deregulation). He concludes that a return to the Act’s simple structure and strict segregation between (regulated) commercial and (unregulated) investment banking is unwarranted.

In essence, the Act provided the unregulated investment banks with a monopoly over securities market activities. Moreover, both commercial and investment banks provide liquidity: the former by creating deposits and the latter by structuring the liabilities issued by borrowers. Thus, investment banks were functionally equivalent to the deposit- and liquidity-creation business of regulated banks but with fewer restrictions and lower costs. The regulated banks sought to compete in the marketplace by expanding their lending into longer maturities. Regulators such as the Securities and Exchange Commission allowed these banks to operate affiliates that were neither regulated nor consolidated for financial reporting purposes, including the ability to engage in (high-risk) activities such as credit derivatives. When the liquidity crisis occurred in 2008, the safety net that was created to respond to a run on bank deposits was totally inadequate to a capital market liquidity crisis.

Kregel observes that an alternative source of revenue has to be found for the regulated banks, and that regulators, legislators, and the judiciary have to agree on permissible banking activities. One approach is to recognize deposit taking as a public service and to regulate it as a public utility. Another approach is a national giro payments system that would eliminate the need for deposit insurance and the lender-of-last-resort function of the Federal Reserve.

In spite of his proposed solutions, Kregel acknowledges that the conundrum of prohibiting regulated banks from engaging in the least costly method of short-term business financing, combined with the impossibility of legislating monopoly deposit protections similar to those in the 1933 Act without prohibiting competitive innovations by nonregulated institutions, remains unresolved.

For the complete text, go to www.levy.org/pubs/ppb_107.pdf.

The Trouble with Pensions: Toward an Alternative Public Policy to Support Retirement

YEVA NERSISYAN and L. RANDALL WRAY
Public Policy Brief No. 109

Pension funds have taken a big hit during the current financial crisis, with losses in the trillions of dollars. In addition, both private and public pensions are experiencing significant funding shortfalls, as is the U.S. government’s Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, which insures the defined-benefit pension plans of private companies.

Retirees suffer not only because of underfunding but also as a result of the transition from defined-benefit to defined-contribution plans and the decline in the proportion of the workforce covered by pension plans. With little or no control over their pensions, workers must now assume almost the entire burden of saving for retirement.

Yevas Nersisyan and Senior Scholar L. Randall Wray argue that the employment-based pension system is highly problematic, since the strategy for managing pension funds leads to excessive cost and risk in an effort to achieve above-average returns. The average fund manager, however, will only achieve the risk-free return. The authors therefore advocate expanding Social Security and encouraging private and public pensions to invest only in safe (risk-free) Treasury bonds, which, on average, will beat the net returns on risky assets. According to the authors, the best solution is to eliminate government support for pension plans and private savings, and to ensure that anyone who
qualifies for Social Security will be rewarded with a comfortable retirement. And since Social Security is a federal government program, it cannot become insolvent.

Nersisyan and Wray point out that pension funds are part of what Hyman P. Minsky called “managed money,” and that these funds are large enough to destabilize asset prices (e.g., the boom and bust in the commodities markets) and any financial market they are allowed to enter. When the risky positions in assets ultimately collapsed, managed money tried to innovate and speculate on new kinds of assets in order to restore funding levels. Workers were left with fees that have drained their pension funds, and with massive counterparty risk. The financial firms thus ensure that pension funds will, on average, net less than a risk-free return.

The financial industry can be justified only if pension fund management can beat the average risk-free return on Treasuries (including industry compensations), but this standard cannot be met, say the authors. Therefore, workers would be better off if they and their employers were required to return to a portfolio of safer, longer-maturity assets such as Treasuries, which are automatically backed by the U.S. government. This approach would require a very small management staff, and would negate the use of fund managers and Wall Street sales staff.

For the complete text, go to www.levy.org/pubs/ppb_109.pdf.

Toward True Health Care Reform: More Care, Less Insurance

Marshall Auerback and L. Randall Wray
Public Policy Brief No. 110

The United States has the most expensive health care system in the world, yet its system produces inferior outcomes relative to those in other countries. Moreover, it is the only country with a high per capita income that lacks universal health care coverage. Less than two-thirds of U.S. workers under age 65 have health insurance, while coverage varies greatly according to socioeconomic status.

Marshall Auerback and Senior Scholar L. Randall Wray examine the U.S. health care reform debate and argue that the fundamental structure of the health care system is unlikely to change. Both the House and Senate versions of the current health care bill entrench the centrality of private health insurance companies and contain no serious proposals to limit costs. “Reform” measures actually promote the status quo by pulling more people into an expensive health care system that is managed and funded by insurers. Since two-thirds of household bankruptcies are due to health care costs, forcing people to turn over an even larger portion of their income to an insurance company will further erode household finances and exacerbate the problem. Moreover, health care remains a function of employment, which preserves a significant cost disadvantage for U.S. corporations and is particularly unappealing during periods of double-digit unemployment.

Insurance prescreening and “denial management” costs are estimated to represent approximately 2 percent of GDP, while administrative overhead and profits represent almost one-third of health spending. And as health care costs have soared, legislators have backed off from enforcing mandates or financing new coverage for the poor. Since it is in the public interest to ensure that the entire population receives preventative and routine care, these services should not be subject to denial of coverage by the insurance companies.

According to the authors, the fundamental problem facing the U.S. health care system is the unhealthy lifestyle of many Americans. They would prefer to see a reduced role for private insurers and an increased role for government funding, along with greater public discussion of environmental and lifestyle factors. Minimal competition between private insurers means that premiums based on behavior modification that reduces health risk have not been adjusted downward. A campaign to promote healthy lifestyles would do more to improve outcomes and reduce costs than any of the proposed health care reforms.

Ideally, say the authors, insurance premiums should be linked to individual risk, since 80 percent of health care costs are attributed to 20 percent of patients; taxing current insurance holders and cutting Medicare to extend insurance to the uninsured should not be features of legislative reform. They point out that Medicare is not really an insurance program but rather a universal-payer, pay-as-you-go system (there is no way to stockpile medical services for future use). A Medicare buy-in (“public option”) for people under 65—a feature that remains doable despite today’s political constraints—would provide more cost control (by competing with private insurance), help to solve the problem of denying treatment based on preexisting conditions, expand the risk pool of patients, and enhance the
Observations on the Problem of “Too Big to Fail/Save/Resolve”

JAN KREGEL
Policy Note 2009/11

Senior Scholar Jan Kregel identifies a number of problems associated with bank size, such as market concentration, interconnectedness, and global competitiveness. Moreover, he notes that there is an inherent conflict of interest associated with multifunctional banking that produces fraudulent, anticompetitive behavior. Multifunctional banking is the leading source of financial crisis, while large size contributes to contagion and systemic risk. Thus, the current thrust of government regulatory reform is inadequate, resolving large banks will not solve banking’s problems, and past solutions may be inappropriate in reforming the financial system.

Louis D. Brandeis argued that a system that allows financial institutions to combine the four distinct functions of banks—commercial banking, trust and insurance, corporate underwriting, and brokering—would not be conducive to market competition that serves the best interests of clients. The basic reason that banks no longer provide financing to the real productive sector of the economy is that profits are higher in capital market and trading activities. This argues in favor of limiting the scope of financial institutions, irrespective of size.

Bank concentration reduces the ability of market competition to ensure efficiency in providing banking services and allocating credit. In the regulatory sphere this is an antitrust problem concerning absolute size and market control. Subsequent to the 1999 Financial Modernization Act, which allowed the integration of diverse banking functions, new antitrust regulations are required to address the impact of bank size and concentration on market competition.

Interconnectedness has to do with a regulatory agency’s ability to rapidly resolve an institution exposed to a wide range of unrelated financial institutions operating in different financial markets. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation’s (FDIC) role as a provider of system stability in the event of bank failure is not conducive to its role as an insurer of deposit liabilities held by the public. This argues in favor of limiting the scope of financial institutions and setting the FDIC’s goal in terms of the stability of depositors’ claims rather than the stability of the financial system.

Kregel debunks a number of justifications for large bank size, such as the need to service complex multinational corporations. There is no evidence of synergy across financial services, nor of large global companies relying on one bank for all financial services. Moreover, the size and liquidity of the capital market, and the cost of hedging, are important for the successful primary issue of securities rather than the size of the capital that can be committed by the underwriter. Furthermore, multifunctional banking is supposed to diversify risk and earnings, and stabilize income, but there is scant evidence of higher returns or lower costs, low correlations of asset earnings across geographical areas, or greater profitability from economies of either scale or scope.

Evidence suggests that banks experience scale economies up to an asset size of approximately $1 billion, followed by diseconomies of scale thereafter. Furthermore, the argument that a decomposition of multifunctional banks would be too costly and disruptive to the financial system is not credible, since over $10 billion has been spent to support these large financial institutions.

For the complete text, go to www.levy.org/pubs/pn_09_11.pdf.
On the 10th anniversary of the euro, the European economy was in free fall and speculation about an imminent breakup of Euroland was rampant. According to Research Associate Jörg Bibow, Europe was not a victim of external shocks but of its own contributions toward the buildup of internal and global imbalances, including beggar-thy-neighbor policies that the euro was meant to ban forever. He advocates that Euroland discard its current policy regime, including its price stability agenda, and take steps toward minding domestic demand and creating a fiscal union to back the euro.

Bibow believes that regime flaws, rather than a common currency, are to blame for Europe’s economic malaise. The Maastricht Treaty features a federal supranational monetary authority paired with national fiscal authorities, whereby members have surrendered their monetary sovereignty but not their fiscal sovereignty. According to Bibow, the Stability and Growth Pact’s (SGP) “no bailout” clause shows that the design of Europe’s monetary union is ludicrous.

The euro is managed by the European Central Bank (ECB), which is a federal supranational central bank that is not properly accountable to national or European political authorities. There is no federal euro treasury and no real coordination of national fiscal policies, aside from the asymmetric constraints arising from the SGP. As a result, Euroland’s fiscal stance is the random outcome of national budget plans that compromise the region’s policy instrument for dealing with asymmetric shocks, making common shocks the burden of monetary policy. In essence, there is no one to stabilize domestic demand and employment unless the central bank chooses to do so. And designers of the regime overlooked the fact that Europe’s “integrated” financial system would be vulnerable at the systemic level, since it lacks an integrated financial supervisory role and a lender-of-last-resort function.

Bibow outlines the ECB’s idiosyncratic views on monetary policy (e.g., it is not in the business of inflation targeting) and its failure to provide an explicit definition of price stability that could be used by policymakers. These features explain the ECB’s asymmetry in setting interest rates, its preference for discretion, and its antigrowth bias. Moreover, the ECB’s mandate allows it to avoid taking responsibility for any risks associated with its primary objectives and to maintain the fiction that price stability contributes to output (growth) and employment. Thus, the ECB fulfills its double mandate by reducing it to a single responsibility: price stability.

The author singles out three main policy blunders with regard to Euroland: (1) a business cycle based on export dependency; (2) the interaction between monetary and fiscal policies, which produced “tax-push inflation” and contributed to headline inflation and domestic demand stagnation; and (3) the Maastricht regime, which amplified divergences and imbalances within the European Union (EU).

Germany’s wage deflation strategy could not work for Euroland as a whole, since one country’s gain in competitiveness leads to serious intraregional imbalances. The lesson here is that substituting national wage deflation for EU macro policy greatly destabilizes the union. This approach to policy is unlikely to make Euroland a constructive player in fostering recovery from the current global crisis.

For the complete text, go to www.levy.org/pubs/wp_583.pdf.

The Global Crisis and the Future of the Dollar: Toward Bretton Woods III?

JÖRG BIBOW
Working Paper No. 584

U.S. financial institutions have enjoyed a superior position in global finance because the international monetary order is centered on the dollar. However, this order has induced defensive (national) macroeconomic policies, as governments seek to control their own financial institutions and economic sovereignty. These policies include maintaining competitive exchange rates against the dollar, increasing current account surpluses, and accumulating foreign exchange reserves denominated in dollars.

According to Research Associate Jörg Bibow, the dollar’s role must be a factor when assessing both the roots of the global financial crisis and the prospects for a sustained economic
recovery. He points out that the world monetary and financial order influenced particular macroeconomic policies underlying credit structures that subsequently led to global and domestic imbalances. He therefore proposes a “Bretton Woods III” regime that features a continuation of U.S. current account deficits driven by public spending, and public debt that focuses on upgrading U.S. infrastructure—an arrangement that would require the Federal Reserve and Wall Street to maintain low financing costs.

Bretton Woods II failed because it ignored the fact that the domestic counterpart to the U.S. external deficit was based on (toxic) private debts, particularly mortgage debt, rather than on (safe) public debts. Moreover, it overlooked the rise in household indebtedness (leverage) as the U.S. personal saving rate declined. The true engine of growth underlying this system was the U.S. consumer’s role as “borrower and spender of last resort.” According to Bibow, the Bretton Woods II regime was doomed long before the demise of Lehman Brothers.

The new engine of growth could be Bretton Woods III, whereby U.S. public debt replaces private debt and the guard changes from monetary to fiscal policy. The only way to support domestic demand is to cut taxes in support of private income or to boost public spending. However, the private sector is retrenching, and the current trend toward global rebalancing may be short term. Bretton Woods III implies a more lasting role for fiscal policy in sustaining domestic demand, and more permanent budget deficits may be needed in spite of rebalancing efforts.

Bibow foresees a future where all major regions and players pursue domestic demand-led growth, and exchange rates are adjusted to balance global trade without any specific currency assuming the dollar’s current role. Any alternative to the dollar’s special status, however, will likely take decades to implement. He suggests that the United States should design its macroeconomic policies to serve its own best interests and focus on infrastructure investment in order to sustain domestic demand-led growth and avoid another private debt–driven boom-and-bust cycle. Furthermore, a compositional shift in demand (e.g., energy conservation and security) may help to contain the U.S. current account deficit.  

For the complete text, go to www.levy.org/pubs/wp_584.pdf.

Is Reregulation of the Financial System an Oxymoron?  
JAN KREGEL  
Working Paper No. 585  

The financial crisis has been attributed to the failure to apply existing regulations, a notion that has minimized fundamental reform of the financial system. The basic problem was believed to be the collapse of asset prices resulting from the disappearance of market liquidity. The response was to change existing regulations in an attempt to restore the normal functioning of the financial system in terms of, for example, subprime mortgages, capital adequacy, and liquidity.

Senior Scholar Jan Kregel outlines three distinct stages of the crisis and determines that the lack of meaningful reform stemmed from the failure to recognize that both the assets and the institutions holding the assets were insolvent. As long as policy focuses on providing sufficient liquidity with the hope that asset prices will return to levels that allow banks to remain solvent with minimum capital injections, says Kregel, there will be no meaningful reform or regulation of the financial system.

The first stage of the crisis related to the regulation and supervision of mortgage lending, and to mortgage affiliates that were outside the purview of Federal Reserve supervision. According to Kregel, existing regulations were not applied, and supervision was lax by design rather than by oversight. At this time, regulations were applied according to a model where financial instability was considered an exceptional event rather than a normal occurrence (as emphasized by Hyman P. Minsky).

The crisis’s second stage related to mortgage securitization and (unregulated) off-balance-sheet affiliates. Kregel points out that there was no lack of formal regulation at this time because the special investment vehicles were created in answer to reregulation that was supposed to prevent the abuses associated with the Enron scandal. Again, the government’s response was to reinforce the application of existing regulations. At this time, the entire financial system operated on the basis of borrowing short-term funds to finance (long-term) mortgage assets under the belief that the subprime exposure problem was well contained.

The third stage of the crisis began in the investment-banking sector with the collapse of Bear Stearns and ended with the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers and the upending of the entire
financial system. There was an increasingly long chain of short-term lending or financial layering supporting speculative positions in long-term assets, with increasing leverage in terms of both assets and liabilities—an extremely fragile system subject to collapse.

The Treasury and the Fed decided that a systemic solution was required to support asset prices, so they asked Congress for funding through the Troubled Asset Relief Program, while the Fed also decided to lend to all institutions in order for them to meet short-term funding requirements. Kregel points out that this response is proof of Minsky’s rule: the stability of an institution depends solely on its ability to sell assets for cash—and the Federal Reserve is the only body that can provide unlimited amounts of cash.

For the complete text, go to www.levy.org/pubs/wp_585.pdf.

Is This the Minsky Moment for Reform of Financial Regulation?

JAN KREGEL

According to Senior Scholar Jan Kregel, the current approach to regulating the financial system is a series of cosmetic changes designed to remedy the conditions generated by a “Minsky moment.” However, the recent financial crisis and instability in the mortgage markets are byproducts of increasing fragility in the financial system as a whole—not a “moment” but rather a “process,” as described by Hyman P. Minsky’s financial fragility hypothesis.

Kregel identifies two types of systemic changes that reform must redress and reverse: the way that business financing (capital market instruments) has integrated banking and finance functions, and the way in which these instruments, by increasing financial layering, have reduced system liquidity and heightened fragility. His analysis concludes that it may be impossible to fully separate deposit-taking “commercial” banks from capital market activities if securitization is maintained as the basic financial structure.

Kregel analyzes the evolution of the U.S. financial system since the New Deal legislation. In terms of the (traditional) role of banks, there was confusion between “deposit taking” (a high-cost activity) and “deposit making” (the granting of a loan through the creation of a deposit). Nonbanks developed more cost-effective means of creating liquidity via asset securitization, which produced lower financing spreads through risk reduction and redistribution. Legislation and various administrative rulings by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Federal Reserve eventually eliminated the separation of banking and finance, and aided and abetted the decline of bank stability.

Kregel notes that banks no longer “lend” to the nonbank business sector but to other financial institutions—a departure from the restrictions of the 1933 Banking Act. Thus, the collapse of liquidity was the result of financial institutions no longer lending to one another. A return to Glass-Steagall would be difficult because commercial banking now uses capital market instruments. However, system stability has become hostage to the search for lower-cost means of providing financing that produces higher returns, primarily through capital market activities.

An alternative to returning to Glass-Steagall involves regulating the creation of liquidity through capital market structures using measures similar to those applied to money market funds. Kregel recommends the following measures: (1) precluding deposit-taking banks from proprietary trading; (2) not allowing prudentially regulated institutions to coexist with market-regulated institutions; (3) recognizing the difference between liquidity created by bank net margin spreads and liquidity created by risk arbitrage; (4) terminating the exemption that excludes hedge funds from registering as investment companies; (5) breaking up the large banks and organizing them around related functions; and (6) eliminating SEC exemptions on financial contracts, such as private placements and derivatives.

For the complete text, go to www.levy.org/pubs/wp_586.pdf.

The Global Financial Crisis and the Shift to Shadow Banking

YEVA NERSISYAN and L. RANDALL WRAY

The thrust of the U.S. policy response to the financial crisis has been to preserve what Hyman P. Minsky called the money manager phase of capitalism (i.e., financialization), with the bailout resulting in further concentration of the financial sector. These
policies are doomed to fail, say the authors of this working paper, because the solution lies in downsizing the financial sector by two-thirds or more. The momentum for real change has been lost, and the policy response has sown the seeds for another crisis.

Yeva Nersisyan and Senior Scholar L. Randall Wray review the U.S. financial system and find that the long period of robust growth following World War II created the conditions for a return of financial crises. Contrary to New Deal reforms, the distinction between “finance” and “industry” disappeared, and the real economy became increasingly vulnerable to the instability of the financial sector. The trend toward globalization and securitization allowed large domestic institutions to become even larger. Other transformations included a shift away from banks and toward managed money, as well as the ability of regulated banks to avoid capital and reserve requirements, and to increase leverage and return on equity.

Minsky argued that the fragility of the financial structure is based on the quality of loans made by bankers. Deregulation and financial innovations, however, separated risk from responsibility and contributed to a deterioration of loan quality. When bankers emphasize the value of collateral rather than expected cash flows, a fragile financial system emerges, because loan viability depends on the expected market value of assets pledged. This is what happened when the banks originated mortgages. Moreover, the significant decrease in commercial and industrial loans indicates that the large banks were not really making loans to businesses. Therefore, the notion that bailing out the biggest firms will get credit flowing again is fundamentally flawed.

The authors note that the government has played a negligible role in the decision making of rescued firms and that banks continue to engage in risky practices. They suspect that most of the reported bank profits are the result of bad assets bought at inflated prices, similar to the actions of the thrift industry in the 1980s. They also doubt that the U.S. economy is in recovery, since the recent large fiscal stimulus package is unlikely to be repeated and there are global deflationary pressures.

Nersisyan and Wray maintain that the government must not allow the financial industry to regulate itself nor its institutions to become “too big to fail.” Furthermore, insolvent banks should be resolved according to two principles: ensuring the least cost to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and downsizing in order to minimize the impact on the banking system. Other options include regulating securitized products, establishing a centralized clearinghouse for trading derivatives, forbidding banks to engage in securitization, creating a regulated exchange for financial derivatives—and prosecuting fraud.

According to the authors, the Obama-supported Consumer Finance Protection Agency Act is unlikely to pass. Moreover, the proposed “Volcker rule” (prohibiting regulated and publicly insured financial institutions from operating hedge and private equity funds or from engaging in proprietary trading) is a step in the right direction, but it is insufficient to safeguard the financial sector. Furthermore, we need debt relief for households, a stronger public retirement system, and real health care reform. For the complete text, go to www.levy.org/pubs/wp_587.pdf.

Decomposition of the Black-White Wage Differential in the Physician Market

TSU-YU TSAO and ANDREW PEARLMAN
Working Paper No. 588

A 1957 labor market study by Gary Becker titled The Economics of Discrimination showed that labor market discrimination in terms of minority earnings can originate from three sources: employers, coworkers, and consumers. It is important to disaggregate these sources in order to enact antidiscrimination legislation.

Tsu-Yu Tsao and Andrew Pearlman, Bard College, develop a general framework to quantify earnings differentials between black and white physicians, and to disaggregate the effects of firm versus consumer discrimination. They find that potential discrimination plays a small role in the racial wage gap among physicians, and that discrimination by firms may actually favor black physicians.

Using data from the Young Physicians Survey of 1987 and 1991, the authors develop a simple model to decompose wage differentials associated with discrimination, recognizing that there are both self-employed and salaried workers. Tsao and Pearlman find that black physicians have a greater tendency to specialize in fields that are ranked relatively lower in terms of average hourly earnings. They also find that single (male) physicians have lower wages and work fewer hours than their married counterparts. Surprisingly, the status of board certification (lower for blacks) does not appear to have a bearing on wage
rates. Another surprising result is that salaried physicians are about 10 percent more productive than self-employed physicians.

This study is the first to document higher returns, based on experience, for blacks relative to whites. The authors offer three reasons for this unique result: sample homogeneity, exceptional talent, and psychology (e.g., whites hold black physicians in high esteem). The results suggest that potential discrimination plays a small role in the racial wage gap among physicians. For the complete text, go to www.levy.org/pubs/wp_588.pdf.

Recent Trends in Household Wealth in the United States: Rising Debt and the Middle-Class Squeeze—An Update to 2007
EDWARD N. WOLFF
Working Paper No. 589

Senior Scholar Edward N. Wolff updates his previous analysis of household wealth in the United States (see Working Paper No. 502) and finds skyrocketing indebtedness leading to a “middle-class squeeze.” A rising debt-to-income ratio has reached its highest level in 25 years, while most gains in wealth and income continue to accrue to the uppermost quintile; particularly, the top 1 percent of the population. As a result of stagnating incomes, middle-class households have incurred more debt in order to finance normal consumption expenditures.

Wolff finds that the narrowing of racial disparities in wealth holdings in the 2001–07 period is the result of the gain in house prices relative to stock prices. He estimates, however, that mean and median wealth has declined considerably since 2007, while wealth inequality has risen sharply. Moreover, he estimates that almost 17 percent of homeowners are “underwater,” meaning that their mortgage debt has exceeded their home’s value.

Using data from the Federal Reserve’s Survey of Consumer Finances since 1983, Wolff discusses the measurement of household wealth and presents wealth trends in terms of concentration, composition, race, and age. He also details stock ownership by demographic group and provides a partial update of household wealth trends to 2009.

While average household income has stagnated since 1990, median net worth and median nonhome wealth have grown strongly, despite the setback between 2001 and 2004. So far, this century has witnessed a moderate increase in income inequality, a small rise in wealth inequality, and a significant increase in nonhome wealth inequality. The growth in wealth, however, has been concentrated in a surprisingly small segment of the population. Despite some progress this decade, the wealth gap between African Americans and Hispanics, on the one hand, and non-Hispanic whites on the other (approximately 50 percent) remains much greater than the corresponding income gap (20–25 percent).

There has been a sharp rise in the debt-to-equity ratio and the debt-to-income ratio of the middle class. In the past two decades, families have used tax-sheltered mortgages, home equity loans, and credit cards, rather than consumer loans and other forms of consumer debt, to finance consumption. As a result, there has been a marked deterioration in middle-class wealth to 1992 levels (median wealth plunged 36 percent, to $65,400). Rising debt made the middle class vulnerable to income shocks, setting the stage for the mortgage crisis and financial meltdown in 2008–09.

For the complete text, go to www.levy.org/pubs/wp_589.pdf.
INSTITUTE NEWS

Upcoming Events

April 14–16, 2010
Ford Foundation, New York City

From his extensive research, Hyman P. Minsky was convinced that economic systems are prone to financial instability and crisis, and urged that lessons be learned from the crisis of 1929–33 so that “it”—the Great Depression—could not happen again.

The focus of this year’s conference draws upon many Minskyan themes, including, among others, reconstituting the financial structure; the reregulation and supervision of financial institutions; the relevance of the Glass-Steagall Act; the roles of the Federal Reserve, FDIC, and Treasury; moral hazard of the “too big to fail” doctrine; debt deflation; and the economics of “the big bank” and “big government.” The conference will also compare the European and Latin American responses to the global financial crisis and proposals for reforming the international financial architecture. Moreover, central bank exit strategies, both national and international, will be considered.

Complete program and registration information is available on our website, www.levy.org.

The Hyman P. Minsky Summer Seminar
June 19–29, 2010
Blithewood
Annandale-on-Hudson, N.Y.

The Levy Economics Institute is pleased to announce that it will hold the Hyman P. Minsky Summer Seminar in June 2010. The Seminar will provide a rigorous discussion of both theoretical and applied aspects of Minsky’s economics, with an examination of meaningful prescriptive policies relevant to the current economic and financial crisis. The Seminar will consist of a summer school from June 19 to 26, followed by an international conference on June 27, 28, and 29, both to be held at the Levy Institute in Annandale-on-Hudson, N.Y.

For more information on the Seminar, including how to apply, visit www.levy.org.

PUBLICATIONS AND PRESENTATIONS

Publications and Presentations by Levy Institute Scholars

RANIA ANTONOPOULOS Research Scholar and Program Director


PHILIP ARESTIS Senior Scholar


JAMES K. GALBRAITH Senior Scholar


GREG HANNSGEN Research Scholar


JAN KREGEL Senior Scholar and Program Director

Publications: “Mercados Financieros y Especialización en el Comercio Internacional: El Caso de los Productos Basicos,” in La crisis financiera y el comercio: Hacia una respuesta integrada en Latinoamérica y el Caribe selección de ponencias, Centre of Concern and Sistema Económico Latinoamericano y del Caribe, 2009; “The Debt Trade Causality in Balance of Payments..."


THOMAS MASTERSON Research Scholar

DIMITRI B. PAPADIMITRIOU President

Presentations: interview regarding Senator Dodd’s bill that would limit the Federal Reserve’s role to monetary policy with Ron Fink, CFOZone.com, November 18, 2009; interview regarding the challenges of the Greek economy with Eleftherotypia, November 24; interview regarding small business lending with Paul Davis, American Banker, December 7; interview regarding U.S. gold holdings with Constance Gustke, CBS Money Watch, December 9; interview regarding the latest Strategic Analysis report and monetary policy with Ron Fink, CFOZone.com, December 15; interview regarding job elimination during the recession with Joe Gomez, KTRH Houston, January 12, 2010; “Global Imbalances after the Economic Crisis,” International Development Economics Associates conference on “Reforming the Financial System: Proposals, Constraints, and New Directions,” Muttukadu, Chennai, India, January 25–27; interview regarding what impact the Federal Reserve’s raising the discount rate might have on banks with Paul Davis, American Banker, February 19; “Economic Outlook for the U.S. and Global Economy,” University of Macedonia, Thessaloniki, Greece, March 22.
EDWARD N. WOLFF Senior Scholar


L. RANDALL WRAY Senior Scholar


AJIT ZACHARIAS Senior Scholar

GENNARO ZEZZA Research Scholar
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March 2010

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