New Public Policy Brief

IT’S TIME TO REIN IN THE FED

SCOTT FULLWILER and L. RANDALL WRAY
Public Policy Brief No. 117

In this brief, Scott Fullwiler, Wartburg College, and Senior Scholar L. Randall Wray review the roles of the Federal Reserve and the Treasury in the context of quantitative easing (QE). They find that the crisis has highlighted the limited oversight of Congress and the limited transparency of the Fed. And since a Fed promise is ultimately a Treasury promise that carries the full faith and credit of the US government, the question is whether the Fed should be able to commit the public purse in times of national crisis.

According to the authors, the Fed has not learned how to efficiently implement monetary policy. QE can only work through price effects, not through quantity, and it is probable that a second round—QE2—could be deflationary. Since fiscal policy is the only possible engine of growth to lead an economic recovery, policymakers must rely on domestic measures to reverse job loss. Otherwise, there is a real danger that the United States will slip back into recession.

When the global financial crisis began in 2007, the Fed provided liquidity and created extraordinary standing facilities, which provided short-term credit in the money markets. The Treasury also intervened to provide funds and guarantees. Though the total amount of government commitments is estimated at more than $20 trillion, only a very small portion was explicitly approved by Congress, and much of the detail surrounding these commitments is unknown.

The Fed’s focus on fighting inflation seems to have diverted attention away from its core responsibilities. The crisis demonstrates the wisdom of returning the Fed to its original mission, as amended by Congress: to pursue a dual mandate of full employment and reasonable price stability, provide an elastic supply of currency and act as lender of last resort to banks, and regulate and closely supervise financial institutions.

The belief that QE encourages banks to lend excess reserves is clearly mistaken. Another fallacy is that banks need excess reserves in order to induce loans to firms and households. Moreover, it makes little sense to increase debt or reduce saving when there is record private sector debt. Furthermore, the stimulative effects of QE are insignificant, since there is no guarantee that market

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forces will reduce yields based on a particular quantity of Treasuries purchased by the Fed.

The authors disagree with Fed critics who are concerned that QE will lead to inflation and dollar depreciation, and they do not support the strategy to pressure US trading partners to appreciate their currencies. Rather, the Fed and the Treasury should announce their intention not to depreciate the dollar, and US policymakers should focus on domestic policy measures to end the crisis. In addition, the belief that monetary policy alone can stabilize the US economy is erroneous and dangerous.

Monetary policy played a major role in pumping up asset prices, which subsequently collapsed in a speculative bust. Meanwhile, the neglect of fiscal policy generated macroeconomic imbalances—for example, a record level of household indebtedness as borrowing substituted for jobs and income growth.

QE1 mitigated the economic downturn in spite of some ill-conceived spending and tax cuts, say the authors. The major problem was that the stimulus package was too small, as well as temporary. And in light of the similar effects of the financial crisis in the United States and Japan, they support a larger and more permanent fiscal policy to deal with the recession. The first task of fiscal policy at this time is to reverse job loss.

Although the authors’ position is at odds with current attempts to reduce the US budget deficit, they note that the deficit is mostly due to collapsing tax revenues, combined with automatic stabilizers such as unemployment compensation. The deficit will decline rapidly when the economy recovers, they say. Thus, reactive policies such as spending cuts and higher taxes during normal deficit expansions would be a mistake.

Another reason to reject undue reliance on monetary policy is that those in charge are not subject to the same degree of democratic accountability as those in charge of fiscal policy. While the Fed is accountable to Congress, current law does not provide Congress with substantive control of the Fed. There is an inherent conflict between the need for oversight and transparency associated with public spending, and the need for independence and secrecy in formulating monetary policy and supervising regulated financial institutions.

The bailouts have been uncoordinated and largely executed in secret—by the Fed. And the massive, mostly off-budget sup-

port of Wall Street has proven to be a tremendous barrier to formulating another stimulus package for Main Street.

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New Policy Note

What Happens if Germany Exits the Euro?

MARSHALL AUERBACK

Policy Note 2011 / 1

The recent turmoil in Europe has given rise to the idea that the euro might be reversible, and that one or more countries might revert to a national currency. Research Associate Marshall Auerback applies the sector financial balances approach to national income accounting in order to determine what would happen if Germany decided to reembrace the Deutschmark and regain its fiscal freedom. While Germany would likely emerge with a strong global “safe haven” currency that would save its banking system, such currency appreciation would destroy its export base (external sector) and result in much larger budget deficits.

By returning to the Deutschmark, Germany would become the issuer, as opposed to the user, of a currency and fully sovereign with respect to its fiscal and monetary policy. A budget deficit per se would not cause any problems per se, as the country would no longer have any external constraint. But historically, Germany has embraced an export-based model at the expense of curbing domestic consumption.

In response to a trade shock, German policymakers would face a choice: to proactively offset the decline in its current account surplus via a more aggressive fiscal policy by choice (in search of a full employment policy) or to reactively respond to rising deficits via growth in the automatic stabilizers. According to national income accounting, the systematic pursuit of government budget surpluses is dollar-for-dollar manifested as declines in nongovernment surpluses. There is no merit in eliminating government debt simply to force the private sector into greater deficit, notes Auerback.

www.levyinstitute.org/pubs/pn_1_11.pdf
New Working Papers

International Trade Theory and Policy: A Review of the Literature
SUNANDA SEN
Working Paper No. 635

Research Associate Sunanda Sen provides a survey of the literature on trade theory—from the classical example of comparative advantage to the New Trade theories (NTT) used by many advanced countries to direct industrial policy and trade. She concludes that the evolution of trade theory has impacted policy at two levels. The first relates to the free-trade doctrine of developed countries and multilateral institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Trade Organization; the second, to policies that rely on NTT. Sen notes that trade theory has contributed to uneven power relations between rich and poor countries, and that policymakers have neglected the macroeconomic issues at both the national and international levels.

NTT introduced three deviants—scale economies, imperfect markets, and product differentiation—that set it apart from the old trade models. Imperfect markets with the potential for reciprocal (subsidized) dumping of exports led to the notion of “strategic trade,” which gained currency in public policy during the 1980s (especially in the United States). This led to the notion that governments should intervene to shift resources from “sunset” to “sunrise” industries in order to generate high value-added products.

But both NTT and traditional doctrines failed to address the dynamic implications of trade (e.g., changing income distributions) and the uneven development of trading nations. Terms of trade resurfaced as a powerful tool to demonstrate trade inequities for developing countries (e.g., the core-periphery distinction). According to Sen, liberalization generated some specific tools for policymakers that would justify deregulation in the global economy, but there were a number of problems associated with this approach.

The “product-lifecycle” (PLC) theory of foreign trade incorporates both product differentiation and market imperfections. The basic premise of PLC and other neotechnology models rests on the transfer of technology across countries, and it seems to provide a platform for an integrated approach to trade, technology, and foreign direct investment. While earlier trade models were location-specific, PLC theory introduced product-specific characterizations and organization-specific factors.

In Sen’s view, advances in trade theory have not kept pace with the issues guiding policy in developing countries, and they fail to provide guidelines that avoid conflicting interests in trade. Furthermore, unemployment and an oversupply of domestic goods are seen to be related to labor-market distortions, cheap foreign goods, or overvalued currencies. Little attention is paid to deficiencies in domestic demand.

Sen notes several discriminatory practices associated with global trading regimes such as regional trading blocs (e.g., NAFTA and the European Union) and trade exemptions within GATT. In addition, there are unfulfilled promises associated with the Doha Development Round (2001) in terms of market access to the advanced countries (e.g., agricultural products).

The clock has been turned back, says Sen. Trade liberalization is operating in the developing countries but not in the developed countries, where protectionist subsidies rule. Furthermore, the IMF, World Bank, and Bank for International Settlements continue to exercise control and impose regulations in the interest of finance, which significantly impacts world trade.

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Bernanke’s Paradox: Can He Reconcile His Position on the Federal Budget with His Recent Charge to Prevent Deflation?
PAVLINA R. TCHERNEVA
Working Paper No. 636

Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke has made two contradictory statements: the “fiscal components” of monetary policy for fighting deflation can be financed without limit; and government deficits can become too large and must be reversed to preserve fiscal responsibility. Research Associate Pavlina R. Tcherneva attempts to resolve this paradox by reviewing Bernanke’s (unorthodox) policy recommendations and his views on government spending. She finds that the paradox stems from Bernanke’s inability to reconcile the mainstream view of government finance with traditional crowding-out arguments. If Bernanke insists on reversing the budgetary
stance, it would have a devastating impact on the US economy, employment, and output, says Tcherneva.

Bernanke’s policies in 2008–09 closely followed a blueprint that he developed within the context of the Japanese crisis during the 1990s. According to Bernanke, the monetary authority has all of the tools necessary to fight deflation. His solution includes four key policy moves: (1) the monetary authority must articulate its steadfast commitment to a zero-interest-rate policy and a specific inflation target; (2) exchange-rate depreciation; (3) money-financed fiscal transfers; and (4) nontraditional discount window and open-market operations. This framework suggests a new view of the effectiveness of both monetary and fiscal policy, and new implications for central bank independence.

Tcherneva outlines the role and meaning of the “fiscal components” of monetary policy, such as exchange-rate depreciation, money-financed fiscal transfers, and nontraditional open-market operations. She concludes that the effectiveness of monetary policy depends on the size of the fiscal components, and that there are no technical limits to government spending. The implication of the fiscal components is that foreign exchange intervention or purchases of financial assets are not purely monetary policy levers, but fiscal levers financed by the Federal Reserve. According to Bernanke’s new interpretation of monetary easing, there are no technical limits to financing the fiscal components of monetary policy. By contrast, monetary policy in the European Union is completely devoid of fiscal components and largely impotent in dealing with deflationary forces.

The crux of the paradox is that Bernanke’s recipe for deflation fighting can be implemented in sovereign currency regimes without financial limitations, but he has expressed strong concerns about the sustainability of ballooning government debts and deficits. Deficit spending does not crowd out private spending and investment but rather generates a crowding-in effect that puts downward pressure on interest rates.

The Modern Money literature can help to resolve Bernanke’s paradox, says Tcherneva. There are three ingredients to understanding the nature of government spending: (1) there is no inherent operational limit to government spending for governments that pay in their own liabilities; (2) government deficit spending creates an equivalent amount of surpluses in the nongovernment sector; and (3) the central bank cannot choose which government payments to clear.

The primary criteria to measure policy effectiveness are not the size of debt-to-GDP ratios or the availability of reserves in the banking system. Rather, they are high (full) employment, more equitable income distribution, stable profit expectations, and viable private and public investment. There is no reason why Bernanke’s recipe for stabilization should favor money-financed tax cuts as opposed to alternative fiscal policies such as public investment and job creation by the government.

Financial Stability, Regulatory Buffers, and Economic Growth: Some Postrecession Regulatory Implications
ÉRIC TYMOIGNÉ
Working Paper No. 637

Free-market ideas related to risk management, self-regulation, and market discipline have justified an extended period of financial deregulation. The overriding goal of regulators during this period has been to avoid limiting the creativity of financial institutions. Moreover, the primary aim of regulating financial institutions in response to the Great Recession has been to improve the existing regulatory framework.

Research Associate Éric Tymoigne maintains that the core problem related to reregulation is that the analytical framework and underlying economic principles failed. He proposes a regulatory framework and formative philosophy that centers on the detection of financial fragility and on proactive policies with a strong supervisory component. An assessment of financial stability should focus more on broader measures of social well-being, says Tymoigne, and less on (traditional) parameters of economic growth.

The author notes that financial fragility can emerge during a period of economic stability. Therefore, regulators should not wait for declining profitability and net worth, or other signs of payment difficulties, prior to taking strong actions. According to Hyman P. Minsky’s financial fragility hypothesis, the goal should be to detect and prevent financial fragility rather than to protect against financial crises. The key is to see how balance sheets are affected by financial practices—an approach requiring alternative indicators such as Ponzi finance. Financial
fragility should be based on an analysis of balance sheets, cash flow, underwriting procedures, and the underlying assets.

Since financial institutions have a strong incentive to bypass regulations, regulators must keep up with their innovations, says Tymoigne, and no innovation should be unregulated or unsupervised. Collateral-based Ponzi finance should be forbidden in all activities that have an implicit or explicit government guarantee. There is also a vital role for the central bank in protecting banks and the payment system from competition (e.g., the cost of funding should be kept low and stable). At the same time, more emphasis should be put on the Federal Reserve’s discount window as a means of influencing the business practices of financial institutions. And when a Ponzi process collapses, the company responsible should be allowed to be dismantled in an orderly fashion (e.g., receivership).

Tymoigne also notes that there has been no significant improvement in US economic welfare since the mid-1970s because rising socioeconomic and environmental problems have outweighed gains in output. He further notes that the widespread emphasis on investment-led growth is prone to economic instability (and Ponzi finance), so economic growth should focus on domestic consumption that is socioecologically durable and “sustainable” in the long term.


Exports, Capabilities, and Industrial Policy in India

JESUS FELIPE, UTSAV KUMAR, and ARNELYN ABDON
Working Paper No. 638

Jesus Felipe, Utsav Kumar, and Arnelyn Abdon, Asian Development Bank, Manila, Philippines, examine the sophistication and diversification of India’s export basket since the 1960s. They find that its export basket is both more sophisticated and diverse than expected for a country at its stage of development. Core products such as metals, machinery, and chemicals were above expectations, given India’s per capita income, and were also relatively high in terms of their share of total manufacturing products exported with revealed comparative advantage. In spite of abundant labor, India has diversified in the skill- and capital-intensive sectors. This trade focus is at odds with that of China, which embraced its comparative advantage and focused on labor-intensive commodity exports.

The key objective of India’s leadership after independence was to be self-sufficient in all sectors of the economy. The public sector was actively involved in industrial development and the private sector was regulated with instruments such as industrial and import licensing (the license-permit raj) so that it conformed to government priorities. Import substitution was encouraged and labor-intensive small-scale enterprises were protected from competition. The manufacturing sector was held back by policy as well as a lack of physical and social infrastructure. Subsequent reform led to a liberal trade regime and the progressive reduction of tariff and nontariff barriers. India promoted free trade, while its industrial policy negatively affected the labor-intensive sectors.

In the post-reform period (2001–07), China and India exported 257 and 246 products with revealed comparative advantage, respectively. No other lower-middle-income countries exported as many products with this designation. The authors’ findings are consistent with the notion that India’s manufacturing sector is both capital-intensive and skilled labor-intensive. Labor-intensive manufacturing did not experience any major gains in the post-reform period. By making heavy industry a focal point of its industrial development strategy, India established a presence in core commodities and built up capabilities in producing and exporting sophisticated products.

India’s policymakers defied comparative advantage by establishing skill-intensive activities related to scientific and technical infrastructure, higher education (especially in engineering and management), and information technologies. These activities have not harmed India’s long-term growth prospects since they have provided highly skilled low-cost labor for industrial development, particularly in core products.


US “Quantitative Easing” Is Fracturing the Global Economy

MICHAEL HUDSON
Working Paper No. 639

According to Research Associate Michael Hudson, the global financial system has decoupled from trade and investment, and shifted economic planning into the hands of finance-sector lobbyists. Moreover, the US government has attempted to bail out
the banks by reinflating the real estate, stock, and bond markets (leading to more debt creation). This approach, in combination with a second round of quantitative easing—QE2—is saving the banks from negative equity, while flooding the global economy with cheap US dollar “keyboard credit” and destabilizing the global financial system.

In essence, QE2 is a form of financial aggression, says Hudson, and Federal Reserve policymakers have not acknowledged a number of problems with the program. For example, banks are sending the Fed’s tsunami of credit abroad and engaging in interest-rate arbitrage (the carry trade) as well as currency and commodity speculation, and buying foreign companies in place of domestic lending. Such financial aggression can only be mitigated by erecting capital controls that block foreign speculators from deranging the currency and financial markets.

What makes the speculative capital inflows abroad so unwelcome is that they do not contribute to tangible capital formation or employment. Hudson proposes dual exchange rates for trade and capital movements, currency-swap agreements for bilateral trade, and a BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, and China)-centered system that reverses the policy of open and unprotected capital markets put in place after World War II.

Predatory financial opportunism is breaking the world economy into two spheres: a dollar sphere of central bank reserves that is declining in value; and a BRIC-centered sphere that runs trade surpluses. Foreign economies are expected to serve as markets for greater US industrial exports and for US banks and speculators at the expense of foreign central banks trying to stabilize their currencies, and to help US banks earn their way out of negative equity. Furthermore, speculative capital inflows push foreign currencies up against the dollar, pricing exporters out of global markets and disrupting domestic employment and trade patterns. This currency speculation is the most aggressive, predatory, and destructive aspect of US financial behavior (an upward revaluation of China’s renminbi would be a bonanza for speculators). As a result, countries are trying to shape the “market” of international speculation by imposing, for example, a withholding tax on interest payments to foreign investors, and to free themselves from the International Monetary Fund and its destructive, neoliberal, financial austerity programs.

The flight out of the US dollar into Asian and other third world currencies is changing the global economy’s orientation by restoring financial dominance to nations running balance-of-payments surpluses and whose currencies promise to rise against the dollar (their economic base is less dependent and indebted than in the past). The major question is how such national economies can gain greater stability by insulating themselves from predatory financial practices.


The Central Bank “Printing Press”: Boon or Bane?

Remedies for High Unemployment and Fears of Fiscal Crisis

GREG HANNSGEN and DIMITRI B. PAPADIMITRIOU

Working Paper No. 640

Trillions of dollars in excess government expenditures in the United States and Europe have been committed to maintain a stable financial system. Does the United States risk a fiscal crisis based on its ability to borrow and spend without limit? Research Scholar Greg Hannsgen and President Dimitri B. Papadimitriou examine this question in light of suggestions that the federal government has debt limits. They argue that there are few “affordability” constraints on further Keynesian stimulus or government debt. Current limits to fiscal stimulus posed by the scarcity of real resources, especially when demand is sufficient, are irrelevant because unemployment rates remain close to 10 percent.

The authors suggest using capital controls such as taxes on capital flows, foreign currency trades, or other key financial assets to restrict international capital movements. They also suggest that the international financial system should be reformed to fight imbalances, along with the destabilizing effects of “hot money.” The greatest need at a time of economic stagnation, they say, is to adjust the global economy toward full employment and away from deflation.

The possibility of default that threatens the eurozone is unlikely to happen here because the United States can borrow in its own currency by using the power of the Federal Reserve’s “printing press” (i.e., quantitative easing). By comparison, eurozone countries such as Greece have had to resort to emergency loans because they lack a truly independent fiscal policy. And to prevent default, the European Central Bank has taken on a role similar to the Fed: monetizing the debt of some European
governments. The European system has been forced to abandon its policy commitments (e.g., fiscal deficit limits), which were expected to control inflation and stabilize the economy.

In light of the merits of a country issuing its own currency, Hannsgen and Papadimitriu consider the advantages of a currency bloc or pegging a currency to the dollar, the impact of excessive government debt, the effects of alternative monetary and fiscal systems in the United States, and the use of novel policy tools such as capital controls or currency devaluations to fight unemployment. They conclude that the only way to choose fiscal and monetary policies, while controlling their impact on the exchange rate, is to implement capital controls. Also, it is important to keep monetary and fiscal options open when policy actions on the foreign exchange markets are unclear. Moreover, nations with underemployed workforces should be encouraged to lower interest rates and increase deficits rather than increase exports. And it must be recognized that the state’s ability to create its own money cannot generate unlimited wealth or unlimited benefits at no cost. Readily available credit is likely to lead to overinvestment in unproductive ventures.

Disaggregating the Resource Curse: Is the Curse More Difficult to Dispel in Oil States than in Mineral States?
TIMOTHY AZARCHS and TAMAR KHITARISHVILI
Working Paper No. 641

The resource curse is based on the hypothesis that natural-resource wealth leads to slower economic growth. Timothy Azarchs and Research Associate Tamar Khitarishvili disaggregate resources by type in order to shed light on the mixed economic outcomes of resource-abundant countries, including a country’s ability to transform its institutional and economic infrastructure. Their findings are in line with similar studies using an aggregate resource stock measure: that resource abundance contributes positively to resource dependence and export dependence has no significant empirical effect on growth.

Using a disaggregated resource stock, the authors provide new insights—for example, oil is the only resource to affect institutions negatively, and different resources have different effects on resource dependence. These results highlight the need to understand the relationship between resource type and a country’s ability to improve its economic and institutional performance.

Azarchs and Khitarishvili disaggregate mineral resources into four categories (oil, natural gas, coal, and nonfuel), focus on two channels (resource dependence and institutional quality), and compare the economic performance of countries in 1970–89 and in 1996–2008. They find that oil-rich countries have a particularly difficult time diversifying their economies and reforming their institutions. Natural gas appears to affect growth through channels other than resource dependence or institutions, and to be a boon in the most recent period. Coal abundance may be associated with a decrease in resource dependence and affect growth directly and positively.

The authors’ contribution to the literature lies in differentiating between measures of resource abundance and resource dependence. Their findings lend support to the use of ordinary least square regressions for testing the effect of resource dependence on growth. Avenues for future research include why different resources have different effects (e.g., public ownership and industrial characteristics) and which natural gas channels affect growth (e.g., human capital and output volatility).

China in the Global Economy
SUNANDA SEN
Working Paper No. 642

The integration of China in the global economy has raised concerns about the first- and second-round effects of the economic downturn on that country. China’s unique position as a developing country stems from its large volume of exports and trade surplus, its investment links and imports of intermediate goods from other Asian countries, and its stable financial sector.

Research Associate Sunanda Sen traces China’s (changing) pattern of trade and finds that its entry into the global financial market can be defined by two distinct phases: a pre-2005 period of relatively strict controls, followed by a period of relaxed controls and regulations. She also finds that trade integration has been directed more to the rest of Asia than to the advanced industrial countries, a potentially favorable factor in withstanding a collapse in its traditional export markets. However, capital
flows remain closely integrated with the financial markets of advanced economies, making China vulnerable to outside shocks and sudden capital flight.

China’s trade pattern has changed dramatically since 1990 and now favors the developing countries, with the rest of Asia becoming a major export destination and import source. The United States continues to contribute the most to China’s trade surplus and even finances China’s deficits with other countries. Nevertheless, the value of goods exported in 2009 was down 16 percent, while imports decreased 11 percent. Thus, a recession in the advanced economies impinges heavily on exports and China’s accumulation of official foreign exchange reserves, which exceeded $2.13 trillion as of June 2009.

Despite an upward appreciation of the renminbi-dollar exchange rate since 2005, hot-money flows into China have been revived due to the near-zero interest rate policy in the United States, combined with a recent moderate drop in the dollar exchange rate. This has compelled China to reactivate its credit restraints, including higher reserve ratios and open-market policies in the bond market (interest rates have not been used as a tool of monetary management). Although China cannot dictate its own monetary policy, it has withstood a 40 percent drop in export earnings by means of credit and fiscal expansions. However, exports are likely to face a second-round shock if foreign-direct-investment flows, which are important to China’s gross domestic capital formation, falter as a result of the crisis.

Like other developing countries, China faces the “impossible trilemma”: managing its exchange rate with a monetary policy of (open) capital mobility and national autonomy. Concerns about the trade-displacing effects of cheap exports appear exaggerated, says Sen, because China is also a large importer, especially of intermediate goods. The growing alliance between China and other Asian countries portends a decoupling tendency between the developed and developing nations. And government spending seems to be functioning better, as China uses expansionary fiscal policy ($586 billion) to bolster domestic demand and counter shrinking export demand. This response is helping to avert another global recession, but it is unclear how such government spending is helping the “jobless recovery” or the situation of migrant workers.

Modeling Technological Progress and Investment in China: Some Caveats

JESUS FELIPE and JOHN MCCOMBIE

Working Paper No. 643

Jesus Felipe, Asian Development Bank, Manila, Philippines, and John McCombie, Cambridge Centre for Economic and Public Policy, question the methodologies used to model the Chinese economy. Many assumptions, theories, and statistical techniques underlying neoclassical economics cannot be applied toward understanding the Chinese economy, they say.

The authors review three models: the methods proposed by Guang H. Wan (1995) and Gregory C. Chow (1993) to quantify technical progress; and the neoclassical investment model proposed by Xinhua He and Duo Qin (2004). Wan’s approach to estimate the rate of total factor productivity growth in China suffers from serious limitations. Chow’s regressions for total output are an exercise in data mining, say Felipe and McCombie, and his argument about the lack of total factor productivity growth in the Chinese economy is based on a peculiar misspecification problem. He and Qin’s conclusion that aggregate business investment in China is largely market-driven is unwarranted; for example, their production function respecting government sector investment in neoclassical terms misses an important feature of the Chinese economy: technological progress.

Felipe and McCombie recommend that the neoclassical aggregate production function relating to the role of technological progress should be discarded. They also recommend that investment modeling in China consider aggregate investment as a meaningful economic concept outside the realm of neoclassical economics and incorporate applicable elements from development theory, the role of expectations, and the role of profits as an investment source. Economists must pay attention to their theories and statistical techniques in order to improve their knowledge about the Chinese economy.

Some countries achieve sustained growth but most countries are in an economic trap. Jesus Felipe, Utsav Kumar, and Arnelyn Abdon, Asian Development Bank, Manila, Philippines, empirically analyze the export baskets of 154 countries and 779 products in terms of sophistication and connectivity. They determine that only 34 countries export mostly sophisticated and well-connected products, while 75 countries are in a low product trap. Solving the fundamental development problem requires an understanding of the relationship between poverty and the structure of production, and implementing appropriate economic policies. Many countries export “bad” products—products with low sophistication that are not well connected to other products.

Capabilities refer to human and physical capital needed to produce a product, industrial “know-how” at the level of the firm, and the organizational abilities of people. When products use similar capabilities, there is a high probability that a country can export these products with comparative advantage. A country’s position within product space signals its capacity to expand into more sophisticated products, thus laying the groundwork for future growth.

The authors use a country’s position in product space to classify the country according to two product characteristics: sophistication and connectivity. This method enables them to delimit the necessary targeted government-policy interventions required to replace unsophisticated and unconnected products, and undertake structural transformation.

Based on the distribution of products according to their level of sophistication, the authors classify the products within a sophistication-proximity matrix. The most sophisticated (core) products (e.g., metal products, machinery, and chemicals) are also the best connected and tend to be man-made. The least sophisticated product groups (e.g., tropical agriculture, cereals, and petroleum) are the least connected and tend to be nature-made. The authors subsequently classify the countries according to the products exported with revealed comparative advantage.

High-core countries include the United States and European countries such as the UK, Germany, Switzerland, and Norway. Countries in the middle product-trap category include the BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India, and China), Mexico, and Malaysia. Low-core countries in the low product-trap category include Australia, Chile, and Nigeria; while low-core countries in the middle-low product-trap category include oil-exporting countries in the Middle East.

Countries in the low product-trap category need to industrialize, generate an advanced service sector, raise per capita incomes, reduce population growth, plan for a large-scale expansion of a wide range of economic activities, encourage significant government intervention in the development of new economic sectors, and focus their efforts on accumulating new capabilities.


Quantitative Easing and Proposals for Reform of Monetary Policy Operations

SCOTT FULLWILER and L. RANDALL WRAY
Working Paper No. 645

Some estimates place the total amount of US government loans, purchases, spending, and guarantees provided during the financial crisis at more than $20 trillion. Only a small portion of this amount was approved explicitly by Congress, and much of the detail surrounding commitments by the Federal Reserve remains unknown. The bailouts in this crisis have been uncoordinated, mostly off-budget, and done largely in secret by the Fed.

Scott Fullwiler, Wartburg College, and Senior Scholar L. Randall Wray review the roles of the Fed and Treasury in the context of quantitative easing (QE). They find that the crisis has highlighted the limited oversight of Congress and the executive branches, and the limited transparency of the Fed. The question is whether the Fed should be able to commit the public purse in times of national crisis (the Fed’s promises, which are made without congressional approval, are ultimately Uncle Sam’s promises). They encourage policymakers to explore a number of issues regarding transparency and accountability, and to pursue domestic policy measures to end the crisis.

The authors conclude that the Fed has not learned how to efficiently implement monetary policy. They note that QE can
only work through price effects, not through quantity, and it is probable that QE2 could be deflationary (by reducing income and spending). They also conclude that the excess reserves in the banking system will not pose a challenge to policymakers, the threat of inflation is erroneous, and there is little justification to fear a depreciating dollar. Moreover, the pressure placed on US trading partners to appreciate their currencies is a mistake. And since fiscal policy is the only possible engine of growth, policymakers must rely on domestic measures to reverse job loss. Otherwise, there is a real danger that the United States will slip back into recession.

According to Fullwiler and Wray, the Fed should return to its original mission: acting as lender of last resort, regulating and supervising the financial system, and pursuing a dual mandate of full employment and price stability. They determine that the impact of QE2 on interest rates will not be large and the impact on private spending will be trivial. The belief that QE encourages banks to lend excess reserves is clearly mistaken, they say. And it does not make sense to encourage more lending and borrowing when the nation is overindebted.

The authors note that median real wages stopped growing when monetary policy was favored over fiscal policy, which is particularly important in a deep recession and financial crisis. Since export-led growth is unlikely to bring recovery in the United States, fiscal policy is the only engine of growth. The major problem with the government’s stimulus package is that it was too small and temporary (as exemplified by the current state of state and local government finances). They also note that the US budget deficit will quickly disappear when the economy recovers and if there is full employment. Therefore, policymakers need a more aggressive stimulus, including a greater role for sustained fiscal policy.


A Demographic Base for Ethnic Survival? Blending across Four Generations of German-Americans
JOEL PERLMANN
Working Paper No. 646

Ethnic blending is a distinguishing feature of American society. As pointed out by Senior Scholar Joel Perlmann, even fairly low levels of out-marriage in the first and second generations will produce a considerable proportion of mixed-origin couples and their children. He explores how demographic factors affected German immigrants arriving in the United States in the late 1800s, with a focus on intermarriage across four generations. He finds a high level of out-marriage with successive generations and dramatic differences in marital patterns across geographic areas. He also finds that cultural processes were the determining factor leading to the fading of German ethnicity over time.

Three factors can prolong the demographic basis for ethnic survival: the cumulative effect of fertility rates; second-generation members marrying recent immigrants during periods of high immigration (“replenishment”); and geography with respect to ethnic concentration and associated institutions. Using the US Census datasets of the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series from the (full-count) 1880 census in combination with the Linked Representative Sample, Perlmann confirms his earlier finding: high levels of ethnic blending are evident by the third generation. He also finds that the odds of marrying a woman of German origin increase with rising German concentration and that the difference between the central cities versus rural areas was statistically insignificant.

The fundamental conclusion is that generational standing, more than single origin, is the critical determinant of ethnic marital choice among men. The proportion of men with third-generation single-origins who married women with the same background was miniscule. The impact of immigration on preserving the demographic base for German ethnicity cannot be overstated, says Perlmann.

www.levyinstitute.org/pubs/wp_646.pdf

Money
L. RANDALL WRAY
Working Paper No. 647

What is money, what role does it play, and what should policy do about it? Senior Scholar L. Randall Wray builds a theory on money and links his theory to common themes in the heterodox literature based on three fundamental propositions: (1) Robert Clower’s (1965) insight that money buys goods and goods buy money, but goods do not buy goods; (2) money is always debt; and (3) default on debt is possible.
The important thing about the origin and historical transformation of money is the view of money’s role. For example, the presumption that money must be neutral in the long run is a mistake. Wray observes that Clower’s insight must underlie John Maynard Keynes’s view of a monetary economy; that is, the purpose of production is to accumulate money. As Keynes argued, there are only two obvious units of account: labor hours or the money wage unit. Money is the object of production and not merely the way we measure the value of output. Commodities obtain their value and become commodities when they are exchanged for the universal representation of social value (money). The production process begins with money, on the expectation of ending up with more money.

Money is not a “thing” but rather a unit of account in which we track all debits and credits. Production begins with money, which is a “score” that represents an IOU (debt): it does not need to have any physical existence other than some form of record, which is mostly a keyboard entry on a computer. According to Hyman P. Minsky, if money is debt, then anyone can create money by issuing an IOU denominated in the social unit of account. It is important to note that a promise to convert is voluntary and not fundamental to the issue of an IOU (e.g., modern “fiat” currencies on floating exchange rates).

Government currency is accepted because the sovereign government has the authority to collect taxes, which are levied in the national money of account. Private banks intermediate between taxpayers and government, and make payment in currency and reserves on behalf of taxpayers. All that is required to ensure acceptance of the government’s currency is the imposition of a tax liability to be paid in the government’s currency. Like all debtors, government must accept its own IOU when presented. Thus, taxes drive money.

Banks are special because they finance their position in assets by issuing debt and can operate with very high leverage ratios (i.e., they have guaranteed access to the central bank and government insurance). And they are true “intermediaries” because their profits are derived from providing the liquid “money” needed for rather than from commodity production. Since “money” is commonly associated with the transferability of debt among third parties, it is not surprising that government currency as well as bank liabilities are often included in definitions of money.

www.levyinstitute.org/pubs/wp_647.pdf

Views of European Races among the Research Staff of the US Immigration Commission and the Census Bureau, ca. 1910

JOEL PERLMANN
Working Paper No. 648

The List of Races and Peoples classification system was adopted by the US Immigration Commission and the US Census Bureau at the beginning of the 20th century. Senior Scholar Joel Perlmann focuses on the key researchers who analyzed the classification issues and determined the meaning of race, country of origin, and mother tongue for US immigrants. A main concern was to formulate applicable questions and categories in order to determine the immigrants’ impact on the country as a prelude to legislating immigration policy.

Perlmann finds a dramatic range of contradictory views among the highest level of researchers, including a broad spectrum of issues under consideration (e.g., an excess of unskilled laborers). He also finds that the recommendations of the Commission related more to restricting immigration, as voiced by the commissioners prior to their appointment, than to the findings of various reports. Thus, the balance between research and politics at the Commission was different than that at the Census Bureau, which was not expected to provide explicit policy recommendations for congressional legislation.

The Commission’s most important senior researcher was Daniel Folkmar—author of The Dictionary of Races and Peoples (1911). Folkmar believed that physical differences among European races were crucial to their mental characteristics (a popular sentiment). Race was a more fundamental factor in a person’s social life and in America’s future than a person’s country of birth, and mother tongue was indicative of ethnic stock. According to Folkmar, there was a close connection between anthropology (the survival of the fittest) and legislating (practical) immigration policy. He therefore favored adding the “race or people” question to the census enumeration. The Census Bureau subsequently placed Folkmar in charge of interpreting the mother-tongue information gained in the 1910 census (underscoring the connection between race and mother tongue).

**Fiscal Policy Effectiveness: Lessons from the Great Recession**  
**PAVLINA R. TCHERNEVA**  
Working Paper No. 649

John Maynard Keynes linked the goal of macroeconomic stabilization to the goal of full employment, which equates to an unemployment level of less than 1 percent. He identified unemployment as a problem of deficient effective demand rather than deficient aggregate demand that should be resolved by direct job creation through public works.

According to Research Associate Pavlina R. Tcherneva, Keynes provides a crucial tool for dealing with the Great Recession as well as a policy for addressing unemployment at all phases of the business cycle. What is required is a fundamental reorientation of fiscal policy toward closing the labor-demand gap rather than the output gap.

Boosting aggregate demand has been the policy response of the Bush II and Obama presidencies in the aftermath of the September 2008 financial crisis. While the Troubled Asset Relief Program and American Recovery and Reinvestment Act budgets constituted 10 percent of GDP, they were inadequate in size and direction because their net effect on growth and employment was small. There was a misplaced faith in pump-priming policies, says Tcherneva, leading to a mass exodus of discouraged workers from the labor market, a declining labor force participation rate, the wholesale destruction of full-time jobs, and record levels of long-term unemployment.

An entirely new approach is necessary to solve the unemployment problem. Reexamining the role of public works suggests that genuine full employment can be achieved via a policy of permanent “on-the-spot” employment programs open to all who are ready, willing, and able to work. Targeting employment directly is the only method for stabilizing the economy and simultaneously generating full employment over the long run.

Policy has become very effective in stabilizing aggregate incomes, profits, and cash flows, but not employment. The improvement in the balance sheets of firms is unlikely to boost hiring, while state governments and households are still too weak to lead a recovery. The onus, then, is on the stimulative policies of the federal government.

Among alternative fiscal policies, the direct job-creation approach has three main benefits: (1) it creates the highest employment impact; (2) it circumvents the problem of fixing the point of effective demand at full employment; and (3) it deals with structural unemployment directly. The goal is to provide decent jobs in terms of public goods and services that do not compete with private-sector pay or output. Tcherneva points out that policy should take workers as they are and tailor the jobs so that workers enhance their skills and gain work experience (for the private sector). Targeting spending directly to households is a genuine bottom-up approach to economic recovery.

**Fiscal Policy: Why Aggregate Demand Management Fails and What to Do about It**  
**PAVLINA R. TCHERNEVA**  
Working Paper No. 650

The aggregate demand model is designed to place a floor under collapsing demand by improving aggregate incomes, cash flows, and balance sheets. Research Associate Pavlina R. Tcherneva calls for implementing concrete fiscal policies throughout the business cycle rather than focusing on the size of (counter-cyclical) government spending. The specific objectives of fiscal policy must include full employment, better income distribution, and poverty alleviation, she says.

John Maynard Keynes emphasized direct employment and structural reform, and he favored a broader socialization of investment as the solution to macroeconomic stability. According to Tcherneva, the recipe for full employment and macroeconomic stability consists of boosting the government’s demand for labor rather than output.

Tcherneva considers three shortcomings of the aggregate-demand approach: the failure to produce and maintain full employment, the tendency to erode income distribution (contributing to overall inequality), and the reinforcement of the poverty cycle. She notes that, after seven decades, postwar aggregate demand management policies in the United States have failed to produce true full employment, while there has been a clear upward trend in the long-term unemployment rate. Furthermore, these policy measures are fraught with inflationary pressures because they boost the wages of workers at the top of the income distribution first and those at the bottom last,
while financing capital assets. As a result, policymakers abandon the aggregate-demand approach before full employment. By contrast, the Keynesian targeted-demand approach directly increases and stabilizes the share of labor income in production, and improves incomes at the bottom of the income distribution relative to incomes at the top (by employing workers in the production of public goods and services).

The current pro-growth, pro-investment aggregate demand approach is bankrupt from a moral and an economic perspective, says Tcherneva, and more government spending cannot be a proper policy objective. Rather, meaningful academic and political discourse should focus on the type of government spending. A key strategy should foster “labor force attachment,” since a job guarantee helps eliminate poverty.

Unit Labor Costs in the Eurozone: The Competitiveness Debate Again
Jesus Felipe and Utsav Kumar
Working Paper No. 651

Policy discussions about regaining competitiveness in the eurozone have focused on unit labor costs (and a decrease in the nominal wage rate). According to Jesus Felipe and Utsav Kumar, Asian Development Bank, Manila, Philippines, the debate overlooks the lack of empirical evidence concerning the (supposed) relationship between unit labor costs and output (e.g., Kaldor’s paradox). Using aggregate data to calculate unit labor costs for a particular country is misleading, they say, because there is no physical equivalent of output (value added is used instead). The most sensible option to counter the current crisis is reform that allows a greater and more active role for fiscal policy to upgrade production, particularly for the PIIGS (Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, and Spain).

Kaldor’s paradox states that countries with the greatest decline in price competitiveness (i.e., the highest increase in unit labor costs) also experience the greatest increase in market share. As a result, the belief that low nominal wage growth vis-à-vis productivity will restore competitiveness is too simplistic, say the authors, and a decrease in the nominal wage rate is not a solution to the current crisis.

Felipe and Kumar analyze 12 countries in the eurozone for the 1980–2007 period. They find that unit labor costs increased at a greater pace than labor productivity in all countries. Moreover, unit labor costs in the PIIGS increased at a faster rate than in Germany. The problem is that the PIIGS are trapped into using midlevel technologies. Thus, wage reduction is not the solution.

The authors also define unit capital costs (the ratio of the nominal profit rate to the productivity of capital) and find a constant or increasing share of capital in the total value added (with the exception of Greece) that has important macroeconomic implications. It indicates that the “loss of competitiveness” by some countries is not just a question of nominal wages increasing faster than labor productivity. Rather, nominal profit rates decreased at a slower pace than capital productivity. Moreover, the nontradable sector of economies has been gaining on the tradable sector.

The problem with using unit labor costs as a policy variable is that competitiveness is considered from the firm’s point of view; analyses of unit labor costs and real wages may send different signals. Using real average labor compensation data as a proxy for real wages, the authors find that unit labor costs increased faster than “real wages.” They also find that labor productivity grew faster than real wage rates in all countries with the exceptions of Greece and Portugal.

A prolonged income shift toward capital will induce a mismatch between supply and demand, and a decline in consumption, capacity utilization, income, production, and employment (an underconsumption crisis). In contrast, a wage-led economy (with higher real wage rates or labor share) stimulates demand and leads to an increase in the equilibrium capacity utilization rate, the growth rate of capital stock, and economic growth. Thus, policies that reduce unit labor inputs lead to a sharp decline in domestic demand—an outcome that is overlooked in policy discussions. A policy option for the eurozone that has the support of the authors is a greater role for fiscal policy, including a (long-term) strategy where the PIIGS replicate Germany in terms of developing more sophisticated (export) products.
INSTITUTE NEWS

Upcoming Events

20th Annual Hyman P. Minsky Conference on the State of the US and World Economies
Financial Reform and the Real Economy
Ford Foundation, New York City
April 13–15, 2011

The 20th Annual Minsky Conference will address the ongoing effects of the global financial crisis on the real economy, and examine proposed and recently enacted policy responses. Should ending too-big-to-fail be the cornerstone of reform? Do the markets’ pursuit of self-interest generate real societal benefits? Is financial sector growth actually good for the real economy? Will the recently passed US financial reform bill make the entire financial system, not only the banks, safer? This conference is organized by the Levy Economics Institute of Bard College with support from the Ford Foundation. Additional information, including how to register, is available at www.levyinstitute.org.

Wednesday, April 13

8:00–9:00 a.m.  Breakfast and Registration

9:00–9:30 a.m.  Welcome and Introduction
LEONARDO BURLAMAQUI, Ford Foundation
DIMITRI B. PAPADIMITRIOU, Levy Institute

9:30–11:00 a.m.  Session 1
The Ford–Levy Institute Project on Reregulating Financial Institutions and Markets
Speakers:
JAN KREGEL, Levy Institute and Tallinn Technical University
L. RANDALL WRAY, Levy Institute and University of Missouri–Kansas City
ÉRIC TYMOIGNE, Levy Institute and Lewis and Clark College

11:00–11:15 a.m.  Coffee Break

11:15 a.m. – 1:00 p.m.  Session 2

Financial Journalism and Financial Reform: What’s Missing from the Headlines?
Moderator: JOHN CASSIDY, The New Yorker
Speakers:
JEFF MADRICK, Challenge, Roosevelt Institute, and The New School
JOE NOCERA, The New York Times
FRANCESCO GUERRERA, Financial Times
STEVE RANDY WALDMAN, Interfluidity.com

1:00–2:45 p.m.  Lunch
Speaker: GARY GENSLER, US Commodity Futures Trading Commission

2:45–3:45 p.m.  Speaker
STEPHEN S. ROACH, Morgan Stanley and Yale University

3:45–4:00 p.m.  Coffee Break

4:00–5:00 p.m.  Session 3
Swaps Regulation
Moderator: JUSTIN LAHART, The Wall Street Journal
Speakers:
JOSÉ GABILOMONDO, Florida International University
MICHAEL GREENBERGER, The University of Maryland
MICHAEL W. MASTERS, Masters Capital Management, LLC

5:00 p.m.  Reception and Dinner
Speaker: PAUL MCCULLEY, Society of Fellows, Global Interdependence Center; formerly, Managing Director, PIMCO

Thursday, April 14

8:30–9:00 a.m.  Breakfast

9:00–10:15 a.m.  Speaker
ANDREW SHENG, China Banking Regulatory Commission and Tsinghua University

10:15–11:15 a.m.  Session 4
Financial Reform and the GATS: Challenges and Opportunities
Speakers:
WILLIAM H. JANEWAY, Warburg Pincus and Cambridge in America
PHILIP SUITTL, The Institute of International Finance
LORI M. WALLACH, Global Trade Watch, Public Citizen

11:15–11:30 a.m.  Coffee Break
16:30 a.m. – 12:30 p.m. Speaker
PHIL ANGELIDES, Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission

12:30–2:15 p.m. Lunch
Speaker: CHARLES I. PLOSSER, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia

2:15–3:30 p.m. Session 5
Fiscal Constraints and Macro Perspectives
Moderator: LOUIS UCHITELLE, The New York Times
Speakers:
RICHARD BERNER, Morgan Stanley
PETER HOOPER, Deutsche Bank Securities
ROBERT W. PARENTEAU, Levy Institute and MacroStrategy Edge
MARSHALL AUERBACK, Levy Institute and Roosevelt Institute

3:30–4:30 p.m. Speaker
GARY B. GORTON, Yale University and National Bureau of Economic Research

4:30–4:45 p.m. Coffee Break

4:45–6:15 p.m. Policy and Regulatory Responses of Emerging Markets:
Latin America
Speaker: MERCEDES MARCO DEL PONT, Central Bank of Argentina
Discussion: ARTURO O’CONNELL, Central Bank of Argentina

6:15 p.m. Reception and Dinner
Speaker: PAUL TUCKER, Bank of England

Friday, April 15

8:30–9:00 a.m. Breakfast

9:00–10:00 a.m. Speaker
ATHANASIOS ORPHANIDES, Central Bank of Cyprus and European Central Bank

10:00–11:00 a.m. Speaker
VÍTOR CONSTÂNcio, European Central Bank

11:00–11:15 a.m. Coffee Break

11:15 a.m. – 12:15 p.m. Speaker
CHARLES L. EVANS, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago

12:15–2:30 p.m. Lunch
Speaker: SHEILA C. BAIR, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation

2:30–3:45 p.m. Session 6
Reregulating the US Financial System: Beyond Dodd-Frank
Moderator: ERIC DASH, The New York Times
Speakers:
JAMES K. GALBRAITH, Levy Institute and University of Texas at Austin
ROBERT A. JOHNSON, Institute for New Economic Thinking
ALEX J. POLLOCK, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research

3:45–4:15 p.m. Speaker
MARTIN MAYER, The Brookings Institution

4:15–5:15 p.m. Reception

The Wynne Godley Memorial Conference
Contributions in Stock-flow Modeling
Levy Economics Institute of Bard College
Annandale-on-Hudson, New York
May 25–26, 2011

Wynne Godley’s work focused on the strategic prospects for the US, UK, and world economies, and the use of accounting macroeconomic models to reveal structural imbalances. This conference will provide scholars profoundly influenced by his work the opportunity to celebrate his contributions to the field of economics. Topics will include fiscal policy and stock-flow consistent models; unsustainable processes and the role of the dollar in fostering global imbalances; stability and convergence programs; trade and current account imbalances and international currencies; financial integration, intrazone credit, and stabilization in a monetary union; debt-deflation traps within small open economies; and the UK and US private expenditure function.

The Hyman P. Minsky Summer Seminar
Levy Economics Institute of Bard College
Annandale-on-Hudson, New York
June 18–26, 2011

The second annual Minsky Summer Seminar will provide a rigorous discussion of both the theoretical and applied aspects of
Minsky’s economics, with an examination of meaningful prescriptive policies relevant to the current economic and financial crisis. The Seminar program will be organized by Jan Kregel, Dimitri B. Papadimitriou, and L. Randall Wray, and will be of particular interest to recent graduates, graduate students, and those at the beginning of their academic or professional careers. Teaching staff will include well-known economists concentrating on and expanding Minsky’s work. For additional information, visit our website.

**PUBLICATIONS AND PRESENTATIONS**

Publications and Presentations by Levy Institute Scholars

RANIA ANTONOPoulos Research Scholar and Program Director


PHILIP ARESTIS Senior Scholar


JAMES K. GALBRAITH Senior Scholar


JAN KREGEL Senior Scholar and Program Director


Italy, November 30; “Evolution versus Equilibrium,” Veblen-Commons Award Lecture, Annual Meeting of the Association for Evolutionary Economics, Denver, Colo., January 7, 2011.

**THOMAS MASTERSON** Research Scholar


**Presentations:** “Economic Inequality in the US: An Alternative Perspective” (with E. N. Wolff and A. Zacharias), Union for Radical Political Economists (URPE) panel on “Inequality and Worker Well-Being in the US,” and “New Estimates of Economic Inequality in America, 1959–2004,” URPE panel on “Inequality in North America,” Annual Meeting of the Allied Social Science Associations, Denver, Colo., January 8–9.

**DIMITRI B. PAPADIMITRIOU** President


**JOEL PERLMANN** Senior Scholar and Program Director


**EDWARD N. WOLFF** Senior Scholar


**AJIT ZACHARIAS** Senior Scholar

**Presentation:** “Economic Inequality in the US: An Alternative Perspective” (with T. Masterson and E. N. Wolff), Union for Radical Political Economists panel on “Inequality and Worker Well-Being in the US,” Annual Meeting of the Allied Social Science Associations, Denver, Colo., January 8, 2011.

**GENNARO ZEZZA** Research Scholar
