Research Programs

The State of the US and World Economies

The State of the US and World Economies

This program's central focus is the use of Levy Institute macroeconomic models in generating strategic analyses of the US and world economies. The outcomes of alternative scenarios are projected and analyzed, with the results—published as Strategic Analysis reports—serving to help policymakers understand the implications of various policy options.

The Levy Institute macroeconomic models, created by Distinguished Scholar Wynne Godley, are accounting based. The US model employs a complete and consistent system (in that all sectors “sum up,” with no unaccounted leakages) of stocks and flows (such as income, production, and wealth). The world model is a “closed” system, in which 11 trading blocs—of which the United States, China, Japan, and Western Europe are four—are represented. This model is based on a matrix in which each bloc’s imports are described in terms of exports from the other 10 blocs. From this information, and using alternative assumptions (e.g., growth rates, trade shares, and energy demands and supplies), trends are identified and patterns of trade and production analyzed.

The projections derived from the models are not presented as short-term forecasts. The aim is to display, based on analysis of the recent past, what it seems reasonable to expect if current trends, policies, and relationships continue. To inform policy, it is not necessary to establish that a particular projection will come to pass, but only that it is something that must be given serious consideration as a possibility. The usefulness of such analyses is strategic: they can serve to warn policymakers of potential dangers and serve as a guide to policy instruments that are available, or should be made available, to deal with those dangers, should they arise.



United States

  • Working Paper No. 1042 | February 2024
    For more than 25 years, the Social Security Trust Fund was projected to run out of money in 2033 (give or take a few years), potentially causing benefits to be severely reduced in the absence of corrective legislative action. Today (February 2024), projections are made by the Social Security Administration that indicate that future benefits will need to be reduced by roughly 25 percent or taxes will need to be increased by about 33 percent, or some combination to avoid benefit curtailment. While Congress will most probably prevent benefits from being reduced for retirees and those nearing retirement, the longer Congress and the president take to address the shortfall, the more politically unpalatable (and possibly draconian) the solutions will be for all others.
     
    Dozens of proposals are being evaluated to address the long-term problem by mainstream benefits experts, economists, think tanks, politicians, and government agencies but, with rare exceptions from a few economists, none address the short-term problem of Trust Fund depletion, provide a workable roadmap for the long-term challenges, or consider fundamental financing differences between the federal government and the private sector.
     
    This paper aims to address these issues by suggesting legislative changes that will protect the Social Security system indefinitely, help ensure the adequacy of benefits for retirees and their survivors and dependents, and remove confusing and misleading legislative and administrative complexity. In making recommendations, this paper will demonstrate that the Social Security Trust Funds, while legally distinct, are essentially an artificial accounting contrivance within the US Treasury that have become a tool to force program changes that, for ideological reasons, will likely shift an increasing financial burden onto those who can least bear it.  Finally, while the focus of this paper is on the Social Security system, it would be incomplete without also addressing, albeit in a limited way, the larger political issue of the nation’s debt and deficit along with the implications for inflation.

  • Strategic Analysis | July 2023
    In this Strategic Analysis, Dimitri B. Papadimitriou, Michalis Nikiforos, Giuliano T. Yajima, and Gennaro Zezza discuss how the current state and structural features of the US economy might affect its future trajectory. The recent recovery after the pandemic has been remarkable, when compared to previous cycles, and offers evidence of the efficacy of fiscal policy. Moreover, the inflation rate has been finally decelerating as the problems in global value chains that emerged after the pandemic are resolving and the price of commodities and oil, which spiked after the pandemic and the war in Ukraine, are stabilizing.

    Yet despite the recent success of fiscal policy in promoting output and employment growth, the recent debt ceiling deal—culminating in the 2023 Fiscal Responsibility Act—risks putting the US economy on the austerity path of the previous decade. And given the structural weaknesses of the US economy—including its high current account deficits, high level of indebtedness of firms, and overvalued stock and real estate prices—this projected fiscal policy tightening, combined with the impacts of high interest rates, could lead to a significant slowdown of the US economy.

    The US economy, the authors contend, is in need of a structural transformation toward modernizing its infrastructure, promoting industrial policy, and investing in the greening of its economy and environmental sustainability. A necessary condition for achieving these goals is an increase in government expenditure; they show that such an increase could also have positive demand effects on output and employment. 

  • Policy Note 2023/1 | May 2023
    In 2022, Greek GDP grew at a higher rate than the eurozone average as the nation’s economy rebounded from the COVID-19 shock.

    However, it was not all welcome news. In particular, Greece registered its largest current account deficit since 2009. Despite a widespread focus on fiscal profligacy, it is excessive current account and trade deficits—largely caused by private sector imbalances—that are at the root of Greece’s multiple economic challenges. This policy note identifies the major determinants causing the deterioration of the current account balance in order to devise appropriate corrective policies.

  • Working Paper No. 1018 | April 2023
    How to Deal with the “Demographic Time Bomb”
    The aging of the global population is in the headlines following a report that China’s population fell as deaths surpassed births. Pundits worry that a declining Chinese workforce means trouble for other economies that have come to rely on China’s exports. France is pushing through an increase of the retirement age in the face of what is called a demographic “time bomb” facing rich nations, created by rising longevity and low birthrates. As we approach the debt limit in the US, while President Biden has promised to protect Social Security, many have returned to the argument that the program is financially unsustainable. This paper argues that most of the discussion and policy solutions proposed surrounding aging of populations are misfocused on supposed financial challenges when they should be directed toward the challenges facing resource provision. From the resource perspective, the burden of caring for tomorrow’s seniors seems far less challenging. Indeed, falling fertility rates and an end to global population growth should be welcomed. With fewer children and longer lives, investment in the workers of the future will ensure growth of productivity that will provide the resources necessary to support a higher ratio of retirees to those of working age. Global population growth will peak and turn negative, reducing demands on earth’s biosphere and making it easier to transition to environmental sustainability. Rather than facing a demographic “time bomb,” we can welcome the transition to a mature-aged profile.

  • Working Paper No. 1017 | April 2023
    This paper revisits a traditional theme in the literature on the political economy of development, namely how to redistribute rents from traditional exporters of natural resources toward capitalists in technology-intensive sectors with a higher potential for innovation and the creation of higher-productivity jobs. Porcile and Lima argue that this conflict has been reshaped in the past three decades by two major transformations in the international economy. The first is the acceleration of technical change and the key role governments play in supporting international competitiveness. This role provides the strategic public goods to foster innovation and the diffusion of technology (what Christopher Freeman called “technological infrastructure”). The second is the impact of financial globalization in limiting the ability of governments in the periphery to tax and/or issue debt to finance those public goods. Capital mobility allows exporters of natural resources to send their foreign exchange abroad to arbitrate between domestic and foreign assets, and to avoid taxation. Using a macroeconomic model for a small, open economy, the authors argue that in this more complex international context, the external constraint on output growth assumes different forms. They focus on two polar cases: the “pure financialization” case, in which legal and illegal capital flights prevent the government from financing the provision of strategic public goods; and the “trade deficit” case, in which private firms in the more technology-intensive sector cannot import the capital goods they need to expand industrial production.
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    Author(s):
    Gabriel Porcile Gilberto Tadeu Lima
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    United States

  • Working Paper No. 1015 | February 2023
    Fractional reserve regimes generate fragile banking, and full reserve regimes (e.g., narrow banking) remove fragility at the cost of suppressing the role of banks as lenders. A Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC) could provide safe money, but at the cost of potentially disrupting bank lending. Our aim is to avoid this potential disruption. Building on the recent literature on CBDCs, in this study we propose what we call the “CBDC next-level model,” whereby the central bank creates money by lending to banks, and banks on-lend the proceeds to the economy. The proposed model would allow for deposits to be taken off the balance sheet of banks and into the balance sheet of the central bank, thereby removing significant risk from the banking system without adversely impacting banks’ basic business. Once CBDC is injected in the system, irrespective of however it is used, wherever it accumulates, and whoever holds and uses it, it will always represent central bank equity, and no losses or defaults by individual banks or borrowers can ever dent it or weaken the central bank’s capital position or hurt depositors. Yet, individual borrowers and banks would still be required to honor their debt in full, lest they would be bound to exit the market or even be forced into bankruptcy. The CBDC next-level model solution would eliminate the threat of bank runs and system collapse and induce a degree of financial stability (“super-stability”) that would be unparalleled by any existing banking system.

  • Working Paper No. 1013 | January 2023
    A Sectoral Multiplier Analysis for the United States
    We assess the sectoral impact of the implementation of a “green” employer of last resort (ELR) program in the US, based on an environmental modification of an extended Kurz’s (1985) multiplier framework and data from OECD Input-Output tables. We use these multipliers to estimate the impact of an “optimal” ELR, designed to maximize the impact on both output and employment while minimizing both imports and carbon emissions. We then test several alternative policy scenarios based upon different compositions of US government expenditure. We provide evidence that (1) investing in the optimal sectors in terms of output, employment, Co2, and import multipliers does not always deliver optimal results in the aggregate; (2) ecological sustainability for the US economy also fosters import sustainability; (3) a rebounding effect in Co2 emissions may be tamed if the ELR satisfies the abovementioned optimality condition, though this undermines its success in terms of output and employment. 

  • One-Pager | December 2022
    While the trigger for the Covid recession was unusual—a collapse of the supply side that produced a drop in demand—the inflation the US economy is now facing is not atypical, according to L. Randall Wray. In this one-pager, he explores the causes of the current inflationary environment, arguing that continuing inflation pressures come mostly from the supply side.

    Wray warns that, given federal spending had already been declining substantially before the Fed started raising interest rates, rate hikes make a recession—and potentially stagflation—even more likely. A key part of our fiscal policy response should be focused on well-designed public investment addressing the substantial supply constraints still affecting the US economy—constraints that are not just due to the Covid crisis, but also decades of underinvestment in infrastructure. Such an approach, in Wray's view, would reduce inflationary pressures while supporting growth.
     

  • Strategic Analysis | August 2022
    The Fed Conundrum
    In this report, Institute President Dimitri B. Papadimitriou, Research Scholar Michalis Nikiforos, and Senior Scholar Gennaro Zezza analyze how and why the US economy has achieved a swift recovery in comparison with the last few economic cycles.

    This recovery has nevertheless been accompanied by significant increases in the trade deficit and inflation. Papadimitriou, Nikiforos, and Zezza argue that the elevated rate of inflation has been largely unrelated to the level of demand or the pace of the recovery, and has more to do with pandemic-related disruptions, the war in Ukraine, and the beginning of a new commodity super cycle.

    The authors also identify persistent Minskyan processes that mean the US economy remains fundamentally unstable, with a risk of financial crisis and potentially severe consequences in terms of output and employment—a risk heightened by the reversal of the loose monetary policy that has prevailed over the last decade and a half. In their first scenario, they simulate the macroeconomic impact of such a financial crisis and private sector deleveraging. In two additional scenarios, the authors analyze the likely effects of a new round of fiscal stimulus that would be necessary in case of a crisis: a deficit-financed expenditure boost with no offsetting revenue increases, and a deficit-neutral scenario in which taxation of high-income households increases by an amount equivalent to the expansion of public expenditure.

  • Public Policy Brief No. 157 | April 2022
    The Fed Cannot Engineer a Soft Landing but Risks Stagflation by Trying
    Roughly two years into the economic recovery from the COVID-19 crisis, the topic of elevated inflation dominates the economic policy discourse in the United States. And the aggressive use of fiscal policy to support demand and incomes has commonly been singled out as the culprit. Equally as prevalent is the clamor for the Federal Reserve to raise interest rates to relieve inflationary pressures. According to Research Scholar Yeva Nersisyan and Senior Scholar L. Randall Wray, this narrative is flawed in a number of ways. The problem with the US economy is not one of excess of demand in their view, and the Federal Reserve will not be able to engineer a “soft landing” in the way many seem to be expecting. The authors also deliver a warning: excessive tightening, combined with headwinds in 2022, could lead to stagflation. Moreover, while this recovery looks robust in comparison to the jobless recoveries and secular stagnation that have typified the last few decades, in Nersisyan and Wray’s estimation there are few signs of an overheating economy to be found in the macro data. In their view, this inflation is not centrally demand driven; rather dynamics at the micro-level are playing a much more central role in driving the price increases in question, while significant supply chain problems have curtailed productive capacity by disrupting the availability of critical inputs.

    The authors suggest there is a better way to conduct policy—one oriented around targeted investments that would increase our real resource space. This will serve not only to address inflationary pressures, according to Nersisyan and Wray, but also the far more pressing climate emergency.
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  • Working Paper No. 1003 | March 2022
    Pandemic or Policy Response?
    This paper examines the recent increase of the measured inflation rate to assess the degree to which the acceleration is due to problems created (largely on the supply side) by the pandemic versus pressures created on the demand side by pandemic relief. Some have attributed the inflation to excess demand, most notably Larry Summers, who had warned that the pandemic relief spending was too great. As evidence, one could point to the quick recovery of GDP and to reportedly tight labor markets. Others have variously blamed supply chain disruptions, shortages of certain inputs, OPEC’s oil price increases, labor market disruptions because of COVID, and rising profit margins obtained through exercise of pricing power. We conclude that there is little evidence that excess demand is the problem, although we agree that in the absence of the relief checks, recovery would have been sufficiently slow to minimize inflation pressure. We closely examine the main contributors to rising overall prices and conclude that tighter monetary policy would not be an effective way to reduce price pressures. We also cast doubt on the expectations theory of inflation control. We present evidence that suggests there is currently little danger that higher inflation will become entrenched. If anything, rate hikes now will make it harder for the economy to adjust to current realities. The potential for lots of pain with little gain is great. The best course of action is to tackle problems on the supply side.

  • One-Pager No. 69 | February 2022
    A recent article in the New York Times asks whether Modern Money Theory (MMT) can declare victory after its policies were (supposedly) implemented during the response to the COVID-19 pandemic. The article suggests yes, but for the high inflation it sparked. In the view of Yeva Nersisyan and Senior Scholar L. Randall Wray, the federal government’s response largely validated MMT’s claims regarding public debt and deficits and questions of sovereign government solvency—it did not, however, represent MMT policy.

  • Working Paper No. 1001 | February 2022
    This paper estimates the distribution-led regime of the US economy for the period 1947–2019. We use a time varying parameter model, which allows for changes in the regime over time. To the best of our knowledge this is the first paper that has attempted to do this. This innovation is important, because there is no reason to expect that the regime of the US economy (or any economy for that matter) remains constant over time. On the contrary, there are significant reasons that point to changes in the regime. We find that the US economy became more profit-led in the first postwar decades until the 1970s and has become less profit-led since; it is slightly wage-led over the last fifteen years.

  • Working Paper No. 999 | January 2022
    Does Financial “Bonanza” Cause Premature Deindustrialization?
    The outbreak of COVID-19 brought back to the forefront the crucial importance of structural change and productive development for economic resilience to economic shocks. Several recent contributions have already stressed the perverse relationship that may exist between productive backwardness and the intensity of the COVID-19 socioeconomic crisis. In this paper, we analyze the factors that may have hindered productive development for over four decades before the pandemic. We investigate the role of (non-FDI) net capital inflows as a potential source of premature deindustrialization. We consider a sample of 36 developed and developing countries from 1980 to 2017, with major emphasis on the case of emerging and developing economies (EDE) in the context of increasing financial integration. We show that periods of abundant capital inflows may have caused the significant contraction of manufacturing share to employment and GDP, as well as the decrease of the economic complexity index. We also show that phenomena of “perverse” structural change are significantly more relevant in EDE countries than advanced ones. Based on such evidence, we conclude with some policy suggestions highlighting capital controls and external macroprudential measures taming international capital mobility as useful tools for promoting long-run productive development on top of strengthening (short-term) financial and macroeconomic stability.
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    Author(s):
    Alberto Botta Giuliano Toshiro Yajima Gabriel Porcile
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    United States, Latin America, Europe, Middle East, Africa, Asia

  • One-Pager No. 68 | November 2021
    With the US Treasury cutting checks totaling approximately $5 trillion to deal with the COVID-19 crisis, Senior Scholar L. Randall Wray argues that when it comes to the federal government, concerns about affordability and solvency can both be laid to rest. According to Wray, the question is never whether the federal government can spend more, but whether it should. And while there are still strongly held beliefs about the negative impacts of deficits and debt on inflation, interest rates, growth, and exchange rates, with two centuries of experience the evidence for these concerns is mixed at best.

  • Working Paper No. 993 | September 2021
    Theory and Empirics
    This paper provides a theoretical and empirical reassessment of supermultiplier theory. First, we show that, as a result of the passive role it assigns to investment, the Sraffian supermultiplier (SSM) predicts that the rate of utilization leads the investment share in a dampened cycle or, equivalently,  that a convergent cyclical motion in the utilization-investment share plane would be counterclockwise. Second, impulse response functions from standard recursive vector autoregressions (VAR) for postwar US samples strongly indicate that the investment share leads the rate of utilization, or that these cycles are clockwise. These results raise questions about the key mechanism underlying supermultiplier theory.

  • e-pamphlets | August 2021
    Modern Money Theory (MMT) has been frequently mentioned in recent media—first as “crazy talk” that if followed would bankrupt the nation and then, after the COVID-19 pandemic hit, as a way to finance an emergency response. In recent months, however, Washington seems to have returned to the old view that government spending must be “paid for” with new taxes. This raises the question: Has MMT really made headway with policymakers? This e-pamphlet examines the extraordinary interview given recently by Representative John Yarmuth’s (D, KY-03), Chair of the House Budget Committee, in which he explicitly adopts an MMT approach to budgeting. Chairman Yarmuth also lays out a path for realizing the major elements of President Biden’s proposals. Finally, Wray summarizes a recent presentation he gave to the Congressional Budget Office’s Macroeconomic Analysis section that urged reconsideration of the way that fiscal policy impacts are assessed.

  • Public Policy Brief No. 155 | June 2021
    Yes, If He Abandons Fiscal “Pay Fors"
    President Biden’s proposals for investing in social and physical infrastructure signal a return to a budget-neutral policymaking framework that has largely been set aside since the outbreak of the COVID-19 crisis. According Yeva Nersisyan and L. Randall Wray, this focus on ensuring revenues keep pace with spending increases can undermine the goals internal to both the public investment and tax components of the administration’s plans: the “pay for” approach limits our spending on progressive policy to what we can raise through taxes, and we will only tax the amount we need to spend.

    Nersisyan and Wray propose an alternative approach to budgeting for large-scale public expenditure programs. In their view, policymakers should evaluate spending and tax proposals on their own terms, according to the goals each is intended to meet. If the purpose of taxing corporations and wealthy individuals is to reduce inequality, then the tax changes should be formulated to accomplish that—not to “raise funds” to finance proposed spending. And while it is possible that general tax hikes might be needed to prevent public investment programs from fueling inflation, they argue that the kinds of taxes proposed by the administration would do little to relieve inflationary pressures should they arise. Under current economic circumstances, however, the president’s proposed infrastructure spending should not require budgetary offsets or other measures to control inflation in their estimation.

  • Strategic Analysis | June 2021
    In this report, Institute President Dimitri B. Papadimitriou and Research Scholars Michalis Nikiforos and Gennaro Zezza analyze how the US economy was affected by the pandemic and its prospects for recovery.
     
    Their baseline simulation using the Institute’s stock-flow macroeconometric model shows a significant pickup in the growth rate in 2021 as a result of the American Rescue Plan Act. The report includes two additional scenarios simulated on top of the baseline, finding that President Biden’s infrastructure and families plans—whether paired with offsetting tax increases on high-earners or “deficit financed”—would have positive macroeconomic effects. Additionally, Papadimitriou, Nikiforos, and Zezza warn that if US policymakers do not prioritize decreasing the trade deficit, maintaining growth will require either continuous and very high government deficits or the private sector once again becoming a net borrower.
     
    Finally, they argue that concerns about a sharp increase in inflation spurred by the fiscal stimulus are unwarranted: the US economy was not close to full employment or full utilization of resources before the pandemic, and the propagation mechanisms that could lead to accelerating inflation are not in place.

  • Working Paper No. 989 | June 2021
    The paper provides an empirical discussion of the national emergency utilization rate (NEUR), which is based on a “national emergency” definition of potential output and is published by the US Census Bureau. Over the peak-to-peak period 1989–2019, the NEUR decreased by 14.2 percent. The paper examines the trajectory of potential determinants of capacity utilization over the same period as specified in the related theory, namely: capital intensity, relative prices of labor and capital, shift differentials, rhythmic variations in demand, industry concentration, and aggregate demand. It shows that most of them have moved in a direction that would lead to an increase in utilization. The main factor that can explain the decrease in the NEUR is aggregate demand, while the increase in industry concentration might have also played a small role.

  • One-Pager No. 65 | February 2021
    With the unveiling of President Biden’s nearly $2 trillion proposal for addressing the COVID-19 crisis, Democrats appear keen to avoid repeating the mistakes of the Great Recession—most notably the inadequate fiscal response.

    Yeva Nersisyan and L. Randall Wray observe that while Democrats are not falling for the “deficit bogeyman” this time, critics have pushed the idea that the increase in government spending will cause inflation. Nersisyan and Wray argue that the current fiscal package should be evaluated as a set of relief measures, not stimulus, and that the objections of the inflation worriers should not stand in the way of taking needed action.
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  • Public Policy Brief No. 154 | February 2021
    Let Us Look Seriously at the Clearing Union
    This policy brief explores a route to remaking the international financial system that would avoid the contradictions inherent in some of the prevailing reform proposals currently under discussion. Senior Scholar Jan Kregel argues that the willingness of central banks to consider electronic currency provides an opening to reconsider a truly innovative reform of the international financial system, and one that is more appropriate to a digital monetary world: John Maynard Keynes’s original clearing union proposal.
     
    Kregel investigates whether such a clearing system could be built up from an already-existing initiative that has emerged in the private sector. He analyzes the operations of a private, cross-border payment system that could serve as a real-world blueprint for a more politically palatable equivalent of Keynes’s international clearing union.
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    Jan Kregel
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    United States, Europe

  • Policy Note 2020/6 | October 2020
    As COVID-19 infection and test positivity rates rise in the United States and federal stimulus plans expire, Senior Scholar Jan Kregel articulates an alternative approach to analyzing the economic problems raised by the pandemic and organizing an appropriate policy response. In contrast to both the mainstream and some Keynesian-inspired approaches, Kregel advocates a central role for direct social provisioning as a means of equitably sharing the costs of quarantine under conditions of strict lockdown.
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    Jan Kregel
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  • Working Paper No. 971 | September 2020
    In a seminal 1972 paper, Robert M. May asked: “Will a Large Complex System Be Stable?” and argued that stability (of a broad class of random linear systems) decreases with increasing complexity, sparking a revolution in our understanding of ecosystem dynamics. Twenty-five years later, May, Levin, and Sugihara translated our understanding of the dynamics of ecological networks to the financial world in a second seminal paper, “Complex Systems: Ecology for Bankers.” Just a year later, the US subprime crisis led to a near worldwide “great recession,” spread by the world financial network. In the present paper we describe highlights in the development of our present understanding of stability and complexity in network systems, in order to better understand the role of networks in both stabilizing and destabilizing economic systems. A brief version of this working paper, focused on the underlying theory, appeared as an invited feature article in the February 2020 Society for Chaos Theory in Psychology and the Life Sciences newsletter (Hastings et al. 2020).
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    Harold M. Hastings Tai Young-Taft Chih-Jui Tsen
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    United States

  • Policy Note 2020/1 | March 2020
    The Economic Implications of the Pandemic
    The spread of the new coronavirus (COVID-19) is a major shock for the US and global economies. Research Scholar Michalis Nikiforos explains that we cannot fully understand the economic implications of the pandemic without reference to two Minskyan processes at play in the US economy: the growing divergence of stock market prices from output prices, and the increasing fragility in corporate balance sheets.

    The pandemic did not arrive in the context of an otherwise healthy US economy—the demand and supply dimensions of the shock have aggravated an inevitable adjustment process. Using a Minskyan framework, we can understand how the current economic weakness can be perpetuated through feedback effects between flows of demand and supply and their balance sheet impacts.

  • One-Pager No. 62 | March 2020
    As the coronavirus (COVID-19) spreads across the United States, it has become clear that, in addition to the public health response (which has been far less than adequate), an economic response is needed. Yeva Nersisyan and Senior Scholar L. Randall Wray identify four steps that require immediate attention: (1) full coverage of medical costs associated with testing and treatment of COVID-19; (2) mandated paid sick leave and full coverage of associated costs; (3) debt relief for families; and (4) swift deployment of testing and treatment facilities to underserved communities.

  • One-Pager No. 61 | March 2020
    The rapidly growing uncertainty about the potential global fallout from an emerging pandemic is occurring against a background in which there is evidence US corporate sector balance sheets are significantly overstretched, exhibiting a degree of fragility that, according to some measures, is unmatched in the postwar historical record. The US economy is vulnerable to a shock that could trigger a cascade of falling asset prices and private sector deleveraging, with severe consequences for both the real and financial sides of the economy.

  • Working Paper No. 945 | January 2020
    The present paper emphasizes the role of demand, income distribution, endogenous productivity reactions, and other structural changes in the slowdown of the growth rate of output and productivity that has been observed in the United States over the last four decades. In particular, it is explained that weak net export demand, fiscal conservatism, and the increase in income inequality have put downward pressure on demand. Up until the crisis, this pressure was partially compensated for through debt-financed expenditure on behalf of the private sector, especially middle- and lower-income households. This debt overhang is now another obstacle in the way of demand recovery. In turn, as emphasized by the Kaldor-Verdoorn law and the induced technical change approach, the decrease in demand and the stagnation of wages can lead to an endogenous slowdown in productivity growth. Moreover, it is argued that the increasingly oligopolistic and financialized structure of the US economy also contributes to the slowdown. Finally, the paper argues that there is nothing secular about the current stagnation; addressing the aforementioned factors can allow for growth to resume, as has happened in the past.

  • Public Policy Brief No. 148 | January 2020
    In this policy brief, Yeva Nersisyan and Senior Scholar L. Randall Wray argue that assessing the “affordability” of the Green New Deal is a question of whether there are suitable and sufficient real resources than can be mobilized to implement this ambitious approach to climate policy. Only after a careful resource accounting can we address the question of whether taxes and other means might be needed to reduce private spending to avoid inflation as the Green New Deal is phased in.
     
    Nersisyan and Wray provide a first attempt at resource budgeting for the Green New Deal, weighing available resources—including potential excess capacity and resources that can be shifted away from existing production—against what will be needed to implement the major elements of this plan to fight climate change and ensure a just transition to a more sustainable economic model.

  • Strategic Analysis | January 2020
    2020 and Beyond
    This Strategic Analysis examines the US economy’s prospects for 2020–23 and the risks that lie ahead. The baseline projection generated by the Levy Institute’s stock-flow consistent macroeconomic model shows that, given current fiscal arrangements and the slowdown in the global economy, the pace of the US recovery will slacken somewhat, with a growth rate that will average 1.5 percent over the next several years.

    The authors then point to three factors that can derail this already weak baseline trajectory: (1) an overvalued stock market; (2) evidence that the corporate sector’s balance sheets are more fragile than they have ever been in the postwar period; and (3) risks in the foreign sector stemming from the slowdown of the global economy, an overvalued dollar, and the current administration’s erratic trade policy.

  • Working Paper No. 940 | November 2019
    A Rejoinder and Some Comments
    The critique by Gahn and González (2019) of the conclusions in Nikiforos (2016) regarding what data should be used to evaluate whether capacity utilization is endogenous to demand is weak for the following reasons: (i) The Federal Reserve Board (FRB) measure of utilization is not appropriate for measuring long-run variations of utilization because of the method and purpose of its construction. Even if its difference from the measures of the average workweek of capital (AWW) were trivial, this would still be the case; if anything, it would show that the AWW is also an inappropriate measure. (ii) Gahn and González choose to ignore the longest available estimate of the AWW produced by Foss, which has a clear long-run trend. (iii) Their econometric results are not robust to more suitable specifications of the unit root tests. Under these specifications, the tests overwhelmingly fail to reject the unit root hypothesis. (iv) Other estimates of the AWW, which were not included in Nikiforos (2016) confirm these conclusions. (v) For the comparison between the AWW series and the FRB series, they construct variables that are not meaningful because they subtract series in different units. When the comparison is done correctly, the results confirm that the difference between the AWW series and the FRB series has a unit root. (vi) A stationary utilization rate is not consistent with any theory of the determination of capacity utilization. Even if demand did not play a role, there is no reason to expect that all the other factors that determine utilization would change in a fashion that would keep utilization constant.

  • Working Paper No. 934 | August 2019
    This paper analyzes the dynamics of long-term US Treasury security yields from a Keynesian perspective using daily data. Keynes held that the short-term interest rate is the main driver of the long-term interest rate. In this paper, the daily changes in long-term Treasury security yields are empirically modeled as a function of the daily changes in the short-term interest rate and other important financial variables to test Keynes’s hypothesis. The use of daily data provides a long time series. It enables the extension of earlier Keynesian models of Treasury security yields that relied on quarterly and monthly data. Models based on higher-frequency daily data from financial markets—such as the ones presented in this paper—can be valuable to investors, financial analysts, and policymakers because they make it possible for a real-time fundamental assessment of the daily changes in long-term Treasury security yields based on a wide range of financial variables from a Keynesian perspective. The empirical findings of this paper support Keynes’s view by showing that the daily changes in the short-term interest rate are the main driver of the daily changes in the long-term interest rate on Treasury securities. Other financial variables, such as the daily changes in implied volatility of equity prices and the daily changes in the exchange rate, are found to have some influence on Treasury yields.

  • One-Pager No. 60 | July 2019
    Senators Elizabeth Warren and Bernie Sanders, along with Representative Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, recently proposed to increase the rate of taxation on very high incomes and net worth. One of the primary justifications for such policies is that reducing inequality would help safeguard political equality. However, Dimitri B. Papadimitriou, Michalis Nikiforos, and Gennaro Zezza show how these tax policies, if matched by comparable increases in government spending, have the potential to boost aggregate demand while helping reform the unstable structure of the US economy.
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  • Working Paper No. 931 | May 2019
    This paper follows the methodology developed by J. M. Keynes in his How to Pay for the War pamphlet to estimate the “costs” of the Green New Deal (GND) in terms of resource requirements. Instead of simply adding up estimates of the government spending that would be required, we assess resource availability that can be devoted to implementing GND projects. This includes mobilizing unutilized and underutilized resources, as well as shifting resources from current destructive and inefficient uses to GND projects. We argue that financial affordability cannot be an issue for the sovereign US government. Rather, the problem will be inflation if sufficient resources cannot be diverted to the GND. And if inflation is likely, we need to put in place anti-inflationary measures, such as well-targeted taxes, wage and price controls, rationing, and voluntary saving. Following Keynes, we recommend deferred consumption as our first choice should inflation pressures arise. We conclude that it is likely that the GND can be phased in without inflation, but if price pressures do appear, deferring a small amount of consumption will be sufficient to attenuate them.

  • Working Paper No. 929 | May 2019
    Increases in the federal funds rate aimed at stabilizing the economy have inevitably been followed by recessions. Recently, peaks in the federal funds rate have occurred 6–16 months before the start of recessions; reductions in interest rates apparently occurred too late to prevent those recessions. Potential leading indicators include measures of labor productivity, labor utilization, and demand, all of which influence stock market conditions, the return to capital, and changes in the federal funds rate, among many others. We investigate the dynamics of the spread between the 10-year Treasury rate and the federal funds rate in order to better understand “when to ease off the (federal funds) brakes.”
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    Author(s):
    Harold M. Hastings Tai Young-Taft Thomas Wang
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    United States

  • Policy Note 2019/2 | May 2019
    Against the background of an ongoing trade dispute between the United States and China, Senior Scholar Jan Kregel analyzes the potential for achieving international adjustment without producing a negative impact on national and global growth. Once the structure of trade in the current international system is understood (with its global production chains and large imbalances financed by international borrowing and lending), it is clear that national strategies focused on tariff adjustment to reduce bilateral imbalances will not succeed. This understanding of the evolution of the structure of trade and international finance should also inform our view of how to design a new international financial system capable of dealing with increasingly large international trade imbalances.

  • Press Releases | April 2019
    Study Finds that Proposals to Increase Tax Rates of the Very Rich
     Will Provide a Macroeconomic Boost if Matched by Increases in Public Spending
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    Author(s):
    Mark Primoff
    Region(s):
    United States

  • Strategic Analysis | April 2019
    Although the ongoing recovery is about to become the longest in the history of the United States, it is also the weakest in postwar history, and as we enter the second quarter of 2019, many clouds have gathered.

    This Strategic Analysis considers the recent trajectory, the present state, and the future prospects of the US economy. The authors identify four main structural problems that explain how we arrived at the crisis of 2007–09 and why the recovery that has followed has been so weak—as well as why the prospect of a recession is increasingly likely.

    The US economy is in need of deep structural reforms that will deal with these problems. This report analyzes a pair of policies that begin to move in that direction, both involving an increase in the tax rate for high-income and high-net-worth households. Even if the primary justification for these policies is not economic, this report shows that if such an increase in taxes is accompanied by an equivalent increase in government outlays, the redistributive impact will have a positive macroeconomic effect while moving the US economy toward a more sustainable future.

  • Working Paper No. 924 | February 2019
    The paper builds on the concept of (shifting) involvements, originally proposed by Albert
    Hirschman (2002 [1982]). However, unlike Hirschman, the concept is framed in class terms. A model is presented where income distribution is determined by the involvement of the two classes, capitalists and workers. Higher involvement by capitalists and lower involvement by workers tends to increase the profit share and vice versa. In turn, shifts in involvements are induced by the potential effect of a change in distribution on economic activity and past levels of distribution. On the other hand, as the profit share increases, the economy tends to become more wage led. The dynamics of the resulting model are interesting. The more the two classes prioritize the increase of their income share over economic activity, the more possible it is that the economy is unstable. Under the stable configuration, the most likely outcome is Polanyian predator-prey cycles, which can explain some interesting historical episodes during the 20th century. Finally, the paper discusses the possibility of conflict and cooperation within each of the distribution-led regimes.

  • Working Paper No. 907 | May 2018
    The paper discusses the Sraffian supermultiplier (SSM) approach to growth and distribution. It makes five points. First, in the short run the role of autonomous expenditure can be appreciated within a standard post-Keynesian framework (Kaleckian, Kaldorian, Robinsonian, etc.). Second, and related to the first, the SSM model is a model of the long run and has to be evaluated as such. Third, in the long run, one way that capacity adjusts to demand is through an endogenous adjustment of the rate of utilization. Fourth, the SSM model is a peculiar way to reach what Garegnani called the “Second Keynesian Position.” Although it respects the letter of the “Keynesian hypothesis,” it makes investment quasi-endogenous and subjects it to the growth of autonomous expenditure. Fifth, in the long run it is unlikely that “autonomous expenditure” is really autonomous. From a stock-flow consistent point of view, this implies unrealistic adjustments after periods of changes in stock-flow ratios. Moreover, if we were to take this kind of adjustment at face value, there would be no space for Minskyan financial cycles. This also creates serious problems for the empirical validation of the model.

  • Conference Proceedings | April 2018
    A conference organized by the Levy Economics Institute of Bard College

    The proceedings include the 2017 conference program, transcripts of keynote speakers’ remarks, synopses of the panel sessions, and biographies of the participants.
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    Author(s):
    Michael Stephens
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    United States, Latin America, Europe

  • Strategic Analysis | April 2018
    The US economy has been expanding continuously for almost nine years, making the current recovery the second longest in postwar history. However, the current recovery is also the slowest recovery of the postwar period.

    This Strategic Analysis presents the medium-run prospects, challenges, and contradictions for the US economy using the Levy Institute’s stock-flow consistent macroeconometric model. By comparing a baseline projection for 2018–21 in which no budget or tax changes take place to three additional scenarios, the authors isolate the likely macroeconomic impacts of: (1) the recently passed tax bill; (2) a large-scale public infrastructure plan of the same “fiscal size” as the tax cuts; and (3) the spending increases entailed by the Bipartisan Budget Act and omnibus bill. Finally, Nikiforos and Zezza update their estimates of the likely outcome of a scenario in which there is a sharp drop in the stock market that induces another round of private-sector deleveraging.

    Although in the near term the US economy could see an acceleration of its GDP growth rate due to the recently approved increase in federal spending and the new tax law, it is increasingly likely that the recovery will be derailed by a crisis that will originate in the financial sector.
     

  • Research Project Reports | February 2018
    Among the more ambitious policies that have been proposed to address the problem of escalating student loan debt are various forms of debt cancellation. In this report, Scott Fullwiler, Research Associate Stephanie Kelton, Catherine Ruetschlin, and Marshall Steinbaum examine the likely macroeconomic impacts of a one-time, federally funded cancellation of all outstanding student debt.

    The report analyzes households’ mounting reliance on debt to finance higher education, including the distributive implications of student debt and debt cancellation; describes the financial mechanics required to carry out the cancellation of debt held by the Department of Education (which makes up the vast majority of student loans outstanding) as well as privately owned student debt; and uses two macroeconometric models to provide a plausible range for the likely impacts of student debt cancellation on key economic variables over a 10-year horizon.

    The authors find that cancellation would have a meaningful stimulus effect, characterized by greater economic activity as measured by GDP and employment, with only moderate effects on the federal budget deficit, interest rates, and inflation (while state budgets improve). These results suggest that policies like student debt cancellation can be a viable part of a needed reorientation of US higher education policy.
     
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    Author(s):
    Scott Fullwiler Stephanie A. Kelton Catherine Ruetschlin Marshall Steinbaum
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    United States

  • Working Paper No. 894 | August 2017
    This paper undertakes an empirical inquiry concerning the determinants of long-term interest rates on US Treasury securities. It applies the bounds testing procedure to cointegration and error correction models within the autoregressive distributive lag (ARDL) framework, using monthly data and estimating a wide range of Keynesian models of long-term interest rates. While previous studies have mainly relied on quarterly data, the use of monthly data substantially expands the number of observations. This in turn enables the calibration of a wide range of models to test various hypotheses. The short-term interest rate is the key determinant of the long-term interest rate, while the rate of core inflation and the pace of economic activity also influence the long-term interest rate. A rise in the ratio of the federal fiscal balance (government net lending/borrowing as a share of nominal GDP) lowers yields on long-term US Treasury securities. The short- and long-run effects of short-term interest rates, the rate of inflation, the pace of economic activity, and the fiscal balance ratio on long-term interest rates on US Treasury securities are estimated. The findings reinforce Keynes’s prescient insights on the determinants of government bond yields.
     

  • Working Paper No. 891 | May 2017
    A Survey

    The stock-flow consistent (SFC) modeling approach, grounded in the pioneering work of Wynne Godley and James Tobin in the 1970s, has been adopted by a growing number of researchers in macroeconomics, especially after the publication of Godley and Lavoie (2007), which provided a general framework for the analysis of whole economic systems, and the recognition that macroeconomic models integrating real markets with flow-of-funds analysis had been particularly successful in predicting the Great Recession of 2007–9. We introduce the general features of the SFC approach for a closed economy, showing how the core model has been extended to address issues such as financialization and income distribution. We next discuss the implications of the approach for models of open economies and compare the methodologies adopted in developing SFC empirical models for whole countries. We review the contributions where the SFC approach is being adopted as the macroeconomic closure of microeconomic agent-based models, and how the SFC approach is at the core of new research in ecological macroeconomics. Finally, we discuss the appropriateness of the name “stock-flow consistent” for the class of models we survey.

  • In the Media | May 2017
    By Atossa Araxia Abrahamian
    The Nation, May 22–28, 2017. All Rights Reserved.

    In early 2013, Congress entered a death
 struggle—or a debt struggle, if you will—over the future of the US economy. A spate of old tax cuts and spending programs were due to expire almost simultaneously, and Congress couldn’t agree on a budget, nor on how much the government could borrow to keep its engines running. Cue the predictable partisan chaos: House Republicans were staunchly opposed to raising the debt ceiling without corresponding cuts to spending, and Democrats, while plenty weary of running up debt, too, wouldn’t sign on to the Republicans’ proposed austerity....

     Read more: https://www.thenation.com/article/the-rock-star-appeal-of-modern-monetary-theory/
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  • In the Media | April 2017
    By Deirdre Fernandes
    The Boston Globe, April 19, 2017. All Rights Reserved.

    The next recession will likely force the Federal Reserve to once again buy up large amounts of assets to boost the supply of money and stimulate the economy, a move that nearly a decade ago was considered drastic and unconventional, according to Boston Federal Reserve President Eric Rosengren....

    Read more: https://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2017/04/19/remember-quantative-easing-could-make-comeback-says-boston-fed-president/FjNnoluxXb2WPXHJzjgQxO/story.html
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    Region(s):
    United States
  • In the Media | April 2017
    MarketWatch, April 19, 2017. All Rights Reserved.

    The Federal Reserve should start shrinking its balance sheet relatively soon but do it so slowly that it doesn’t disturb the central bank’s plans to continue to gradually raise short-term interest rates, said Boston Fed President Eric Rosengren on Wednesday....

    Read more: http://www.marketwatch.com/story/feds-rosengren-wants-to-shrink-balance-sheet-so-slowly-that-rate-hikes-can-continue-2017-04-19
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    Region(s):
    United States
  • In the Media | April 2017
    Bu Gary Siegel
    The Bond Buyer, April 19, 2017. All Rights Reserved.

    The Federal Reserve's balance sheet will probably continue to be used as a monetary policy tool in the future, since interest rates remain low, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston President and CEO Eric S. Rosengren said Wednesday....

    Read more: https://www.bondbuyer.com/news/rosengren-balance-sheet-will-be-policy-tool-going-forward
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    United States
  • In the Media | April 2017
    CNBC, April 19, 2017. All Rights Reserved.

    The U.S. Federal Reserve should begin shedding its bond holdings soon but do so in a very gradual way that has little effect on its planned interest rate hikes, Boston Fed President Eric Rosengren said on Wednesday....

    Read more: http://www.cnbc.com/2017/04/19/fed-should-shed-bonds-soon-keep-hiking-rates-rosengren.html
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    Region(s):
    United States
  • In the Media | April 2017
    By Jessica Dye
    Financial Times, April 19, 2018. All Rights Reserved.

    Eric Rosengren, president of the Boston Fed, has added his voice to the chorus of policymakers who say they are prepared to start the process of unwinding the central bank’s massive balance sheet....

    Read more: https://www.ft.com/content/14e638f2-b0d8-347b-9eb5-5eff9d83d497
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    United States
  • In the Media | April 2017
    By Christopher Condon
    Bloomberg, April 19, 2017. All Rights Reserved.

    Federal Reserve Bank of Boston President Eric Rosengren said the central bank should shrink its out-sized balance sheet slowly enough that officials don’t need to alter the path of interest-rate increases....

    Read more: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-04-19/fed-s-rosengren-calls-for-trimming-balance-sheet-soon-but-slowly
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    United States
  • In the Media | April 2017
    By Jonathan Spicer
    Reuters, April 19, 2017. All Rights Reserved.

    The U.S. Federal Reserve should begin shedding its bond holdings soon but do so in a very gradual way that has little effect on its planned interest rate hikes, Boston Fed President Eric Rosengren said on Wednesday....

    Read more: http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-fed-rosengren-idUSKBN17L276
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    Region(s):
    United States
  • In the Media | April 2017
    By Giovanni Bruno
    The Street, April 19, 2017. All Rights Reserved.

    Boston Fed President Eric Rosengren today said that he is prepared to begin the process of reducing the Federal Reserve's vast balance sheet, according to the Financial Times

    "In my view that process could begin relatively soon, and should not significantly alter the (Federal Open Market Committee's) continuing gradual normalization of short-term interest rates," Rosengren said today at the Hyman P Minsky Conference at Bard College....

    Read more: https://www.thestreet.com/story/14093318/1/boston-fed-president-rosengren-balance-sheet-reduction-should-begin-soon.html
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  • In the Media | April 2017
    By Wallace Witkowski
    Fox Business, April 19, 2017. All Rights Reserved.

    Economic news: Boston Federal Reserve President Eric Rosengren said at Bard College's Levy Economics Institute that he would like the Fed to start shrinking the balance sheet but at such a gradual rate (http://www.marketwatch.com/story/feds-rosengren-wants-to-shrink-balance-sheet-so-slowly-that-rate-hikes-can-continue-2017-04-19) that it doesn't disrupt the central bank's raising of interest rates.

    Read more: http://www.foxbusiness.com/features/2017/04/19/market-snapshot-stocks-mostly-higher-but-dow-dragged-down-by-ibm.html
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    United States
  • In the Media | April 2017
    Reuters, April 19, 2017. All Rights Reserved.

    A top U.S. financial regulator on Wednesday warned against scrapping, as some American lawmakers urge, the "Title II" part of the 2010 Dodd-Frank legislation that created an alternative insolvency process for large firms, saying further reforms would be needed to protect the economy....

    Read more: http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-banks-hoenig-idUSKBN17L1TO
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    United States
  • In the Media | April 2017
    Bloomberg Markets, April 18, 2017. All Rights Reserved.

    Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City President Esther George discusses monetary policy and the state of the U.S. economy. She speaks with Bloomberg's Michael McKee on "Bloomberg Markets."

    Video: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/videos/2017-04-18/fed-s-george-says-2017-rate-hikes-depend-on-economy-video
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    United States
  • In the Media | April 2017
    By Michael S. Derby
    The Wall Street Journal, April 18, 2017. All Rights Reserved.

    Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City President Esther George said on Tuesday the U.S. central bank needs to press forward with rate rises, adding it should also begin reducing its massive balance sheet later in the year.

    Read more: https://www.wsj.com/articles/feds-george-says-continuing-with-rate-rises-is-necessary-1492520723
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    United States
  • In the Media | April 2017
    CNBC, April 18, 2017. All Rights Reserved.

    Another Federal Reserve policymaker on Tuesday backed an emerging U.S. central bank plan to begin trimming its bond holdings later this year, as Kansas City Fed President Esther George warned against waiting too long in order to "overheat" labor markets....

    Read more: http://www.cnbc.com/2017/04/18/fed-official-backs-bond-pairing-this-year.html
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  • In the Media | April 2017
    By Steve Matthews and Matthew Boesler
    Bloomberg Markets, April 18, 2017. All Rights Reserved.

    Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City President Esther George urged the Federal Open Market Committee to start shrinking its $4.5 trillion balance sheet this year, making reductions automatic and not subject to a quick reversal....

    Read more: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-04-18/george-calls-for-fed-s-balance-sheet-to-shrink-on-autopilot
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    Region(s):
    United States
  • In the Media | April 2017
    By Jonathan Spicer
    Reuters, April 18, 2017. All Rights Reserved.

    Another Federal Reserve policymaker on Tuesday backed an emerging U.S. central bank plan to begin trimming its bond holdings later this year, as Kansas City Fed President Esther George warned against waiting too long in order to "overheat" labor markets....

    Read more: http://mobile.reuters.com/article/idUSKBN17K1J9
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    Region(s):
    United States
  • In the Media | April 2017
    Nasdaq, April 18, 2017. All Rights Reserved.

    Another Federal Reserve policymaker on Tuesday backed an emerging U.S. central bank plan to begin trimming its bond holdings later this year, as Kansas City Fed President Esther George warned against waiting too long in order to "overheat" labor markets....

    Read more: http://m.nasdaq.com/article/another-fed-official-backs-paring-bond-holdings-this-year-20170418-00756
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    United States
  • Conference Proceedings | April 2017

    A conference organized by the Levy Economics Institute of Bard College with support from the Ford Foundation

    The 2016 Minsky Conference addressed whether what appears to be a global economic slowdown will jeopardize the implementation and efficiency of Dodd-Frank regulatory reforms, the transition of monetary policy away from zero interest rates, and the “new” normal of fiscal policy, as well as the use of fiscal policies aimed at achieving sustainable growth and full employment. The proceedings include the conference program, transcripts of keynote speakers’ remarks, synopses of the panel sessions, and biographies of the participants.

    Download:
    Associated Program(s):
    Author(s):
    Barbara Ross Michael Stephens
    Region(s):
    United States

  • Strategic Analysis | April 2017
    From a macroeconomic point of view, 2016 was an ordinary year in the post–Great Recession period. As in prior years, the conventional forecasts predicted that this would be the year the economy would finally escape from the “new normal” of secular stagnation. But just as in every previous year, the forecasts were confounded by the actual result: lower-than-expected growth—just 1.6 percent.
     
    The radical policy changes promoted by the new Trump administration dominated economic conditions in the closing quarter of the year and the first quarter of 2017. Markets have responded with exuberance since the November elections, on the expectation that the proposed policy measures would increase profitability by boosting growth and cutting personal and corporate taxes. However, an evaluation of the US economy’s structural characteristics reveals three key impediments to a robust, sustainable recovery: income inequality, fiscal conservatism, and weak net export demand. The new administration’s often conflicting policy proposals are unlikely to solve any of these fundamental problems—if anything, the situation will worsen.
     
    Our latest Strategic Analysis provides two medium-term scenarios for the US economy. The “business as usual” baseline scenario (built on CBO estimates) shows household debt and GDP growth roughly maintaining their moribund postcrisis trends. The second scenario assumes a sharp correction in the stock market beginning in 2017Q3, combined with another round of private sector deleveraging. The results: negative growth and a government deficit of 8.3 percent by 2020—essentially a repeat of the crisis of 2007–9. 

  • Policy Note 2017/1 | April 2017
    Since the 1980s, economic recoveries in the United States have been delivering the vast majority of income growth to the wealthiest households. This policy note updates the analysis in One-Pager No. 47 and Policy Note 2015/4 with the latest data through 2015, looking at the distribution of average income growth (with and without capital gains) between the bottom 90 percent and top 10 percent of households, and between the bottom 99 percent and top 1 percent of households.

    Little has changed when considering the distribution of average income growth in the current recovery (up to 2015) between the bottom 90 percent and top 10 percent of families, with or without capital gains. Although average real income for the bottom 90 percent of households is no longer shrinking, these families still capture a historically small proportion of that growth—only between 18 percent and 22 percent. The growing economy continues to deliver the most benefits to the wealthiest families.

  • Working Paper No. 887 | March 2017
    Job Creation in the Midst of Welfare State Sabotage

    President Trump’s faux populism may deliver some immediate short-term benefits to the economy, masking the devastating long-term effects from his overall policy strategy. The latter can be termed “welfare state sabotage” and is a wholesale assault on essential public sector institutions and macroeconomic stabilization features that were built during the New Deal era and ushered in the “golden age” of the American economy. Starting in the late ’70s, many of these institutions were significantly eroded by Republicans and Democrats alike, paving the way for the rise of Trump but paling in comparison with what is to come.

  • Working Paper No. 880 | January 2017
    Evidence from Measures of Economic Well-Being

    The Great Recession had a tremendous impact on low-income Americans, in particular black and Latino Americans. The losses in terms of employment and earnings are matched only by the losses in terms of real wealth. In many ways, however, these losses are merely a continuation of trends that have been unfolding for more than two decades. We examine the changes in overall economic well-being and inequality as well as changes in racial economic inequality over the Great Recession, using the period from 1989 to 2007 for historical context. We find that while racial inequality increased from 1989 to 2010, during the Great Recession racial inequality in terms of the Levy Institute Measure of Economic Well-Being (LIMEW) decreased. We find that changes in base income, taxes, and income from nonhome wealth during the Great Recession produced declines in overall inequality, while only taxes reduced between-group racial inequality.

  • Working Paper No. 869 | June 2016
    Phases of Financialization within the 20th Century in the United States

    This paper explores from a historical perspective the process of financialization over the course of the 20th century. We identify four phases of financialization: the first, from the 1900s to 1933 (early financialization); the second, from 1933 to 1940 (transitory phase); the third, between 1945 and 1973 (definancialization); and the fourth period begins in the early 1970s and leads to the Great Recession (complex financialization). Our findings indicate that the main features of the current phase of financialization were already in place in the first period. We closely examine institutions within these distinct financial regimes and focus on the relative size of the financial sector, the respective regulation regime of each period, and the intensity of the shareholder value orientation, as well as the level of financial innovations implemented. Although financialization is a recent term, the process is far from novel. We conclude that its effects can be studied better with reference to economic history.

    Download:
    Associated Program(s):
    Author(s):
    Apostolos Fasianos Diego Guevara
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    Region(s):
    United States

  • In the Media | May 2016
    By Gary D. Halbert
    ValueWalk, May 3, 2016. All Rights Reserved.

    Today we will focus on a recent study from the Levy Economics Institute which found that 90% of Americans were worse off financially in 2015 than at any time since the early 1970s. Furthermore, for the vast majority of Americans, the nation’s economy is in a prolonged period of stagnation, worse even than that of Japan.

    So are we really worse off today than Japan? This latest study concludes that the answer isYES, when it comes to real income – that is, income adjusted for inflation. According to their findings, 90% of Americans earn roughly the same real income today as the average American earned back in the early 1970s. It’s an eye-opening look at how the vast majority of Americans are struggling to make ends meet....

    Read more: http://www.valuewalk.com/2016/05/americans-worse-off/
     
    Associated Program:
    Region(s):
    United States
  • In the Media | April 2016
    By Dora Mekouar
    Voice of America, April 25, 2016. All Rights Reserved.

    Donald Trump has famously declared that the American Dream is dead, but the majority of middle class Americans seem to disagree with the Republican presidential frontrunner.

    Sixty-three percent of people surveyed earlier this year believe they are living the American Dream. That finding suggests American optimism hasn’t been a casualty of the recession, despite a report that says 90 percent of Americans are worse off today than they were in the 1970s....

    Read more: http://blogs.voanews.com/all-about-america/2016/04/25/trump-says-american-dream-is-dead-is-he-right/ 
    Associated Program:
    Region(s):
    United States
  • In the Media | April 2016
    By Peter Eavis
    The New York Times, April 14, 2016. All Rights Reserved.

    Bank regulators on Wednesday sent a message that big banks are still too big and too complex. They rejected special plans, called living wills, that the banks have to submit to show they can go through an orderly bankruptcy.

    The thinking behind the regulators’ call for living wills is that if a large bank crash is orderly, there will be no need to save it and no need for taxpayer bailouts....

    Read more:
    http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/15/upshot/how-regulators-mess-with-bankers-minds-and-why-thats-good.html  
  • In the Media | April 2016
    Von Tom Fairless
    Finanz Nachrichten, 14 April 2016. Alle Rechte vorbehalten.

    Für das Instrument der negativen Zinsen gibt es nach Aussage des EZB-Vizepräsidenten Vitor Constancio "klare Grenzen". Die Schwelle, an der die Leute anfangen, Geld abzuziehen, um die Negativzinsen zu umgehen, scheine aber noch weit weg zu sein, sagte Constancio in einer Rede beim Bard College in New York....

    Weiterlesen: http://www.finanznachrichten.de/nachrichten-2016-04/37060417-ezb-constancio-instrument-der-negativzinsen-hat-grenzen-015.htm
    Associated Program(s):
    Region(s):
    United States, Europe
  • In the Media | April 2016
    Foreign Affairs, April 14, 2016. All Rights Reserved.

    Speech by Vítor Constâncio, Vice-President of the ECB, at the 25th Annual Hyman P. Minsky Conference on the State of the U.S. and World Economies at the Levy Economics Institute of Bard College, Blithewood, Annandale-on-Hudson, New York, 13 April 2016 

    Ladies and Gentlemen,

    I want to start by thanking the Levy Institute for inviting me again to address this important conference honouring Hyman Minsky, the economist that the Great Recession justifiably brought into the limelight. His work provides crucial insights not only identifying the key mechanisms by which periods of financial calm sow the seeds for ensuing crises, but also the specific challenges that economies face in recovering from such crises....

    Read more: http://foreignaffairs.co.nz/2016/04/14/speech-vitor-constancio-international-headwinds-and-the-effectiveness-of-monetary-policy/
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  • In the Media | April 2016
    By Alessandro Speciale and Matthew Boesler
    The Washington Post, April 14, 2016. All Rights Reserved.

    European Central Bank Vice President Vitor Constancio on Wednesday said there was only so much that negative interest rates can do to boost the economy and defended the central bank’s strategy as positive for the euro area as a whole.

    It is “important to recall that there are clear limits to the use of negative deposit facility rates as a policy instrument,” he said in a speech at the Levy Economics Institute of Bard College in New York state. “Tier systems that simply pass direct costs at the margin can mitigate this concern but cannot dispel it altogether.” ...

    Read more: http://washpost.bloomberg.com/Story?docId=1376-O5LE8T6TTDS101-597LUN1M75BN1J81FK32I14G7R
  • In the Media | April 2016
    By Richard Leong
    Reuters, April 14, 2016. All Rights Reserved.

    Negative deposit rates are not required as a monetary fix for the United States at the moment, in contrast with the euro zone, which is struggling with deflation risk, a top European Central Bank official said on Wednesday.

    The U.S. economy, while far from robust, has been growing at a steady pace, and has seen some improvement in price growth since hitting a post-crisis low earlier this year.

    Read more: http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-ecb-policy-constancio-negativerates-idUKKCN0XA2Q4
  • In the Media | April 2016
    By Richard Leong
    Yahoo! Finance, April 13, 2016. All Rights Reserved.

    Negative deposit rates are not required as a monetary fix for the United States at the moment, in contrast with the euro zone, which is struggling with deflation risk, a top European Central Bank official said on Wednesday.

    Read more: http://finance.yahoo.com/news/negative-rates-not-needed-u-225239865.html
  • In the Media | April 2016
    By Richard Leong
    Reuters, April 13, 2016. All Rights Reserved.

    Negative deposit rates are not required as a monetary fix for the United States at the moment, in contrast with the euro zone, which is struggling with deflation risk, a top European Central Bank official said on Wednesday.

    The U.S. economy, while far from robust, has been growing at a steady pace, and has seen some improvement in price growth since hitting a post-crisis low earlier this year....

    Read more: http://www.reuters.com/article/ecb-policy-constancio-negativerates-idUSL2N17G2GK
  • In the Media | April 2016
    By Alessandro Speciale and Matthew Boesler
    Bloomberg, April 13, 2016. All Rights Reserved.

    European Central Bank Vice President Vitor Constancio on Wednesday said there was only so much that negative interest rates can do to boost the economy and defended the central bank’s strategy as positive for the euro area as a whole.

    It is “important to recall that there are clear limits to the use of negative deposit facility rates as a policy instrument,” he said in a speech at the Levy Economics Institute of Bard College in New York state. “Tier systems that simply pass direct costs at the margin can mitigate this concern but cannot dispel it altogether.” ...

    Read more: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-04-13/ecb-s-constancio-says-negative-rate-policy-has-clear-limits
  • In the Media | April 2016
    By Richard Leong
    The Fiscal Times, April 13, 2016. All Rights Reserved.

    Negative deposit rates are not required as a monetary fix for the United States at the moment, in contrast with the euro zone, which is struggling with deflation risk, a top European Central Bank official said on Wednesday....

    Read more: http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/latestnews/2016/04/13/Negative-rates-not-needed-US-now-ECBs-Constancio
  • Strategic Analysis | March 2016
    Our latest strategic analysis reveals that the US economy remains fragile because of three persistent structural issues: weak demand for US exports, fiscal conservatism, and a four-decade trend in rising income inequality. It also faces risks from stagnation in the economies of the United States’ trading partners, appreciation of the dollar, and a contraction in asset prices. The authors provide a baseline and three alternative medium-term scenarios using the Levy Institute’s stock-flow consistent macro model: a dollar appreciation and reduced growth in US trading partners scenario; a stock market correction scenario; and a third scenario combining scenarios 1 and 2. The baseline scenario shows that future growth will depend on an increase in private sector indebtedness, while the remaining scenarios underscore the linkages between a fragile US recovery and instability in the global economy. 

  • e-pamphlets | March 2016
    American Prosperity in Historical Perspective
    Jordan Brennan, of Unifor and the Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, examines the rise of income inequality and the deceleration of economic growth in the United States in this two-part analysis. The first section explores the consolidation of corporate power, through mergers and acquisitions, between 1895 and 2013, and finds that reduced competition, declines in fixed asset investment, and the rise of practices such as stock buybacks have shifted investment away from the real economy, leading to weak economic growth and rising income inequality. The second section of Brennan’s analysis examines the interplay of labor unions, inflation, and income inequality. The author observes that the decline of unions as a countervailing force to corporate power and anti-inflationary monetary policy have shifted income away from middle- and lower-income groups. Similarly, he observes that over the past century inflation has tended to redistribute income from capital to labor—from the upper to the lower income strata. In this context, he observes that anti-inflation policy is a use of state power to effect a regressive redistribution of income.  
    Download:
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    Jordan Brennan
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  • Conference Proceedings | November 2015

    A conference organized by the Levy Economics Institute of Bard College with support from the Ford Foundation

    The 2015 Minsky Conference addressed, among other issues, the design, flaws, and current status of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act, including implementation of the operating procedures necessary to curtail systemic risk and prevent future crises; the insistence on fiscal austerity exemplified by the recent pronouncements of the new Congress; the sustainability of the US economic recovery; monetary policy revisions and central bank independence; the deflationary pressures associated with the ongoing eurozone debt crisis and their implications for the global economy; strategies for promoting an inclusive economy and a more equitable income distribution; and regulatory challenges for emerging market economies. The proceedings include the conference program, transcripts of keynote speakers’ remarks, synopses of the panel sessions, and biographies of the participants.

    Download:
    Associated Program(s):
    Author(s):
    Barbara Ross Michael Stephens
    Region(s):
    United States, Europe

  • In the Media | October 2015
    By Richie Bernardo
    WalletHub, October 12, 2015. All Rights Reserved.

    For many Americans today, the Great Recession is nothing more than the distant shadow of a troubled economic past. The longest downturn since the Great Depression officially ended six years ago. Cities coast to coast have completely bounced back — some even surpassing their pre-recession economic levels, thanks to lucrative industries that helped them rebuild or stay afloat through the crisis.

    Yet the effects of the recession still reverberate in various parts of the U.S., falling deeper into debt and leaving millions of Americans wondering whether the recession has indeed blown over. ...

    Read more: https://wallethub.com/edu/most-least-recession-recovered-cities/5219/#pavlina-r-tcherneva 
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  • Working Paper No. 844 | July 2015

    We present a model where the saving rate of the household sector, especially households at the bottom of the income distribution, becomes the endogenous variable that adjusts in order for full employment to be maintained over time. An increase in income inequality and the current account deficit and a consolidation of the government budget lead to a decrease in the saving rate of the household sector. Such a process is unsustainable because it leads to an increase in the household debt-to-income ratio, and maintaining it depends on some sort of asset bubble. This framework allows us to better understand the factors that led to the Great Recession and the dilemma of a repeat of this kind of unsustainable process or secular stagnation. Sustainable growth requires a decrease in income inequality, an improvement in the external position, and a relaxation of the fiscal stance of the government.

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  • In the Media | June 2015
    Economia, June 23, 2015. All Rights Reserved.

    All'interno del quadro economico internazionale, Jan Kregel, direttore del programma “Politica Monetaria” presso il Levy Economic Institute negli USA, analizza qual è stato il ruolo degli Stati Uniti all'interno della crisi economica. Uno degli elementi che viene messo maggiormente in evidenza, è l' importanza data al settore finanziario, rispetto all'economia reale: ciò ha portando ad una minore attenzione a problemi come la disoccupazione, che rappresenta ancora una delle questioni irrisolte dell'Europa, ma soprattutto dell'Italia. 

    Una volta che la crisi economica è scoppiata negli Usa, si è diffusa a macchia d'olio specie nel continente europeo, dove la forbice presente tra europa meridionale e settentrionale, si è notevolmente ampliata.   A tale ritratto, Kregel, aggiunge anche un'attenta le politiche economiche messe in atto da Cina e Giappone e dalle loro ripercussioni sul sistema economico mondiale.

    intervista videoregistrata:
    http://www.economia.rai.it/articoli/la-crisi-negli-usa-il-punto-di-vista-di-jan-kregel/30575/default.aspx
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    Jan Kregel
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  • In the Media | June 2015
    Background Briefing, June 11, 2015. All Rights Reserved.

    Levy President Dimitri B. Papadimitriou and Ian Masters discuss the Institute’s latest Strategic Analysis of the US economy, and how destructive political ideology is crippling recovery and undermining an otherwise healthy economy. Full audio of the interview is available here.
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  • Strategic Analysis | May 2015
    In this latest Strategic Analysis, the Institute’s Macro Modeling Team examines the current, anemic recovery of the US economy. The authors identify three structural obstacles—the weak performance of net exports, a prevailing fiscal conservatism, and high income inequality—that, in combination with continued household sector deleveraging, explain the recovery’s slow pace. Their baseline macro scenario shows that the Congressional Budget Office’s latest GDP growth projections require a rise in private sector spending in excess of income—the same unsustainable path that preceded both the 2001 recession and the Great Recession of 2007–9. To better understand the risks to the US economy, the authors also examine three alternative scenarios for the period 2015–18: a 1 percent reduction in the real GDP growth rate of US trading partners, a 25 percent appreciation of the dollar over the next four years, and the combined impact of both changes. All three scenarios show that further dollar appreciation and/or a growth slowdown in the trading partner economies will lead to an increase in the foreign deficit and a decrease in the projected growth rate, while heightening the need for private (and government) borrowing and adding to the economy’s fragility. 

  • In the Media | April 2015
    By Pedro Nicolaci da Costa
    The Wall Street Journal, April 22, 2015. All Rights Reserved.

    The effort by financial regulators to ensure big banks and other financial institutions have adequate levels of capital is misguided since that will only help lessen the impact of a crisis, not prevent one.

    That’s the conclusion of Eric Tymoigne, an economist at Lewis & Clark Collegein a presentation last week at the Levy Economics Institute‘s 24th Minsky Conference.

    Read more:
    http://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2015/04/22/wall-street-watchdogs-should-prevent-crises-not-build-buffers/  
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  • In the Media | April 2015
    Moyers & Company, April 18, 2015. All Rights Reserved.

    Last Wednesday, Senator Elizabeth Warren delivered this speech at a conference at the Levy Institute in Washington which lays out the banking reform she believes still needs to happen.  The Nation’s George Zornick called it “a blueprint for how Warren thinks Democrats should attack continued financial reform.”

    Read more: http://billmoyers.com/2015/04/18/elizabeth-warren-speech/
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  • In the Media | April 2015
    By Robert Feinberg
    NewsMax, April 17, 2015. All Rights Reserved.

    Perhaps the highlight of the 24th Annual Hyman P. Minsky Conference on the State of the U.S. and World Economies was a speech by Paul Tucker, senior fellow at both the Kennedy School and the Business School at Harvard, who served as deputy governor of the Bank of England (BOE) from 2009 to 2013.... 

    Read more: http://www.newsmax.com/finance/robertfeinberg/tucker-financial-dodd-frank-bank/2015/04/17/id/639147/
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  • In the Media | April 2015
    By Jim Tankersley
    The Washington Post, April 17, 2015. All Rights Reserved.

    It still isn’t winter in Westeros, at least not on television, although there is no shortage of reminders that it is coming. The seasons in George R.R. Martin’s “Game of Thrones” aren’t regular or celestial. Summer can last a few minutes or many years. At this point in the show, the start of the fifth season, it has gone on for a decade, the longest in the realm’s recorded history. The balmy weather is about to give way to snows and famine, and astoundingly, no one in the land seems prepared....

    Read more: http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2015/04/17/game-of-thrones-and-the-economic-darkness-that-awaits-us/
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  • In the Media | April 2015
    By David Dayen
    The Fiscal Times, April 17, 2015. All Rights Reserved.

    “Rules are not the enemy of markets,” Sen. Elizabeth Warren told me yesterday, on the heels of her major address on the unfinished business of financial reform at the Levy Institute’s Hyman Minsky Conference. “Rules promote innovation and competition. Rules prevent markets from blowing up. We learned that in 1929 and we should have learned it again in 2008.” 

    Read more:
     http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/Columns/2015/04/17/What-Elizabeth-Warren-Has-Hillary-Clinton-Needs
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  • In the Media | April 2015
    By Martin Sandbu
    Financial Times, April 17, 2015. All Rights Reserved.

    Elizabeth Warren may not be running for president but she does not relent in gunning for Wall Street. On Wednesday she gave a speech arguing powerfully that the task of taming finance is far from finished. It is an important speech that deserves to be widely read. The location she chose to give it was, incidentally, as apt as can be. The Levy Institute has covered itself in more glory than the economics profession at large, with research less marred by the blind spots that once distracted so many economists from the looming crisis. (It was Hyman Minsky's home institution.)

    Read more:
     http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/a37b9244-e386-11e4-9a82-00144feab7de.html#axzz3Xfu2l4dm
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    United States
  • In the Media | April 2015
    By Robert Feinberg
    NewsMax, April 16, 2015. All Rights Reserved.

    On the first day of the Levy Institute's two-day annual Hyman P. Minsky Conference, held at the National Press Club in Washington, high-powered speakers held forth on the most prominent issues in the financial world that will affect the economy as Congress begins to try to legislate during the two years that the Republican Congress has to make its mark as the Obama administration winds down. 

    Read more:
     http://www.newsmax.com/finance/robertfeinberg/bullard-hoenig-warren-financial/2015/04/16/id/638861/
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    United States
  • In the Media | April 2015
    By Portia Crowe
    Business Insider Australia, April 16, 2015. All Rights Reserved.

    Elizabeth Warren made a speech at the Levy Institute’s Minsky Conference on Wednesday and laid out some major financial reforms she wants to push through.

    “The culture of cheating on Wall Street didn’t stop with the 2008 crash,” the populist Massachusetts Senator said.

    Read more:
     http://www.businessinsider.com.au/elizabeth-warren-new-reforms-2015-4  
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  • In the Media | April 2015
    MPA Magazine, April 16, 2015. All Rights Reserved.

    U.S. Senator Elizabeth Warren has called on lawmakers to break up too-big-to-fail by capping the size of the largest financial institutions and separating commercial and investment banking. She also proposed limiting emergency lending by the Federal Reserve to troubled institutions by the Federal Reserve.

    Speaking at the Levy Institute’s 24thannual Hyman Minsky conference, Warren said the fact that the Federal Reserve and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. say 11 banks threaten the entire U.S. economy means they are too big.

    Read more:
     http://www.mpamag.com/mortgage-originator/warren-its-time-to-break-up-toobigtofail-banks-22121.aspx
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    United States
  • In the Media | April 2015
    By George Zornick
    The Nation, April 16, 2015. All Rights Reserved.

    If Elizabeth Warren ran for president, a key part of her campaign—if not the centerpiece—would likely involve how to restructure the financial sector in a less dangerous and more productive way. Dodd-Frank was by many accounts a good start, but it’s clear the economy is still over-financialized and too-big-to-fail banks continue to pose an existential threat.

    Warren isn’t running for president, but she unveiled that exact agenda in a sweeping speech Wednesday in a conference at the Levy Institute in Washington. It advocated an array of specific, often ambitious policy proposals, many of which have circulated in Washington for years and that Warren, at various times, has already called for.

    Read more:
     http://www.thenation.com/blog/204433/big-elizabeth-warren-speech-how-finish-financial-reform#  
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    United States
  • In the Media | April 2015
    By Jan Strupczewski
    Reuters, April 16, 2015. All Rights Reserved.

    The European Central Bank's monetary policy will be accommodative in the foreseeable future, the bank's Vice President Vitor Constancio said on Thursday.

    "... Monetary policy needs to be accommodative, as I expect to be the case for the foreseeable future in the euro area," Constancio told a seminar at the Levy Economics Institute. 
       
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    United States
  • In the Media | April 2015
    By Harriet Torry
    The Wall Street Journal, April 16, 2015. All Rights Reserved.

    Vitor Constancio, vice president of the European Central Bank, said Thursday that economic recovery in Europe remains “gradual and moderate,” underscoring the need for loose monetary policy in the eurozone for the foreseeable future.

    “Monetary policy has to remain accommodative with low interest rates,” Mr. Constancio said, adding that “getting Europe growing again is one of the most important challenges we face at present.”

    But Mr. Constancio also highlighted the importance of being aware of the limitations of monetary policy, in remarks at a conference hosted by the Levy Institute.

    Read more:
     http://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2015/04/16/ecb-constancio-eurozone-monetary-policy-needs-to-stay-accommodative/
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  • In the Media | April 2015
    By Charles Pierce
    Esquire, April 16, 2015. All Rights Reserved.

    It's been an interesting week for Senator Professor Elizabeth Warren. First, in Time Magazine's annual 100 Groovy Folks list, she gets a rapturous shout-out from none other than Hillary Rodham Clinton, currently touring the silos of Iowa and the clam shacks of New Hampshire....

    Read more:
     http://www.esquire.com/news-politics/politics/news/a34418/a-visit-from-senator-professor-warren/
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  • In the Media | April 2015
    By Victoria Finkle
    American Banker, April 15, 2015. All Rights Reserved.

    WASHINGTON — Sen. Elizabeth Warren, D-Mass., delivered a sweeping speech Wednesday aimed at what she's calling "the unfinished business of financial reform."

    Warren laid out a number of broad policy goals for the banking industry, arguing that while the Dodd-Frank Act "made some real progress," more needs to be done to resurrect a safe financial system.

    Read more:
     http://www.americanbanker.com/news/law-regulation/warren-lays-out-detailed-plan-to-take-on-wall-street-1073764-1.html  
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    United States
  • In the Media | April 2015
    By Matthew Yglesias
    Vox, April 15, 2015. All Rights Reserved.

    Elizabeth Warren isn't running for president. But she does have an agenda for reining in the big banks that would go well beyond the Obama administration's (underrated) bank regulation moves and substantially alter the role of Wall Street in American life.

    In a speech delivered on April 15 at the Levy Institute's 24th annual Hyman Minsky conference, Warren laid out the most comprehensive and ambitious version of her agenda yet.

    Read more:
     http://www.vox.com/2015/4/15/8420789/elizabeth-warren-prosecutions  
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  • In the Media | April 2015
    By Holly LeFon
    US News & World Report, April 15, 2015. All Rights Reserved.

    Sen. Elizabeth Warren, D-Mass., called Wednesday for breaking up big banks through structural reforms that would bring a decisive end to “too big to fail.”

    Warren told a Levy Economics Institute conference she has worked with other lawmakers to advance a bill that would build a wall between commercial banking and investment banking.

    Read more:
     http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2015/04/15/warren-calls-for-breaking-up-the-banks  
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    United States
  • In the Media | April 2015
    By Barney Jopson and Gina Chon
    Financial Times, April 15, 2015. All Rights Reserved.

    Elizabeth Warren, the anti-Wall Street senator, has lashed out at US regulators for being soft on misbehaving banks, describing settlements that extracted billion dollar fines as a “slap on the wrist” and demanding that banks be put on trial.

    The remarks by Ms Warren, who has emerged as a standard bearer of the Democratic left, are designed to put pressure on the US authorities as they come close to concluding their investigation into the manipulation of the foreign exchange market.

    Read more:
     http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/bce88134-e394-11e4-9a82-00144feab7de.html?siteedition=intl#axzz3XQnJg6ZU  
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  • In the Media | April 2015
    By Sam Fleming
    Financial Times, April 15, 2015. All Rights Reserved.

    US growth is set to remain relatively "robust" and low inflation is due largely to temporary factors, St Louis Federal Reserve president James Bullard said in a speech on Wednesday morning in Washington DC. 

    He renewed his recent calls for higher interest rates, in part because of the risks of stoking up asset bubbles by leaving them at near zero levels, reports the FT's Sam Fleming.

    Read more:
     http://www.ft.com/intl/fastft/308482/us-growth-remain-relatively-robust-feds-bullard  
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  • In the Media | April 2015
    By Ryan Tracy
    The Wall Street Journal, April 15, 2015. All Rights Reserved.

    WASHINGTON—The No. 2 official at the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. said banks should get “regulatory relief” if they meet minimum capital requirements and other criteria, weighing in as Congress considers measures to ease rules on smaller banks.

    FDIC Vice Chairman Thomas Hoenig, who favors breaking up the largest banks and is influential with members of Congress on both sides of the aisle, said banks should only get regulatory relief if they hold foreign exchange and interest rate derivatives worth less than $3 billion, maintain an equity-to-asset ratio of at least 10%, and don’t engage in trading activity.

    Read more:
     http://www.wsj.com/articles/fdic-banks-should-meet-capital-minimum-to-get-regulatory-relief-1429107301  
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  • In the Media | April 2015
    By Steve MatthewsChristopher Condon
    Bloomberg, April 15, 2015. All Rights Reserved.

    Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis President James Bullard repeated his call for beginning to normalize monetary policy and said maintaining interest rates near zero risks destructive asset-price bubbles.

    “A risk of remaining at the zero lower bound too long is that a significant asset-market bubble will develop,” Bullard said in prepared remarks in Washington on Wednesday. “If a bubble in a key asset market develops, history has shown that we have little ability to contain it,” he said, citing the housing bubble that preceded the last recession.

    Read more:
     http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-04-15/fed-s-bullard-says-zero-policy-rate-risks-asset-price-bubbles  
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  • In the Media | April 2015
    Reuters, April 15, 2015. All Rights Reserved.

    (Reuters) – A top Federal Reserve official said on Wednesday that it's okay for the Fed to raise interest rates and then return to near-zero levels if the economic data shows that the central bank needs to retreat.

    "I don't think there's a problem with that," St. Louis Federal Reserve President James Bullard said, referring to the issue of hiking rates soon and then lowering them shortly afterward if economic growth drops.

    Read more:
     http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/04/15/usa-fed-bullard-rates-idUSN9N0WC01O20150415  
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  • In the Media | April 2015
    By Brai Odion-Esene
    MNI Deutsche Börse Group, April 15, 2015. All Rights Reserved.

    WASHINGTON (MNI) - The vice chair of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. Wednesday argued against giving all small banks an exemption from the ban on proprietary trading by traditional banks, commonly known as the Volcker Rule, arguing that it does not impose any added regulatory burdens on smaller institutions.

    "A blanket exemption for smaller institutions to engage in proprietary trading and yet be exempt from the Volcker Rule is unwise," Thomas Hoenig said in remarks prepared for delivery at the Levy Institute's Hyman Minsky conference in Washington.

    Read more:
     https://mninews.marketnews.com/content/fdics-hoenigblanket-small-bank-exemption-volcker-unwise
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  • In the Media | April 2015
    By Annie Linskey
    The Boston Globe, April 15, 2015. All Rights Reserved.

    Massachusetts Senator Elizabeth Warren wants to limit to just one the number of deals financial institutions accused of wrongdoing can cut with the government, a change that she believes would force corporations to follow the rules or face criminal charges.

    It’s among several new ideas that Warren unveiled in a speech at the National Press Club on Wednesday. The senator offered new initiatives that would require banks to par far higher “mandatory minimum” fines when they avoid prosecution after violating rules. She also suggested a tax incentive aimed at prodding highly leveraged banks to use capital to finance deals rather than debt.

    Read more: http://www.bostonglobe.com/news/politics/2015/04/15/elizabeth-warren-pitches-ideas-for-stronger-wall-street-curbs/4OHy5tGIOxcEhtAyEr7YYL/story.html  
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  • In the Media | April 2015
    By Jesse Hamilton and Silla Brush
    Chicago Tribune, April 15, 2015. All Rights Reserved.

    Wall Street banks and their top executives should face new tax penalties to keep them from engaging in risky practices that can pose threats to the financial system, Sen. Elizabeth Warren said Wednesday.

    Warren, who has been a leading defender of the Dodd-Frank Act, called on the Republican-led Congress to relent from attacks on the 2010 law and close a tax loophole that she said encourages bank chief executive officers to seek quick gains.

    Read more: http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/sns-wp-blm-news-bc-warren15-20150415-story.html  
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  • In the Media | April 2015
    By Zach Carter
    The Huffington Post, April 15, 2015. All Rights Reserved.

    WASHINGTON -- Sen. Elizabeth Warren (D-Mass.) assailed the nation's top bank regulators on Wednesday for coddling Wall Street offenders and ducking the responsibilities Congress assigned them in the wake of the 2008 financial meltdown.

    At a conference hosted by the Levy Economics Institute, Warren called not only for structural change to the banking system but for a revamping of the weak enforcement culture at the Federal Reserve, the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Department of Justice....

    Read more:
     http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/04/15/elizabeth-warren-wall-street_n_7073040.html  
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  • In the Media | April 2015
    By Victoria Finkle
    American Banker, April 15, 2015. All Rights Reserved.

    WASHINGTON — Hillary Clinton just kicked off her presidential bid on Sunday, but progressives have already begun a campaign of their own to shape the financial policy debate ahead of the 2016 elections.

    Sen. Elizabeth Warren, D-Mass., delivered a wide-ranging address on Wednesday, laying out an agenda for tending to "unfinished business" in the financial industry in the wake of the financial crisis and the Dodd-Frank Act.

    Read more:
     
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  • In the Media | April 2015
    By Joe Mont
    Compliance Week, April 15, 2015. All Rights Reserved.

    If she had not already emphatically dismissed the idea of running for president, Sen. Elizabeth Warren (D-Mass.) delivered what would have been a headline-grabbing stump speech on Wednesday.

    Speaking at Bard College’s Levy Economics Institute, Warren presented her view of what is needed for continuing financial reforms beyond the Dodd-Frank Act....

    Read more:
     https://www.complianceweek.com/blogs/the-filing-cabinet/warren-on-the-warpath-slams-sec-pitches-financial-reforms#.VTFJtL6itUR  
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  • In the Media | April 2015
    Value Walk, April 15, 2015. All Rights Reserved.

    In a speech at the Levy Institute’s annual Hyman P. Minsky Conference today, Senator Elizabeth Warren laid out a set of proposals to advance the process of financial reform that began with the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010.

    Read more:
     http://www.valuewalk.com/2015/04/elizabeth-warren-financial-reform/
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  • In the Media | April 2015
    By Eric Garcia
    National Journal, April 15, 2015. All Rights Reserved.

    For Sen. Elizabeth Warren, the Dodd-Frank financial reform law was an important first step to taming financial markets. On Wednesday, she laid out a series of bold next steps for financial reform that could provide a road map for the Democratic Party in 2016.

    Speaking at the Levy Economics Institute of Bard College's 24th Annual Hyman P. Minsky Conference on Wednesday, Warren gave a message that could serve as strong ammunition for Democrats in the future, saying that opponents of financial regulation often pit the argument as between being pro-market and supporting deregulation versus being anti-market and supporting more regulation.

    Read more:
     http://www.nationaljournal.com/economy/elizabeth-warren-s-new-agenda-for-democrats-on-financial-reform-20150415  
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  • Policy Note 2015/4 | March 2015
    Trends in US Income Inequality
    In the postwar period, with every subsequent expansion, a smaller and smaller share of the gains in income growth have gone to the bottom 90 percent of families. Worse, in the latest expansion, while the economy has grown and average real income has recovered from its 2008 lows, all of the growth has gone to the wealthiest 10 percent of families, and the income of the bottom 90 percent has fallen. Most Americans have not felt that they have been part of the expansion. We have reached a situation where a rising tide sinks most boats.   This policy note provides a broader overview of the increasingly unequal distribution of income growth during expansions, examines some of the changes that occurred from 2012 to 2013, and identifies a disturbing business cycle trend. It also suggests that policy must go beyond the tax system if we are serious about reversing the drastic worsening of income inequality. 

  • In the Media | February 2015
    By Sasha Abramsky
    The Nation, February 2, 2015. All Rights Reserved.

    By many measures, the American economy has recovered from the 2008 implosion. The stock market is soaring, housing values in many markets have rebounded and GDP is growing at a healthy rate of more than 4 percent. Compared to Spain and Greece, where debt, mass unemployment and hardship remain widespread following the Eurozone crisis, America looks to be on easy street.

    Yet scratch below the surface and you’ll see that the United States still has a considerable economic problem. While the official unemployment rate has fallen to 5.6 percent, the lowest since 2008, the percentage of the adult population participating in the labor market remains far lower than it was at the start of the recession. At least in part, headline unemployment numbers look respectable because millions of Americans have grown so discouraged about their prospects of finding work that they no longer try, and thus are no longer counted among the unemployed. Depending on the measures, only 59 to 63 percent of the working-age population is employed, far below recent historical norms.

    Read more:
     http://www.thenation.com/article/196721/workers-think-tank
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  • In the Media | December 2014
    By Mustafa Caglayan
    Anadolu Agency, December 24, 2014. All Rights Reserved.

    The U.S. economy on Tuesday posted its fastest expansion in more than a decade, but experts warn that there may be a dark cloud to this silver lining.

    Official figures show that the gross domestic product—the broadest measure of economic output and growth—grew at its fastest rate since 2003, surging 5 percent in the third quarter.

    Read more:
     http://www.aa.com.tr/en/economy/440452--despite-growth-experts-skeptical-us-recovering-from-recession
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  • Conference Proceedings | November 2014
    A conference organized by the Levy Economics Institute with support from the Ford Foundation

    In the context of a sluggish economic recovery and global uncertainty, with growth and employment well below normal levels, the 2014 Minsky Conference addressed both financial reform and prosperity, drawing from Hyman Minsky’s work on financial instability and his proposal for achieving full employment. Panels focused on the design of a new, more robust, and stable financial architecture; fiscal austerity and the sustainability of the US and European economic recovery; central bank independence and financial reform; the larger implications of the eurozone debt crisis for the global economic system; the impact of the return to more traditional US monetary policy on emerging markets and developing economies; improving governance of the social safety net; the institutional shape of the future financial system; strategies for promoting an inclusive economy and more equitable income distribution; and regulatory challenges for emerging-market economies. The proceedings include the conference program, transcripts of keynote speakers’ remarks, synopses of the panel sessions, and biographies of the participants. 
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  • One-Pager No. 47 | October 2014
    In the postwar period, income growth has become more inequitably distributed with virtually every subsequent economic expansion. From 2009 to 2012, while the economy was recovering from one of the biggest economic downturns in recent memory, the top 1 percent took home 95 percent of the income gains. To reverse this pattern, Research Associate Pavlina R. Tcherneva recommends policy strategies to promote growth from the bottom up—to change the income distribution directly by funding employment opportunities in the public, nonprofit, or social entrepreneurial sector. 

  • In the Media | September 2014
    By Joshua Holland
    Moyers & Company, September 29, 2014. All Rights Reserved.

    Matthew Yglesias calls this chart, from Pavlina Tcherneva, an economist at the Levy Economic Institute at Bard College, “the most important chart about the American economy you’ll see this year.” It illustrates how much income gains those at the top have enjoyed during each of our post-war expansions....

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     http://billmoyers.com/2014/09/29/smart-charts-economic-recovery-1-percent/
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  • In the Media | September 2014
    By Aaron Abbruzzese
    Mashable, September 27, 2014. All Rights Reserved.

    If it seems like the rich are getting richer, well, the data might just back you up. A new graph based on data from times of growth backs up growing concern that the current economic system is disproportionately favoring those that are already wealthy....

    Read more:
     http://mashable.com/2014/09/25/this-really-depressing-graph-about-the-u-s-economy-is-turning-heads/
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  • In the Media | September 2014
    By Neil Irwin
    The New York Times, September 25, 2014

    Economic expansions are supposed to be the good times, the periods in which incomes and living standards improve. And that’s still true, at least for some of us....

    Read more:
     http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/27/upshot/the-benefits-of-economic-expansions-are-increasingly-going-to-the-richest-americans.html?hp&action=click&pgtype=Homepage&version=HpSum&module=second-column-region®ion=top-news&WT.nav=top-news&abt=0002&abg=0    
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  • In the Media | September 2014
    By Christopher Ingraham
    The Washington Post, September 25, 2014

    Take a look at this chart, from Bard College economist Pavlina Tcherneva. In an August 2013 paper, she wrote:

    An examination of average income growth [in the U.S.] during every postwar expansion (from trough to peak) and its distribution between the wealthiest 10% and bottom 90% of households reveals that income growth becomes more inequitably distributed with every subsequent expansion during the entire postwar period.

    In other words, the wealthy are capturing more and more of the overall income growth during each expansion period....

    Read more:
     http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2014/09/25/this-depressing-chart-shows-that-the-rich-arent-just-grabbing-a-bigger-slice-of-the-income-pie-theyre-taking-all-of-it/
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  • In the Media | September 2014
    By Jordan Weissmann
    Slate, September 25, 2014

    When you write about the economy every day for a living, you can start feeling numb toward charts about income inequality. After all, the story doesn't change much week to week, and usually neither do the visualizations. But this one, from Bard College economist Pavlina Tcherneva, somehow still feels astonishing, and has stirred up a bunch of attention today. It shows how much of U.S. income growth has been claimed by the top 10 percent of households during economic expansions, and how much was claimed by the bottom 90 percent. Guess who's gotten the lion's share in recent years?

    Read more: 
    http://www.slate.com/blogs/moneybox/2014/09/25/how_the_rich_conquered_the_economy_in_one_chart.html
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  • In the Media | September 2014
    By Matthew Yglesias
    Vox, September 25, 2014. All Rights Reserved.

    Pavlina Tcherneva's chart showing the distribution of income gains during periods of economic expansion is burning up the economics internet over the past 24 hours and for good reason. The trend it depicts is shocking....

    Read more:
     http://www.vox.com/xpress/2014/9/25/6843509/income-distribution-recoveries-pavlina-tcherneva
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  • In the Media | September 2014
    By Kevin Drum
    Mother Jones, September 27, 2014. All Rights Reserved.

    It's not easy finding new and interesting ways to illustrate the growth of income inequality over the past few decades. But here are a couple of related ones. The first is from "Survival of the Richest" in the current issue of Mother Jones, and it shows how much of our total national income growth gets hoovered up by the top 1 percent during economic recoveries. The super-rich got 45 percent of total income growth during the dotcom years; 65 percent during the housing bubble years; and a stunning 95 percent during the current recovery. It's good to be rich....

    Read more:
     http://www.motherjones.com/kevin-drum/2014/09/rich-are-getting-richer-part-millionth
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  • Conference Proceedings | August 2014
    This conference was organized as part of the Levy Institute’s international research agenda and in conjunction with the Ford Foundation Project on Financial Instability, which draws on Hyman Minsky’s extensive work on the structure of financial systems to ensure stability, and the role of government in achieving a growing and equitable economy.
      Among the key topics addressed: the challenges to global growth and employment posed by the continuing eurozone debt crisis; the impact of austerity on output and employment; the ramifications of the credit crunch for economic and financial markets; the larger implications of government deficits and debt crises for US and European economic policies; and central bank independence and financial reform. 

  • In the Media | June 2014
    By Dimitri B. Papadimitriou

    The Guardian, June 15, 2014

    The US Congressional Budget Office is projecting a continued economic recovery. So why look down the road – say, to 2017 – and worry?

    Here's why: because the debt held by American households is rising ominously. And unless our economic policies change, that debt balloon, powered by radical income inequality, is going to become the next bust....

    Read the full article here: www.theguardian.com/money/2014/jun/15/us-economy-bubble-debt-financial-crisis-corporations
     

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  • Working Paper No. 801 | May 2014
    Debt, Finance, and Distributive Politics under a Kalecki-Goodwin-Minsky SFC Framework

    This paper describes the political economy of shadow banking and how it relates to the dramatic institutional changes experienced by global capitalism over past 100 years. We suggest that the dynamics of shadow banking rest on the distributive tension between workers and firms. Politics wedge the operation of the shadow financial system as government policy internalizes, guides, and participates in dealings mediated by financial intermediaries. We propose a broad theoretical overview to formalize a stock-flow consistent (SFC) political economy model of shadow banking (stylized around the operation of money market mutual funds, or MMMFs). Preliminary simulations suggest that distributive dynamics indeed drive and provide a nest for the dynamics of shadow banking.

  • In the Media | October 2013
    Tim Mullaney
    USA Today, October 16, 2013. All Rights Reserved.

    Fitch Ratings took a step toward cutting the U.S. government's AAA debt rating Tuesday, as the clock ticked toward the Thursday deadline to raise the nation's debt ceiling or risk default.

    Chicago-based Fitch, the third-largest of the major debt-rating companies behind Standard & Poor's and Moody's Investors Service, put U.S. Treasury bonds on Rating Watch Negative, which is sometimes but not always a first step before a downgrade. Fitch said in a statement that it still thinks the debt ceiling will be raised in time to prevent a default.
      Fitch said the government would have only limited capacity to make payments on the $16.7 trillion national debt after Treasury Department's emergency measures run out Thursday.

    Some Republicans have advocated Treasury make debt service payments before paying day-to-day bills, but Fitch said that may not be legal or technologically possible. Even Treasury could do that, a failure to act would still leave the U.S. missing payments for Social Security and payments to government contractors, Fitch said.

    "All of (these) would damage the perception of U.S. sovereign creditworthiness and the economy,'' Fitch said in a statement. "The prolonged negotiations over raising the debt ceiling ... risks undermining confidence in the role of the U.S. dollar as the preeminent global reserve currency, by casting doubt over the full faith and credit of the U.S. This `faith' is a key reason why the U.S. 'AAA' rating can tolerate a substantially higher level of public debt than other AAA" bonds.

    Fitch said it could make a decision on whether to lower its AAA rating on U.S. debt by the end of the first quarter.

    "The announcement reflects the urgency with which Congress should act to remove the threat of default hanging over the economy," the Treasury Department said in response.

    One money manager quickly backed Fitch's action, which affects all U.S. bonds.

    "This action by Fitch is not about ability to pay,'' said Cumberland Advisors chief investment officer David Kotok. "It is about governance and our willingness to pay. In that category the United States has reached the brink of political failure.'' Economists have warned that there are two main ways failing to raise the debt ceiling could hurt the economy.

    One is by causing chaos in financial markets, forcing stock prices lower and freezing credit to many borrowers. The other is by forcing the government to cut spending by as much as $130 billion over as little as six weeks to avoid borrowing more, Moody's Analytics estimated last week.

    A study Tuesday by Bard College estimated that a rapid-fire balanced budget scenario would cause the U.S. economy to shrink by almost 3% in 2014 and the unemployment rate to surge to more than 9.5%.

    That is before accounting for the chance that a failure to raise the debt ceiling will push U.S. trading partners into recession, the Bard study says.

    "A recession in the United States would certainly exert a negative influence on growth in the rest of the world, which would in turn feed back to the States," Bard economist Michalis Nikiforos said.

    Moody's says it has no plans to change its Aaa rating on U.S. debt.

    Political brinksmanship was a key reason for S&P's downgrade of the U.S. to AA+ from AAA in 2011, the last time Washington flirted with refusing to raise the debt ceiling. The lack of an agreement on the debt limit this week would not necessarily trigger another S&P downgrade, spokesman John Piecuch said.

    "Passing (Oct.) 17th is not a specific trigger," Piecuch said.

    If the U.S. missed a debt payment, however, its rating would be lowered to selective default, he added.

    Contributing: John Waggoner, Adam Shell and David M. Jackson 
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  • Strategic Analysis | October 2013
    If the Congressional Budget Office’s recent projections of government revenues and outlays come to pass, the United States will not grow fast enough to bring down the unemployment rate between now and 2016. The public sector deficit will decline from present levels, endangering the sustainability of the recovery. But as this new Strategic Analysis shows, a public sector stimulus of a little over 1 percent of GDP per year focused on export-oriented R & D investment would increase US competitiveness through export-price effects, resulting in a rise of net exports, and slowly lower unemployment to less than 5 percent by 2016. The improvement in net export demand would allow the US economy to enter a period of aggregate-demand rehabilitation—with very encouraging consequences at home. 

  • Policy Note 2013/9 | October 2013
    A Scenario of Hitting the Debt Ceiling

    The United States entered the second week of a government shutdown on Monday, with no end to the deadlock in sight. The cost to the government of a similar shutdown in 1995–96 amounted to $2.1 billion in today’s dollars. However, the cost and broader consequences of today’s shutdown are not yet clear—especially since the US economy is in the midst of an anemic recovery from the biggest economic crisis of the last eight decades.

  • In the Media | September 2013
    By Jonathan Schlefer

    The New York Times, September 10, 2013. All rights Reserved.

    Wynn Godley

    BOSTON — With the 2008 financial crisis and Great Recession still a raw and painful memory, many economists are asking themselves whether they need the kind of fundamental shift in thinking that occurred during and after the Depression of the 1930s. “We have entered a brave new world,” Olivier Blanchard, the International Monetary Fund’s chief economist, said at a conference in 2011. “The economic crisis has put into question many of our beliefs. We have to accept the intellectual challenge.”

    If the economics profession takes on the challenge of reworking the mainstream models that famously failed to predict the crisis, it might well turn to one of the few economists who saw it coming, Wynne Godley of the Levy Economics Institute. Mr. Godley, unfortunately, died at 83 in 2010, perhaps too soon to bask in the credit many feel he deserves.

    But his influence has begun to spread. Martin Wolf, the eminent columnist for The Financial Times, and Jan Hatzius, chief economist of global investment research at Goldman Sachs, borrow from his approach. Several groups of economists in North America and Europe — some supported by the Institute for New Economic Thinking established by the financier and philanthropist George Soros after the crisis — are building on his models.

    In a 2011 study, Dirk J. Bezemer, of Groningen University in the Netherlands, found a dozen experts who warned publicly about a broad economic threat, explained how debt would drive it, and specified a time frame.

    Most, like Nouriel Roubini of New York University, issued warnings in informal notes. But Mr. Godley “was the most scientific in the sense of having a formal model,” Dr. Bezemer said.

    It was far from a first for Mr. Godley. In January 2000, the Council of Economic Advisers for President Bill Clinton hailed a still “youthful-looking and vigorous” expansion. That March, Mr. Godley and L. Randall Wray of the University of Missouri-Kansas City derided it, declaring, “Goldilocks is doomed.” Within days, the Nasdaq stock market peaked, heralding the end of the dot-com bubble.

    Why does a model matter? It explicitly details an economist’s thinking, Dr. Bezemer says. Other economists can use it. They cannot so easily clone intuition.

    Mr. Godley was relatively obscure in the United States. He was better known in his native Britain — The Times of London called him “the most insightful macroeconomic forecaster of his generation” — though often as a renegade.

    Mainstream models assume that, as individuals maximize their self-interest, markets move the economy to equilibrium. Booms and busts come from outside forces, like erratic government spending or technological dynamism or stagnation. Banks are at best an afterthought.

    The Godley models, by contrast, see banks as central, promoting growth but also posing threats. Households and firms take out loans to build homes or invest in production. But their expectations can go awry, they wind up with excessive debt, and they cut back. Markets themselves drive booms and busts.

    Why did Mr. Godley, who had barely any formal economics training, insist on developing a model to inform his judgment? His extraordinary efforts to overcome a troubled childhood may be part of the explanation. Tiago Mata of Cambridge University called his life “a search for his true voice” in the face of “nagging fear that he might disappoint [his] responsibilities.”

    Mr. Godley once described his early years as shackled by an “artificial self” that kept him from recognizing his own spontaneous reactions to people and events. His parents separated bitterly. His mother was often away on artistic adventures, and when at home, she spent long hours coddling what she called “my pain” in bed.

    Raised by nannies and “a fierce maiden aunt who shook me violently when I cried,” Mr. Godley was sent at age 7 to a prep school he called a “chamber of horrors.”

    Despite all that, Mr. Godley, with his extraordinary talent, still managed to achieve worldly success. He graduated from Oxford with a first in philosophy, politics and economics in 1947, studied at the Paris Conservatory, and became principal oboist of the BBC Welsh Orchestra.

    But “nightmarish fears of letting everyone down,” he recalled, drove him to take a job as an economist at the Metal Box Company. Moving to the British Treasury in 1956, he rose to become head of short-term forecasting. He was appointed director of the Department of Applied Economics at Cambridge in 1970.

    In the early 1980s, the British Tory government, allied with increasingly conventional economists at Cambridge, began “sharpening its knives to stab Wynne,” according to Kumaraswamy Velupillai, a close friend who now teaches at the New School in New York. They killed the policy group he headed and, ultimately, the Department of Applied Economics.

    But after warning of a crash of the British pound in 1992 that took official forecasters by surprise, Mr. Godley was appointed to a panel of “six wise men” advising the Treasury.

    In 1995 he moved to the Levy Institute outside New York, joining Hyman Minsky, whose “financial instability hypothesis” won recognition during the 2008 crisis.

    Marc Lavoie of the University of Ottawa collaborated with Mr. Godley to write “Monetary Economics: An Integrated Approach to Credit, Money, Income, Production and Wealth” in 2006, which turned out to be the most complete account he would publish of his modeling approach.

    In mainstream economic models, individuals are supposed to optimize the trade-off between consuming today versus saving for the future, among other things. To do so, they must live in a remarkably predictable world.

    Mr. Godley did not see how such optimization is conceivable. There are simply too many unknowns, he theorized.

    Instead, Mr. Godley built his economic model around the idea that sectors — households, production firms, banks, the government — largely follow rules of thumb.

    For example, firms add a standard profit markup to their costs for labor and other inputs. They try to maintain adequate inventories so they can satisfy demand without accumulating excessive overstock. If sales disappoint and inventories pile up, they correct by cutting back production and laying off workers.

    In mainstream models, the economy settles at an equilibrium where supply equals demand. To Mr. Godley, like some Keynesian economists, the economy is demand-driven and less stable than many traditional economists assume.

    Instead of supply and demand guiding the economy to equilibrium, adjustments can be abrupt. Borrowing “flows” build up as debt “stocks.”

    If rules of thumb suggest to households, firms, or the government that borrowing, debt or other things have gone out of whack, they may cut back. Or banks may cut lending. The high-flying economy falls down.

    Mr. Godley and his colleagues expressed just this concern in the mid-2000s. In April 2007, they plugged Congressional Budget Office projections of government spending and healthy growth into their model. For these to be borne out, the model said, household borrowing must reach 14 percent of G.D.P. by 2010.

    The authors declared this situation “wildly implausible.” More likely, borrowing would level off, bringing growth “almost to zero.” In repeated papers, they foresaw a looming recession but significantly underestimated its depth.

    For all Mr. Godley’s foresight, even economists who are doubtful about traditional economic thinking do not necessarily see the Godley-Lavoie models as providing all the answers. Charles Goodhart of the London School of Economics called them a “gallant failure” in a review. He applauded their realism, especially the way they allowed sectors to make mistakes and correct, rather than assuming that individuals foresee the future. But they are still, he wrote, “insufficient” in crises.

    Gennaro Zezza of the University of Cassino in Italy, who collaborated with Mr. Godley on a model of the American economy, concedes that he and his colleagues still need to develop better ways of describing how a financial crisis will spread. But he said the Godley-Lavoie approach already is useful to identify unsustainable processes that precede a crisis.

    “If everyone had remained optimistic in 2007, the process could have continued for another one or two or three years,” he said. “But eventually it would have broken down. And in a much more violent way, because debt would have piled up even more.”

    Dr. Lavoie says that one of the models he helped develop does make a start at tracing the course of a crisis. It allows for companies to default on loans, eroding banks’ profits and causing them to raise interest rates: “At the very least, we were looking in the right direction.”

    This is just the direction that economists building on Mr. Godley’s models are now exploring, incorporating “agents” — distinct types of households, firms and banks, not unlike creatures in a video game — that respond flexibly to economic circumstances. Stephen Kinsella of the University of Limerick, the Nobel laureate economist Joseph Stiglitz and Mauro Gallegati of Polytechnic University of Marche in Italy are collaborating on one such effort.

    In the meantime, Mr. Godley’s disciples say his record of forecasting still stands out. In 2007 Mr. Godley and Dr. Lavoie published a prescient model of euro zone finances, envisioning three outcomes: soaring interest rates in Southern Europe, huge European Central Bank loans to the region or brutal fiscal cuts. In effect, the euro zone has cycled among those outcomes.

    So what do the Godley models predict now? A recent Levy Institute analysis expresses concern not about serious financial imbalances, at least in the United States, but weak global demand. “The main difficulty,” they wrote, “has been in convincing economic leaders of the nature of the main problem: insufficient aggregate demand.” So far, they are not having much success.

    A version of this article appears in print on September 11, 2013, on page B1 of the New York edition with the headline: Embracing Economist Who Modeled the Crisis.

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  • Working Paper No. 772 | August 2013
    A Critical Assessment of Fiscal Fine-Tuning

    The present paper offers a fundamental critique of fiscal policy as it is understood in theory and exercised in practice. Two specific demand-side stabilization methods are examined here: conventional pump priming and the new designation of fiscal policy effectiveness found in the New Consensus literature. A theoretical critique of their respective transmission mechanisms reveals that they operate in a trickle-down fashion that not only fails to secure and maintain full employment but also contributes to the increasing postwar labor market precariousness and the erosion of income equality. The two conventional demand-side measures are then contrasted with the proposed alternative—a bottom-up approach to fiscal policy based on a reinterpretation of Keynes’s original policy prescriptions for full employment. The paper offers a theoretical, methodological, and policy rationale for government intervention that includes specific direct-employment and investment initiatives, which are inherently different from contemporary hydraulic fine-tuning measures. It outlines the contours of the modern bottom-up approach and concludes with some of its advantages over conventional stabilization methods.

  • A conference organized by the Levy Economics Institute of Bard College with support from the Ford Foundation   The 2013 Minsky Conference addressed both financial reform and poverty in the context of Minsky’s work on financial instability and his proposal for a public job guarantee. Panels focused on the design of a new, more robust, and stable financial architecture; fiscal austerity and the sustainability of the US economic recovery; central bank independence and financial reform; the larger implications of the eurozone debt crisis for the global economic system; improving governance of the social safety net; the institutional shape of the future financial system; strategies for promoting poverty eradication and an inclusive economy; sustainable development and market transformation; time poverty and the gender pay gap; and policy and regulatory challenges for emerging-market economies. The proceedings include the conference program, transcripts of keynote speakers’ remarks, synopses of the panel sessions, and biographies of the participants. 
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  • In the Media | April 2013
    By Gareth Hutchens
    The Age (Melbourne), April 21, 2013. All Rights Reserved.

    If we needed more evidence that economics is not a science, we have it now.

    A shock wave hit the economics world this week when two of its most famous practitioners—Kenneth Rogoff and Carmen Reinhart—were found to have produced some very dodgy data to support their claims about the consequences of high government debt.

    It comes back to a research paper of theirs, Growth in a Time of Debt widely quoted since it was published in 2010. The paper shows that if government debt becomes too high—say, around 90 per cent of gross domestic product—then economic growth will almost always suffer. Global policymakers have taken it to mean that if countries with too-high debt levels want to kick-start flagging economies then they ought to begin the resuscitation process by reducing debt levels first.

    It has been repackaged into a simple message: Reduce your debt and economic growth will begin to pick up. But the corollary is that highly indebted governments should not try to spend their way out of economic stagnation because spending more will only make things worse. It has helped to provide the intellectual justification that the proponents of austerity wanted; thus the wave of austerity policies washing around the world since 2010. Millions of people have suffered because of it.

    But the intellectual edifice for the global austerity movement was severely weakened this week after it emerged that professors Reinhart and Rogoff had made some basic errors in their interpretation of data that supported their research. The errors were discovered by Thomas Herndon, a student at the University of Massachusetts Amherst's doctoral program in economics. He published a paper this week explaining what he found, with help from two of his teachers, Michael Ash and Robert Pollin.

    The paper shows Reinhart and Rogoff had omitted data, made a mistake in their Excel spreadsheet, and used a bizarre statistical methodology, all of which skewed results. It set the academic world ablaze.

    As Nobel laureate Paul Krugman wrote: "In this age of information, maths errors can lead to disaster. NASA's Mars Orbiter crashed because engineers forgot to convert to metric measurements; JPMorgan Chase's "London Whale" venture went bad because modellers divided a sum instead of an average. So, did an Excel coding error destroy the economies of the Western world?"

    Reinhart and Rogoff have acknowledged they made a spreadsheet error, but they also say it didn't affect their result much.

    "It is sobering that such an error slipped into one of our papers despite our best efforts to be consistently careful," they said. "We do not, however, believe this regrettable slip affects in any significant way the central message of the paper or that in our subsequent work."

    But in the brouhaha that followed, a few people have been asking why it took so long for Reinhart and Rogoff's research to be tested.

    Imagine you've handed your assignment in at school. You make some wonderful claims in it about the way the world works. Your research—based on an analysis of data of 44 countries spanning 200 years—has led you to discover that high government debt to GDP ratios above a "90 per cent threshold" almost always lead to a slowdown in economic growth. It's a law that seems to hold no matter what you throw at it. You can compare different countries in disparate regions, and once you try to take account of the fact that a country's political and financial systems evolve over time you can mix and match these things across centuries of data and the law stays the same.

    It's a striking thesis. And luckily for you, you're not expected to hand your data in with your assignment so your work can be checked. Your teacher takes your word for it. That's not how the scientific method is supposed to work. Some economists, such as L. Randall Wray of the Levy institute, say they have written to Reinhart and Rogoff in the past to ask for data, but have been rebuffed. "They ignored our request. I have heard from several other researchers that Reinhart and Rogoff also ignored their repeated requests for the data," Professor Wray wrote this week.

    It is sobering to be reminded that economic analyses, produced in this way, can have such influence in the real world. It's worth remembering next time we hear some politician referring to "economic modelling" that supports his or her claim.
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  • In the Media | April 2013
    By Robert Lenzner
    Forbes, April 20, 2013. All Rights Reserved.

    The President of the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, Erick Rosengren, suggested this week that there could still be runs on money market mutual funds, as took place at the peak of the 2008 financial crisis, since these funds have “no capital” and invest in uninsured short term securities of banks and other financial service firms. While debate over potential regulatory solutions for money market funds continues on, the Boston Fed chief, emphasized that the safety of the money market mutual funds are a “significant unresolved issue.”

    As of April 13 there was $903.56 billion in retail money market funds sponsored by Fidelity, T. Rowe Price, Dreyfus, Invesco and others, The total amount of all kinds of money market funds, some owned by institutional investors, was $2.6 trillion. The average weekly yield was a record low of only 0.02%.

    He also singled out the issue of capital for the broker-dealer fraternity, where he raised the problem of “virtually no change for broker-dealers since the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September, 2008 and the shotgun marriage of Merrill Lynch into BankAmerica. The solution Rosengren recommended was that the “larger(these investment firms) get the higher the capital ratio”: should be imposed on them. The Boston Fed chief executive, speaking at Bard College’s Levy Institute conference on the economy and financial markets, seemed to be suggesting that the cause for this vacuum in policy is that “Regulatory bodies haven’t evolved as much as the financial markets.” In other words, 5 years after the 2008 meltdown we still have a major challenge in trying to make the global financial system secure against runs and speculative bubbles. There is still further to go in the structural reorganization of the danger from derivatives, but he believes clearing derivatives contracts on exchanges and the decline in bilateral transactions has reduced an element of risk.

    Nevertheless, Rosengren made crystal clear in conversation after his talk that he “sees no bubbles anywhere, not even in real estate where prices are still below their 2006 peak.” He believes prices of residential real estate in Boston and New York are still 15-20% under their peak—and prices in Miami, Phoenix, Las Vegas, California– are still priced at a steeper discount to the peak in 2006.

    As for the economy in general, Rosengren sees “traction” picking up momentum, in which case he would support the “prudent” position of gradually reducing the QE stimulus program. However, he is troubled by the fact that monetary policy(quantitative easing and record low interest rates) are in conflict with fiscal policy, the restraint of sequester and reduction of federal, state and local government spending, ie “the Obama cuts.”
  • In the Media | April 2013
    By Robert Lenzner
    Forbes, April 19, 2013. All Rights Reserved.

    The growing disparity in wealth made the great recession worse and the recovery weaker than ever before. This nation’s wealth disparity widened more than ever before over the last five years because of the steep decline in the value of residential homes and stagnant wages for the lower and middle income groups in the U.S., explained a member of the Federal Reserve Board, Sarah Bloom Raskin, in a speech that explored for the first time a fresh explanation about the obstacles holding back economic growth.

    This “financial vulnerability and marginal ability” to recover from the decline in the wealth of lower income and middle income Americans is “undermining our country’s strength,” Governor Raskin emphasized in New York yesterday at an economic conference sponsored by the Levy Institute at Bard College and the Ford Foundation. Raskin admitted to a feeling of frustration at the central bank about the inability of the Fed’s low interest rate policy together with the expansion in the money supply to alleviate this growing disparity between the wealthy and the rest of American families. She admitted there was current exploration at the Board level of the central bank that “our macro models should be adjusted,” because four years into the recovery a confluence of factors have contributed to a weak recovery.

    “Inequality contributed to the severity of the recession,” Raskin said flatly, and blamed this inequality- for the “differential expectations” in the future between well-off families– with those families not so well off, who were battered by a plunge in the value of their homes, a high level of debt and a continuance of lower wages. I had never heard that theme so sharply expressed as the blame for the mediocre rate of growth we are experiencing.

    Here are the Fed’s latest breakdown on the disparity in wealth. The top 20% of the population own 72% of the nation’s wealth in large part due to their vast holdings in the common shares of publicly held companies. By comparison, the poorest 20% of the U.S. population only own 3% of the wealth, and so were unable to shelter themselves when their homes declined in value, often below the face value of their mortgage and their take-home pay was not growing– or they lost their jobs.

    The distribution of wealth inequality is far worse than the disparity in incomes. Nonetheless, the Fed Governor suggested it does explain the lower levels of consumer spending. As to income disparity between 1979 and 2007, the Federal Reserve figures shows the highest income cohort doubled their annual compensation when adjusted for inflation. The top 1% of earners in the nation saw their share of the national income rise from 10% to 20%. Meanwhile the bottom 40% of the nation’s workers saw their share of the national income decline slightly from 13% to 10%.

    The middle class average income rose in those 30 years to 2007 by only 20% or less than 1% a year, underscoring just how much middle income Americans have fallen behind their wealthier brethren. Fed Governor Raskin called this performance “sluggishness.”

    One hopeful sign is the gradual increase in prices for residential homes throughout the United States. This trend has restored some semblance of household wealth for homeowners from low income and middle income sectors of the population. Another 10% increase in home values, Gov. Raskin suggested, would allow many more low income families to stay in their homes.

    More worrisome, however, is the trend for more and more jobs to be only part-time with less pay and less benefits. “We have lost 9 million jobs,” she said and the growing trend for new jobs to be part-time employment or involving contingent work is “no way to upward mobility” in America.
  • Policy Note 2013/3 | April 2013

    This policy note discusses the prospects for job creation in the US based on the most recent Levy Economics Institute Strategic Analysis report, Is the Link between Jobs and Output Broken? The results of our analysis confirm the continued weakness of the US economy in terms of job creation—a phenomenon that has come to be known as a “jobless recovery.” We argue that to understand the problem we must look beyond the unemployment rate, which can conceal changes in the labor force. A prolonged recession can discourage workers, causing them to drop out of the labor market, thus lowering the unemployment rate without increasing employment. Therefore, the total number of people employed should be considered in tandem with the unemployment rate.

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  • In the Media | April 2013
    By Dimitri B. Papadimitriou
    Los Angeles Times, April 5, 2013. All Rights Reserved.

    The government can and should increase the deficit to return us to prosperity. Without such outlays we can’t get enough GDP growth to seriously attack unemployment.

    Just before the congressional spring break, a Senate budget proposal to decrease, but not eliminate, the deficit over 10 years was denounced as “pro debt” by an Alabama senator. It was the kind of proud and loud anti-deficit rhetoric that, no matter how nonsensical, plays nicely into Washington group-think on the subject.

    The deficit has arguably gained the distinction of being the single most widely misunderstood public policy issue in America. Just 6% (6!) of respondents in a recent poll correctly stated that it had been shrinking, which has in fact been the case for several years, while 10 times more, 62%, wrongly believed that it’s been getting bigger.

    Despite prevailing notions in the capital and throughout the nation, those of us at the Levy Economics Institute—along with many other analysts and economists—have concluded that the deficit should be increased.

    Why add to the deficit right now? Jobs. Our economic models clearly show that without increased government outlays we’ll be unable to generate enough GDP growth to seriously attack unemployment. If we tried to balance the budget through tax hikes, our still-recovering economy would be hurt. That leaves a temporarily bigger deficit as an important option.

    A mutation in the link between growth and jobs makes the issue urgent. While we are seeing some economic growth, the unemployment rate is not responding as strongly to the gains as it did in the past.

    This slow job growth—today’s “jobless recovery”—isn’t an outlier. It’s a phenomenon that has been increasing over the last three decades, with jobs coming back more and more slowly after a downturn, even when GDP is increasing. The weak employment response has been an almost straight-line trend for more than 30 years.

    Our institute’s newest econometric models show that each 1% boost in the GDP today will create, roughly, only a third as much improvement to the unemployment rate as the same 1% rise did in the late 1970s.

    Traditionally, we’ve assumed that GDP growth would be followed by an employment surge. The break in that link is now very clear. It’s especially worrisome this year, with only a small GDP rise universally anticipated.

    The Federal Reserve, for one, just reduced its growth outlook to 2.8% at most for 2013. The shallow recovery we’re seeing may indeed continue through 2014 and beyond. Since employment now consistently lags well behind GDP, we’ll have a long slog before we reach pre-crisis unemployment levels (below 4.6%). Some Federal Reserve officials believe it might take three years just to get from today’s 7.7% down to 6.5%. Full employment would still be nowhere in sight.

    The quantitative data are telling us that without a stimulus, we can’t expect a strong employment lift. But instead of stimulus, we’re devising federal budgets that cut spending and lay off workers. The sequester is expected to depress GDP growth by perhaps half a percentage point—when we know that more growth than ever will be needed to raise employment—and cost anywhere from 700,000 to more than 1 million jobs.

    Slower government spending is one reason that post-recession growth has been below par compared with other recoveries, Fed Vice Chair Janet Yellen has argued. As government outlays and employment have shrunk, the contribution of public funds to national growth has also fallen. By our estimates, that contribution now stands at about zero. That’s another data point indicating that federal deficits need to be increased.

    To better understand the changing relationship between growth and jobs, the Levy Institute recently looked at three scenarios through 2016: what the results might be of a small, medium or large stimulus. A strong stimulus was clearly the most effective option, since it had a powerful, positive influence on employment growth and, in the long term, on deficit reduction. Of course, that route is completely unfeasible in the current political climate. But we saw that even a small amount of deficit spending could help put the recovery on track if it were combined with a mix of private investment, increased exports and good policy alternatives.

    That points toward a way forward. Increasing the deficit while our economy is fragile is not “pro deficit,” any more than a family with a 30-year home mortgage is “pro debt.” To reclaim a phrase that deficit hawks have tried to make their own, it is “sensible and serious.” The federal government can run a deficit, as it almost always has, to help the nation return to prosperity.

    With our new understanding of the fraying tie between GDP growth and jobs, we know that millions of Americans are on course for an agonizingly slow march out of joblessness unless we make a move. The nature of slumps and recoveries has changed, and the policies to manage them need to change too.

    Dimitri B. Papadimitriou is president of the Levy Economics Institute of Bard College and executive vice president of Bard.
  • Strategic Analysis | March 2013

    As this report goes to press, the official unemployment rate remains tragically elevated, compared even to rates at similar points in previous recoveries. The US economy seems once again to be in a “jobless recovery,” though the unemployment rate has been steadily declining for years. At the same time, fiscal austerity has arrived, with the implementation of the sequester cuts, following tax increases and the ending of emergency extended unemployment benefits just two months ago.

    Our new report provides medium-term projections of employment and economic growth under four different scenarios. The baseline scenario starts by assuming the same growth rates and government deficits as the Congressional Budget Office’s (CBO) baseline projection from earlier this year. The result is a new surge of the unemployment rate to nearly 8 percent in the third quarter of this year, followed by a very gradual new recovery. Scenarios 1 and 2 seek to reach unemployment-rate goals of 6.5 percent and 5.5 percent, respectively, by the end of next year, using new fiscal stimulus.

    We find in these simulations that reaching the goals requires large amounts of fiscal stimulus, compared to the CBO baseline. For example, in order to reach 5.5 percent unemployment in 2014, scenario 2 assumes 11 percent growth in inflation-adjusted government spending and transfers, along with lower taxes.

    As an alternative, scenario 3 adds an extra increase to growth abroad and to private borrowing, along with the same amount of fiscal stimulus as in scenario 1. In this last scenario of the report, the unemployment rate finally pierces the 5.5 percent threshold from the previous scenario in the third quarter of 2015. We conclude with some thoughts about how such an increase in demand from all three sectors—government, private, and external—might be realistically obtained.

  • In the Media | December 2012
    By Mitja Stefancic
    The University of Ljubljana Faculty of Economics provides an overview of the Institute's Minsky Conference on Financial Instability here.
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  • In the Media | November 2012
    Por Andrea Hopkins y Sarah Marsh, Reuters

    El Periòdico de México, 28 de Noviembre de 2012. Copyright © 2006 El Periòdico de México. Todos los derechos reservados.

    TORONTO / BERLIN — Las profundas divisiones de la Reserva Federal quedaron expuestas el martes, apenas dos semanas antes de la siguiente reunión de política monetaria del banco central de Estados Unidos, con un funcionario de la Fed impulsando un mayor alivio y otro defendiendo la fijación de límites.

    La brecha pone de relieve los obstáculos que enfrenta el presidente de la Fed, Ben Bernanke, en su intento de alcanzar un consenso entre sus compañeros sobre los esfuerzos políticos a veces polémicos del banco central por reducir la elevada tasa de desempleo del país, que registró un 7,9 por ciento el mes pasado.

    Charles Evans, presidente de la Reserva Federal de Chicago y uno de los moderados de la Fed, dijo que las tasas de interés deberían permanecer cerca de cero hasta que la tasa de desempleo caiga a menos del 6,5 por ciento. Tal política acarrearía "sólo riesgos mínimos de inflación", y podría impulsar el crecimiento más rápido que en otro caso, dijo.

    Evans, que pasará a ocupar en enero un asiento con derecho a voto en el panel de fijación de política de la Fed, también dijo que la Fed debería intensificar su programa de alivio cuantitativo en el nuevo año para mantener su nivel global de compras de activos en 85.000 millones de dólares al mes por la mayor parte, si no todo, el 2013.

    Pero el presidente de la Fed de Dallas, Richard Fisher, un duro que se inclina por el rigor fiscal, dijo que el banco central de Estados Unidos podría meterse en problemas si no se establece un límite a la cantidad de activos que está dispuesto a comprar.

    "No se puede expandir de manera ilimitada sin consecuencias terribles", dijo a periodistas en el marco de la conferencia organizada por el Levy Economics Institute de Berlín. "No hay un infinito en la política monetaria, sabemos eso a partir de la experiencia alemana", agregó.

    En septiembre, la Fed lanzó un abierto programa de compra de activos, partiendo con 40.000 millones de dólares en valores respaldados por hipotecas y prometiendo continuar o reforzar el programa a menos que las perspectivas del mercado laboral mejoren sustancialmente.

    Esas compras se suman a los 45.000 millones de dólares en bonos del Tesoro a largo plazo que la Fed está comprando cada mes bajo la Operación Twist, compras que se financian con la venta de una cantidad igual de bonos del Tesoro a corto plazo.

    "Es importante mantener el nivel general de compra de activos en 85.000 millones de dólares, al menos por un tiempo hasta que podamos ver si lo estamos haciendo mejor o no, o si las cosas van más lento, podemos ajustarlo, dependiendo de esa evaluación", dijo a los periodistas que asistían a una conferencia en el Instituto CD Howe en Toronto.

    "Creo que debemos tener una discusión sobre qué es una 'mejoría sustancial'. ¿lo hemos visto? En mi opinión, no lo hemos hecho", agregó.

    Evans dijo que juzgaría que el mercado laboral ha mejorado sustancialmente una vez que vea ganancias mensuales de al menos 200.000 puestos de trabajo durante unos seis meses, así como sobre una tendencia de crecimiento del Producto Interno Bruto que conduzca a la disminución del desempleo.

    "Estaría muy sorprendido si pudiéramos alcanzar eso antes de que hayan pasado seis meses, y no me sorprendería si tarda hasta fines del 2013", declaró.

    Evans dijo que la Fed debería mantener las tasas bajas mucho más allá de esa fecha, hasta que la tasa de desempleo llegue al 6,5 por ciento, siempre y cuando las perspectivas de inflación para los próximos dos o tres años se mantengan por debajo del 2,5 por ciento. El objetivo de inflación de la Fed es del 2 por ciento.

    Evans durante el último año había pedido tasas bajas hasta que la tasa de desempleo caiga al 7 por ciento, mientras la inflación no amenace con superar la barrera del 3 por ciento.

    El martes Evans dijo que ahora considera que un umbral de desempleo de un 7 por ciento es "demasiado conservador". El también dijo que ahora cree que una garantía de que la inflación no supere el 2,5 por ciento es apropiada, dado que un umbral mayor "pone a muchas personas ansiosas", y no es necesario para que la política funcione.

    "Es mucho más probable que alcancemos el umbral de un 6,5 por ciento de desempleo antes de que la inflación comience incluso a acercarse a un número modesto como un 2,5 por ciento", afirmó.

    La Fed han estado aumentando las discusiones sobre los llamados umbrales -puntos específicos de datos económicos como el desempleo y las tasas de inflación- que indicarían cuándo el banco central probablemente comenzará a subir las tasas de interés desde casi cero.

    El presidente de la Fed de Minneapolis, Narayana Kocherlakota, el presidente de la Fed de Boston, Eric Rosengren, y la influyente vicepresidenta de la Fed, Janet Yellen, han expresado apoyo a la idea.

    En Berlín, Fisher también intervino en el debate.

    "Una opción que creo que podríamos seguir es tener una definición de nuestro objetivo de desempleo, así como nuestro objetivo a largo plazo la inflación", dijo, haciendo notar que esto sería difícil, y que el establecimiento de un límite global de compras de activos era preferible.

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  • In the Media | November 2012
    Pide Fisher de Fed fijar límites a la compra de activos
    El Financiero, November 28, 2012. © 2012 Copyright Grupo Multimedia Lauman, SAPI de CV.

    El presidente de la Reserva de Dallas, Richard Fisher, subrayó que no estaba preocupado por la inflación en Estados Unidos, sino por el desempleo, al tiempo que el Banco Central debería considerar fijar un límite para el total de activos que está dispuesto a comprar.

    "Las tasas de interés son las más bajas en la historia de Estados Unidos, la pregunta es qué va a estimular a las empresas y poner a nuestra gente de vuelta en el trabajo", dijo Fisher, un crítico de la política de alivio de la Fed, en declaraciones en una conferencia organizada por el Levy Economics Institute de Berlín.

    "Es momento de que aclaremos cuáles son nuestros objetivos y nuestros límites", subrayó Fisher, un crítico de la política expansiva de la Fed, quien se describe a sí mismo como ortodoxo frente a la inflación.

    "Una opción es tener una definición de nuestra meta del empleo, además de nuestra meta de inflación de largo plazo. Será difícil de hacer, pero es una opción", resaltó.

    La segunda opción sería anunciar "más pronto que tarde" cuánto está dispuesta a comprar la Fed.

    El Banco Central estadunidense anunció una tercera ronda de compras de activos en septiembre, de final abierto, que según dice continuará hasta que haya una mejora sustancial en el mercado laboral.

    A la espera de la Fed

    En Estados Unidos se conocerá el informe económico conocido como Beige Book, esperando encontrar pistas sobre los próximos pasos a seguir por parte de la Reserva Federal y de su percepción en torno al problema fiscal.
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  • In the Media | November 2012
    Por Andrea Hopkins y Sarah Marsh

    TORONTO / BERLIN (Reuters) — Las profundas divisiones de la Reserva Federal quedaron expuestas el martes, apenas dos semanas antes de la siguiente reunión de política monetaria del banco central de Estados Unidos, con un funcionario de la Fed impulsando un mayor alivio y otro defendiendo la fijación de límites.

    La brecha pone de relieve los obstáculos que enfrenta el presidente de la Fed, Ben Bernanke, en su intento de alcanzar un consenso entre sus compañeros sobre los esfuerzos políticos a veces polémicos del banco central por reducir la elevada tasa de desempleo del país, que registró un 7,9 por ciento el mes pasado.

    Charles Evans, presidente de la Reserva Federal de Chicago y uno de los moderados de la Fed, dijo que las tasas de interés deberían permanecer cerca de cero hasta que la tasa de desempleo caiga a menos del 6,5 por ciento. Tal política acarrearía "sólo riesgos mínimos de inflación", y podría impulsar el crecimiento más rápido que en otro caso, dijo.

    Evans, que pasará a ocupar en enero un asiento con derecho a voto en el panel de fijación de política de la Fed, también dijo que la Fed debería intensificar su programa de alivio cuantitativo en el nuevo año para mantener su nivel global de compras de activos en 85.000 millones de dólares al mes por la mayor parte, si no todo, el 2013.

    Pero el presidente de la Fed de Dallas, Richard Fisher, un duro que se inclina por el rigor fiscal, dijo que el banco central de Estados Unidos podría meterse en problemas si no se establece un límite a la cantidad de activos que está dispuesto a comprar.

    "No se puede expandir de manera ilimitada sin consecuencias terribles", dijo a periodistas en el marco de la conferencia organizada por el Levy Economics Institute de Berlín. "No hay un infinito en la política monetaria, sabemos eso a partir de la experiencia alemana", agregó.

    En septiembre, la Fed lanzó un abierto programa de compra de activos, partiendo con 40.000 millones de dólares en valores respaldados por hipotecas y prometiendo continuar o reforzar el programa a menos que las perspectivas del mercado laboral mejoren sustancialmente.

    Esas compras se suman a los 45.000 millones de dólares en bonos del Tesoro a largo plazo que la Fed está comprando cada mes bajo la Operación Twist, compras que se financian con la venta de una cantidad igual de bonos del Tesoro a corto plazo.

    "Es importante mantener el nivel general de compra de activos en 85.000 millones de dólares, al menos por un tiempo hasta que podamos ver si lo estamos haciendo mejor o no, o si las cosas van más lento, podemos ajustarlo, dependiendo de esa evaluación", dijo a los periodistas que asistían a una conferencia en el Instituto CD Howe en Toronto.

    "Creo que debemos tener una discusión sobre qué es una 'mejoría sustancial'. ¿lo hemos visto? En mi opinión, no lo hemos hecho", agregó.

    Evans dijo que juzgaría que el mercado laboral ha mejorado sustancialmente una vez que vea ganancias mensuales de al menos 200.000 puestos de trabajo durante unos seis meses, así como sobre una tendencia de crecimiento del Producto Interno Bruto que conduzca a la disminución del desempleo.

    "Estaría muy sorprendido si pudiéramos alcanzar eso antes de que hayan pasado seis meses, y no me sorprendería si tarda hasta fines del 2013", declaró.

    Evans dijo que la Fed debería mantener las tasas bajas mucho más allá de esa fecha, hasta que la tasa de desempleo llegue al 6,5 por ciento, siempre y cuando las perspectivas de inflación para los próximos dos o tres años se mantengan por debajo del 2,5 por ciento. El objetivo de inflación de la Fed es del 2 por ciento. Evans durante el último año había pedido tasas bajas hasta que la tasa de desempleo caiga al 7 por ciento, mientras la inflación no amenace con superar la barrera del 3 por ciento.

    El martes Evans dijo que ahora considera que un umbral de desempleo de un 7 por ciento es "demasiado conservador". El también dijo que ahora cree que una garantía de que la inflación no supere el 2,5 por ciento es apropiada, dado que un umbral mayor "pone a muchas personas ansiosas", y no es necesario para que la política funcione.

    "Es mucho más probable que alcancemos el umbral de un 6,5 por ciento de desempleo antes de que la inflación comience incluso a acercarse a un número modesto como un 2,5 por ciento", afirmó.

    La Fed han estado aumentando las discusiones sobre los llamados umbrales -puntos específicos de datos económicos como el desempleo y las tasas de inflación- que indicarían cuándo el banco central probablemente comenzará a subir las tasas de interés desde casi cero.

    El presidente de la Fed de Minneapolis, Narayana Kocherlakota, el presidente de la Fed de Boston, Eric Rosengren, y la influyente vicepresidenta de la Fed, Janet Yellen, han expresado apoyo a la idea.

    En Berlín, Fisher también intervino en el debate.

    "Una opción que creo que podríamos seguir es tener una definición de nuestro objetivo de desempleo, así como nuestro objetivo a largo plazo la inflación", dijo, haciendo notar que esto sería difícil, y que el establecimiento de un límite global de compras de activos era preferible.

    (Reporte de Sarah Marsh y Reinhard Becker en Berlín, Andrea Hopkins y Jeffrey Hodgson en Toronto; Escrito por Ann Saphir. Editado en español por Carlos Aliaga)
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  • In the Media | November 2012
    The China Post, November 29, 2012. Copyright © 1999–2012 The China Post.

    TORONTO/BERLIN—Deep divisions at the Federal Reserve were on display on Tuesday, just two weeks before the U.S. central bank's next policy-setting meeting, with one top Fed official pushing for more easing, and another advocating limits. The divide underscores the hurdles Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke faces as he tries to win consensus among his fellow policymakers on the central bank's sometimes controversial efforts to bring down the nation's lofty unemployment rate, which registered 7.9 percent last month.

    Charles Evans, president of the Chicago Federal Reserve Bank and one of the Fed's most outspoken doves, said interest rates should stay near zero until the jobless rate falls to at least 6.5 percent. Such a policy would carry “only minimal inflation risks,” and could boost growth faster than otherwise, he said. Evans, who rotates into a voting seat on the Fed's policy-setting panel in January, also said the Fed should step up its program of quantitative easing in the new year to keep its overall level of asset purchases at US$85 billion a month for most, if not all, of 2013.

    But Dallas Fed President Richard Fisher, a self-identified inflation hawk, said the U.S. central bank could get into trouble if it does not set a limit on the amount of assets it is willing to buy.

    “You cannot expand without limits without horrific consequences,” he told reporters on the sidelines of the conference organized by the Levy Economics Institute in Berlin. “There is no infinity in monetary policy, we know that from the German experience.”

    In September the Fed launched an open-ended asset-purchase program, kicking it off with a monthly US$40 billion in mortgage-backed securities and promising to continue or ramp up the program unless the outlook for the labor market improves substantially.

    Those purchases come on top of the US$45 billion in long-term Treasurys the Fed is buying each month under Operation Twist, purchases that are funded with sales of a like amount of short-term Treasuries.

    “It's important to maintain the overall level of asset purchases at US$85 billion, at least for a time until we can see whether or not we are doing better or things are going more slowly, and we can adjust, depending on that assessment,” Evans told reporters attending a speech at the C.D. Howe Institute in Toronto.

    “I think we have to have discussion about what is 'substantial improvement.' Have we seen it? In my opinion, we have not,” he said.

    Evans said he would judge the labor market as substantially improved once he sees monthly job gains of a least 200,000 for about six months, as well as above-trend growth in gross domestic product that would lead to declines in unemployment.

    “I would be very surprised if we could achieve that before six months have passed, and I would not be surprised if it takes until the end of 2013,” he said.
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  • In the Media | November 2012
    By Phil Bolton
    Global Atlanta, November 27, 2012. All content © 1993- GlobalAtlanta.com, All Rights Reserved.

    The president and CEO of the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, Dennis Lockhart, spoke at an economic conference in Berlin Nov 27 about the potential harm that cyber attacks on U.S. banks could do to the global payments system.
      Mr. Lockhart called the attacks “a real financial concern” that the Atlanta Fed is studying. He cited attacks in recent months on U.S. banks that flooded bank web servers with junk data, allowing the hackers to target certain web applications and disrupt online services.
      “The increasing incidence and heightened magnitude of attacks suggests to me the need to update our thinking,” he told attendees at the Hyman P. Minsky Conference organized by the Levy Economic Institute of Bard College. Dr. Minsky was an American economist who researched the characteristics of financial crises.
      The two-day conference is being supported by the Ford Foundation, the German Marshall Fund of the United States and Deutsche Bank AG to address challenged to global growth affected by the eurozone debt crisis; the impact of the credit crunch on economic and financial markets; the larger implications of government deficits and the debt crisis for U.S., European and Asian economic policy and central bank independence and financial reform.
      Mr. Lockhart is one of many speakers including Philip D. Murphy, the U.S. ambassador to Germany; Klaus Gunter Deutsch, director of Deutsche Bank Research; and Peter Praet, chief economist and executive board member of the European Central Bank.
    Mr. Lockhart qualified his concerns saying that he didn’t think cyber attacks on payment systems was as critical as fiscal crises or bank runs. But he suggested that resilience measures of the sort banks have to maintain operations in a natural disaster such as multiple back-up sites and redundant computer systems would be appropriate.
      Mr. Lockhart also said that the Atlanta Fed is investigating the current state of public pensions as a possible source of financial instability and called it “the other debt problem” that the U.S. faces.
      If public funds can attain an 8 percent average annual return on their portfolios, he said that public state and municipal pension funds in the U.S would still have an $800 billion funding gap to fill.
      Using more realistic return assumptions, such as the longer-term rate on U.S. Treasuries, the gap could reach as high as $3 trillion to $4 trillion, he added.
    He cited three strategies fund managers can apply: increase contributions, decrease promised future benefit or assume more investment risk.
      “As a financial stability consideration, the problem of pension underfunding is not likely to be the source of any immediate shock or trigger a broader systemic crisis,” he said.
      “However, the situation needs to be monitored, as public finance does contribute to financial and economic stability more broadly.”
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  • In the Media | November 2012
    By Andrea Hopkins and Sarah Marsh
    Yahoo! News, November 27, 2012. (c) Copyright Thomson Reuters 2012.

    TORONTO/BERLIN Nov 27 (Reuters) — Deep divisions at the Federal Reserve were on display on Tuesday, just two weeks before the U.S. central bank's next policy-setting meeting, with one top Fed official pushing for more easing, and another advocating limits.

    The divide underscores the hurdles Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke faces as he tries to win consensus among his fellow policymakers on the central bank's sometimes controversial efforts to bring down the nation's lofty unemployment rate, which registered 7.9 percent last month.

    Charles Evans, president of the Chicago Federal Reserve Bank and one of the Fed's most outspoken doves, said interest rates should stay near zero until the jobless rate falls to at least 6.5 percent. Such a policy would carry "only minimal inflation risks," and could boost growth faster than otherwise, he said.

    Evans, who rotates into a voting seat on the Fed's policy-setting panel in January, also said the Fed should step up its program of quantitative easing in the new year to keep its overall level of asset purchases at $85 billion a month for most, if not all, of 2013.

    But Dallas Fed President Richard Fisher, a self-identified inflation hawk, said the U.S. central bank could get into trouble if it does not set a limit on the amount of assets it is willing to buy.

    "You cannot expand without limits without horrific consequences," he told reporters on the sidelines of the conference organized by the Levy Economics Institute in Berlin. "There is no infinity in monetary policy, we know that from the German experience."

    In September the Fed launched an open-ended asset-purchase program, kicking it off with a monthly $40 billion in mortgage-backed securities and promising to continue or ramp up the program unless the outlook for the labor market improves substantially.

    Those purchases come on top of the $45 billion in long-term Treasuries the Fed is buying each month under Operation Twist, purchases that are funded with sales of a like amount of short-term Treasuries.

    "It's important to maintain the overall level of asset purchases at $85 billion, at least for a time until we can see whether or not we are doing better or things are going more slowly, and we can adjust, depending on that assessment," Evans told reporters attending a speech at the C.D. Howe Institute in Toronto.

    "I think we have to have discussion about what is 'substantial improvement.' Have we seen it? In my opinion, we have not," he said.

    Evans said he would judge the labor market as substantially improved once he sees monthly job gains of a least 200,000 for about six months, as well as above-trend growth in gross domestic product that would lead to declines in unemployment.

    "I would be very surprised if we could achieve that before six months have passed, and I would not be surprised if it takes until the end of 2013," he said.

    Evans said the Fed should keep rates low well beyond that date, until the jobless rate hits at least 6.5 percent, as long as the inflation outlook for the next two to three years remains below 2.5 percent. The Fed's inflation target is 2 percent.

    Evans for the past year had called for low rates until the jobless rate falls to 7 percent, as long as inflation does not threaten to breach 3 percent.

    On Tuesday Evans said he now views a 7 percent unemployment threshold as "too conservative," and sees a 2.5 percent inflation safeguard as appropriate, given that a higher threshold makes some people "apoplectic" and is not needed in order for the policy to work.

    "We're much more likely to reach the 6.5 percent unemployment threshold before inflation begins to approach even a modest number like 2.5 percent," he said.

    Fed policymakers have been ramping up discussions on so-called thresholds—economic data points such as specific unemployment and inflation rates - that would signal when the central bank is likely to begin raising benchmark interest rates from near zero.

    Minneapolis Fed President Narayana Kocherlakota, Boston Fed President Eric Rosengren and the Fed's influential vice chair, Janet Yellen, have all expressed support for the idea.

    In Berlin, Fisher also chimed into the debate. "One option I believe we might pursue is to have a definition of our unemployment target as well as our long-term inflation target," he said, noting it would be difficult, however, and setting an overall limit on asset purchases was preferable.

    Fed Chairman Bernanke said last week that adopting numerical thresholds for unemployment and inflation could be a "very promising" step to develop the Fed's communication strategy, but stressed that it was still under discussion.

    On at least one issue, Fisher and Evans agreed: lack of jobs, not high inflation, is the biggest problem for the U.S. economy.

    "I am not worried about inflation right now, I am worried about an underemployed workforce in America," said Fisher.
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  • In the Media | November 2012
    By Steve Matthews and Stefan Riecher
    Bloomberg Businessweek, November 27, 2012. ©2012 Bloomberg L.P. All Rights Reserved.

    Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta President Dennis Lockhart said financial regulators need to be vigilant in identifying risks, including cybercrime at banks and the underfunding of public pensions.

    “At a global level, the span of vigilance needs to be extremely broad,” Lockhart said today in remarks prepared for a speech in Berlin. “The events of 2007 and 2008 brought many surprises,” he said. “Markets that some thought too small to cause much trouble ultimately posed systemic-scale problems.”

    U.S. regulators are grappling with how to identify threats to financial stability more than four years after the collapse of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. The Dodd-Frank Act tightening post-crisis supervision created a council of regulators to monitor sources of instability.

    Lockhart didn’t comment on the U.S. economic outlook or monetary policy in his prepared remarks.

    One concern is “the potential for malicious disruptions to the payments system in the form of broadly targeted cyber-attacks,” Lockhart said at the Levy Economics Institute’s Hyman P. Minsky Conference on Financial Stability.

    “Banks and other participants in the payments system will need to reevaluate defense strategies” in light of increasing attacks by “sophisticated, well-organized hacking groups,” he said.

    Funding Shortfalls U.S. states and municipalities face pension funding shortfalls of as much as $3 trillion or $4 trillion, when conservative investment returns are assumed, Lockhart said. While pensions may not trigger a financial crisis, the health of state and local governments contributes to economic stability, he said.

    “The situation needs to be monitored,” Lockhart said. “The public pension funding problem, as it grows, has the potential to sap the resilience we wish for to withstand a future spell of financial instability.”

    Lockhart, a former Georgetown University professor, has led the Atlanta Fed since 2007. The Atlanta Fed district includes Alabama, Florida, Georgia, and portions of Louisiana, Mississippi, and Tennessee.
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  • In the Media | November 2012
    Reuters, November 27, 2012. ©2012 Thomson Reuters. All rights reserved.

    (Reuters) — Dallas Fed President Richard Fisher, a top Federal Reserve official, said on Tuesday the U.S. central bank could get into trouble if it doesn’t set a limit on the amount of assets it is willing to buy.

    But Fisher, a critic of easy Fed policy, also said his main concern now was unemployment, not inflation.

    He said another option the Fed might consider to signal its aims to markets was a target for unemployment, although this would be difficult because monetary policy alone was not responsible for creating jobs. Fiscal policy was also key.

    Fisher kicked off his speech at a conference in Berlin with a reference to German policies in the 1920s that led to hyperinflation, saying that while inflation was not his main concern now, unlimited quantitative easing was risky.

    “You cannot expand without limits without horrific consequences,” he told reporters on the sidelines of the conference organized by the Levy Economics Institute. “There is no infinity in monetary policy, we know that from the German experience.”

    The Fed announced a third, open-ended round of asset purchases in September that it says will continue until there is a substantial turnaround in the labor market.

    A self-described anti-inflation hawk, Fisher said the Fed should announce “sooner rather than later” limits on the amount of assets it would purchase, preferably in December.

    Fisher said inflation need not be the inevitable consequence of quantitative easing, but the Fed must remain mindful.

    He said that while he backed the first round of the Fed’s purchases of mortgage-backed securities, he doubted it should be continued as it had not reduced interest rate differentials as he had hoped.

    He also said that he was not in favor of extending Operation Twist, under which the Fed has been selling short-term securities to buy $45 billion in longer-term debt every month to push down long-term borrowing costs.

    Over to Fiscal Policy Fisher chimed into the debate on setting specific numerical rates for unemployment and inflation as markers for when the Fed would consider lifting interest rates.

    “One option I believe we might pursue is to have a definition of our unemployment target as well as our long-term inflation target,” he said, noting it would be difficult however and setting an overall limit on asset purchases was preferable.

    Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke said last week that adopting numerical thresholds for unemployment and inflation could be a “very promising” step to develop the Fed’s communication strategy, but stressed that it was still under discussion.

    “I am not worried about inflation right now, I am worried about an underemployed workforce in America,” said Fisher.

    “American businesses are ready to roll ... they are just not doing so, and that requires the fiscal authorities to incentivize them properly, in whatever way they choose.” He also said that after dealing with its fiscal policy, the U.S. government should seek a free trade deal with Europe.

    “It is very important our government, in addition to getting its act together on fiscal policy, resist with every fiber in their body the temptation to follow a protectionist course.”

    (Reporting by Sarah Marsh and Reinhard Becker, editing by Gareth Jones/Ruth Pitchford)
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  • In the Media | November 2012
    MNI | Deutsche Börse Group, November 27, 2012.

    BERLIN (MNI) - Dallas Federal Reserve Bank President Richard Fisher said Tuesday that the main problem in the U.S. economy at the moment is unemployment, not inflation.

    “I believe inflation is under control in the United States,” Fisher said at a conference of the Levy Economics Institute here. “Our real problem is underemployment,” he said.

    Fisher said he currently saw “no evidence” of inflation risks. “I do not believe inflation need be the inevitable consequence of the Federal Reserve expanding its balance sheet,” he added.

    At the same time he cautioned that “we must be ever mindful...that a shift [in inflation expectations] comes quickly and suddenly.”

    Fisher said the Fed must define what the limits of its policies are. “We’re going to need to soon decide and signal to the market when the punchbowl will be ended and then will be withdrawn,” he said.

    “Monetary policy is necessary but not sufficient” to get the U.S. economy on track again, Fisher argued. “Now we need the fiscal side to do its job,” he said.

    Currently, worries about the so-called “fiscal cliff” in the U.S., as well as concerns about the Chinese and European economy, are holding back investments in the economy, he said
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  • In the Media | November 2012
    Terra.com, 27 de Noviembre de 2012. © Copyright 2012, Terra Networks, S.A.

    BERLIN (Reuters) — El presidente de la Fed de Dallas, Richard Fisher, un funcionario de alto rango de la Reserva Federal de Estados Unidos, dijo el martes que no estaba preocupado por la inflación en Estados Unidos, sino por el desempleo y sostuvo que la política monetaria no es suficiente para crear puestos de trabajo.

    “Las tasas de interés son las más bajas en la historia de la República Americana (...) La pregunta es qué va a estimular las empresas y poner a nuestra gente de vuelta en el trabajo”, dijo Fisher, un crítico de la política de alivio de la Fed.

    El hizo estas declaraciones en una conferencia organizada por el Levy Economics Institute de Berlín.

    (Reporte de Sarah Marsh. Editado en español por Carlos Aliaga.)
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  • In the Media | November 2012
    By Michael S. Derby
    NASDAQ, November 27, 2012. All Rights Reserved.

    NEW YORK—A rising wave of cyberattacks on banks and underfunded pensions represent potential threats to financial stability, a key Federal Reserve official said Tuesday.

    The central banker, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta President Dennis Lockhart, didn’t address monetary policy or the economic outlook in remarks prepared for delivery in Berlin before a conference held by the Levy Economics Institute. Instead, he talked about issues confronting regulators at a time where the promotion of financial stability is seen a critical task.

    Mr. Lockhart observed “at a global level, the span of vigilance needs to be extremely broad,” and that’s because “the events of 2007 and 2008 brought many surprises.” In his speech, he zeroed in on threats to the payment system, most notably the sharp rise in electronic attacks directed at banks.

    “Just in the last few months, the United States has experienced an escalating incidence of distributed denial of service attacks aimed at our largest banks,” Mr. Lockhart said, noting “the attacks came simultaneously or in rapid succession,” apparently at the hand of those who appeared to be “sophisticated” and “well organized.”

    Mr. Lockhart said the motives for the attacks are “not always clear.” He explained “the intent appears to be to disable essential systems of financial institutions and cause them financial loss and reputational damage.”

    The spate of attacks suggests that financial sector participants will need to view the situation as “a persistent threat with potential systemic implications.” And while such attacks are unlikely to bring the financial system down, they nevertheless need to be countered, he said.

    Mr. Lockhart also warned about underfunded nature of much of the public pension system. “At a systemic level, this area of concern is more likely to be manifested as a gradually accreting threat to growth than a single event shock,” the official warned.

    The central banker pointed at the large gaps between what has been promised and the money put into the funds. He said managers of these funds are often operating with unrealistic investment return goals that lead to an understating of the degree of the problem.

    “The public pension funding problem, as it grows, has the potential to sap the resilience we wish for to withstand a future spell of financial instability,” Mr. Lockhart said.
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  • In the Media | November 2012
    By Harriet Torry and Brian Blackstone
    4-Traders.com, November 27, 2012. Copyright © 2012 Surperformance. All Rights Reserved.
        BERLIN—The U.S. Federal Reserve should end its program aimed at lowering long-term interest rates, known as Operation Twist, next month, U.S. Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas President Richard Fisher said Tuesday.
     
    Under the program, the Fed buys long-term Treasury bonds and sells short-term ones. Operation Twist is due to expire at the end of the year and Mr. Fisher, who has been skeptical of the program from its beginning, said he doesn’t want it extended.
     
    “I question its efficacy,” he told reporters after a speech.
     
    Mr. Fisher, who is considered one of the Fed’s most strident anti-inflation hawks, also said he doesn’t feel the Fed needs to continue purchasing mortgage-backed securities. In September, the Fed announced it would buy $40 billion per month of mortgage-backed securities until the U.S. employment market improves.
     
    “My personal view is we don’t need to do more,” Mr. Fisher said.
     
    He also said the Fed should define the limits of monetary policy. One option, he said, is to have a target for unemployment. At the same time, the Fed should set limits on the size of its balance sheet, he added.
     
    During his speech, the veteran U.S. central-bank official said the Federal Reserve needs to think about how to harness monetary policy to spur businesses to put Americans back to work.
     
    Speaking at a conference organized by the Levy Economics Institute, Mr. Fisher said the central bank now has a duty not only to maintain price stability and maximize employment, but also to preserve financial stability. He also said he supports a free trade agreement with Europe, which he said would be “stimulative” and would strengthen ties.
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  • In the Media | November 2012
    By Greg Robb
    MarketWatch, November 27, 2012. Copyright © 2012 MarketWatch, Inc. All rights reserved.   WASHINGTON (MarketWatch) — The U.S. financial system and its regulators need to “update our thinking” about the threat of cyber-attacks given the spike and magnitude of recent events, said Dennis Lockhart, president of the Atlanta Federal Reserve Bank, on Tuesday. “What was previously classified as an unlikely but very damaging event affecting one or a few institutions should now probably be thought of as a persistent threat with potential systemic implications,” Lockhart told a conference in Berlin on financial instability, sponsored by the Levy Economics Institute. Banks have been defending themselves against such attacks for a while, but recent episodes carry up to 20 times more volume of traffic than before, he noted. Lockhart said that another financial-stability concern facing the United States that does not get headlines is the underfunding of public-pension plans. The gap might be as much as $3 trillion to $4 trillion because of losses on investment portfolios during the crisis, according to the Fed president.
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  • In the Media | November 2012
    By Dimitri B. Papadimitriou
    The Huffington Post, November 6, 2012. Copyright © 2012 TheHuffingtonPost.com, Inc. All Rights Reserved.

    The gruesome package of spending cuts and tax increases scheduled for December 31 was dubbed the "Fiscal Cliff' by Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke. It's apparent why the phrase caught on. Less understandable is the urge to jump into equally dangerous policy options.

    Virtually all of Washington is unhappy with the prospect of the measures. For months there've been reports of informal meetings to create a fix. But the austerity-worshipping ethos that underlies the plan is firmly entrenched, and some version of it will be enacted. Because of the wounds that extreme austerity will inflict, the Levy Institute is predicting—and we're hardly alone—that we're headed for another recession in 2013.

    All the evidence confirms that austerity programs have been a counterproductive disaster in Europe. That hasn't persuaded fiscal conservatives to adapt their ideology to reality. They continue to point to the inevitability of a Greek or Portuguese-style meltdown in the United States unless we immediately put government on a no-calorie diet and extract higher tax payments from those least able to afford them. This is despite the understanding by economists, including the most orthodox, that our federal control of the dollar puts us in a fundamentally different position than that of countries yoked to the euro.

    What we should be watching instead is the sorry mess in the United Kingdom. It's a more relevant comparison because, like the United States, the UK controls its own money; it stuck with the pound and never adopted the euro.

    Britain's own fiscal cliff was the 2010 austerity agenda of Prime Minister David Cameron and the Conservative Party. A set of drastic measures aimed to increase growth and reduce debt, it has failed spectacularly on both fronts. The UK economy today is indisputably worse than it was when the tightening began, with a shrunken GDP and the deficit shooting up. Government spending cutbacks—integral to the plan—helped bring about this new recession. Cameron and Chancellor of the Exchequer David Osborne have yet to take responsibility for their policies, accusations of incompetence from the press and a slap-down from the International Monetary Fund not withstanding.

    The U.S. Congress seems determined to follow this running leap into extreme austerity. The most likely modification to the current plan is an extension of some of the Bush-era tax cuts. Yet there hasn't been any move to extend the payroll tax holiday. Workers on the low end of the pay scale need the additional take-home pay that this measure has been providing. Because these employees spend their paychecks (they save the least of any group), they've also been helping to stimulate the larger economy. To eliminate this prime tax relief issue for the working class would be a major blunder.

    Slashing federal agencies—the planned "sequestration" of Treasury Department funds when the overall budget hits a targeted figure—would be even worse. Medicare and Medicaid are exempt, but if the pressure to restore military spending succeeds, countless key economic drivers will have to be decimated instead, in order to reach the magic targeted number. With the pain spread across a wide range of departments, you might assume that the impact would be insignificant. No. The shrinkage would be, roughly, a substantial 12 to 15 percent. The cuts would lead to another recession here, in a mirror of what's happening in Great Britain.

    The trap that occurs when austerity measures are used to balance a budget is predictable and preventable. On the most simple level, spending cuts and tax increases promote a cycle of low demand (because consumers buy less), low profits, high unemployment, and slow growth. These, in turn, inevitably lead to lower tax revenues and higher government safety net payouts, which of course produce rising government deficits. Greg Hannsgen and I detail other factors that also play significant roles in a new report [Fiscal Traps and Macro Policy after the Eurozone Crisis]. The austerity cult's response to this cycle is bigger spending cuts and more tax increases, which lead to ... you get the idea.

    What's at the heart of this irrational strategy? A mistaken belief that our national economic problems stem only from a failure to control spending. The data shows that this simply is not the case. Total United States government spending has actually been falling as a percentage of GDP, while the total number of government employees has been declining. This alone clearly indicates that our deficits—like those in the UK, by the way—have more to do with meager tax revenue than with profligate spending.

    Also key to the craze is the belief that austerity measures cannot wait. Many in Washington and the media are convinced that the recovery is well underway, and if spending cuts and tax increases are delayed for even a year it will be too late to tame inflation and tighten fiscal policy on a soaring economy. The urgency rests on unfounded optimism. We still have a very long way to go before the economy is anywhere near healthy enough to heat up. The GDP is now, and has long been, far below trend.

    Our economic malaise has been consistently underestimated, and the result has been the adoption of inadequate half-measures. Swapping budget cuts at the edge of the fiscal cliff isn't a solution. A reduction in federal spending during a downturn will perpetuate the damaging cycle, no matter how judiciously the cuts are chosen.

    The sequester should be repealed outright, and it certainly should not be replaced. We need a strong stimulus that increases employment, not by wishing for it, but through public sector hiring. The Fiscal Cliff show is a morality play that celebrates puritanical righteousness and unnecessary punishment. As we've already seen on the UK stage, it's headed towards an unhappy ending.
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  • In the Media | November 2012
    Leading European and U.S. Policymakers to Discuss Financial Instability and Its Global Economic Implications at the Levy Economics Institute's Hyman P. Minsky Conference, in Berlin, November 26-27
    BERLIN, Nov. 6, 2012 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) -- From November 26 to 27, the Levy Economics Institute of Bard College will gather top policymakers, economists, and analysts at the Hyman P. Minsky Conference on Financial Instability to gain a better understanding of the causes of financial instability and its implications for the global economy. The conference will address the challenge to global growth affected by the eurozone debt crisis; the impact of the credit crunch on economic and financial markets; the larger implications of government deficits and the debt crisis for U.S., European, and Asian economic policy; and central bank independence and financial reform. Organized by the Levy Economics Institute and ECLA of Bard with support from the Ford Foundation, The German Marshall Fund of the United States, and Deutsche Bank AG, the conference will take place Monday and Tuesday, November 26 to 27, in Frederick Hall, 4th fl., Deutsche Bank AG, Unter den Linden 13–15, Berlin.

    Participants include Philip D. Murphy, U.S. Ambassador, Federal Republic of Germany; Steffen Kampeter, parliamentary state secretary, German Ministry of Finance; Lael Brainard*, under secretary for international affairs, U.S. Department of the Treasury;  Mary John Miller*, Treasury under secretary for domestic finance; Vítor Constâncio, vice president, European Central Bank; Peter Praet, chief economist and executive board member, European Central Bank; Richard Fisher, president and CEO, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas; Dennis Lockhart, president and CEO, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta; Christine M. Cumming, first vice president, Federal Reserve Bank of New York; George Stathakis, member of the Greek Parliament (Syriza) and professor of political economy,University of Crete; Jack Ewing, European economics correspondent, International Herald TribuneBrian Blackstone, European economics correspondent, The Wall Street JournalWolfgang Münchau, associate editor, Financial TimesRobert J. Barbera, chief economist, Mount Lucas Management LP; Andrew Smithers, founder, Smithers & Co.; Frank Veneroso, president, Veneroso Associates, LLC; Michael Greenberger, professor, School of Law, and director, Center for Health and Homeland Security, The University of Maryland; Leonardo Burlamaqui, program officer, Ford Foundation; Dimitri B. Papadimitriou, president, Levy Institute; Jan Kregel, senior scholar, Levy Institute, and professor, Tallinn Technical University; Dimitrios Tsomocos, reader in financial economics, Saïd Business School, and fellow, St. Edmund Hall, University of Oxford; Alexandros Vardoulakis, research economist, European Central Bank and Banque de France; Michael Pettis, professor, Guanghua School of Management, Peking University, and senior associate, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; Eckhard Hein, professor, Berlin School of Economics; L. Randall Wray, senior scholar, Levy Institute, and professor, University of Missouri–Kansas City; Éric Tymoigne, research associate, Levy Institute, and professor, Lewis and Clark College; and Jörg Bibow, research associate, Levy Institute, and professor, Skidmore College. *to be confirmed

    The Levy Economics Institute of Bard College, founded in 1986 through the generous support of the late Bard College trustee Leon Levy, is a nonprofit, nonpartisan, public policy research organization. The Institute is independent of any political or other affiliation, and encourages diversity of opinion in the examination of economic policy issues while striving to transform ideological arguments into informed debate.
     
    ECLA of Bard is a liberal arts university offering an innovative, interdisciplinary curriculum with a global sensibility. Students come to Berlin from 30 countries in order to study with our international faculty. The curriculum focuses on value studies, in which the norms and ideals we live by, and the scholarly attention they inspire, come together in integrated programs. Small seminars and tutorials encourage lively and thoughtful dialogue. The Ford Foundation is an independent, nonprofit grant-making organization. For more than half a century it has worked with courageous people on the frontlines of social change worldwide, guided by its mission to strengthen democratic values, reduce poverty and injustice, promote international cooperation, and advance human achievement. With headquarters in New York, the foundation has offices in Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, and Asia.

    © 2012 GlobeNewswire, Inc. All Rights Reserved.

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  • In the Media | October 2012
    By Brianna Ehley
    Washington Post, October 23, 2012. All Rights Reserved.

    The Congressional Budget Office predicted back in August that if the country went over the fiscal cliff, the economy would dip into a shallow recession and take about a year to recover. The U.S. economy would shrink about 0.5 percent over the year before bouncing back and growing at a rapid clip of 4.3 percent annually between 2014 and 2017.

    However, the Washington Post’s Brad Plumer reports that a new study by the Levy Economics Institute found problems with CBO’s estimate and claims that it is optimistic at best – without providing alternative projections for declining growth next year.

    The authors of the report argue that unless one assumes that U.S. households will start borrowing and spending at an unprecedented rate – which is not likely to happen -- the CBO’s numbers don’t work. The report notes, “households would have to carry more debt than they did at the height of the housing bubble for the CBO’s optimistic growth rates to come true.”

    The Levy Economics Institute maps out three post-cliff scenarios.:

    Scenario 1 -- There  is an unlikely boom in household borrowing and spending. 
Scenario 2 – The Bush tax cuts are extended and households increase their borrowing and consumption at a more realistic rate. Unemployment stays high.
Scenario 3 – Congress enacts a very modest fiscal stimulus. Unemployment goes down just a bit.

    The report also predicts that unemployment will remain unacceptably high for an indefinite period unless Congress and the White House agree to avert a year-end confluence of major tax increases and spending cuts. “Based on our results, we surmise that it would take a much more substantial increase in fiscal stimulus to reduce unemployment to a level that most policymakers would regard as acceptable.”
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  • Conference Proceedings | September 2012
    Debt, Deficits, and Financial Instability

    A conference organized by the Levy Economics Institute of Bard College with support from the Ford Foundation

    The 2012 Minsky conference addressed the ongoing and far-reaching effects of the global financial crisis, including the challenge to global growth represented by the eurozone debt crisis, the impact of the credit crunch on the economic and financial markets outlook, the sustainability of the US economic recovery in the absence of support from monetary and fiscal policy, reregulation of the financial system and the design of a new financial architecture, and the larger implications of the debt crisis for US economic policy—and for the international financial and monetary system as a whole.

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    Barbara Ross Michael Stephens
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  • In the Media | June 2012

    American Banker, June 1, 2012. © 2012 American Banker and SourceMedia, Inc. All Rights Reserved.

    Hyman Minsky was a maverick economist in his day. He theorized about the inherent instability of financial markets, and viewed the Federal Reserve as the author of both the permission slip and the prescription for economic crises.

    None of it sounds very far-fetched now, of course. The Great Recession pulled Minsky’s ideas in from the fringes of the economics mainstream, and turned the late economist’s work into a touchstone for many who have tried making sense of the latest financial crisis. Accordingly, the annual Hyman P. Minsky Conference, where academics, policymakers and assorted market philosophers gather to apply Minsky’s lens to contemporary issues in finance, has taken on special significance since the events of 2008.

    This year, the forum focused mainly on the financial reforms underway in the United States, and on the continuing crisis in Europe.

    The upshot was that the US banking agencies are making decent, and in some cases helpful, progress in carrying out new duties assigned to them under the Dodd-Frank Act, while the European economy is, and likely will be for the next five to 10 years, a total basket case.

    Translation: Minsky was right to eschew the deregulation arguments that most of his contemporaries were making in the 1970s and 1980s, and if it hasn’t been proven yet that markets are inherently unstable, it can at least be agreed upon that they are frequently unstable-and not just on this side of the pond.

    But how should that instability be handled?

    Joseph Stiglitz, the Nobel Prize–winning economist from Columbia University, argued for fiscal solutions to the persistent US economic malaise, saying, “Monetary policy can’t help now.”

    But as Financial Times commentator Martin Wolf reminded the audience the next day, fiscal strength failed to ward off the crisis in Spain and Ireland, which were in excellent fiscal shape right up until their economic booms ended.

    Wolf wasn’t responding directly to Stiglitz, but juxtaposing the remarks by the two men, an important question is raised: if monetary policy can only go so far, and fiscal strength can only last so long, what other solution for stability is there?

    Better regulation, perhaps. Minsky put more stock in financial regulation than many of his contemporaries did. But even he acknowledged that regulators are poorly positioned to keep up with financial sector innovations-a point driven home whenever the conference discussion turned to the topic of derivatives regulation.

    Frank Partnoy, a University of San Diego School of Law professor who used to structure derivatives on Wall Street, was largely critical of the Dodd-Frank Act’s attempts to regulate derivatives, particularly its mandating of centralized clearing for swaps. He said a migration to clearing would have happened with or without the legislation, and that it wouldn’t do much to stabilize the financial system in any case, especially with exemptions being carved out for so many big pieces of the derivatives market. Partnoy readily acknowledged the paradox in his critique, admitting, “It’s sort of like Woody Allen’s complaining that the food is terrible and the portions are too small.”

    The challenge of chasing innovation also was addressed by J. Nellie Liang, the director of the Office of Financial Stability Policy and Research at the Federal Reserve Board. In her impressively succinct (and refreshingly apolitical) explanation of what Dodd-Frank does and does not do, she noted the act makes no attempt to control financial innovations, thus ensuring a healthy level of activities in the shadows for some time.

    Liang pointed out that most of Dodd-Frank’s accomplishments are of the pre-emptive variety-like prescribing higher capital requirements, establishing a Financial Stability Oversight Council and creating a resolution regime for the largest institutions. Such measures can’t prevent future crises (“Shocks are hard to predict,” Liang noted) but what they can dois “tell you how many people need to be in the room to solve the problem she said.

    Christine Cumming, first vice president of the New York Fed, provided some color on one of the most curious pre-emptive measures of all: end-of-life planning for the biggest institutions. She said discussions between regulators and bankers on living wills have been productive, if not easy conversations to have (though certainly easier than they would have been pre-2008, she pointed out).

    The living wills required by Dodd-Frank “will not be meet-me-at-the-bridge-at-5-o’clock kinds of plans, but they will be menus of options” for handling a wind-down, Cumming said.

    With the worst of the crisis slowly receding into rear view, the atmosphere at the conference was less combative than in past years, when the panels and audiences seemed to contain more, or at least more vocal, critics of banks and bank regulators.

    One of the more memorable moments of last year’s Minsky Conference came in a speech by Phil Angelides, who chaired the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission. He was outraged that former Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan had been in the press that spring criticizing Dodd-Frank. It was Greenspan, Angelides said, who “had his foot on the gas pedal as we drove over the cliff, and now he wants to give the nation driving lessons once again.”

    Greenspan’s driving abilities were considered again this year, this time by Bruce Greenwald of Columbia University, who had a much more detached view of the whole situation.

    “Alan Greenspan is not a hero. Alan Greenspan is not a villain. Alan Greenspan is irrelevant,” Greenwald said, arguing that by the time Greenspan got “into the driver’s seat,” the steering column already “had been disconnected from the wheels.”

    Did this reflect a fundamental difference of opinion, or just an extra year’s worth of hindsight and contemplation as we move farther away from the most acute stages of the crisis?

    Maybe both. Dmitri Papadimitriou, president of the Levy Economics Institute of Bard College, which sponsors the annual Minsky gathering, explained the softening in tone thusly: “When you are having a crisis and you don’t see a ready solution to it, you want to put your views forward. There are real problems we haven’t come to a solution to yet ... But there is a lot more agreement now.”

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  • Book Series | June 2012
    Edited by Dimitri B. Papadimitriou and Gennaro Zezza

    In the 1970s, at a time of shock, controversy and uncertainty over the direction of monetary and fiscal policy, Wynne Godley and the Cambridge Department of Applied Economics rose to prominence, challenging the accepted Keynesian wisdom of the time. This collection of essays brings together eminent scholars who have been influenced by Godley's enormous contribution to the field of monetary economics and macroeconomic modeling.

    Godley's theoretical, applied and policy work is explored in detail, including an analysis of the insightful New Cambridge 'three balances' model, and its use in showing the progression of real capitalist economies over time. Godley's prescient concerns about the global financial crash are also examined, demonstrating how his work revealed structural imbalances and formed the foundations of an economics relevant to the instability of finance.

    Published By: Palgrave MacMillan

  • Working Paper No. 723 | May 2012

    Recently, some have wondered whether a fiscal stimulus plan could reduce the government’s budget deficit. Many also worry that fiscal austerity plans will only bring higher deficits. Issues of this kind involve endogenous changes in tax revenues that occur when output, real wages, and other variables are affected by changes in policy. Few would disagree that various paradoxes of austerity or stimulus might be relevant, but such issues can be clarified a great deal with the help of a complete heterodox model.

    In light of recent world events, this paper seeks to improve our understanding of the dynamics of fiscal policy and financial crises within the context of two-dimensional (2D) and five-dimensional heterodox models. The nonlinear version of the 2D model incorporates curvilinear functions for investment and consumption out of unearned income. To bring in fiscal policy, I make use of a rule with either (1) dual targets of capacity utilization and public production, or (2) a balanced-budget target. Next, I add discrete jumps and policy-regime switches to the model in order to tell a story of a financial crisis followed by a move to fiscal austerity. Then, I return to the earlier model and add three more variables and equations: (1) I model the size of the private- and public-sector labor forces using a constant growth rate and account for their social reproduction by introducing an unemployment-insurance scheme; and (2) I make the markup endogenous, allowing its rate of change to depend, in a possibly nonlinear way, on capacity utilization, the real wage relative to a fixed norm, the employment rate, profitability, and the business sector’s desired capital-stock growth rate. In the conclusion, I comment on the implications of my results for various policy issues.

  • Working Paper No. 721 | May 2012

    This paper investigates the causes behind the euro debt crisis, particularly Germany’s role in it. It is argued that the crisis is not primarily a “sovereign debt crisis” but rather a (twin) banking and balance of payments crisis. Intra-area competitiveness and current account imbalances, and the corresponding debt flows that such imbalances give rise to, are at the heart of the matter, and they ultimately go back to competitive wage deflation on Germany’s part since the late 1990s. Germany broke the golden rule of a monetary union: commitment to a common inflation rate. As a result, the country faces a trilemma of its own making and must make a critical choice, since it cannot have it all —perpetual export surpluses, a no transfer / no bailout monetary union, and a “clean,” independent central bank. Misdiagnosis and the wrongly prescribed medication of austerity have made the situation worse by adding a growth crisis to the potpourri of internal stresses that threaten the euro’s survival. The crisis in Euroland poses a global “too big to fail” threat, and presents a moral hazard of perhaps unprecedented scale to the global community.

  • Working Paper No. 719 | May 2012

    The paper evaluates the fiscal policy initiatives during the Great Recession in the United States. It argues that, although the nonconventional fiscal policies targeted at the financial sector dwarfed the conventional countercyclical stabilization efforts directed toward the real sector, the relatively disappointing impact on employment was a result of misdirected funding priorities combined with an exclusive and ill-advised focus on the output gap rather than on the employment gap. The paper argues further that conventional pump-priming policies are incapable of closing this employment gap. In order to tackle the formidable labor market challenges observed in the United States over the last few decades, policy could benefit from a fundamental reorientation away from trickle-down Keynesianism and toward what is termed here a “bottom-up approach” to fiscal policy. This approach also reconsiders the nature of countercyclical government stabilizers.

  • Strategic Analysis | April 2012

    Though the economy appears to be gradually gaining momentum, broad measures indicate that 14.5 percent of the US labor force is unemployed or underemployed, not much below the 16.2 percent rate reached a full year ago. In this new report in our Strategic Analysis series, we first discuss several slow-moving factors that make it difficult to achieve a full and sustainable economic recovery: the gradual redistribution of income toward the wealthiest 1 percent of households; a failure to fully stabilize and reregulate finance; serious fiscal troubles for state and local governments; and detritus from the financial crisis that remains on household and corporate balance sheets. These factors contribute to a situation in which employment has not risen fast enough since the (supposed) end of the recession to significantly increase the employment-population ratio. Meanwhile, public investment at all levels of government fell from roughly 3.7 percent of GDP in 2008 to 3.2 percent in the fourth quarter of 2011, helping to explain the weak economic picture.

    For this report, we use the Levy Institute macro model to simulate the economy under the following three scenarios: (1) a private borrowing scenario, in which we find the appropriate amount of private sector net borrowing/lending to achieve the path of employment growth projected under current policies by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), in a report characterized by excessive optimism and a bias toward deficit reduction; (2) a more plausible scenario, in which we assume that the federal government extends certain key tax cuts and that household borrowing increases at a more reasonable rate than in the previous scenario; and (3) a fiscal stimulus scenario, in which we simulate the effects of a fully “paid for” 1 percent increase in government investment.

    The results show the importance of debt accumulation as a consideration in macro policymaking. The first scenario reproduces the CBO’s relatively optimistic employment projections, but our results indicate that this private-sector-led growth scenario quickly brings household and business debt to new all-time highs as percentages of GDP. We note that the CBO makes its projections using an orthodox model with several common, but fundamental, flaws. This makes possible the agency’s result that current policies will reduce the unemployment rate without a run-up in the private sector’s debt—“business as usual,” in the words of our report’s title.

    The policies weighed in the second scenario do not perform much better, despite a looser fiscal stance. Finally, our third scenario illustrates that a small, tax-financed increase in government investment could lower the unemployment rate significantly—by about one-half of 1 percent. A stimulus package of this size might be within the realm of political possibility at this juncture. However, our results lead us to surmise that it would take a much more substantial fiscal stimulus to reduce unemployment to a level that most policymakers would regard as acceptable.

  • Strategic Analysis | December 2011

    Fiscal austerity is now a worldwide phenomenon, and the global growth slowdown is highly unfavorable for policymakers at the national level. According to our Macro Modeling Team's baseline forecast, fears of prolonged stagnation and a moribund employment market are well justified. Assuming no change in the value of the dollar or interest rates, and deficit levels consistent with the Congressional Budget Office’s most recent “no-change” scenario, growth will remain very weak through 2016 and unemployment will exceed 9 percent.

    In an alternate scenario, the authors simulate the effect of new austerity measures that are commensurate with the implementation of large federal budget cuts. Here, growth falls to 0.06 percent in the second quarter of 2014 before leveling off at approximately 1 percent and unemployment rises to 10.7 percent by the end of 2016. In their fiscal stimulus scenario, real GDP growth increases very quickly, unemployment declines to 7.2 percent, and the US current account balance reaches 1.9 percent by the end of 2016—with a debt-to-GDP ratio that, at 97.4 percent, is only slightly higher than in the baseline scenario.

    An export-led growth strategy may accomplish little more than drawing a small number of scarce customers away from other exporting nations, and the authors expect no net contribution to aggregate demand growth from the financial sector. A further fiscal stimulus is clearly in order, they say, but an ill-timed round of fiscal austerity could result in a perilous situation for Washington.

  • In the Media | November 2011
    By Dan Monaco

    The Straddler, Fall 2011. All content © The Straddler

    I
    The events leading up to and following the financial crisis in 2008 led to widespread deployment of the term “Minsky Moment,” used to describe the painful termination of what Hyman Minsky called “runaway expansion.” In boom times, according to Minsky, stable profit growth resulting from speculative (debt-fueled) risk-taking leads to ever greater speculative risk-taking until the bubble finally bursts and a debt-deflation crisis ensues as investors liquidate their assets to cover their debt liabilities. The longer the “runaway expansion” lasts, the more dramatic the “Minsky Moment” is liable to be.

    In June I traveled to the Minsky Summer Seminar at the Levy Institute at Bard College. The train stop closest to Bard is Amtrak’s Rhinecliff station, and the journey to it from New York City takes you up the eastern bank of the Hudson River for about ninety minutes. It’s hard not to be struck by the beauty of the Hudson, broad and grand between its beveled cliffs, a steady, workmanlike current, simultaneously fierce and serene, operating like a paradoxically silent operatic ostinato. Pleasure cruises run between New York City and Albany, and it is not unusual to see a barge heading in this direction or that, evoking the Hudson Valley’s manufacturing history.

    Of course, the Hudson River is also infamous for its having been contaminated by toxic polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) from General Electric’s manufacturing plants in Hudson Falls and Fort Edward. The result of years of mostly legal dumping of PCBs between 1947 and 1977 led to a large stretch of the river being declared a Superfund Site in 1984. Turmoil, controversy, and legal battles ensued; cleanup dredging began in earnest in 2009.

    Knowing this as one looks out a railcar window at the river leads to an odd and occasionally eerie appreciation of the scenery. It might also inspire a thought or two on the occupation of the economist. For there is a sense in which all economists are implicitly charged with advancing recommendations on the appropriate use of an apparatus—call it the labor and money arrangements of man—which one might with only slight exaggeration describe as a sort of savage machinery. This apparatus is capable, when adequately structured, of advancing human well-being; it is capable, too, of setting well-being back, of passing over certain sections of humanity—including populations within nations, nations themselves, continents, and generations.

    But there is also a sense in which, at least to the eyes of an outsider, the codes of the profession, and the dominant modes of thought within the field, seem to put the economist who fully acknowledges the potency of the poorly secured munitions ship whose course he is seeking to influence in a bit of an odd position. If he thinks it is best to grapple with the navigation plan, he must still contend with the tendencies of the moiety of his brethren who, in spite of the field’s outsized political and cultural influence, either deny that their conclusions have anything to do with something as complex as the actual practice of seafaring, or who—hewing closely to the field’s first principles—regard an absence of captaincy as the best captaincy, the rarely manned bridge the best manned bridge.

    “Economists have lost their credibility because they do not actually deal with the real world,” Dimitri Papadimitriou, President of the Levy Institute, told me in my conversation with him. “But there were and are certainly some economists, including Hyman Minsky, who looked at the real world not as an exception case.”

    “Minsky was in some ways a pioneer. He saw that economic theory assumed that everything is known and that there is some tendency of the system to reach for equilibrium and, at times, to reach periods of ‘tranquility,’ as he preferred to call them. Of course, he never believed that stability was possible. He didn’t believe in the invisible hand. There’s a reason why it’s invisible—because it’s not there.”

    II
    It is characteristic of capitalism, according to Minsky’s John Maynard Keynes, that it fails to maintain full employment,(1) and that its most essential traits are instability and uncertainty.

    JMK appeared in 1975, just as the postwar “Golden Age” of global capitalism was coming to an end in a decade marked by oil shocks, unsustainable levels of inflation, the dismantling of the Bretton Woods international monetary system, rising rates of unemployment, and growing popular familiarity with the concepts of “stagflation” (stagnation and inflation) and the “misery index” (unemployment plus inflation).

    The 1970s were a crucial period for both economic policy and economic study; the decade’s disruptions were exhibited to impugn the effectiveness of, and ultimately abandon mainstream adherence to, Keynesian economics. As Peter Temin, an economic historian at MIT, told The Straddler in February, there were two reactions within economics to the problems of the 1970s: “One was to patch up [Keynesian] theory and extend it. The other came from people who said that Keynesian theory is terrible—it got us into this mess, we have to do something different. And that fed into this desire to use mathematics to set up elaborate models and to have everything be efficient."(2)

    It led, in other words, to the recrudescence of precisely the sort of clean neoclassical models of efficiency, equilibrium, and omniscience from which Keynes, in 1937, had broken by publishing The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money.

    The return back to neoclassical economics, however, was made easier by its never having really left. The Keynesianism prevailing for a time before, and for the thirty years after, the second World War was in fact a neoclassical synthesis of old ideas and new theory.

    In Minsky’s recap of the standard telling, the process of synthesis began with J.R. Hicks’ influential 1937 article “Mr. Keynes and the ‘Classics’,” which introduced an interpretation and a simplified model (IS-LM) by which to understand Keynes. Hicks’ interpretation was the foundation of the influential economist Alvin Hansen’s work “in hammering out the American version of standard Keynesianism."(3) As a result, American (and a great deal of international) economic policy was guided by a neoclassical synthesis called Keynesianism into the 1970s.

    Without getting into the neoclassical synthesis’ IS-LM model (which examines the relationships between interests rates and GDP), or the intricacies, such as they are, of neoclassical Quantity Theory (which essentially argues that prices are exclusively related to the amount of money in circulation), the fundamental difference between Keynesianism (whatever the version) and neoclassical theory is that the former argues that some form of government intervention into the economy is necessary to achieve full-employment stability, while the latter holds, to use Minsky’s words, that “a decentralized economy is fundamentally stable."(4)

    Johan Van Overtveldt’s history of the Chicago School provides a succinct summary of the worldview underlying neoclassical theory:

    The basic assumption of neoclassical economic theory is the proposition that in a competitive market environment, individuals and corporations pursuing their own self-interests necessarily promote the best interests of society as a whole.(5)

    Thus, neoclassical economics, whatever its modifications or adjustments, is always in essence a cry for “pure” capitalism, while Keynesianism, whatever its color, is always at heart a proffered solution (more or less “radical,” depending upon one’s interpretation) to the problems of capitalism from within capitalism.

    In JMK, Minsky writes that in the 1930s, neoclassical economics had held that events like the onset of depressions were anomalies; once they began there was nothing to do but ride them out. Coming from a different direction, orthodox Marxists “interpreted the Great Depression as confirming the validity of the view that capitalism is inherently unstable. Thus, during the depression’s worst days, the mainstream of orthodox economists and the Marxists came to the same policy conclusions: …nothing useful could be done to counteract depressions."(6)

    The General Theory was thus simultaneously a response to worldwide depression, a dramatic (if not a clean) break with neoclassical economics, and an argument that while capitalism is “inherently unstable,” policy solutions from within do exist to ensure that “business cycles, while not avoidable, [can] be controlled."(7)

    What made Keynes’ theory possible, in Minsky’s view, was a radical paradigm shift in perception that placed the “fragile” workings of the financial sector at the center of a complex modern capitalist economy:

    Whereas classical economics and the neoclassical synthesis are based upon a barter paradigm—the image is of a yeoman or a craftsman trading in a village market—Keynesian theory rests upon a speculative-financial paradigm—the image is of a banker making his deals on a [sic] Wall Street.(8)

    In this capitalist economy, full-employment equilibrium—indeed, equilibrium in general—is not possible because each stage of the business cycle contains the loose strands of its own unraveling. Actors operating in a sophisticated financial sector are engaged in “decision-making under conditions of intractable uncertainty” and as a result there are always “processes at work which will ‘disequilibriate’ the system."(9)

    Financial collapses are the most pronounced examples of these disequilibriations:

    [T]he financial system necessary for capitalist vitality and vigor…contains the potential for runaway expansion, powered by an investment boom. This runaway expansion is brought to a halt because accumulated financial changes render the financial system fragile, so that not unusual changes can trigger serious financial difficulties.… [S]tability…is destabilizing.(10)

    III
    What of Minsky’s claim that Keynes was basically misinterpreted by mainstream economics? And what of this claim in the context of capitalism’s “Golden Age?” Whether or not the neoclassical synthesis was an accurate interpretation of Keynes, the thirty years following World War II were notable in the history of capitalism for their relatively stable growth and their approximation to full employment. I put these questions to Papadimitriou.

    Papadimitriou: Minsky realized that there were some important features that prevented a full-blown crisis from occurring. There were a number of near crises, but Minsky would agree that during the “Golden Age” there was a crucial role that both big government played as well as the big bank [i.e., the Federal Reserve].

    Minsky was always interested in what is apt policy versus what particular item one should look for in a policy. Minsky’s own policy was that if you believe stability is destabilizing—that is, there is a tendency for the system to destabilize—you need to be prepared for that and do something about it to prevent it.

    Yes, you can assume that private markets can be self-regulating as a result of profit seeking—you don’t want anything bad to happen. But on the other hand, we know that avarice and greed become a lot more important than self-restraint and self-regulation. So my suspicion is that Minsky would have said that you have to be able to rely on something other than policies emanating from traditional economic theory, like the neoclassical synthesis. As, for example, in the same way as Schumpeter had said that there will always be technological innovation, and therefore you will have creative destruction, Minsky was cognizant of financial innovation. And, there is a need, then, for sophisticated instruments of regulation that are required to keep up with financial innovation, especially if you believe that a sophisticated economy as ours is more or less a finance-guided economy. Look what has happened especially now, where the free-market mantra took hold beginning with the Reagan Presidency. Look at the results.

    Had Minsky been alive today, he would have said that government doesn’t only have to play a role in expenditures [to generate adequate aggregate demand], but also, a role in industrial policy. And that has been absent. The American economy is superior to other economies in terms of high technology, aerospace, and probably agriculture. But you cannot sustain growth to provide for 300 million people [on these industries alone].

    In addition to emphasizing that “there is no final solution to the problems of organizing economic life,"(11) Minsky argued that policies based on a correct interpretation of Keynes would direct government expenditures towards more socially and individually productive ends, and would also promote a more equitable distribution of income. Writing as the neoclassical synthesis was on the verge of giving way, he lamented the military spending and empty consumption of capital-intensive goods that had marked its heyday.

    As Keynes summarized The General Theory, he avowed that there were two lessons to be learned from the argument. The first was the obvious lesson that policy can establish a closer approximation to full employment than had, on average, been achieved. The second, more subtle, lesson was that policy can establish a closer approximation to a more logical and equitable distribution of income than had been achieved.

    To date [i.e., 1975] the first lesson has been learned, albeit in a manner that makes an approximation to full employment heavily dependent upon government spending in the form of defense production and private investment that sacrifices present plenty for questionable benefits in the future. … [T]he second lesson has been forgotten; the need for policy aimed to achieve justice and equity in income distribution has not only been ignored but it has been so to speak turned on its head.(12)

    Raising questions of income distribution and inequality in America tends to lead, in both elite and barroom discourse, to cries of “class warfare” or worse, so I asked Papadimitriou to elaborate a bit on Minsky’s idea of equality in the context of the reality of default American economic ideology.

    Papadimitriou: Minsky was very concerned about poverty. He thought the government should approach the poor from the perspective of, “why are they poor?” and seek to restructure the view about what government should do. He was against the idea of government transfers to alleviate poverty. He would have been intolerant of the government’s failure to do now what was done during the Great Depression through employment programs such as the Works Progress Administration and other programs of the New Deal, because he thought that by giving the poor these transfers the government changed their behavior as opposed to providing them with a job—giving them a goal and, to some extent, the capacity to enjoy a standard of living and social inclusion.

    Minsky was realistic that the sort of equality connotated by the word “equality” is not achievable—it wasn’t achieved under socialism; it wasn’t achieved under communism. But, nevertheless, the question is, is it appropriate for one-tenth of the population to control that gigantic percentage of wealth, and to command that kind of income, relative to the bottom half, which basically does not have a chance to realize the prosperity that can be achieved in this country.

    You can put it in a different way. The government plays the role of a redistributive vehicle. As an example, Minsky and others would be appalled at the Bush tax cuts being continued. They don’t do anything for aggregate demand, they don’t do anything in terms of increasing employment, and they don’t do anything in setting the economy on a path for growth. Therefore, Minsky would have insisted that these tax cuts cause the wrong kind of debt for the government to incur. He would have suggested other policies—for example, promulgating a tax structure that is progressive and not, like the payroll tax, regressive—that could bring about better outcomes. That would not lead to the same maldistribution of wealth we are experiencing currently.

    But what about the perception of this maldistribution of wealth? There seems to be an odd phenomenon, arguably not limited to American society, by which the reality of discontent with income and wealth maldistribution is held in check by ambivalent feelings about to what degree it is actually malevolent. Back in April, former U.S. Senator Phil Gramm authored an op-ed in the Wall Street Journal in which he argued that Barack Obama’s presidency had brought about “higher taxes on the most productive members of American society."(13) This is a familiar stance on the right that is not wholly rejected by the population at large: the wealthy may create abundant riches for themselves, but they are the job creators who provide us with employment, and so anything we do to hurt their bottom line just ends up hurting our own. Or, even if that’s a bit hard to take, in any case, any remedy the government would come up with to address maldistribution would be worse than the malady itself.

    And this ambivalence has an additional, aspirational contour. There is a famous quote, attributed to John Steinbeck, that runs, “Socialism never took root in America because the poor see themselves not as an exploited proletariat but as temporarily embarrassed millionaires.” I asked Papadimitriou if, putting the question of socialism aside, he thought the attitude towards the rich by the poor was in some ways informed by their seeing themselves not as the poor, “but as temporarily embarrassed millionaires.”

    Papadimitriou: The majority of the population has that perspective, and that comes out clearly in the surveys that are run on individuals who are surviving on welfare checks and yet are against taxation because they believe there could be a time that they will be hurt. There is this longing, to go back to Steinbeck’s words, to become a millionaire.

    On the other hand, there is another group of the population that is totally disenfranchised, and I doubt that these people have any notion that they will ever actually find a ticket out of their misery. You can see that in the inner cities, and in the increase of homelessness. IV
    With respect to creating a culture that is receptive to the idea that there is a role for the government in promoting a more equitable society, the challenge faced by people like the Minskians is fourfold. First, a significant portion of the population at large must agree that the so-called “American Dream” is not alive and well. As Papadimitriou told me, “the ‘American Dream’ is fulfilled only for a segment of the population. Maybe the one percent in the income distribution ladder.”

    Second, this same portion of the population must accept that the receding of the “American Dream” is not a result of government malfeasance but has its roots in the present structure of the system in which private actors operate.

    Third, there must be widespread willingness to accept that government has a place in bringing about better economic outcomes and more equitable distributions of income.

    Fourth, people must be willing to act on these beliefs to press the government to take action. (For all its myriad failings and inefficiencies, the government possesses a quality unique among powerful entities in that it is subject to some form of democratic accountability.)

    Just how challenging the current ideological climate makes all of this was well encapsulated in an exchange that took place in July between Paul Krugman and George Will. Just after word emerged of a pending agreement between the House, Senate, and President to raise the ceiling on federal debt in exchange for spending cuts and budgetary reductions, both Will and Krugman appeared on the “roundtable” segment of ABC’s This Week:

    Krugman: We used to talk about the Japanese and their lost decade. We’re going to look to them as a role model. They did better than we’re doing. This is going to go on—I have nobody I know who thinks the unemployment rate is going to be below eight percent at the end of next year. With these spending cuts it might well be above nine percent at the end of next year. There is no light at the end of this tunnel. We’re having a debate in Washington which is all about, “Gee, we’re going to make this economy worse, but are we going to make it worse on ninety percent of the Republicans’ terms or a hundred percent of the Republicans’ terms?” And the answer is a hundred percent.

    Will: Paul’s right, we are a third of the way to a lost decade. But we’re a third of the way after TARP, the stimulus, Cash for Clunkers, dollars for dishwashers, cash for caulkers, the entire range of stimulus—the Keynesian approach which, by its own evidence, simply hasn’t worked. Now, Paul would double down—

    Krugman: In advance—one important point to make is that people like me said, in advance, this wasn’t remotely big enough. It’s not an after the fact—

    Will: That’s true.

    Krugman: —it’s not coming back afterwards. Right from the beginning, I looked at the numbers—people like me looked at the numbers and said, we’re going to have cutbacks at the state and local level, you’ve got a federal increase which is going to be barely enough to limit those cutbacks. There’s going to be no net fiscal stimulus if you look at government as a whole, which is what happened. So here we are.

    Will: It would be good to go to the electorate and have a Krugman election this time, saying, “Resolved, the government is too frugal. Let’s vote."(14)

    And so, even in the face and fallout of a disastrous economic collapse brought about by a financial crisis that occurred in the maw of an era of pronounced deregulation and government rollback, the burden of proof remains on anyone who would argue that properly calibrated government intervention into the economy is not only necessary, but is also capable of producing more positive outcomes. (It is, of course, worth noting that many forms of government expenditure—defense and less visible subsidies and tax incentives for large businesses and wealthy individuals being obvious examples—are somehow exempted from categorization as government intervention into the economy.)

    Thus, Will, who is somewhat rare among contemporary conservative commentators in broadcast media in that his is the professorial posture of a man who likes to take his arguments on the plane of ideas, was quite comfortable responding to Krugman’s points with nothing more than an arched rhetorical eyebrow, confident (not without cause) that such a response was all that was necessary to refute the most modest and elementary recommendations derived from Keynesianism.

    In responding to a crisis which they agree calls for a basic Keynesian response, then, left-of-(rather conservative)-center political actors and analysts (Larry Summers, for example—a hedge-fund liberal and the most prominent embodiment of the “New Keynesian” heirs to the neoclassical synthesis, who was instrumental in developing the partially effective stimulus bill of 2009, and who was also an ardent supporter of financial deregulation in the 1990s—called for additional stimulus in 2011) find themselves in a circular process by which they are:

    constrained by politics and ideology which → limits the force of the response which → leads to outcomes that partially attenuate but do not end the crisis which → allows opponents who have helped build constraints on a potential Keynesian response to claim to demonstrate that Keynesianism does not work which → builds even more confining constraints on its application.

    And, if, returning to Minsky, he is correct that Keynes has been misinterpreted, the process above is, in some ways, the same process that Keynesianism itself underwent during, and immediately following, the reign of the neoclassical synthesis.

    V
    Why should Keynes’ theory have “triggered an aborted, or incomplete, revolution in economic thought?” Minsky offers a number of reasons. He suggests, for example, that The General Theory is a “clumsy statement” (“a great deal of the new [theory] is imprecisely stated and poorly explained”); that Keynes’ didn’t have a chance to participate in the interpretative debate following its publication (he was sidelined by a heart attack and then went to work in the war effort); and that it is not possible to perform controlled experiments in the social sciences (a familiar lament).(15) But two of Minsky’s explanations in particular stand out.

    1) According to Minsky, “the older standard theory, after assimilating a few Keynesian phrases and relations, made what was taken to be real scientific advances.”

    Even though economists had often argued as if the laissez-faire proposition, about the common good being served as if by an invisible hand by a regime of free competitive markets, were firmly established, it is only since World War II that mathematical economists have been able to achieve elegant formal proofs of the validity of this proposition for a market economy—albeit under such highly restrictive assumptions that the practical relevance of the theory is suspect.(16)

    Keynes was therefore “made to ride piggy-back on mathematical general-equilibrium theory.”

    As an outsider, it is hard not to see in this assimilation a manifestation of a broader tendency in mainstream economics to reach for an equilibrium of another kind. The au fond assumption away from which the field, generally speaking, seems to resist being pulled, and towards which it inevitably claws its way back, is precisely the neoclassical proposition Van Overtreldt describes in the citation above.

    Of all of the social sciences, famously incomplete in their ability to comprehend human affairs, economics seems to be the least capable of acknowledging its limitations—or perhaps it is simply the most skilled at cagily hedging those limitations. After all, it seems reasonable to assume that the economic affairs of man are a complex affair, full of inconsistencies, contradictions, and odd behavior. Messy, in other words. And yet, it appears that theories within mainstream economics seeking to account for this mess—or seeking to counter the deleterious consequences of this mess—are at best partially assimilated, and at worst, wholly rejected in favor of models and modes of thought that don’t just envision and promote the benefits of the competitive workings of free and unfettered markets, but that also create an ideal out of them.(17) Further, any deviation is met with a redoubled effort to reinforce and/or retrofit the ideal. As Peter Temin told The Straddler, “The kind of models that many people use—general equilibrium models—start from assumptions of perfect competition, omniscient consumers, and various like things which give rise to an efficient economy. As far as I know, there has never been an economy that actually looked like that—it’s an intellectual construct."(18)

    James Kenneth Galbraith’s words to The Straddler back in March of 2010 are of a similar flavor—and go further towards hinting at an explanation of why this might be:

    [W]hen we encounter a doctrine of harmonization, of the smoothly functioning realization of the interests of all, the great and the small, which is textbook market economics, people should recognize that this is sand being thrown in their faces—that this cannot possibly be a realistic representation of the world in which we actually live. Take it as an analytic principle that one has to look at the behavior of the great with a cold eye.(19)

    There is a famous and oft-cited quote of Keynes from The General Theory which runs:

    The ideas of economists and political philosophers, both when they are right and when they are wrong, are more powerful than is commonly understood. Indeed the world is ruled by little else. Practical men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual influence, are usually the slaves of some defunct economist. Madmen in authority, who hear voices in the air, are distilling their frenzy from some academic scribbler of a few years back. I am sure that the power of vested interests is vastly exaggerated compared with the gradual encroachment of ideas.

    Minsky agrees and disagrees, proposing that this quote “needs to be amended to allow the political process to select for influence those ideas which are attuned to the interests of the rich and powerful.” That is, ideas are important, but those ideas best suited to the advance and further entrenchment of the “vested interests” are often selected as the most important.

    Perhaps it is this process, beyond the limitations of the field qua investigative social science, that accounts for mainstream economics’ radical idealism with respect to the functioning of capitalism.

    2) But there is a further point to be made, using the final potential reason Minsky lists for the failure of full-throated Keynesianism to take hold as a point of departure:

    [T]he Keynesian Revolution may have been aborted because the standard neoclassical interpretation led to a policy posture that was adequate for the time. Given the close memory of the Great Depression in the immediate post-World War II era, all that economic policy really had to promise was that the Great Depression would not recur. … Questions as to whether the success of standard policy could be sustained and questions of “for whom” and “what kind” and about the nature of full employment were not raised. The Keynesian Revolution may have been aborted because the lessons drawn from the standard interpretation not only did not require any radical reformulation of the society but also were sufficient for the rather undemanding performance criteria that were ruling.(20)

    One wonders—in an age of florid and ever-increasing income inequality, stagnating wages for the majority of Americans, the recent development of high and persistent unemployment, and the pronounced deterioration in the quality of experience for the citizen as laborer (not only has job security disappeared, but the erosion of benefits for members of the workforce has increased as a structural adjustment of the meaning of employment continues apace) and for the citizen as consumer (interactions with providers of goods and services leave the consumer not infrequently in a netherworld between simultaneously complex, shoddy, and quickly obsolete products and poor, generally unresponsive support service)—if the implementation of an effective method to remedy the recent trajectory of economic citizenry would now require a radical reformulation of society. Or, what is more likely, if a change in society’s structure that, while not particularly radical, would be perceived as radical by those who have benefitted most from its current arrangements. Perhaps this is why Barack Obama’s speech on September 19th, in which he issued recommendations for tax increases on high-end incomes, and which contained a knowing and preemptive rhetorical strike against those who would call it class warfare, was greeted with cries of class warfare. (Class warfare, incidentally, is a concept with notable and defining instances in the actions of mankind. Examples in modern history include the French Revolution, the Russian Revolution, the Chinese Revolution, and America’s nineteenth-century labor battles. None of these events or movements seem to have had at its vanguard a battering ram in the shape of a modest tax increase.)

    While a small sector of the society has been well served by the workings of America’s economic system, the vast majority of the population has reason for discontent. One suspects that this might become even more the case as the future unfolds. Under these circumstances, if you’re interested in defending the status quo, better to fight on the plane upon which you are strongest by wrapping yourself in the rhetorical trappings of American economic ideology and the reassuring tropes of American self-identity than to join the battle on the plane of real-world outcomes and conditions.

    And better, too, if you are an economist with a stake in the game—a little too cozy, perhaps, with those who foot the bills, but by no means operating outside of the ethics of the field in which you ply your trade—to retreat to models demonstrating the fundamental correctness of your position, even if these models, in the end, have a dubious relationship to the actual world.

    VI
    It should be noted that in some ways, Minsky’s pessimism about the possibilities for stability within capitalism, may prove—subsequent to the 2008 “Minsky Moment”—too optimistic for present circumstances.

    Speaking extemporaneously on a panel at the Levy Institute in June, the Washington University economist Steven Fazzari pointed up the potential for a cycle to get stuck at a particular stage:

    What’s the converse of “stability is destabilizing?” Instability is stabilizing. I don’t know that Hy[man Minksy] would have ever said that, but the theory does imply this to some extent because it is a theory of indefinite cycles. So you get the boom, you hit the peak, you get the crisis, the crisis is cleansing—it may be extremely painful, but you wipe out the weaker units and you reestablish the conditions for growth again when the balance sheets are in some sense repaired. I think that’s the basic theory, the basic story.

    So in that context, if you want to tie my question—what will be the aggregate demand generating process going forward—to a Minsky perspective, you have to ask how long will it take for balance sheets to be repaired? How long will it be until more robust conditions in the financial system are established?

    A necessary condition for a more robust recovery is the improvement of the household balance sheet—leading to a restoration of better consumption, given that consumption is such a big part of demand. But I’m actually not fully convinced that this is sufficient. It’s necessary, but I’m not sure it’s sufficient.

    Income distribution is a fundamental structural problem that goes beyond finance. The growth model in the US over the past three decades was one of relatively stagnant income growth across much of the income distribution, plugging the hole in demand with more consumer borrowing. So balance sheet improvement can help but it doesn’t seem to me that it deals with the additional issue of the income distribution. And there’s nothing on the table from a policy perspective or a structural perspective that would change this.

    In other words, absent some significant event or dramatic change in policy, the fuse may have blown on the washing machine, leaving us stuck on soak.

    Paul Davidson, editor of the Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, made a similar argument in his remarks at the Institute:

    From the end of World War I to the beginning of World War II, the unemployment rate in the UK was double digits, except for one year when it was 9.7. That doesn’t sound like a cyclical problem to me, and it didn’t sound like it to Keynes, who basically argued that the economy had settled down at a long-run, stable unemployment rate which was very high. Just look at Japan in the 1990s and 2000s—and, I’m afraid to say, maybe a decade or two in the United States, beginning in 2007. So it’s not the ups and downs of a roller coaster—the capitalist system can be stable at less than full employment.

    No one can know what will happen as the avenues to affluence and the economic expectations (be they grand or modest) that people have for their lives are more and more ostentatiously occluded for more and more members of the population. It’s not likely to be pleasant, as grievances tend to manifest themselves in all sorts of odd and often irrational ways (the Tea Party being Exhibit A in our own times). But it’s also always possible, of course, that the worm will turn and those who benefit least will fix their attention on those who benefit most. Perhaps this is American capitalism’s fundamental anxiety—indeed, perhaps it always has been. But in the aftermath—and in the midst—of its greatest crisis in eighty years, a heightened unease may help account for its pronounced defensiveness,(21) and the rigidity of its scholarly underpinnings.

    VII
    There remain broader questions. Though we are in a tough spot today partially because consumers are less able to play their accustomed role in demand generation, Minsky’s speculation that “[t]he joylessness of American affluence may be due to the lack of a goal, the acceptance of a standard in which ‘more’ is really not worth the effort"(22) rings no less true in these circumstances.

    As of 1975, according to Minsky, “[t]he combination of investment that leads to no, or minimal net increment to useful capital, perennial war preparation, and consumption fads [had] succeeded in maintaining employment.” But though the period of the “Golden Age” had been remarkable in purely quantitative economic terms, in America it had “put all—the affluent, the poor, and those in between—on a fruitless inflationary treadmill, accompanied by…deterioration in the biological and social environment."(23)

    And so, even if we accept that an economy should be geared towards full-employment with stable growth, a reasonably equitable distribution of income, and the potential to enjoy prosperity and affluence as goals, what form will this growth take? What do we mean by prosperity and affluence? And what are qualitative contours by which to gauge the well-being of members of our society?

    At a time where a move back to some contemporary approximation of the moderate principles underlying the neoclassical synthesis would be regarded as radical, perhaps it is worth putting these larger, qualitative questions on the table as well.

    Perhaps, too, it is time to urge the field of economics to wrestle with the complexity of a system whose limitations it is best not to elide in simplified models that have a Panglossian sanguinity at their core. And perhaps too it would be well to investigate the complexities that are actually produced by the limits of the capabilities of field.

    For, as Minsky writes as he closes JMK, if, like Keynes, we think it best to live under an economic system “that sustains the basic properties of capitalism,” it should not be “because of the virtues of unfettered capitalism but in spite of its defects, which, though great, can in principle be controlled. ...[I]f capitalism is to be controlled so that the basic triad of efficiency, justice, and liberty is achieved, then the design of the controls will have to be enlightened by an awareness of what was obvious to Keynes—that with regard to both the stability of employment and the distribution of income, capitalism is flawed."(24)

    Notes

    1. “Full employment” is generally understood to mean a situation in which every person of working age who wants to work has a job, which is of course different than saying every person of working age has a job. In practical terms, unemployment rates below three, four, or even five percent—like those seen in the 50s and 60s, and again in the 90s—have typically been considered reasonably close approximations to full employment, not least because of the perceived relationship between low unemployment rates and the danger of an “overheating” economy leading to high rates of inflation. Indeed, there is a not uncontroversial concept in economics, the NAIRU (Non Accelerating Inflation Rate of Unemployment), which argues that there is a rate of unemployment (sometimes infelicitously termed the “natural” rate of unemployment) below which an economy ought not go lest it risk unsustainable rates of inflation. It is a subject of some debate precisely what this rate is, or if it is the same rate at all times, or if it is even a useful concept, but it’s typically claimed to be in the neighborhood of five percent.

    It is also worth noting, of course, that the official rate of unemployment is always lower than the actual rate of unemployment because official measurements fail to include significant portions of the nonworking population. For example, in September of 2011, the unemployment rate in the United States stood at 9.1 percent, or 14 million, according to the Department of Labor. But there were an additional 2.5 million, or 1.6 percent, who were officially not counted (how many were unofficially not counted is another matter):

    “In September, about 2.5 million persons were marginally attached to the labor force, about the same as a year earlier.… These individuals were not in the labor force, wanted and were available for work, and had looked for a job sometime in the prior 12 months. They were not counted as unemployed because they had not searched for work in the 4 weeks preceding the survey.…

    “Among the marginally attached, there were 1.0 million discouraged workers in September…. Discouraged workers are persons not currently looking for work because they believe no jobs are available for them.”* (*United States Department of Labor. Employment Situation—September 2001. Washington D.C.: Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2011. http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/empsit.pdf [bold type in original].)

    The so-called “underemployed,” people who would like to work full time but are working in part-time jobs, are also not included in official measures of unemployment.

    2. “What’s Natural? Peter Temin in Conversation with The Straddler.” The Straddler, springsummer2011. http://www.thestraddler.com/20117/piece5.php

    3. Minsky, Hyman P. John Maynard Keynes. New York: McGraw Hill, 2008. 32.

    4. Ibid. 2.

    5. Overtveldt, Johan van. The Chicago School. Evanston, IL: Agate B2, 2007. 52.

    6. Minsky. Op. cit. 6

    7. Ibid. 7.

    8. Ibid. 55.

    9. Ibid. 11, 59.

    10. Ibid. 11.

    11. Ibid. 166.

    12. Ibid. 158.

    13. Gramm, Phil. “The Obama Growth Discount.” Wall Street Journal. 15 Apr 2011.
    http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703983104576262763594126624.html [my emphasis].

    14. “Roundtable.” This Week with Christiane Amanpour. ABC: 31 Jul 2011.
    http://abcnews.go.com/ThisWeek/video/roundtable-part-budget-endgame-14198610.

    15. Minsky. Op. cit. 11-15.

    16. Ibid. 15. Minsky continues:

    “It turns out that the accomplishments of pure theory during the 1950s and 1960s are more apparent than real, when the problems of a financially sophisticated capitalist economy are under consideration.… Thus the purely intellectual pursuit of consistency between what was taken to be an elegant and scientifically valid microeconomics and a presumably crude macroeconomics has turned [o]ut to have been a false pursuit; microeconomics is at least as crude as macroeconomics.”

    17. As one of The Straddler’s contributing editors, Gary Peatling, observes:

    “I’m wondering if this unreality of neoclassical economics is itself a defense mechanism. Since a really unregulated economy is impossible (and is not even desired by the richest and most powerful vested corporate interests), any failure can be blamed on residual regulation. Hence the tenets are always irrefutable, in the manner of what Karl Popper termed a ‘bad science’ (although Popper might not have identified this). Also I’m reminded of John Ruskin’s comment that political economy was like science of gymnastics devised on the assumption that humans have no skeletons.” (Peatling, Gary. Personal communication. October 25, 2011)

    18. Temin. Op. cit.

    19. “The Predators’ Boneyard: A Conversation with James Kenneth Galbraith.” The Straddler, springsummer2010. http://www.thestraddler.com/20105/piece2.php

    20. Minsky. Op. Cit. 16.

    21. A comparatively mild articulation of this defensiveness was on display in a sympathetic 2010 New York Times Magazine profile of “lifelong Democrat” Jamie Dimon, CEO of Chase Bank:

    “The executive I encountered was on a mission to reclaim a respected place for his industry, even as he admits that it committed serious mistakes. He was adamant that government officials—he seemed to include President Obama—have been unfairly tarring all bankers indiscriminately. ‘It’s harmful, it’s unfair and it leads to bad policy,’ he told me again and again. It’s a subject that makes him boil, because Dimon’s career has been all about being discriminating—about weighing this or that particular risk, sifting through the merits of this or that loan.” (Lowenstein, Roger. “Jamie Dimon: America’s Least-Hated Banker.” New York Times Dec. 1, 2010. www.nytimes.com/2010/12/05/magazine/05Dimon-t.html)

    22. Minsky. Op Cit. 164.

    23. Ibid. 163.

    24. Ibid. 165.

    Associated Program:
    Region(s):
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  • Conference Proceedings | November 2011
    Financial Reform and the Real Economy
    A conference organized by the Levy Economics Institute of Bard College with support from the FordFoundationLogo.

    This year’s Minsky conference marks the Levy Institute’s 25 anniversary, and the third year of the Ford–Levy joint initiative on reforming global financial governance. This initiative aims to examine financial instability and reregulation within the theoretical framework of Minsky’s work on financial crises. Minsky was convinced that a program of financial reform must be based on a critique of the existing system that identifies not only what went wrong, but also why it happened. Speakers addressed the ongoing effects of the global financial crisis on the real economy, and examined proposed as well as recently enacted policy responses. Should ending too-big-to-fail be the cornerstone of reform? Do the markets’ pursuit of self-interest generate real societal benefits? Is financial sector growth actually good for the real economy? Will the recently passed US financial reform bill make the entire financial system, not only the banks, safer?

  • Working Paper No. 695 | November 2011
    Explosion in the 1990s versus Implosion in the 2000s

    Orthodox and heterodox theories of financial crises are hereby compared from a theoretical viewpoint, with emphasis on their genesis. The former view (represented by the fourth-generation models of Paul Krugman) reflects the neoclassical vision whereby turbulence is an exception; the latter insight (represented by the theories of Hyman P. Minsky) validates and extends John Maynard Keynes’s vision, since it is related to a modern financial world. The result of this theoretical exercise is that Minsky’s vision represents a superior explanation of financial crises and current events in financial systems because it considers the causes of financial crises as endogenous to the system. Crucial facts in relevant financial crises are mentioned in section 1, as an introduction; the orthodox models of financial crises are described in section 2; the heterodox models of financial crises are outlined in section 3; the main similarities and differences between orthodox and heterodox models of financial crises are identified in section 4; and conclusions based on the information provided by the previous section are outlined in section 5. References are listed at the end of the paper.

  • In the Media | October 2011
    The Gold Report

    Business Insider, October 19, 2011. Copyright © 2011 Business Insider, Inc. All rights reserved.

    The Gold Report: Many of the resource companies in Pinetree Capital’s investment portfolio are gold companies. Gold went from above $1,900/ounce (oz.) in early September to around $1,600/oz. currently. Now, European central banks have sold 1.1 million metric tons of gold into the market to drive the price lower. Pinetree’s share price has followed gold lower and your exposure to gold remains high. What’s Pinetree’s pitch to investors right now?

    Marshall Auerback: We had a very significant run up in the gold price, so some correction is understandable. But the conditions that created the run-up to $1,900/oz. have not dissipated. If anything, they’ve become more pronounced, notably in the Eurozone, where investors must begin to seriously consider the possibility of a break-up of the European monetary union and the implications that has for gold. And if you look at the monetary overhangs in places like China and Japan, it’s hard to find stores of value there either. So we have had some significant spec liquidation, some central bank sales—a plus, as central bankers are usually a great contrary indicator—and yet the price appears to have stabilized around $1,600/oz. Gold stocks, in contrast, still reflect valuations that are substantially lower than the current gold price. It is also important to note that the capital markets, in contrast to late 2008, have not shut down. Good quality mining projects can still obtain funding, especially for projects with robust economics, which a number of our holdings possess.

    Pinetree has a unique structure. We raise money from the markets, which means that our longer-term funding requirements are, to some degree, shaped by market perceptions and market enthusiasm for resource stocks. But it also means we are not subject to monthly, daily or quarterly redemption pressures, so we can hold on to some smaller names that now offer the most compelling value they have offered in years.

    TGR: A few years ago, Pinetree went from being focused on technology and biotechnology stocks to resource-based equities.

    MA: Yes, the fundamental thesis has not changed. The developing world is likely to remain the dominant social, political and economic theme for at least the next few generations. Commodity prices have soared because the depletion of readily available resources is now finally outstripping the ingenuity of mankind to extract these resources. That is not just our view. Jeremy Grantham of GMO believes that this has changed the fundamental trend in real commodity prices, though the explosive nature of these prices in recent years has no doubt been amplified by speculation and historically unprecedented and ultimately unsustainable fixed investment in China. So you will get periodic corrections, especially during periods of global economic slowdown, but we don’t think this changes the long-term thesis. The portfolio composition has changed somewhat to reflect a changed economic environment of less base metals, more precious metals, but that is a tactical, as opposed to strategic, decision.

    TGR: Did that one-month, $300-dollar drop in the gold price ruin gold’s reputation as a safe-haven investment?

    MA: Not really. The price rise was, like other commodities, undoubtedly amplified by the actions of trend-following speculators. These are generally weak holders, and they tend to get shaken out when there are market gyrations of the sort that we have experienced over the past few months. But the fundamental reasons for holding gold have, if anything, grown stronger over the past few months.

    TGR: Is the fear-trade gone? Is gold now trading strictly on supply and demand fundamentals?

    MA: Given the way that markets have traded toward the end of the quarter, where you get maximum incentive to “paint the tape” in an upward direction, we think it is way too premature to suggest that the fear trade is over. Ultimately, though, gold is a supply/demand story. The market has been in fundamental deficit for decades and only the sales and leasing of gold by the central banks have prevented an even more acute price explosion.

    TGR: The market is always about timing, but timing is even more important now given the rampant volatility in the markets. Fearing an economic collapse, many investors exited the junior sector once the volatility started in August. Many of those same investors remain on the sidelines today and some probably want to get back in. Is there something they should wait for—like a bottoming of the gold price—or is now the time to return?

    MA: We think the time when you get maximum valuation is during these periods of turbulence and fear, when the baby gets thrown out with the bathwater. The good stuff is thrown out along with the bad as redemption pressures mount. Since we are in a comfortable position vis-à-vis our cash positions, we are in a good position to capitalize. Especially as Pinetree, for reasons explained before, doesn’t face comparable redemption pressures.

    TGR: Our readers are primarily retail investors who like the high-risk, high-reward nature of the precious metals juniors. Pinetree is essentially a retail investor with lots of cash and a crack research team. How is Pinetree playing the current market? Have you been adding to your positions on the market dips? Have you sold off? Have you held tight? Give us the scoop.

    MA: We try to “feed the ducks while they’re quacking,” in the sense that we recognize that many of these holdings are small and illiquid, and we tend to take large, strategic stakes. When our assessments are largely validated by market action, then we find that it is a good time to reduce, particularly because with these smaller, less liquid names, we are almost always going to be a bit early because we have to trim when there is good demand. This is especially the case when the company’s development has largely tracked what our analysts forecasted and with that comes the growing popularity of the shares with the broader market. Selling in those kinds of situations gives us the flexibility to take on new deals or, as is the case today, to buy from distressed sellers.

    TGR: What are your favorite five gold plays in the Pinetree Capital portfolio?

    MA: Gold Canyon Resources Inc. (GCU:TSX.V) is one. We are big believers in this deposit. The initial resource should be out by the end of this year and is promising to be several million ounces with grades exceeding most other bulk tonnage deposits in Canada. Looking at the dimensions of the deposit, specifically the new extension to the southeast, the potential here continues to grow far beyond what the company’s initial resource will give it credit for.

    Queenston Mining Inc. (QMI:TSX) is the consolidation of key past producing mines in the prolific Kirkland Lake mining camp. There is an Agnico-Eagle Mines Ltd. (AEM:TSX; AEM:NYSE) take-out potential. Extensive drilling on the Upper Beaver and the South Mine complex joint venture with Kirkland Lake Gold Inc. (KGI:TSX) continues to add ounces.

    RoxGold Inc. (ROG: TSX.V) is operating in Burkina Faso and has just raised the money needed to acquire 100% of its flagship asset. High-grade deposits are very hard to come by and the results it has consistently seen show potential for just that. With mid-major companies operating in the region, as RoxGold continues to add size, it becomes more and more likely to be an attractive candidate for a take-out.

    Continental Gold Ltd. (CNL:TSX) recently reported a very large high-grade resource on its Buritica gold/silver/base metals deposit in Colombia. If you look around right now there aren’t too many deposits that hold size and grade like this one and, with 250 kilometers of assays to come since the resource was calculated, there is still a lot of upside from here.

    Mawson Resources Ltd. (MAW:TSX; MWSNF:OTCPK; MRY:Fkft) is exploring at Rompas in Finland, a new discovery with bonanza gold where samples up to 22,723 grams per ton (g/t) gold and 43.6% uranium have been identified. The weighted average of all channel samples from the 2010 program is 0.59m at 203.66 g/t of gold and 0.73% uranium within a sampling footprint of 6.0 km. strike and 200–250m width. More than 300 discovery sites have now been identified within the mineralized footprint. At this very early stage of exploration, Rompas has to be considered as one of the most exciting global gold discoveries (with a uranium credit) to emerge into the marketplace, in terms of its high grades and hundreds of surface showing over a large area.

    TGR: What are three gold plays Pinetree has positions in that few have ever heard of?

    MA: Redstar Gold Corp. (RGC:TSX.V) is exploring in Alaska where properties have limited historical drilling. However, the company has seen very high grades. Currently, it is drilling up there and with the recent addition of the International Tower Hill Mines Ltd. CEO to their board, there is reason for interest. The company also has a joint venture with Confederation Minerals Ltd. (CFM:TSX.V) up in Red Lake. Thus far, Redstar has seen very high grades over 200 g/t over narrow widths stretching over a potentially several kilometer-long strike length. This kind of project requires lots of drilling; however, thus far, there has been some good continuity of success and with any sort of thicker intervals, this would be a project well worth the interest.

    Prosperity Goldfields Corp.’s (PPG:TSX.V) exploration is headed up by Quinton Hennigh, who is also on the board of Gold Canyon and is heading up its exploration program. Stock had a large run-up prior to results, which the market clearly saw as disappointing. Despite this, we think these results show great promise given that Prosperity was the first in the area and the potential size of this deposit is very large. This project is in Nunavut; however, a winter camp has been set up and, relative to the region, the infrastructure is better than most.

    Terreno Resources Corp. (TNO:TSX.V) is focused on a few different resources in South America. The company just raised $2.8 million and so it is cashed up to move forward on the initial exploration of both precious/base metal projects in Argentina as well as their phosphate/potash exploration in Brazil. It has had some solid trench results thus far down in Argentina, which is promising. The phosphate/potash market seems to be one of the few places where most analysts agree there will be a lift in pricing in the future so we are excited to see the exploration results.

    TGR: Let’s switch gears to silver. Does Pinetree believe silver is a better near-term investment than gold?

    MA: No, we think gold is likely to be the better performer if a global recession becomes the predominant concern, as opposed to systemic issues. That said, there have been some fairly violent moves to the downside over the last few weeks. The bear talk on China has really been overdone. Remember, China has over $2 trillion in foreign exchange reserves, so it has ample firepower to combat the forces of recession. In the very short term, we could get these massively oversold conditions worked off if it looked like the world was not coming to an end and silver could have a nice pop. Look at the U.S. data recently:

    • Since late August, the U.S. economic data has surprised somewhat to the upside.
    • Initial unemployment claims rose less than expected; September chain store sales look stronger than expected; Ford Motor Company’s sales for September were up 9%.
    • It looks as though GDP growth may come in better than 2% annually in both the third and fourth quarters, surpassing recent pessimistic expectations.

    As far as China itself goes, suddenly all the analysts, economists and portfolio managers that were all bulled up on China two years ago, a year ago and even six months ago have become all beared up on China. We are hearing about an imminent hard landing in China from everyone. So why the sudden bearishness about China?

    It is claimed that China’s informal credit market is out of control. Property developers and businesses are starved for credit; business investment and real estate will fall. A hard landing is at hand. Let’s put this informal credit market into perspective.

    This informal credit market is estimated at 3–4 trillion yuan RMB. The Chinese economy is now estimated at something north of 40 trillion yuan. According to Fitch, the formal credit market plus the shadow banking system totals about 70 trillion yuan.

    When one looks at these numbers one can see that the growth of informal lending and the extremely high interest rates on informal lending represent a problem in China. But it does not impact a significant share of aggregate expenditures.

    The real problem lies with the banking system and the shadow banking system.

    TGR: Is this important credit market now poised to take Chinese aggregate demand down?

    MA: We doubt it. Interest rates in the banking system are negative in real terms. The banking system is still expanding at a double-digit annual rate. Interest rates in the shadow banking system are much higher; they are no doubt positive in real terms, but it appears they are not usurious. In any case, this credit is still being allowed to expand at a very rapid rate. Will the authorities be able to deal with problems in the banking system or shadow banking systems, which are the credit markets that matter?

    The answer is probably yes. The biggest credit excesses and the biggest white elephant fixed investments in this cycle lie with the local authorities. The Chinese government in one fell swoop removed half a trillion dollars of such loans off the backs of these local authorities. A half a trillion dollars! That is as large as the entire alleged informal credit market that everyone is getting so beared up about.

    Longer term, the Chinese economy is an out-of-control Ponzi economy. Labor force growth will go negative. Surplus labor in agriculture is depleting. Fixed investment is impossibly high relative to a falling warranted rate of growth. Very bad things will eventually happen. However, the Chinese economy is also an extreme command economy. Extraordinary measures will be taken to avert these very negative outcomes.

    The Chinese economy is highly indebted. The Chinese central government is not. Before the proverbial you-know-what hits the fan, the Chinese government will use its balance sheet to keep the white-elephant over-investment juggernaut going. Do not underestimate the fiscal capacity of the Chinese government and its willingness to use it. We do not think the excesses today in the Chinese informal credit market are a reason to get very beared up on China all of a sudden. The Chinese bear story will unfold progressively over a long time.

    The real threat in China is inflation. China’s fixed investment has become increasingly credit dependent. To keep the fixed-investment juggernaut going and avert a hard landing, there must be sustained rapid money and credit expansion. There is already a large monetary overhang. The combination of these flow and stock dynamics threaten a very high inflation down the road. Which again makes the long-term case for gold very bullish.

    TGR: Where is Pinetree getting its exposure to silver?

    MA: Apogee Silver Ltd. (APE:TSX.V). The company’s primary focus is the Pulacayo-Paca Property located in southwestern Bolivia. The property includes the historic Pulacayo mine, which was the second largest silver mine in Bolivia’s history with historical production exceeding 600 million ounces of silver. Although there is obviously some risk with dealing in Bolivia, there are still many operating mines and we feel the deposit warrants the risk.

    Southern Silver Exploration Corp. (SSV:TSX.V; SEG:Fkft) recently acquired the Cerro Las Minitas property in Durango, Mexico. There is a history of production right in the middle of the property and thus far, the company’s initial holes have been promising. This is a very early stage project and there is a lot more definition needed before a resource can be laid out; however, Southern Silver is in a good region and we feel the property certainly has potential.

    TGR: What are some investment themes that you expect to play out in the coming months?

    MA: We think that the markets could surprise again to the upside as we have apparently discounted a double dip recession, whereas a slowdown might be more accurate. This period might end up being closer to 1998 than 2008.

    The trouble with the view that we are heading for another 2008 is that all crises are different. But they do share one common element: the inability of markets to perceive that when a market discontinuity is fresh in the minds of investors (e.g., 2008); it seldom repeats until that institutional memory is dissipated. Now, I believe that European banks are insolvent conditional upon the PIIGS collectively being insolvent. Clearly, this is the case for Greece (although the European Central Bank (ECB) could easily forestall this if it keeps buying Greek debt), but for the others, this is unclear—and, particularly in the case of Spain and Italy, a function of the rates at which they can borrow. So while the ECB provides a liquidity backstop, they have the room to adjust. Of course, the missing ingredient is growth. Europe already looks as though it has slid into recession. I would argue that recession, as opposed to systemic risk and bank runs, is already priced into European stock markets. But nothing is certain.

    While the current crisis in Europe is worse than the 1998 crisis with LTCM and Russia, in 1998 it was thought that the entire system would collapse. Remember in 1998 Fed funds were 5%, not zero; 10-year notes, above 4%, not 2%+; 2-year notes were 5%; SPX was 30x earnings, not 15x. We had not gone through a 1974-style liquidation in reverse parabola terms except for the one day 1987 sell-off, as we did in 2008–2009. Real estate (houses) was not selling for prices yielding 10%–15% on lower-end real estate, but that is where the focus of foreclosures is felt. The story will be told in the next eight trading days.

    TGR: Thank you for your insights.

    As Pinetree Capital’s corporate spokesperson, Marshall Auerback is a member of Pinetree’s board of directors and has some 28 years of global experience in financial markets worldwide. He plays a key role in the formulation and articulation of Pinetree’s investment strategy. Auerback is a research associate for the Levy Institute and a fellow for the Economists for Peace and Security.

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  • Working Paper No. 693 | October 2011
    Yet another rescue plan for the European Monetary Union (EMU) is making its way through central Europe, but no one is foolish enough to believe that it will be enough. Greece’s finance minister reportedly said that his nation cannot continue to service its debt, and hinted that a 50 percent write-down is likely. That would be just the beginning, however, as other highly indebted periphery nations will follow suit. All the major European banks will be hit—and so will the $3 trillion US market for money market mutual funds, which have about half their funds invested in European banks. Add in other US bank exposure to Europe and you are up to a potential $3 trillion hit to US finance. Another global financial crisis is looking increasingly likely.

    We first summarize the situation in Euroland. Our main argument will be that the problem is not due to profligate spending by some nations but rather the setup of the EMU itself. We then turn to US problems, assessing the probability of a return to financial crisis and recession. We conclude that difficult times lie ahead, with a high probability that another collapse will be triggered by events in Euroland or in the United States. We conclude with an assessment of possible ways out. It is not hard to formulate economically and technically simple policy solutions for both the United States and Euroland. The real barrier in each case is political—and, unfortunately, the situation is worsening quickly in Europe. It may be too late already.

  • In the Media | October 2011
    By Catherine Hollander

    National Journal, October 11, 2011. Copyright © 2011 by National Journal Group Inc.

    The U.S. job market has shown lackluster growth recently, to put it mildly.

    The September employment report, released on Friday, revealed that nonfarm payrolls added just 103,000 jobs last month—not horrific, but still under the threshold economists say they need to cross in order to dent unemployment. The Senate is likely to vote on the job-creation proposals in President Obama’s $447 billion American Jobs Act this week, but the bill’s passage is a long shot.

    As they consider the legislation, lawmakers may want to reflect on their counterparts across the Atlantic.

    While each economy faces unique obstacles to growth, fellow developed countries like Germany, Denmark, and France have implemented programs analogous to some found in Obama’s jobs bill with success. These include job-search programs accompanying unemployment benefits and stepped-up apprenticeship programs.

    Other countries have developed programs not found in the president’s legislation, such as mechanisms to certify workers who have gained skills on the job rather than in the classroom.

    Unemployment insurance programs vary widely from country to country. As of 2007, the most recent year for which data was available, the U.S. paid employees 13.6 percent of their previous earnings on average, compared with 24.7 percent in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development as a whole, which counts the U.S. and 33 other wealthy countries as members.

    The U.S. also has short-lasting unemployment benefits compared with most of the other OECD members. By itself, this provides a “powerful incentive” for the unemployed to look for their next job, according to Gary Burtless, an economist at the Brookings Institution.

    But other OECD countries have deployed different incentives to get recipients of unemployment benefits back to work. Many low-paying jobs in the U.S. pay around the same as the benefits. Other countries have ensured work earnings are higher than unemployment benefits, incentivizing recipients to look for a job, according to Stefano Scarpetta, the OECD’s Deputy Director for Employment, Labour, and Social Affairs. 

    Some OECD countries have bolstered their programs to help the recipients of unemployment insurance re-enter the workforce. France and others have made unemployment benefits conditional on searching for a job and participating in re-employment programs. The U.S. has paid less attention to investing in such labor market institutions, Scarpetta said.

    He recommended focusing on “training, apprenticeship, and skills” to boost unemployment among the most vulnerable sectors of the population -- the young and long-term unemployed. Countries such as Germany and Denmark stepped up their traditional apprenticeship programs in response to the economic downturn. The pumped-up programs have a strong track record of landing apprentices with jobs, Scarpetta said.

    The American Jobs Act proposes to do this through new training for the recipients of unemployment insurance -- so-called “bridge to work” programs modeled after efforts in Georgia and North Carolina. These programs allow long-term unemployed workers to continue receiving unemployment benefits while they pursue work-based training.

    Such training could have secondary benefits, eliminating unwanted social trends such as crime and depression that are associated with high unemployment levels, according to Dimitri Papadimitriou, president of Bard College’s Levy Economics Institute. He called the training programs a “very good idea.”

    But Papadimitriou cautioned that without a more general economic recovery, simply training unemployed workers doesn’t guarantee jobs. Others fear it will be difficult to find employers willing to bring in unpaid trainees. They like to maintain control over the hiring process, Brookings’s Burtless said.

    It would be more fruitful in the long run to reform the way the U.S. thinks about employment training, he said.

    Several OECD countries, including Portugal, have created mechanisms by which workers who drop out of school but gain skills on the job can have those skills certified, making them more attractive to potential employers.

    The U.S. places too much emphasis on formal educational credentials and not enough on skills acquisition, Burtless said. A European-style certification program could make on-the-job training more valuable by providing workers with proof that they have a transferable skill.

    Such a program runs the risk of locking workers into too-rigid skill certifications, which could harm their ability to appear flexible in a changing workforce, according to Randall Eberts, president of the Upjohn Institute for Employment Research. It would not provide immediate unemployment relief, and it would take time for employers and workers to recognize the value of the certificate, but it could provide a huge help in the long run to a large portion of workers who complete their training on the job, Burtless said.

    Some economists were hesitant to make comparisons between the U.S. and the smaller European countries, whose economies operate in a different political environment. And it will ultimately take strong overall economic growth to turn around the labor market. Supply-side changes will have a limited impact without an accompanying improvement in demand, Papadimitriou argued.

    But in the end, the point is not that other developed countries have it all figured out—it’s that no one does, and looking at programs that have been implemented abroad can be a useful jumping-off point for discussions of job-creation measures in the U.S.

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  • In the Media | September 2011
    Interview with Pavlina R. Tcherneva

    September 8, 2011. © 2011 by Wisconsin Public Radio

    As Obama tours the East promoting his jobs bill, and jobs forums spring up across Wisconsin, Research Associate Tcherneva and host Ben Merens talk about what should be done now to address unemployment. Full audio of the interview is available here.

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  • In the Media | August 2011
    By Agostino Fontevecchia

    Forbes, August 30, 2011. © 2011 Forbes.com LLC™. All Rights Reserved.

    “[This] recession has turned into a prolonged and very unusual slump in growth, preventing a labor-market recovery,” explained Dimitri Papadimitriou, head of the Levy Economics Institute, in a recent paper called Not Your Father’s Recession. The economist makes the argument that post-crisis GDP growth rates are about 11.9% off of historical standards, which, along with the employment-to-population ratio, suggest the current macroeconomic environment is a lot more challenging than in other recessions and will need the intervention of government to recover.

    “Considering the already severe slump in job creation, it hardly matters whether such a downturn would constitute the second dip of a ‘double-dip’ recession, a continuation of the ‘Great Recession,’ or a confirmation that the economy has entered a Japanese-style ‘lost decade,’” wrote Papadimitriou, adding that a labor-market recovery appears unlikely without help from the government, and the data proves it.

    Economics hasn’t come to terms with the possibility of a market economy stagnating over a protracted period because its models are based on constant growth. The reality is that market economies have grown relentlessly during the XX century.

    Papadimitriou illustrates it with a chart overlaying an exponential growth line to an inflation adjusted-GDP series from 1967 to today. The match is almost exact all the way to 2007; today, real GDP is “11.9 per cent less than one would have expected based on earlier data.”

    It’s no surprise that a depressed U.S. economy has kept output at multi-year lows. Recent revisions show Q2 GDP growing at a meager 1%, suggesting post-recession growth came from now-exhausted stimulus packages. Papadimitriou takes it one step further, arguing that average GDP, as illustrated by 12-quater, 20-quarter, and 28-quarter moving averages, has been declining since 2000.

    One of the most worrying signs of the U.S.’ generalized economic weakness is the state of labor markets, particularly when compared with other post-recession recoveries.

    Employment-to-population ratios bottom out 18 to 37 months after the onset of the recession in each of the previous six cases of output contraction. This time around, 43 months after the beginning of the recession, the trend continues to be negative, with the ratio down 4.6% to 58.1% in what has been almost four years of negligible recovery in labor markets.

    With Chairman Ben Bernanke choosing to stay on the sidelines and the private sector immersed in a cycle of deleveraging, Papadimitriou points the finger at government, noting “the [federal] government has barely begun the task of creating the new jobs needed to deal with this disaster.”

    Further stimulus will face staunch opposition in Congress, with Tea Party candidates taking the reins of the Republican Party on a cut spending-platform. The White House has leaked, though, an announcement that President Obama will unveil a new jobs plan, which is expected to be some sort of stimulus, in September.

    It remains to be seen whether the situation in Europe will worsen, or if a moderate improvement in economic conditions in the second half of the year, coupled with Obama’s coming plan, will help push the economy out of the gutter.

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  • Public Policy Brief No. 119 | August 2011

    The export-led growth paradigm is a development strategy aimed at growing productive capacity by focusing on foreign markets. It rose to prominence in the late 1970s and became part of a new consensus among economists about the benefits of economic openness.

    According to Thomas I. Palley, this paradigm is no longer relevant because of changed conditions in both emerging-market (EM) and developed economies. He outlines the stages of the export-led growth paradigm leading to its adoption worldwide, as well as the various critiques of this agenda that have become increasingly prescient. He concludes that we should reduce reliance on strategies aimed at attracting export-oriented foreign direct investment and institute a new paradigm based on a domestic demand–led growth model. Otherwise, the global economy is likely to experience asymmetric stagnation and increased economic tensions between EM and industrialized economies.

  • In the Media | August 2011
    By Alexander Eichler

    Huffington Post, August 22, 2011. Copyright © 2011 TheHuffingtonPost.com, Inc. | “The Huffington Post” is a registered trademark of TheHuffingtonPost.com, Inc. All rights reserved.

    During the 2008 financial crisis, when the nation’s banking system seemed on the verge of collapse, President George W. Bush authorized a $700 billion bailout of the financial industry. The U.S. Treasury implemented that program, known as TARP, in an effort to stave off economic catastrophe.

    At the same time, and in the years that followed, the Federal Reserve was undertaking its own rescue operation, in the form of private, previously undisclosed loans to banks and other institutions—lending as much as $1.2 trillion, nearly twice the amount of the Treasury bailout, according to a data analysis performed by Bloomberg News and published on Monday.

    The scope of the Fed’s private lending had previously only been guessed at, but figures obtained under the Freedom of Information Act by Bloomberg News show that the nation’s central banker issued loans to more than 300 institutions between August 2007 and April 2010, including over 100 loans of $1 billion or more.

    While the Fed’s loans likely helped to prevent a complete implosion of the global banking system, analysts say they fear the loans may have contributed to an atmosphere of complacency on Wall Street. Banks that received emergency cash infusions during the crisis may now believe the Fed will always be there to bail them out of trouble, the thinking goes.

    “It is a classic case of moral hazard,” Dimitri Papadimitriou, president of the Levy Economics Institute of Bard College, told The Huffington Post.

    The Federal Reserve itself had argued that the details of its emergency loans should be kept out of the public eye, claiming that the reputations of the firms involved could suffer if they were seen to be taking money from the government in order to stay afloat. Many of the banks that borrowed from the Fed had previously appealed to the Supreme Court to keep those records secret.

    However, an invocation of the Freedom of Information Act forced the Fed to release more than 29,000 pages of documents, revealing the extent to which the financial sector relied on Federal Reserve dollars during the worst days of the crisis.

    Given the extraordinary size of the loans, the public has a right to know what happened, said David Jones, an executive professor at the Lutgert College of Business at Florida Gulf Coast University.

    “It’s completely valid at some point to say, ‘Who did the borrowing?’“ Jones told The Huffington Post. “It was appropriate, under this special set of circumstances, to divulge the information.”

    Among the largest borrowers were Bank of America, which borrowed $91.4 billion; Goldman Sachs, which was in debt for $69 billion; JPMorgan Chase, which borrowed $68.6 billion; Citigroup, which borrowed $99.5 billion and Morgan Stanley, the biggest borrower of all, to which the Fed loaned $107 billion.

    In addition, the Fed issued sizable loans to a number of foreign banks, including the Royal Bank of Scotland, which borrowed $84.5 billion; Credit Suisse Group, which borrowed $60.8 billion and Germany’s Deutsche Bank, to which the Fed lent $66 billion. Nearly half of the 30 largest borrowers were European firms, according to Bloomberg News.

    While the amount of lending that took place is remarkable, some argue that the Fed’s error was not in issuing the loans, but rather in doing so without setting stronger policy reform conditions for the money.

    Dean Baker, co-director of the Center for Economic and Policy Research, told The Huffington Post that Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke could have attached a “quid pro quo” to the emergency loans—stipulating, for example, that the money would only come through if the banks agreed to do business in a less risky way going forward.

    “This is the moment all the banks were on their backs,” Baker said. “The Fed ran to the rescue and got nothing in return.”

    A previous disclosure in December found that the Fed issued $9 trillion in low-interest overnight loans to banks and other Wall Street companies during the crisis. The $1.2 trillion figure represents the peak amount of outstanding loans, which occurred on December 5, 2008, according to Bloomberg News.

    Some critics contend that while the Fed was right to support the financial sector, the government didn’t do enough to help ordinary citizens who were also seeing their wealth evaporate during the crisis.

    Papadimitriou told The Huffington Post that the Fed issued many of its biggest loans during the Bush administration, and that “they didn’t appear to have any difficulty supporting the financial sector, but very much difficulty supporting the real sector, households.”

    Consumer spending suffered and unemployment spiked in the wake of the financial crisis, and the economy remains weak today. Output is low, consumer confidence is down and millions are still out of work—factors that have some economists worried about the possibility of a double-dip recession.

    The TARP bailout, led by the Treasury, was the subject of much popular ire when it occurred, since it was seen as a case of the government throwing money at the financial sector at the expense of everyday Americans. Similarly, the Fed’s $1.2 trillion in emergency loans were primarily aimed at keeping major financial institutions on their feet.

    “One would assume banks are too interconnected, you have to help all of them,” Papadimitriou said. “But if you take households in total, they are also all interconnected. They are also too big to fail.”

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  • In the Media | August 2011

    New Economic Perspectives, August 13, 2011. Copyright © 2010 KPFK. All Rights Reserved.

    Senior Scholar Wray joins Masters for a macroeconomic analysis of adverse economic trends at home and abroad amid dire predictions of a double-dip recession in the United States and defaults in Europe, connecting the dots to see if we are indeed at a Smoot-Hawley moment where the Congress, instead of reversing economic decline, has accelerated it. Full audio of the interview is available here.

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  • Working Paper No. 681 | August 2011

    This paper begins by recounting the causes and consequences of the global financial crisis (GFC). The triggering event, of course, was the unfolding of the subprime crisis; however, the paper argues that the financial system was already so fragile that just about anything could have caused the collapse. It then moves on to an assessment of the lessons we should have learned. Briefly, these include: (a) the GFC was not a liquidity crisis, (b) underwriting matters, (c) unregulated and unsupervised financial institutions naturally evolve into control frauds, and (d) the worst part is the cover-up of the crimes. The paper argues that we cannot resolve the crisis until we begin going after the fraud, and concludes by outlining an agenda for reform, along the lines suggested by the work of Hyman P. Minsky.

  • One-Pager No. 12 | August 2011
    President Dimitri B. Papadimitriou and Research Scholar Greg Hannsgen make the case that the recession has turned into a prolonged and very unusual slump in growth, preventing a labor-market recovery—and the government lags far behind in creating the new jobs needed to deal with this disaster.

  • Working Paper No. 678 | July 2011
    Reevaluating the Role of Fiscal Policy

    Conventional wisdom contends that fiscal policy was of secondary importance to the economic recovery in the 1930s. The recovery is then connected to monetary policy that allowed non-sterilized gold inflows to increase the money supply. Often, this is shown by measuring the fiscal multipliers, and demonstrating that they were relatively small.

    This paper shows that problems with the conventional measures of fiscal multipliers in the 1930s may have created an incorrect consensus on the irrelevance of fiscal policy. The rehabilitation of fiscal policy is seen as a necessary step in the reinterpretation of the positive role of New Deal policies for the recovery.

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  • Working Paper No. 675 | July 2011

    This paper traces the rise of export-led growth as a development paradigm and argues that it is exhausted owing to changed conditions in emerging market (EM) and developed economies. The global economy needs a recalibration that facilitates a new paradigm of domestic demand-led growth. Globalization has so diversified global economic activity that no country or region can act as the lone locomotive of global growth. Political reasoning suggests that EM countries are not likely to abandon export-led growth, nor will the international community implement the international arrangements needed for successful domestic demand-led growth. Consequently, the global economy likely faces asymmetric stagnation.

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  • One-Pager No. 10 | June 2011
    With quantitative easing winding down and the latest payroll tax-cut measures set to expire at the end of this year, pressing questions loom about the current state of the US economic recovery and its ability to sustain itself in the absence of support from monetary and fiscal policy.

  • Working Paper No. 673 | June 2011

    We present strong empirical evidence favoring the role of effective demand in the US economy, in the spirit of Keynes and Kalecki. Our inference comes from a statistically well-specified VAR model constructed on a quarterly basis from 1980 to 2008. US output is our variable of interest, and it depends (in our specification) on (1) the wage share, (2) OECD GDP, (3) taxes on corporate income, (4) other budget revenues, (5) credit, and the (6) interest rate. The first variable was included in order to know whether the economy under study is wage led or profit led. The second represents demand from abroad. The third and fourth make up total government expenditure and our arguments regarding these are based on Kalecki’s analysis of fiscal policy. The last two variables are analyzed in the context of Keynes’s monetary economics. Our results indicate that expansionary monetary, fiscal, and income policies favor higher aggregate demand in the United States.

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  • In the Media | May 2011
    By Dimitri B. Papadimitriou
    May 26, 2011. Copyright © 2011 New Geography

    It's been more than three years since the Great Recession began, and it's no longer debatable that the federal spending in its wake did not provoke inflation. Years of forecasts by fiscal conservatives about the result of government expenditures have proved to be wrong. After three fiscal stimulus packages, core inflation—which excludes the volatile prices of oil and commodities—remains very much in check. The core rate is the most reliable guide to future inflation, and it has not trended upward.

    Headline inflation, however, the rate that does include these two, has increased. Is the recent uptick in gas and food prices a game-changer on inflation? Does it mean that predictions of an inflation tsunami were well-founded? And what's the best course to follow now?

    Many commodity prices have made double and triple digit gains over the past year. The changes are more than a blip—cotton futures, for example, have risen 162 percent—even if the cost of oil continues to decline. These prices are notoriously subject to rapid change for reasons that don't reflect the structure of the U.S. economy. Factors can include Middle East politics, weather, activity in the developing world, and, most significantly today, speculative profiteering.

    Gold and other commodities have become a hot destination for players—money managers—as these markets have become the rare opportunity for high returns. In the absence of federal regulation and supervision, the low interest rates that are so crucial to business growth and to the vast majority of Americans have been allowed to feed into the permissive speculative superstructure.

    The run-up has clearly impacted the poor and the hungry in the undeveloped world. In academic and policy circles, there's a high level confidence that commodities account for only a small share of GDP in wealthy countries, and so aren't of concern as long as core inflation is under control. At the Levy Institute, in contrast, our research shows that even in the developed world expensive food, energy, and materials can crowd out other household purchases. Consumer budgets can be hurt even before serious headline inflation appears.

    If commodity prices were to continue to climb broadly and sharply, the Federal Reserve could face the prospect of a serious episode of cost-push inflation, similar to what we saw in the 1970s and '80s. Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke might find himself occupying the chair of Paul Volcker in more ways than one.

    This kind of inflation is caused neither by the effects of low interest rates on the broader economy, nor by government spending. And, as with any symptom of ill health, the cause dictates the appropriate treatment. So if Bernanke's response was to raise interest rates dramatically in the hope of abating inflation to some arbitrarily low target, it would be a risky mistake. An interest rate rise would be a serious danger to growth and job creation. Business and labor are far too fragile to deal with a double whammy from rising gas and food prices coupled with monetary policy tightening.

    A better response would be "watchful waiting," a phrase seen in the December 1996 minutes of the FOMC (Federal Open Market Committee) meeting. A commodity price inflation could remain at least somewhat isolated.

    Higher commodity prices will be used as an excuse to charge that the Fed's supposedly lax policy has unleashed an inflationary flood of cash throughout the economy. But the Fed's so-called "easy money" is parked at the Fed itself, as bank reserves, since banks are not lending. This can't cause inflation either. Logic hasn't stopped newly re-branded Republican presidential candidate Newt Gingrich, who recently admonished that "The Bernanke policy of printing money is setting the stage for mass inflation."

    Those who purchase securities for long-term investment evidently disagree. Bond traders aren't anticipating an inflationary surge. Just look at the yield spread between inflation-indexed and non-indexed Treasury securities of the same maturity. It has remained almost constant over the past year. In other words, buyers who want their returns insulated from inflation are paying only slightly more for protection than they were last year. That flatness—the unwillingness to pay a premium for inflation insurance—indicates that long-term bond buyers haven't revised their inflation forecasts.

    Also unlikely to revise their predictions: inflation doom-drummers, even as energy prices level, and wages, another inflation indicator, are by no means jumping. Like eons of "the-end-is-nigh" prognosticators, they don't exactly have a great track record. Back in spring 2008, a frenzied Glenn Beck urged Fox viewers to "Buy that coat and shoes for next year now." Some of his Washington cohorts are coy about inflation's estimated time of arrival. Republican House Majority Leader Eric Cantor, for example, tells us that "fears" of "future" inflation are "hanging over the marketplace." Others, like former Pennsylvania Senator Rick Santorum, say it's already arrived (Obama brought it). The accusations continue despite a lengthy stretch of the lowest inflation rates in modern US history, even with the current commodities rise.

    Paul Ryan (R-WI) has been hailed as both a truth sayer and a soothsayer on the economy. He recommends that the Federal Reserve raise interest rates now to head off inflation "before the cow is out of the barn," ignoring the pain this would cause families and businesses. Here's my recommendation: Don't trust predictions about the future from those who've misread the present, and been very wrong in the past.

    Dimitri Papadimitriou is President of the Levy Economics Institute of Bard College, and Executive Vice President and Jerome Levy Professor of Economics at Bard College.

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  • In the Media | May 2011
    By Dimitri B. Papadimitriou

    May 13, 2011. Copyright © 2011, Los Angeles Times

    For 20 years, U.S. exports have trailed imports. Addressing the imbalance could hugely boost the job market.

    One school of thought about the so-called jobless recovery of the American economy blames high unemployment on the federal deficit. But that’s blaming the wrong deficit.

    To achieve an authentic recovery that includes new jobs, the deficit we need to cut is in trade.

    For 20 years, America’s exports have been surpassed by its imports, with a big bite of that trade deficit composed of oil imports. Addressing the imbalance could have a huge effect on the job market, but only if it goes beyond reducing imports. We need to actively strengthen exports as well.

    Even if the economic recovery continues, as is likely, joblessness will remain a colossal disaster. The unemployment rate is hovering at about 9%, and for some groups it is far higher. Nearly 16% of African Americans are unemployed, with young people and Latinos not far behind. The United States is about 19 million jobs behind the curve if employment is to return to its pre-recession levels. Among the world’s most developed nations, the G-7, we have the highest unemployment. Here at the Levy Economics Institute, even in our best-case growth scenario, we see unemployment dropping only to about 7%—way above healthy levels—by 2015. We’re not alone in that pessimism: The figures vary, but the prevailing outlook, including from the Federal Reserve is that job-seekers face years of pain.

    Exports are key to meeting the urgent need for new jobs. The White House estimates that every $1 billion in exports creates 5,000 jobs. This makes it crucial for companies to find more customers in the rest of the world.

    In addition to aircraft and other transport vehicles, U.S. industrial equipment, pharmaceuticals, chemicals, semiconductors and agricultural products—raw and processed—have a track record of success in the global marketplace, along with millions of goods from medium-size and small companies.

    There are things that could be done to help American exporters. A devaluation of the dollar beyond the current downward creep would be a start. A weaker dollar would reduce the cost of our exports in foreign markets, in turn generating demand from buyers abroad. It would also encourage American consumers to buy domestic products because our goods would have a price advantage over imported ones. And the resulting rise in exports would have a side benefit: reducing the national budget deficit, because GDP growth and lower unemployment would mean larger government revenues and less spending on safety-net programs.

    Devaluation does have some downsides, of course. Over the long haul, it can cause inflation, but that is not an immediate danger because core inflation is currently at or near record lows. Still, consumers would probably be paying more in the short term for oil and other imports.

    In the long term, international monetary reforms would certainly be a preferable route to devaluing the dollar. Global imbalances are on the G-20 radar screen, but a serious policy response has yet to be floated. One helpful monetary reform would be to expand Special Drawing Rights—artificial, blended currency units governed by the International Monetary Fund—as supplemental currency reserves. This could only be done by an accord among the G-20 countries. International agreements take time—the World Trade Organization’s Doha talks will soon celebrate their 10th anniversary—so moving the dollar’s exchange rate is a better short-term solution.

    Even then, ramping up American exports will be difficult. The White House has set a goal of doubling exports over five years, but the current mania for spending cuts may work against that ambition. In the House of Representatives, the Small Business Committee has advocated rescinding $30 million in Small Business Administration grants to states for promoting exports and sharply cutting the SBA’s Office of International Trade. These savings would be counterproductive and would work against the nation’s best interests.

    It’s true that our trade account balance has recently improved. The better figures, though, aren’t a sign of healthy growth or an upcoming job surge. They reflect more a drop in imports rather than a growth in exports, and the drop has come because of less demand for goods in the recession’s shadow and amid ongoing financial fears.

    Exports are starting to rise. But making sure that the upward curve continues will be crucial to addressing our still-worrisome unemployment rate.

    Dimitri B. Papadimitriou is president of the Levy Economics Institute of Bard College and a professor of economics there. He is a former vice chairman of Congress’ Trade Deficit Review Commission

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  • In the Media | May 2011
    Pema Levy Interviews James K. Galbraith

    The American Prospect, May 5, 2011. © 2011 by The American Prospect, Inc.

    A deal is taking shape between Congress and the administration on the debt-ceiling vote, and it will likely include some spending cuts in exchange for increasing the amount the government can borrow.

    As these negotiations play out, we’re constantly warned that the debt-ceiling fight has high stakes. Refusing to raise the ceiling will prevent us from paying debts and will destroy the faith our bondholders—that is, China—have in us. Or will it? The Prospect talked with James K. Galbraith, the Lloyd M. Bentsen Jr. Chair in Government/Business Relations at the University of Texas at Austin, about just how accurate the doomsday predictions really are.

    Everyone says that if we don’t raise the debt ceiling soon, we’ll have a financial disaster on our hands. How accurate are these catastrophic predictions?

    Failure to raise the debt limit would be, for sure, a bad idea. Whether it would produce a fiscal and bond market Armageddon, I think, is really doubtful.

    This is a group of politicians saying, give me cuts or I will shoot the economy. So that’s the political problem that we face. And one way I think to handle that problem is to point out that what the hostage-takers have in their hands may well not be a nuclear grenade; it might be something much less cataclysmic.

    A few weeks ago, the ratings agency Standard & Poor’s warned that the United States could lose its AAA rating on U.S. debt (securities, bonds, etc.), which could have serious repercussions for the economy. How do you gauge the chances of a downgrade?

    One can’t judge what Standard & Poor’s or Moody’s will do, because they’ve gotten most everything else wrong in the last decade. These are firms that graded vast mounds of worthless mortgage-backed paper as AAA because of the crafty ways it was securitized. These are firms that never to my knowledge downgraded a major corporate fraud—Enron and so forth—more than a few days in advance of its collapse. And they routinely give cities lower ratings than they should based upon the default rates on those instruments. They have no particular competence in Europe, either. So, it’s a little bit unpredictable what a corporation with that track record is going to do.

    Is there a danger we’ll default?

    If you read the 14th Amendment, Section 4, it says that the [validity of the] debt of the United States authorized by law—including pensions, by the way, so including Social Security—shall not be questioned. So long as we are run by the Constitution, we’re going to pay the debt.

    One fear is that not raising the ceiling will cause a global panic or at least a ripple effect if the U.S. fails to pay its foreign creditors. What will foreign creditors do if we default on our bonds?

    Let’s suppose that the Treasury actually says to the People’s Bank of China, sorry, we can’t write a check to you right now. Well, in the case of the People’s Bank of China, the bond that they hold would become a defaulted bond, but it would still be there. And the Treasury would still recognize its obligation on that bond and would presumably be willing to pay accrued interest on it. The Treasury would probably say, it’s going to be a few days while we resolve this, and the People’s Bank of China would, in my view, probably do nothing.

    If I were sitting in the position of a foreign holder of U.S. Treasury securities in that situation, the last thing I would want would be a panic. I would want this problem to go away.

    And if there is a panic?

    I think the right analogy to that would be the failure of Congress to pass the [Troubled Asset Relief Program] on the first round. The stock market went down by 800 points. That sent a very powerful political wake-up call, and suddenly people changed their positions. The most likely thing if we actually go to this stage where there is real turmoil would be that Congress—the hostage-takers—would drop their guns.

    So the question I would have then is: Does it make sense to give the hostage-takers what they want? Which are massive cuts. And I think it does not make sense by any stretch of the imagination to agree that the debt ceiling shall be the point of leverage for coming to a decision, which is what the Republicans want and unfortunately what some Democrats like Kent Conrad want.

    This would be an act of just gross negotiating folly to set the precedent that the debt-ceiling negotiations become the way in which the extremists get what they want.

    This Q&A has been edited for length and clarity.

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  • Policy Note 2011/2 | May 2011

    By general agreement, the federal budget is on an “unsustainable path.” Try typing the phrase into Google News: 19 of the first 20 hits refer to the federal debt. But what does this actually mean? One suspects that some who use the phrase are guided by vague fears, or even that they don’t quite know what to be afraid of. Some people fear that there may come a moment when the government’s bond markets would close, forcing a default or “bankruptcy.” But the government controls the legal-tender currency in which its bonds are issued and can always pay its bills with cash. A more plausible worry is inflation—notably, the threat of rising energy prices in an oil-short world—alongside depreciation of the dollar, either of which would reduce the real return on government bonds. But neither oil-price inflation nor dollar devaluation constitutes default, and neither would be intrinsically “unsustainable.”

    After a brief discussion of the major worries, Senior Scholar James Galbraith focuses on one, and only one, critical issue: the actual behavior of the public-debt-to-GDP ratio under differing economic assumptions through time. His conclusion? The CBO’s assumption that the United States must offer a real interest rate on the public debt higher than the real growth rate by itself creates an unsustainability that is not otherwise there. Changing that one assumption completely alters the long-term dynamic of the public debt. By the terms of the CBO’s own model, a low interest rate erases the notion that the US debt-to-GDP ratio is on an “unsustainable path.” The prudent policy conclusion? Keep the projected interest rate down. Otherwise, stay cool: don’t change the expected primary deficit abruptly, and allow the economy to recover through time.

  • Working Paper No. 668 | May 2011
    Functional Finance and Full Employment

    Forty-five years ago, the A. Philip Randolph Institute issued “The Freedom Budget,” in which a program for economic transformation was proposed that included a job guarantee for everyone ready and willing to work, a guaranteed income for those unable to work or those who should not be working, and a living wage to lift the working poor out of poverty. Such policies were supported by a host of scholars, civic leaders, and institutions, including the Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.; indeed, they provided the cornerstones for King’s “Poor Peoples’ Campaign” and “economic bill of rights.”

    This paper proposes a “New Freedom Budget” for full employment based on the principles of functional finance. To counter a major obstacle to such a policy program, the paper includes a “primer” on three paradigms for understanding government budget deficits and the national debt: the deficit hawk, deficit dove, and functional finance perspectives. Finally, some of the benefits of the job guarantee are outlined, including the ways in which the program may serve as a vehicle for a variety of social policies.

  • Public Policy Brief No. 118 | April 2011
    Four Fragile Markets, Four Years Later

    In this brief, Research Scholar Greg Hannsgen and President Dimitri B. Papadimitriou focus on the risks and possibilities ahead for the US economy. Using a Keynesian approach and drawing from the commentary of other observers, they analyze publicly available data in order to assess the strength and durability of the expansion that probably began in 2009. They focus on four broad groups of markets that have shown signs of stress for the last several years: financial markets, markets for household goods and services, commodity markets, and labor markets. This kind of analysis does not yield numerical forecasts but it can provide important clues about the short-term outlook for the country’s economic well-being, and cast light on some longer-run threats. In particular, dangers and stresses in the financial and banking systems are presently very serious, and labor market data show every sign of a widespread and severe weakness in aggregate demand. Unless there is new resolve for effective government action on the jobs front, drastic cuts in much-needed federal, state, and local programs will become the order of the day in the United States, as in much of Europe.

  • Working Paper No. 665 | April 2011
    Don’t Forget Finance

    Given the economy’s complex behavior and sudden transitions as evidenced in the 2007–08 crisis, agent-based models are widely considered a promising alternative to current macroeconomic practice dominated by DSGE models. Their failure is commonly interpreted as a failure to incorporate heterogeneous interacting agents. This paper explains that complex behavior and sudden transitions also arise from the economy’s financial structure as reflected in its balance sheets, not just from heterogeneous interacting agents. It introduces “flow-of-funds” and “accounting” models, which were preeminent in successful anticipations of the recent crisis. In illustration, a simple balance-sheet model of the economy is developed to demonstrate that nonlinear behavior and sudden transition may arise from the economy’s balance-sheet structure, even without any microfoundations. The paper concludes by discussing one recent example of combining flow-of-funds and agent-based models. This appears a promising avenue for future research.

  • Strategic Analysis | March 2011

    The US economy grew reasonably fast during the last quarter of 2010, and the general expectation is that satisfactory growth will continue in 2011–12. The expansion may, indeed, continue into 2013. But with large deficits in both the government and foreign sectors, satisfactory growth in the medium term cannot be achieved without a major, sustained increase in net export demand. This, of course, cannot happen without either a cut in the domestic absorption of US goods and services or a revaluation of the currencies of the major US trading partners.

    Our policy message is fairly simple, and one that events over the years have tended to vindicate. Most observers have argued for reductions in government borrowing, but few have pointed out the potential instabilities that could arise from a growth strategy based largely on private borrowing—as the recent financial crisis has shown. With the economy operating at far less than full employment, we think Americans will ultimately have to grit their teeth for some hair-raising deficit figures, but they should take heart in recent data showing record-low “core” CPI inflation—and the potential for export-led growth to begin reducing unemployment.

  • Working Paper No. 640 | December 2010
    Remedies for High Unemployment and Fears of Fiscal Crisis

    In recent years, the US public debt has grown rapidly, with last fiscal year’s deficit reaching nearly $1.3 trillion. Meanwhile, many of the euro nations with large amounts of public debt have come close to bankruptcy and loss of capital market access. The same may soon be true of many US states and localities, with the governor of California, for example, publicly regretting that he has been forced to cut bone, and not just fat, from the state’s budget. Chartalist economists have long attributed the seemingly limitless borrowing ability of the US government to a particular kind of monetary system, one in which money is a “creature of the state” and the government can create as much currency and bank reserves as it needs to pay its bills (this is not to say that it lacks the power to impose taxes). In this paper, we examine this situation in light of recent discussions of possible limits to the federal government’s use of debt and the Federal Reserve’s “printing press.” We examine and compare the fiscal situations in the United States and the eurozone, and suggest that the US system works well, but that some changes must be made to macro policy if the United States and the world as a whole are to avoid another deep recession.

     

  • One-Pager No. 7 | November 2010

    The stability of the international reserve currency’s purchasing power is less a question of what serves as that currency and more a question of the international adjustment mechanism, as well as the compatibility of export-led development strategies with international payment balances. Export-led growth and free capital flows are the real causes of sustained international imbalances. The only way out of this predicament is to shift to domestic demand–led development strategies—and capital flows will have to be part of the solution.

  • One-Pager No. 5 | November 2010
    The Need for More Profound Reforms

    There is no justification for the belief that cutting spending or raising taxes by any amount will reduce the federal deficit, let alone permit solid growth. The worst fears about recent stimulative policies and rapid money-supply growth are proving to be incorrect once again. We must find the will to reinvigorate government and to maintain Keynesian macro stimulus in the face of ideological opposition and widespread mistrust of government.

  • Policy Note 2010/4 | November 2010

    A common refrain heard from those trying to justify the results of the recent midterm elections is that the government’s fiscal stimulus to save the US economy from depression undermined growth, and that fiscal restraint is the key to economic expansion. Research Associate Marshall Auerback maintains that this refrain stems from a failure to understand a fundamental reality of bookkeeping—that when the government runs a surplus (deficit), the nongovernment sector runs a deficit (surplus). If the new GOP Congress led by Republicans and their Tea Party allies cuts government spending now, deficits will go higher, as growth slows, automatic stabilizers kick in, and tax revenues fall farther. And if extending the Bush tax cuts faces congressional gridlock, taxes will rise in 2011, further draining aggregate demand. Moreover, there are potential solvency issues for the United States if the debt ceiling is reached and Congress does not raise it. This chain of events potentially creates a new financial crisis and effectively forces the US government to default on its debt. The question is whether or not President Obama (and his economic advisers) will be enlightened enough to embrace this “teachable moment” about US main sector balances. Recent remarks to the press about deficit reduction suggest otherwise.

  • Working Paper No. 635 | November 2010
    A Review of the Literature

    This paper provides a survey of the literature on trade theory, from the classical example of comparative advantage to the New Trade theories currently used by many advanced countries to direct industrial policy and trade. An account is provided of the neo-classical brand of reciprocal demand and resource endowment theories, along with their usual empirical verifications and logical critiques. A useful supplement is provided in terms of Staffan Linder’s theory of “overlapping demand,” which provides an explanation of trade structure in terms of aggregate demand. Attention is drawn to new developments in trade theory, with strategic trade providing inputs to industrial policy. Issues relating to trade, growth, and development are dealt with separately, supplemented by an account of the neo-Marxist versions of trade and underdevelopment.

  • Working Paper No. 632 | November 2010
    A Structural VAR Analysis

    This paper investigates private net saving in the US economy—divided into its principal components, households and (nonfinancial) corporate financial balances—and its impact on the GDP cycle from the 1980s to the present. Furthermore, we investigate whether the financial markets (stock prices, BAA spread, and long-term interest rates) have a role in explaining the cyclical pattern of the two private financial balances. We analyze all these aspects estimating a VAR—between household and (nonfinancial) corporate financial balances (also known as the corporate financing gap), financial markets, and the economic cycle—and imposing restrictions on the matrix A to identify the structural shocks. We find that households and corporate balances react to financial markets as theoretically expected, and that the economic cycle reacts positively to corporate balance, in accordance with the Minskyan view of the operation of the economy that we have embraced.

  • Public Policy Brief No. 116 | October 2010

    The stability of the international reserve currency’s purchasing power is less a question of what serves as that currency and more a question of the international adjustment mechanism, as well as the compatibility of export-led development strategies with international payment balances. According to Senior Scholar Jan Kregel, export-led growth and free capital flows are the real causes of sustained international imbalances. The only way out of this predicament is to shift to domestic demand–led development strategies—and capital flows will have to be part of the solution.

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  • Public Policy Brief Highlights No. 114A | September 2010

    In this new policy brief, President Dimitri B. Papadimitriou and Research Scholar Greg Hannsgen evaluate the current path of fiscal deficits in the United States in the context of government debt and further spending, economic recovery, and unemployment. They are adamant that there is no justification for the belief that cutting spending or raising taxes by any amount will reduce the federal deficit, let alone permit solid growth. The worst fears about recent stimulative policies and rapid money-supply growth are proving to be incorrect once again. In the authors’ view, we must find the will to reinvigorate government and to maintain Keynesian macro stimulus in the face of ideological opposition and widespread mistrust of government.

  • Press Releases | September 2010
    Budget Deficits Are Inevitable Result of Low Economic Growth and Lost Tax Revenues, and a Normal Part of Boom-Bust Cycle, Scholars Say

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  • Public Policy Brief Highlights No. 112A | August 2010

    The global abatement of the inflationary climate of the past three decades, combined with continuing financial instability, helped to promote the worldwide holding of US dollar reserves as a cushion against financial instability outside the United States, with the result that, for the United States itself, this was a period of remarkable price stability and reasonably stable economic expansion.

    For the most part, the economics profession viewed these events as a story of central bank credibility, fiscal probity, and accelerating technological change coupled with changing demands on the labor market, creating a model of self-stabilizing free markets and hands-off policy makers motivated by doing the right thing—what Senior Scholar James K. Galbraith calls “the grand illusion of the Great Moderation.” A dissenting line of criticism focused on the stagnation of real wages, the growth of deficits in trade and the current account, and the search for new markets. This view implied that a crisis would occur, but that it would result from a rejection of US financial hegemony and a crash of the dollar, with the euro and the European Union (EU) the ostensible beneficiaries.

    A third line of argument was articulated by two figures with substantially different perspectives on the Keynesian tradition: Wynne Godley and Hyman P. Minsky. Galbraith discusses the approaches of these Levy distinguished scholars, including Godley’s correlation of government surpluses and private debt accumulation and Minsky’s financial stability hypothesis, as well as their influence on the responses of the larger economic community.

    Galbraith himself argues the fundamental illusion of viewing the US economy through the free-market prism of deregulation, privatization, and a benevolent government operating mainly through monetary stabilization. The real sources of American economic power, he says, lie with those who manage and control the public-private sectors—especially the public institutions in those sectors—and who often have a political agenda in hand. Galbraith calls this the predator state: a state that is not intent upon restructuring the rules in any idealistic way but upon using the existing institutions as a device for political patronage on a grand scale. And it is closely aligned with deregulation.

  • Public Policy Brief No. 114 | August 2010
    In this new brief, President Dimitri B. Papadimitriou and Research Scholar Greg Hannsgen evaluate the current path of fiscal deficits in the United States in the context of government debt and further spending, economic recovery, and unemployment. They are adamant that there is no justification for the belief that cutting spending or raising taxes will reduce the federal deficit, let alone permit solid growth. The worst fears about recent stimulative policies and rapid money-supply growth are proving to be incorrect once again. In the authors’ view, we must find the will to reinvigorate government and to maintain Keynesian macro stimulus in the face of ideological opposition and widespread mistrust of government.
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  • Policy Note 2010/2 | July 2010
    Facts on the Ground
    The developed world faces a cyclical deficiency of aggregate demand, the product of a liquidity trap and the paradox of thrift, in the context of headwinds born of ongoing structural realignments. According to Paul McCulley, PIMCO, front-loaded fiscal austerity would only add to that deflationary cocktail. This is why the market vigilantes are fleeing risk assets, which depend on growth for valuation support, rather than the sovereign debt of fiat-currency countries. McCulley bases his outlook on the financial balances approach (double-entry bookkeeping) pioneered by the late Wynne Godley, who was a distinguished scholar at the Levy Institute. Godley’s analytical framework, says McCulley, should be the workhorse of discussions on global rebalancing.
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  • After the Crisis: Planning a New Financial Structure
    A conference organized by the Levy Economics Institute of Bard College with support from the FordFoundationLogo.

    On April 14–16, more than 200 policymakers, economists, and analysts from government, industry, and academia gathered at the NYC headquarters of the Ford Foundation for the Levy Institute’s annual Minsky conference on the state of the US and world economies. This year’s conference drew upon many Minskyan themes, including reconstituting the financial structure; the reregulation and supervision of financial institutions; the relevance of the Glass-Steagall Act; the roles of the Federal Reserve, FDIC, and the Treasury; the moral hazard of the “too big to fail” doctrine; debt deflation; and the economics of the “big bank” and “big government.” Speakers compared the European and Latin American responses to the global financial crisis and proposals for reforming the international financial architecture. Moreover, central bank exit strategies, both national and international, were considered.

  • Public Policy Brief No. 112 | June 2010
    Senior Scholar James K. Galbraith argues the fundamental illusion of viewing the US economy through the free-market prism of deregulation, privatization, and a benevolent government operating mainly through monetary stabilization—the prevailing view among economists over the past three decades. The real sources of American economic power, he says, lie with those who manage and control the public‑private sectors—especially the public institutions in those sectors—and who often have a political agenda in hand. Galbraith calls this the predator state: a government that is intent, not upon restructuring the rules in any idealistic way, but upon using the existing institutions as a device for political patronage on a grand scale. And it is closely aligned with financial deregulation.

  • Working Paper No. 603 | June 2010
    A Critique of This Time Is Different, by Reinhart and Rogoff

    The worst global downturn since the Great Depression has caused ballooning budget deficits in most nations, as tax revenues collapse and governments bail out financial institutions and attempt countercyclical fiscal policy. With notable exceptions, most economists accept the desirability of expansion of deficits over the short term but fear possible long-term effects. There are a number of theoretical arguments that lead to the conclusion that higher government debt ratios might depress growth. There are other arguments related to more immediate effects of debt on inflation and national solvency. Research conducted by Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff is frequently cited to demonstrate the negative impacts of public debt on economic growth and financial stability. In this paper we critically examine their work. We distinguish between a nation that operates with its own floating exchange rate and nonconvertible (sovereign) currency, and a nation that does not. We argue that Reinhart and Rogoff’s results are not relevant to the case of the United States.

  • One-Pager No. 1 | May 2010
    How to End America's Trade Deficits

    Now that America’s financial institutions have been brought back from the brink, the greatest threat to global economic stability is the gigantic trade imbalance between the United States, China, and other trading partners. A second big threat to economic stability, in the longer run, is global warming. Both problems are related to America’s addiction to cheap imports and foreign oil—bad habits that a clever cap-and-trade system could help us kick at last.

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  • Working Paper No. 597 | May 2010
    This paper sets out to investigate the forces and conditions that led to the emergence of global imbalances preceding the worldwide crisis of 2007–09, and both the likelihood and the potential sustainability of reemerging global imbalances as the world economy recovers from that crisis. The “Bretton Woods 2” hypothesis of sustainable global imbalances featuring a quasi-permanent US current account deficit overlooked that the domestic counterpart to the United States’ external deficit—soaring household indebtedness—was based not on safe debts but rather toxic ones. We critique the “global saving glut” hypothesis, and propose the “global dollar glut” hypothesis in its stead. With the US private sector in retrenchment mode, the question arises whether fiscal expansion might not only succeed in filling the gap in US domestic demand but also restart global arrangements along BW2 lines, albeit this time based on public debt—call it “Bretton Woods 3.” This paper explores the chances of a BW3 regime, highlighting the role of “dollar leveraging” in sustaining US trade deficits. Longer-term prospects for a postdollar standard are discussed in the light of John Maynard Keynes’s “bancor” plan.

  • Public Policy Brief No. 111 | May 2010
    Why We Should Stop Worrying About U.S. Government Deficits
    This brief by Yeva Nersisyan and Senior Scholar L. Randall Wray argues that deficits do not burden future generations with debt, nor do they crowd out private spending. The authors base their conclusions on the premise that a sovereign nation with its own currency cannot become insolvent, and that government financing is unlike that of a household or firm. Moreover, they observe that automatic stabilizers, not government bailouts and the stimulus package, have prevented the US economic contraction from devolving into another Great Depression. The authors dispense with unsubstantiated concerns about deficits and debts, noting that they mask the real issue: the unwillingness of deficit hawks to allow government to work for the good of the people.

  • Working Paper No. 594 | May 2010
    This paper argues that modified versions of the so-called “New Cambridge” approach to macroeconomic modeling are both quite useful for modeling real capitalist economies in historical time and perfectly compatible with the “vision” underlying modern Post-Keynesian stock-flow consistent macroeconomic models. As such, New Cambridge–type models appear to us as an important contribution to the tool kit available to applied macroeconomists in general, and to heterodox applied macroeconomists in particular.

  • Working Paper No. 591 | March 2010

    This paper investigates the spread of what started as a crisis at the core of the global financial system to emerging economies. While emerging economies had exhibited some resilience through the early stages of the financial turmoil that began in the summer of 2007, they have been hit hard since mid-2008. Their deteriorating fortunes are only partly attributable to the collapse in world trade and sharp drop in commodity prices. Things were made worse by emerging markets’ exposure to the turmoil in global finance itself. As “innocent bystanders,” even countries that had taken out “self-insurance” proved vulnerable to the global “sudden stop” in capital flows. We critique loanable funds theoretical interpretations of global imbalances and offer an alternative explanation that emphasizes the special status of the US dollar. Instead of taking out even more self-insurance, developing countries should pursue capital account management to enlarge their policy space and reduce external vulnerabilities.

  • Strategic Analysis | March 2010
    Research Scholar Gennaro Zezza updates the Levy Institute’s previous Strategic Analysis (December 2009) and finds that the 2009 increase in public sector aggregate demand was a result of the fiscal stimulus, without which the recession would have been much deeper. He confirms that strong policy action is required to achieve full employment in the medium term, including a persistently high government deficit in the short term. This implies a growing public debt, which is sustainable as long as interest rates are kept at the current low level. The alternative is an ongoing unemployment rate above 10 percent that would represent a higher cost to future generations. 

  • In the Media | January 2010
    By James K. Galbraith

    By James K. Galbraith, Thought and Action, The NEA Higher Education Journal, Fall 2009.

    This article is partly a response to Paul Krugman’s piece in the Sunday New York Times of September 6, 2009, on the failures of the economists in the face of the crisis. Here, Senior Scholar James K. Galbraith takes up the challenge of identifying some of those economists—the “nobodies” of the profession—who did see it coming, and who have not gotten the credit they deserve. He also points out the urgent need to expand the academic space and the public visibility of ongoing work that is of actual value when faced with the many deep problems of economic life in our time—an imperative for university administrators, for funding agencies, for foundations, and for students.

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  • Strategic Analysis | December 2009

    Though recent market activity and housing reports give some warrant for optimism, United States economic growth was only 2.8 percent in the third quarter, and the unemployment rate is still very high. In their new Strategic Analysis, the Levy Institute’s Macro-Modeling Team project that high unemployment will continue to be a problem if fiscal stimulus policies expire and deficit reduction efforts become the policy focus. The authors—President Dimitri B. Papadimitriou and Research Scholars Greg Hannsgen and Gennaro Zezza—argue that continued fiscal stimulus is necessary to reduce unemployment. The resulting federal deficits would be sustainable, they say, as long as they were accompanied by a coordinated and gradual devaluation of the dollar, especially against undervalued Asian currencies—a step necessary to prevent an increase in the current account deficit and ward off the risk of a currency crash.

  • Policy Note 2009/10 | October 2009
    What Are the Lessons of the New Deal?

    As the nation watches the impact of the recent stimulus bill on job creation and economic growth, a group of academics continues to dispute the notion that the fiscal and job creation programs of the New Deal helped end the Depression. The work of these revisionist scholars has led to a public discourse that has obvious implications for the controversy surrounding fiscal stimulus bills. Since we support a new stimulus package—one that emphasizes jobs for the 9.8 percent of the workforce currently unemployed—we have been concerned about this debate. With Congress, the White House, pundits, and the press riveted on the all-important health care debate, we worry that they are also distracted by skirmishes over economic theory and history, while millions wait for a new chance to do meaningful work and effective, if imperfect, policy tools are readily at hand. (See also, Public Policy Brief No. 104.)

  • Working Paper No. 581 | October 2009
    Did the New Deal Prolong or Worsen the Great Depression?

    Since the current recession began in December 2007, New Deal legislation and its effectiveness have been at the center of a lively debate in Washington. This paper emphasizes some key facts about two kinds of policy that were important during the Great Depression and have since become the focus of criticism by new New Deal critics: (1) regulatory and labor relations legislation, and (2) government spending and taxation. We argue that initiatives in these policy areas probably did not slow economic growth or worsen the unemployment problem from 1933 to 1939, as claimed by a number of economists in academic papers, in the popular press, and elsewhere. To substantiate our case, we cite some important economic benefits of New Deal–era laws in the two controversial policy areas noted above. In fact, we suggest that the New Deal provided effective medicine for the Depression, though fiscal policy was not sufficiently countercyclical to conquer mass unemployment and prevent the recession of 1937–38; 1933’s National Industrial Recovery Act was badly flawed and poorly administered, and the help provided by the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 came too late to have a big effect on the recovery.

  • Public Policy Brief Highlights No. 104A | September 2009

    A wave of revisionist work claims that “anticompetitive” New Deal legislation such as the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) and the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) greatly slowed the recovery from the Depression; in this new public policy brief, President Dimitri B. Papadimitriou and Research Scholar Greg Hannsgen review these claims in light of current policy debates and cast into doubt the argument that NIRA and NLRA significantly prolonged or worsened the Depression. Moreover, Social Security, federal deposit insurance, and other New Deal programs helped usher in an era of relative prosperity following World War II. When it comes to combating the current recession and employment slump, it is the successful experience with relief and public works, and not the repercussions of pro-union and regulatory legislation, that offer the most relevant and helpful lessons.

  • In the Media | September 2009
    By Stephen Mihm

    Since the global financial system started unraveling in dramatic fashion two years ago, distinguished economists have suffered a crisis of their own. Ivy League professors who had trumpeted the dawn of a new era of stability have scrambled to explain how, exactly, the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression had ambushed their entire profession.

    Amid the hand-wringing and the self-flagellation, a few more cerebral commentators started to speak about the arrival of a “Minsky moment,” and a growing number of insiders began to warn of a coming “Minsky meltdown.”

    “Minsky” was shorthand for Hyman Minsky, a hitherto obscure macroeconomist who died over a decade ago. Many economists had never heard of him when the crisis struck, and he remains a shadowy figure in the profession. But lately he has begun emerging as perhaps the most prescient big-picture thinker about what, exactly, we are going through. A contrarian amid the conformity of postwar America, an expert in the then-unfashionable subfields of finance and crisis, Minsky was one economist who saw what was coming. He predicted, decades ago, almost exactly the kind of meltdown that recently hammered the global economy.

    In recent months Minsky’s star has only risen. Nobel Prize–winning economists talk about incorporating his insights, and copies of his books are back in print and selling well. He’s gone from being a nearly forgotten figure to a key player in the debate over how to fix the financial system.

    But if Minsky was as right as he seems to have been, the news is not exactly encouraging. He believed in capitalism, but also believed it had almost a genetic weakness. Modern finance, he argued, was far from the stabilizing force that mainstream economics portrayed; rather, it was a system that created the illusion of stability while simultaneously creating the conditions for an inevitable and dramatic collapse.

    In other words, the one person who foresaw the crisis also believed that our whole financial system contains the seeds of its own destruction. “Instability,” he wrote, “is an inherent and inescapable flaw of capitalism.”

    Minsky’s vision might have been dark, but he was not a fatalist; he believed it was possible to craft policies that could blunt the collateral damage caused by financial crises. But with a growing number of economists eager to declare the recession over, and the crisis itself apparently behind us, these policies may prove as discomforting as the theories that prompted them in the first place. Indeed, as economists re-embrace Minsky’s prophetic insights, it is far from clear that they’re ready to reckon with the full implications of what he saw.

    In an ideal world, a profession dedicated to the study of capitalism would be as freewheeling and innovative as its ostensible subject. But economics has often been subject to powerful orthodoxies, and never more so than when Minsky arrived on the scene.

    That orthodoxy, born in the years after World War II, was known as the neoclassical synthesis. The older belief in a self-regulating, self-stabilizing free market had selectively absorbed a few insights from John Maynard Keynes, the great economist of the 1930s who wrote extensively of the ways that capitalism might fail to maintain full employment. Most economists still believed that free-market capitalism was a fundamentally stable basis for an economy, though thanks to Keynes, some now acknowledged that government might under certain circumstances play a role in keeping the economy—and employment—on an even keel.

    Economists like Paul Samuelson became the public face of the new establishment; he and others at a handful of top universities became deeply influential in Washington. In theory, Minsky could have been an academic star in this new establishment: like Samuelson, he earned his doctorate in economics at Harvard University, where he studied with legendary Austrian economist Joseph Schumpeter, as well as future Nobel laureate Wassily Leontief.

    But Minsky was cut from different cloth than many of the other big names. The descendent of immigrants from Minsk, in modern-day Belarus, Minsky was a red-diaper baby, the son of Menshevik socialists. While most economists spent the 1950s and 1960s toiling over mathematical models, Minsky pursued research on poverty, hardly the hottest subfield of economics. With long, wild, white hair, Minsky was closer to the counterculture than to mainstream economics. He was, recalls the economist L. Randall Wray, a former student, a “character.”

    So while his colleagues from graduate school went on to win Nobel prizes and rise to the top of academia, Minsky languished. He drifted from Brown to Berkeley and eventually to Washington University. Indeed, many economists weren’t even aware of his work. One assessment of Minsky published in 1997 simply noted that his “work has not had a major influence in the macroeconomic discussions of the last thirty years.”

    Yet he was busy. In addition to poverty, Minsky began to delve into the field of finance, which despite its seeming importance had no place in the theories formulated by Samuelson and others. He also began to ask a simple, if disturbing question: “Can �it’ happen again?”—where “it” was, like Harry Potter's nemesis Voldemort, the thing that could not be named: the Great Depression.

    In his writings, Minsky looked to his intellectual hero, Keynes, arguably the greatest economist of the 20th century. But where most economists drew a single, simplistic lesson from Keynes—that government could step in and micromanage the economy, smooth out the business cycle, and keep things on an even keel—Minsky had no interest in what he and a handful of other dissident economists came to call “bastard Keynesianism.”

    Instead, Minsky drew his own, far darker, lessons from Keynes’s landmark writings, which dealt not only with the problem of unemployment, but with money and banking. Although Keynes had never stated this explicitly, Minsky argued that Keynes’s collective work amounted to a powerful argument that capitalism was by its very nature unstable and prone to collapse. Far from trending toward some magical state of equilibrium, capitalism would inevitably do the opposite. It would lurch over a cliff.

    This insight bore the stamp of his advisor Joseph Schumpeter, the noted Austrian economist now famous for documenting capitalism's ceaseless process of “creative destruction.” But Minsky spent more time thinking about destruction than creation. In doing so, he formulated an intriguing theory: not only was capitalism prone to collapse, he argued, it was precisely its periods of economic stability that would set the stage for monumental crises.

    Minsky called his idea the “Financial Instability Hypothesis.” In the wake of a depression, he noted, financial institutions are extraordinarily conservative, as are businesses. With the borrowers and the lenders who fuel the economy all steering clear of high-risk deals, things go smoothly: loans are almost always paid on time, businesses generally succeed, and everyone does well. That success, however, inevitably encourages borrowers and lenders to take on more risk in the reasonable hope of making more money. As Minsky observed, “Success breeds a disregard of the possibility of failure.”

    As people forget that failure is a possibility, a “euphoric economy” eventually develops, fueled by the rise of far riskier borrowers—what he called speculative borrowers, those whose income would cover interest payments but not the principal; and those he called “Ponzi borrowers,” those whose income could cover neither, and could only pay their bills by borrowing still further. As these latter categories grew, the overall economy would shift from a conservative but profitable environment to a much more freewheeling system dominated by players whose survival depended not on sound business plans, but on borrowed money and freely available credit.

    Once that kind of economy had developed, any panic could wreck the market. The failure of a single firm, for example, or the revelation of a staggering fraud could trigger fear and a sudden, economy-wide attempt to shed debt. This watershed moment—what was later dubbed the “Minsky moment”—would create an environment deeply inhospitable to all borrowers. The speculators and Ponzi borrowers would collapse first, as they lost access to the credit they needed to survive. Even the more stable players might find themselves unable to pay their debt without selling off assets; their forced sales would send asset prices spiraling downward, and inevitably, the entire rickety financial edifice would start to collapse. Businesses would falter, and the crisis would spill over to the “real” economy that depended on the now-collapsing financial system.

    From the 1960s onward, Minsky elaborated on this hypothesis. At the time he believed that this shift was already underway: postwar stability, financial innovation, and the receding memory of the Great Depression were gradually setting the stage for a crisis of epic proportions. Most of what he had to say fell on deaf ears. The 1960s were an era of solid growth, and although the economic stagnation of the 1970s was a blow to mainstream neo-Keynesian economics, it did not send policymakers scurrying to Minsky. Instead, a new free market fundamentalism took root: government was the problem, not the solution.

    Moreover, the new dogma coincided with a remarkable era of stability. The period from the late 1980s onward has been dubbed the “Great Moderation,” a time of shallow recessions and great resilience among most major industrial economies. Things had never been more stable. The likelihood that “it” could happen again now seemed laughable.

    Yet throughout this period, the financial system—not the economy, but finance as an industry—was growing by leaps and bounds. Minsky spent the last years of his life, in the early 1990s, warning of the dangers of securitization and other forms of financial innovation, but few economists listened. Nor did they pay attention to consumers’ and companies’ growing dependence on debt, and the growing use of leverage within the financial system.

    By the end of the 20th century, the financial system that Minsky had warned about had materialized, complete with speculative borrowers, Ponzi borrowers, and precious few of the conservative borrowers who were the bedrock of a truly stable economy. Over decades, we really had forgotten the meaning of risk. When storied financial firms started to fall, sending shockwaves through the ”real” economy, his predictions started to look a lot like a road map.

    “This wasn’t a Minsky moment,'' explains Randall Wray. “It was a Minsky half-century.”

    Minsky is now all the rage. A year ago, an influential Financial Times columnist confided to readers that rereading Minsky's 1986 “masterpiece”—“Stabilizing an Unstable Economy”—“helped clear my mind on this crisis.” Others joined the chorus. Earlier this year, two economic heavyweights—Paul Krugman and Brad DeLong—both tipped their hats to him in public forums. Indeed, the Nobel Prize–winning Krugman titled one of the Robbins lectures at the London School of Economics “The Night They Re-read Minsky.”

    Today most economists, it’s safe to say, are probably reading Minsky for the first time, trying to fit his unconventional insights into the theoretical scaffolding of their profession. If Minsky were alive today, he would no doubt applaud this belated acknowledgment, even if it has come at a terrible cost. As he once wryly observed, “There is nothing wrong with macroeconomics that another depression [won't] cure.”

    But does Minsky’s work offer us any practical help? If capitalism is inherently self-destructive and unstable—never mind that it produces inequality and unemployment, as Keynes had observed—now what?

    After spending his life warning of the perils of the complacency that comes with stability—and having it fall on deaf ears—Minsky was understandably pessimistic about the ability to short-circuit the tragic cycle of boom and bust. But he did believe that much could be done to ameliorate the damage.

    To prevent the Minsky moment from becoming a national calamity, part of his solution (which was shared with other economists) was to have the Federal Reserve—what he liked to call the “Big Bank”—step into the breach and act as a lender of last resort to firms under siege. By throwing lines of liquidity to foundering firms, the Federal Reserve could break the cycle and stabilize the financial system. It failed to do so during the Great Depression, when it stood by and let a banking crisis spiral out of control. This time, under the leadership of Ben Bernanke—like Minsky, a scholar of the Depression—it took a very different approach, becoming a lender of last resort to everything from hedge funds to investment banks to money market funds.

    Minsky’s other solution, however, was considerably more radical and less palatable politically. The preferred mainstream tactic for pulling the economy out of a crisis was—and is—based on the Keynesian notion of “priming the pump” by sending money that will employ lots of high-skilled, unionized labor—by building a new high-speed train line, for example.

    Minsky, however, argued for a “bubble-up” approach, sending money to the poor and unskilled first. The government—or what he liked to call “Big Government”—should become the “employer of last resort,” he said, offering a job to anyone who wanted one at a set minimum wage. It would be paid to workers who would supply child care, clean streets, and provide services that would give taxpayers a visible return on their dollars. In being available to everyone, it would be even more ambitious than the New Deal, sharply reducing the welfare rolls by guaranteeing a job for anyone who was able to work. Such a program would not only help the poor and unskilled, he believed, but would put a floor beneath everyone else's wages too, preventing salaries of more skilled workers from falling too precipitously, and sending benefits up the socioeconomic ladder.

    While economists may be acknowledging some of Minsky’s points on financial instability, it's safe to say that even liberal policymakers are still a long way from thinking about such an expanded role for the American government. If nothing else, an expensive full-employment program would veer far too close to socialism for the comfort of politicians. For his part, Wray thinks that the critics are apt to misunderstand Minsky. “He saw these ideas as perfectly consistent with capitalism,” says Wray. “They would make capitalism better.”

    But not perfect. Indeed, if there's anything to be drawn from Minsky’s collected work, it's that perfection, like stability and equilibrium, are mirages. Minsky did not share his profession's quaint belief that everything could be reduced to a tidy model, or a pat theory. His was a kind of existential economics: capitalism, like life itself, is difficult, even tragic. “There is no simple answer to the problems of our capitalism,” wrote Minsky. “There is no solution that can be transformed into a catchy phrase and carried on banners.”

    It's a sentiment that may limit the extent to which Minsky becomes part of any new orthodoxy. But that’s probably how he would have preferred it, believes liberal economist James Galbraith. “I think he would resist being domesticated,” says Galbraith. “He spent his career in professional isolation.”

    Stephen Mihm is a history professor at the University of Georgia and author of “A Nation of Counterfeiters” (Harvard, 2007).

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  • In the Media | September 2009
    By Dirk Bezemer

    September 7, 2009. Copyright 2009 The Financial Times Limited.

    From the beginning of the credit crisis and ensuing recession, it has become conventional wisdom that “no one saw this coming.” Anatole Kaletsky wrote in The Times of “those who failed to foresee the gravity of this crisis”—a group that included “almost every leading economist and financier in the world.” Glenn Stevens, governor of the Reserve Bank of Australia, said: “I do not know anyone who predicted this course of events. But it has occurred, it has implications, and so we must reflect on it.” We must indeed.

    Because, in fact, many had seen it coming for years. They were ignored by an establishment that, as the former Federal Reserve chairman Alan Greenspan professed in his October 2008 testimony to Congress, watched with “shocked disbelief” as its “whole intellectual edifice collapsed in the summer [of 2007].” Official models missed the crisis not because the conditions were so unusual, as we are often told. They missed it by design. It is impossible to warn against a debt deflation recession in a model world where debt does not exist. This is the world our policymakers have been living in. They urgently need to change habitat.

    I undertook a study of the models used by those who did see it coming.* They include Kurt Richebächer, an investment newsletter writer, who wrote in 2001 that “the new housing bubble—together with the bond and stock bubbles—will [inevitably] implode in the foreseeable future, plunging the US economy into a protracted, deep recession”; and in 2006, when the housing market turned, that “all remaining questions pertain solely to [the] speed, depth and duration of the economy’s downturn.” Wynne Godley of the Levy Economics Institute wrote in 2006 that “the small slowdown in the rate at which US household debt levels are rising resulting from the house price decline, will immediately lead to a sustained growth recession before 2010.” Michael Hudson of the University of Missouri wrote in 2006 that “debt deflation will shrink the ‘real’ economy, drive down real wages, and push our debt-ridden economy into Japan-style stagnation or worse.” Importantly, these and other analysts not only foresaw and timed the end of the credit boom, but also perceived this would inevitably produce recession in the US. How did they do it?

    Central to the contrarians’ thinking is an accounting of financial flows (of credit, interest, profit and wages) and stocks (debt and wealth) in the economy, as well as a sharp distinction between the real economy and the financial sector (including property). In these “flow-of-funds” models, liquidity generated in the financial sector flows to companies, households and the government as they borrow. This may facilitate fixed-capital investment, production and consumption, but also asset-price inflation and debt growth. Liquidity returns to the financial sector as investment or in debt service and fees.

    It follows that there is a trade-off in the use of credit, so that financial investment may crowd out the financing of production. A second key insight is that, since the economy’s assets and liabilities must balance, growing financial asset markets find their counterpart in a growing debt burden. They also swell payment flows of debt service and financial fees. Flow-of-funds models quantify the sustainability of the debt burden and the financial sector’s drain on the real economy. This allows their users to foresee when finance’s relation to the real economy turns from supportive to extractive, and when a breaking point will be reached.

    Such calculations are conspicuous by their absence in official forecasters’ models in the US, the UK and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. In line with mainstream economic theory, balance sheet variables are assumed to adapt automatically to changes in the real economy, and can thus be safely omitted. This practice ignores the fact that in most advanced economies, financial sector turnover is many times larger than total gross domestic product; or that growth in the US and UK has been finance-driven since the turn of the millennium.

    Perhaps because of this omission, the OECD commented in August 2007 that “the current economic situation is in many ways better than what we have experienced in years. . . . Our central forecast remains indeed quite benign: a soft landing in the United States [and] a strong and sustained recovery in Europe.” Official US forecasters could tell Reuters as late as September 2007 that the recession in the US was “not a dominant risk.” This was well after the Levy Economics Institute, for example, predicted in April of that year that output growth would slow “almost to zero sometime between now and 2008.”

    Policymakers have resisted inclusion of balance sheets and the flow of funds in their models by arguing that bubbles cannot be easily identified, nor their effects reliably anticipated. The above analysts have shown that this is, in fact, feasible, and indeed essential if we are to “see it coming” next time. The financial sector is just as real as the real economy. Our policymakers, and the analysts they rely on, ignore balance sheets and the flow of funds at their peril—and ours.

    *No One Saw This Coming”: Understanding Financial Crisis Through Accounting Models, MPRA

    The writer is a fellow at the economics and business department of the University of Groningen in the Netherlands.

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  • Public Policy Brief No. 104 | August 2009
    Did Roosevelt’s “Anticompetitive” Legislation Slow the Recovery from the Great Depression?

    A wave of revisionist work claims that “anticompetitive” New Deal legislation such as the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) and the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) greatly slowed the recovery from the Depression; in this new public policy brief, President Dimitri B. Papadimitriou and Research Scholar Greg Hannsgen review these claims in light of current policy debates and cast into doubt the argument that NIRA and NLRA significantly prolonged or worsened the Depression. Moreover, Social Security, federal deposit insurance, and other New Deal programs helped usher in an era of relative prosperity following World War II. When it comes to combating the current recession and employment slump, it is the successful experience with relief and public works, and not the repercussions of pro-union and regulatory legislation, that offer the most relevant and helpful lessons.

  • Working Paper No. 569 | June 2009

    This paper presents the main features of the macroeconomic model being used at The Levy Economics Institute of Bard College, which has proven to be a useful tool in tracking the current financial and economic crisis. We investigate the connections of the model to the “New Cambridge” approach, and discuss other recent approaches to the evolution of financial balances for all sectors of the economy. We will finally show the effects of fiscal policy in the model, and its implications for the proposed fiscal stimulus on the US economy. We show that the New Cambridge hypothesis, which claimed that the private sector financial balance would be stable relative to income in the short run, does not hold for the short term in our model, but it does hold for the medium/long term. This implies that the major impact of the fiscal stimulus in the long run will be on the external imbalance, unless other measures are taken.

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  • Working Paper No. 567 | June 2009
    An SFC Look at Financialization and Profit-led Growth

    Many heterodox strands of thought share both a concern with the study of different phases or growth regimes in the history of capitalism and the use of formal short-run models as an analytical tool. The authors of this new working paper suggest (1) that this strategy is potentially misleading, and (2) that the stock-flow consistent (SFC) approach, while providing a general framework that may facilitate dialogue among those currents, is particularly well suited to all those who think that macroeconomic models may illuminate historical quests.

  • Working Paper No. 561 | May 2009

    To save America—indeed, the global economy as a whole—the private/public sector balance has to shift, and the neoliberal economic model on which the country has been based for the past 25 years has to be modified. In this new working paper, Marshall Auerback details why the role of the state needs to be reemphasized.

    The abandonment of a mixed economy and corresponding diminution of the role of government was hailed as the “rebirth of individualism,” yet it caused rising inequality and the decline of median wages, and led to the widespread neglect of public goods vital to its citizens’ welfare. Meanwhile, the country ran through the public investment it had made from the 1930s to the 1970s, with few serious challenges from policymakers or mainstream economists.

    The neoliberal model was also aggressively exported: the “optimal” growth strategy for all emerging economies was supposedly one that emphasized limited government, corporate governance, rule of law, and higher levels of state-owned and -influenced enterprise—in spite of significant historical evidence to the contrary. Not even the economic wreckage in Mexico, Argentina, Thailand, Indonesia, and Russia seemed sufficient to challenge, let alone overturn, the prevailing paradigm.

    That is, until now: in reaction to the financial crisis, many governments—led by the United States—are enacting massive economic stimulus packages and taking a central role in promoting economic growth strategies. This reemergence of state-driven capitalism constitutes a “back to the future” investment paradigm, one that is consistent with a long and successful pattern of economic development. But once we get beyond the pothole patching and school repairing, what industries can be pushed forward using public seed capital or through Sematech-like consortiums? What must be brought to the fore is the need for a new growth path for the United States, one in which the state has a significant role.  There are already indications that the private sector is beginning to adapt to this new, collaborative paradigm.

  • Conference Proceedings | April 2009
    Meeting the Challenges of Financial Crisis

    A conference organized by The Levy Economics Institute of Bard College with support from the Ford Foundation.

    On April 16 and 17, more than 150 policymakers, economists, and analysts from government, industry, and academia gathered at the NYC headquarters of the Ford Foundation for the Levy Institute’s annual Minsky conference on the state of the US and world economies. This year’s conference focused on the extraordinary challenges posed by the current global financial crisis. Topics included current conditions and forecasts, macro policy proposals by the Obama administration and others, the rehabilitation of mortgage financing and the banks, financial market reregulation, proposals to limit foreclosures and modify servicing agreements, regulation of alternative financial products (derivatives and credit default swaps), the institutional shape of the future financial system, and international responses to the crisis.

  • Strategic Analysis | April 2009

    Federal government and Federal Reserve (Fed) liabilities rose sharply in 2008. Who holds these new liabilities, and what effects will they have on the economy? Some economists and politicians warn of impending inflation. In this new Strategic Analysis, the Levy Institute’s Macro-Modeling Team focuses on one positive effect—a badly needed improvement of private sector balance sheets—and suggest some of the reasons why it is unlikely that the surge in Fed and federal government liabilities will cause excessive inflation.

  • Strategic Analysis | April 2009

    In 1930, John Maynard Keynes wrote: “The world has been slow to realise that we are living this year in the shadow of one of the greatest economic catastrophes of modern history.” The same holds true today: we are in the shadow of a global catastrophe, and we need to come to grips with the crisis—fast. According to Senior Scholar James K. Galbraith, two ingrained habits are leading to our failure to do so. The first is the assumption that economies will eventually return to normal on their own—an overly hopeful view that doesn’t take into account the massive pay-down of household debt resulting from the collapse of the banks. The second bad habit is the belief that recovery runs through the banks rather than around them. But credit cannot flow when there are no creditworthy borrowers or profitable projects; banks have failed, and the failure to recognize this is a recipe for wild speculation and control fraud, compounding taxpayer losses.

    Galbraith outlines a number of measures that are needed now, including realistic economic forecasts, more honest bank auditing, effective financial regulation, measures to forestall evictions and keep people in their homes, and increased public retirement benefits. We are not in a temporary economic lull, an ordinary recession, from which we will emerge to return to business as usual, says Galbraith. Rather, we are at the beginning of a long, painful, profound, and irreversible process of change—we need to start thinking and acting accordingly.

  • Press Releases | January 2009
    New Strategic Analysis Argues that Coordinated Effort to Address Imbalances in International Trade Is Necessary to Restore Sustained Growth and Full Employment

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  • Strategic Analysis | January 2009

    The Federal Reserve’s latest flow-of-funds data reveal that household borrowing has fallen sharply lower, bringing about a reversal of the upward trend in household debt. According to the Levy Institute’s macro model, a fall in borrowing has an immediate effect—accounting in this case for most of the 3 percent drop in private expenditure that occurred in the third quarter of 2008—as well as delayed effects; as a result, the decline in real GDP and accompanying rise in unemployment may be substantial in coming quarters.

    For further details on the Macro-Modeling Team’s latest projections, see the December 2008 Strategic Analysis Prospects for the US and the World: A Crisis That Conventional Remedies Cannot Resolve.

  • Strategic Analysis | December 2008

    The economic recovery plans currently under consideration by the United States and many other countries seem to be concentrated on the possibility of using expansionary fiscal and monetary policies alone. In a new Strategic Analysis, the Levy Institute’s Macro-Modeling Team argues that, however well coordinated, this approach will not be sufficient; what’s required, they say, is a worldwide recovery of output, combined with sustainable balances in international trade.

  • Public Policy Brief Highlights No. 96A | October 2008
    Money Manager Capitalism and the Financialization of Commodities

    In a new public policy brief, Senior Scholar L. Randall Wray shows how money manager capitalism—characterized by highly leveraged funds seeking maximum returns in an environment that systematically underprices risk—has destabilized one asset class after another, with commodities being simply the latest. Policymakers must fundamentally change the structure of our economic system and reduce the influence of managed money, Wray argues, in order to break the speculative boom-and-bust cycle.

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  • Public Policy Brief No. 95 | August 2008

    A bursting asset bubble inevitably requires central bank action, usually when it is already too late and with adverse spillover effects. In this sense, the Federal Reserve and other central banks already target asset prices; yet, by taking aim at them only on the way down—as in the current housing and credit crisis—the "Big Banks" create a self-perpetuating cycle of perverse incentives and moral hazard that often gives rise to yet another round of bubbles.

    The US central bank's current premise is that policymakers cannot and should not target asset bubbles. However, the housing story has rendered untenable the prevailing belief that bubbles are impossible to spot ahead of time. The warning signals were ubiquitous—for example, price charts showing home values rising impossibly into the stratosphere, and Wall Street's increasing reliance on housing-backed bonds for its record-setting profits. It has become abundantly clear that there was plenty the Fed could have done to discourage speculative behavior and put a stop to predatory lending.

    Recent US experience has bolstered the view that asset prices must come under the central bank's purview in order for the economy to retain some semblance of stability. Former Fed Chairman Paul Volcker recently called for a broader regulatory role for the central bank in light of the housing-centered credit crisis. Indeed, Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson's latest plan for tackling the crisis involves giving the Fed vast new authority to regulate investment banks, not just depository institutions. However, news analyst Pedro Nicolaci da Costa argues that attitude changes among regulators will be even more important than shifts in mandate in ensuring that regulators like the Fed do their jobs properly.

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  • Public Policy Brief Highlights No. 95A | August 2008
    Policy Lessons from America’s Historic Housing Crash

    Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson’s latest plan for tackling the housing-centered credit crisis involves giving the Federal Reserve vast new authority to regulate investment banks, not just depository institutions. However, news analyst Pedro Nicolaci da Costa argues that attitude changes among regulators will be even more important than shifts in mandate in ensuring that regulators like the Fed do their jobs properly.

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    Pedro Nicolaci da Costa
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  • Working Paper No. 538 | July 2008

    This paper considers a plan proposed by Warren Buffett, whereby importers would be required to obtain certificates proportional to the amount of non-oil goods (and possibly also services) they brought into the country. These certificates would be granted to firms that exported goods, which could then sell certificates to importing firms on an organized market. Starting from a relatively neutral projection of all major variables for the US economy, the authors estimate that the plan would raise the price of imports by approximately 9 percent, quickly reducing the current account deficit to about 2 percent of GDP. They discuss several problems that might arise with the implementation of the Buffett plan, including possible instability in the price of certificates and retaliation by US trade partners. They also consider an alternative version of the plan, in which certificates would be sold at a government auction, rather than granted to exporters. The revenues from certificate sales would then be used to finance a reduction in FICA payroll taxes. The authors report the results of simulations of the alternative plan’s effects on macroeconomic balances and GDP growth. Notably, the alternative plan would lessen the severity of the growth recession expected in our base projection.

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  • Working Paper No. 537 | July 2008
    Peering Over the Edge of the Short Period

    This paper argues that institutionally rich stock-flow consistent models—that is, models in which economic agents are identified with the main social categories/institutional sectors of actual capitalist economies, the short period behavior of these agents is thoroughly described, and the “period by period” balance sheet dynamics implied by the latter is consistently modeled—are (1) perfectly compatible with John Maynard Keynes’s theoretical views, (2) the ideal tool for rigorous post-Keynesian analyses of the medium run, and (3) therefore crucial to the consolidation of the broad post-Keynesian research program.

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    Antonio C. Macedo e Silva Claudio H. Dos Santos
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  • Conference Proceedings | April 2008
    Credit, Markets, and the Real Economy: Is the Financial System Working?

    In April 2008, top policymakers, economists, and analysts from government, industry, and academia gathered at the Levy Institute’s research and conference facility in Annandale-on-Hudson, New York, to present their insights about the American economy and the financial sector in the context of Minsky’s economic theories. Participants discussed Minsky’s financial instability hypothesis and the ability of monetary policy to stabilize financial markets and the economy, as well as the role of the Federal Reserve and its ability to function as a systemic lender of last resort. Speakers frequently compared events in the 1930s (the New Deal era) to the present, and they considered the prospect of another debt deflation rivaling the Great Depression. They also examined today’s complex and fragile financial system (e.g., the advent of securitization) and potential solutions to the mortgage crisis. Other related topics included the timing, cause, and length of recession; the nature and effectiveness of proposed economic stimulus packages; regulatory failures and the reformulation of policy; and the deleveraging process and potential financial losses.

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  • Working Paper No. 532 | April 2008

    This paper seeks to explain the causes and consequences of the United States subprime mortgage crisis, and how this crisis has led to a generalized credit crunch in other financial sectors that ultimately affects the real economy. It postulates that, despite the recent financial innovations, the financial strategies—leveraging and financial risk mismatching—that led to the present crisis are similar to those found in the United States savings-and-loan debacle of the late 1980s and in the Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s. However, these strategies are based on market innovations that have heightened, not reduced, systemic risks and financial instability. They are as the title implies: old wine in a new bottle. Going beyond these financial practices, the underlying structural causes of the crisis are located in the loose monetary policies of central banks, deregulation, and excess liquidity in financial markets that is a consequence of the kind of economic growth that produces various imbalances—trade imbalances, financial sector imbalances, and wealth and income inequality. The consequences of excessive risk, moral hazards, and rolling bubbles are discussed.

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    Michael Mah-Hui Lim
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  • Press Releases | April 2008
    New Study Argues Government Expenditure More Effective Than Tax Rebates

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    Mark Primoff
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  • Working Paper No. 530 | April 2008

    This paper traces the evolution of housing finance in the United States from the deregulation of the financial system in the 1970s to the breakdown of the savings and loan industry and the development of GSE (government-sponsored enterprise) securitization and the private financial system. The paper provides a background to the forces that have produced the present system of residential housing finance, the reasons for the current crisis in mortgage financing, and the impact of the crisis on the overall financial system.

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  • Strategic Analysis | April 2008

    As the government prepares to dispense the tax rebates that largely make up its recently approved $168 billion stimulus package, President Dimitri B. Papadimitriou and Research Scholars Greg Hannsgen and Gennaro Zezza explore the possibility of an additional fiscal stimulus of about $450 billion spread over three quarters—challenging the notion that a larger and more prolonged additional stimulus is unnecessary and will generate inflationary pressures. They find that, given current projections of even a moderate recession, a fiscal stimulus totaling $600 billion would not be too much. They also find that a temporary stimulus—even one lasting four quarters—will have only a temporary effect. An enduring recovery will depend on a prolonged increase in exports, the authors say, due to the weak dollar, a modest increase in imports, and the closing of the current account gap.

  • Public Policy Brief Highlights No. 94A | April 2008

    According to Senior Scholar L. Randall Wray, the current crisis in financial markets can be traced back to securitization (the “originate and distribute” model), leverage, the demise of relationship-based banking, and a dizzying array of extremely complex instruments that—quite literally—only a handful understand.

  • Public Policy Brief No. 94 | April 2008
    What Can We Learn from Minsky?

    In this new Public Policy Brief, Senior Scholar L. Randall Wray explains today’s complex and fragile financial system, and how the seeds of crisis were sown by lax oversight, deregulation, and risky innovations such as securitization. He estimates that the combined losses throughout the entire financial sector could amount to several trillion dollars, and that the United States will feel the effects of the crisis for some time—perhaps a decade or more.

     

    Wray recommends enhanced oversight of financial institutions, much larger stimulus packages, and creation of a new institution in line with President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Home Owners’ Loan Corporation.

     

  • Strategic Analysis | November 2007

    In their latest Strategic Analysis, Distinguished Scholar Wynne Godley, President Dimitri B. Papadimitriou, and Research Scholars Greg Hannsgen and Gennaro Zezza review recent events in the housing and financial markets to obtain a likely scenario for the evolution of household spending in the United States. They forecast a significant drop in borrowing and private expenditure in the coming quarters, with severe consequences for growth and unemployment, unless (1) the US dollar is allowed to continue its fall and thus complete the recovery in the US external imbalance, and (2) fiscal policy shifts its course—as it did in the 2001 recession.

  • Public Policy Brief No. 91 | October 2007
    Suggestions for a New Agenda

    The failure of the Doha Development Round of World Trade Organization (WTO) negotiations in July 2006 was the first major collapse of a multilateral trade round since World War II. Research Associate Thomas Palley sees the failure as an event that could mark the close of a 60-year era of trade policy largely centered on increasing market access and reducing tariffs, quotas, and subsidies. Doha’s demise represents an opportunity to challenge the intellectual dominance of the current WTO paradigm, to expose the failings of the neoliberal model of economic development, and to reposition the global trade debate.

  • In the Media | September 2007
    By Wolfgang Münchau

    FT.com, September 3, 2007. Copyright 2007 The Financial Times Limited. “FT” and “Financial Times” are trademarks of the Financial Times

    “Financial operations do not lend themselves to innovation. What is recurrently so described and celebrated is, without exception, a small variation on an established design. . . . The world of finance hails the invention of the wheel over and over again, often in a slightly more unstable version.” —John Kenneth Galbraith, A Short History of Financial Euphoria

    The late John Kenneth Galbraith would have enjoyed this summer. He was no expert on modern credit markets but his analysis of historic bubbles fits our most recent boom and bust episode with uncanny precision.

    All historic bubbles were accompanied by a sharp rise in leverage. A salient feature of modern bubbles is the emergence of innovative financial products. No matter whether we are talking about junk bonds or modern collateralised debt obligations (CDOs), as Galbraith has pointed out, such products boil down to variants of debt secured on a real asset.

    By historic standards, our credit bubble is probably one of the largest ever, given the sheer size of the market itself and the degree of euphoria that was characteristic in the final stages of the boom. While the fallout was initially concentrated in the financial sector itself, it would be surprising if the ongoing problems did not trickle down into the real economy. The availability of credit affects house prices and numerous studies have demonstrated the interlinkages between US house prices and US economic growth.

    So what should central banks do? I suspect that central banks are not going to be the main actors in any rescue operation, but rather governments. Central banks' room for manoeuvre to cut interest rates is more constrained this time than during the most recent recession. But more important, this is not the kind of crisis that can easily be stopped by a few hasty rate cuts or bank bail-outs. If your subprime mortgage exceeds the value of your house by 10 per cent, and if the monthly payments exceed your income, no positive interest rate could bail you out. Your only hope is some serious debt relief.

    The economists Dimitri Papadimitriou, Greg Hannsgen and Gennaro Zezza last week published a study* in which they demonstrated the danger to US economic growth posed by the present real estate crisis. Their policy recommendations go significantly beyond the usual bail-out calls. They argue that it is almost impossible for policymakers to stop the decline in real estate prices, but “if the Fed and Congress can work to stop any incipient recession, they will prevent job losses, which are one of the main contributors to foreclosures. An effective job-creation method could be some form of employer-of-last-resort programme that offers government jobs to all workers who ask for them”.

    We should remember that the subprime market is not the only unstable subsection of the credit market. Once US consumption slows, we should prepare for a crisis in credit card and car finance CDOs. And once corporate bankruptcies start to rise again as the cycle turns down, both in the US and in Europe, we will probably hear about problems with collateralised loan obligations. The credit market is very deep and offers significant potential for contagion.

    In this sense, the debate about whether this is a liquidity or a solvency crisis is beside the point. Banks may look at their CDO investments as a source of temporary illiquidity, but may sooner or later realise that they are sitting on a pile of junk. The fiscal and monetary authorities should therefore assume that they are confronted with a solvency crisis. Bailing out the odd bank, as the Germans did last month, is not going to be sufficient and perhaps not even necessary.

    Instead, the monetary and fiscal authorities should stand ready to support the economy if and when needed. Lower interest rates will probably be part of any such deal, but a large part of the help will invariably come from fiscal policy. The US Federal Reserve will probably cut interest rates soon and the European Central Bank will almost certainly postpone the rate rise it unwisely preannounced only a few weeks ago. I am convinced the next interest rate movement both in the US and the eurozone will be downwards.

    One of the problems the monetary authorities have to deal with is moral hazard. This is not a theoretical issue, as some suggest, but a far more immediate concern. Moral hazard is the result of asymmetric expectations, as markets expect the central bank to bail out the financial sector during a time of crisis. The problem of moral hazard is to some extent related to the monetary policy strategy of central banks, with their mechanistic focus on a single consumer price index. Such strategies often have no space for asset prices, but markets know fully well that central banks must invariably take account of asset prices during sharp downturns. One way out of this asymmetry is for central banks to include asset prices into their policy frameworks in some form or other.

    This said, a bail-out of the financial system will probably become unavoidable, but it should be accompanied with structural policy changes. Tighter financial regulation is probable. The role of the ratings agencies is bound to change too. And central banks should reconsider their monetary policy frameworks. They are part of the problem.

    *Cracks in the Foundations of Growth, Levy Institute, www.levyinstitute.org/pubs/ppb_90.pdf

  • Working Paper No. 506 | July 2007

    Longstanding speculation about the likelihood of a housing market collapse has given way in the past few months to consideration of just how far the housing market will fall, and how much damage the debacle will inflict on the economy. This paper assesses the magnitude of the impact of housing price decreases on real private expenditure, examines the role of new types of mortgages and mortgage-related securities, and analyzes possible policy responses.

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  • Public Policy Brief No. 90 | July 2007
    What Will the Housing Debacle Mean for the U.S. Economy?

    With economic growth having cooled to less than 1 percent in the first quarter of 2007, the economy can ill afford a slump in consumption by the American household. But it now appears that the household sector could finally give in to the pressures of rising gasoline prices, a weakening home market, and a large debt burden. The signals are still mixed; for example, while April’s retail sales numbers caused concern, May’s were much improved, and so was the ISM manufacturing index for June. Consumption growth indicates a slowdown. This Public Policy Brief examines the American household and its economic fortunes, concentrating on how falling home prices might hamper economic growth, generate social dislocations, and possibly lead to a full-blown financial crisis.

  • Public Policy Brief Highlights No. 90A | July 2007
    What Will the Housing Debacle Mean for the U.S. Economy?
    With economic growth having cooled to less than 1 percent in the first quarter of 2007, the economy can ill afford a slump in consumption by the American household. But it now appears that the household sector could finally give in to the pressures of rising gasoline prices, a weakening home market, and a large debt burden.

  • Working Paper No. 503 | June 2007

    Despite being arguably one of the most active areas of research in heterodox macroeconomics, the study of the dynamic properties of stock-flow consistent (SFC) growth models of financially sophisticated economies is still in its early stages. This paper attempts to offer a contribution to this line of research by presenting a simplified Post-Keynesian SFC growth model with well-defined dynamic properties, and using it to shed light on the merits and limitations of the current heterodox SFC literature.

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  • Strategic Analysis | April 2007

    The collapse in the subprime mortgage market, along with multiple signals of distress in the broader housing market, has already drawn forth a large body of comment. Some people think the upheaval will turn out to be contagious, causing a major slowdown or even a recession later in 2007. Others believe that the turmoil will be contained, and that the US economy will recover quite rapidly and resume the steady growth it has enjoyed during the last four years or so.

    Yet no participants in the public discussion, so far as we know, have framed their views in the context of a formal model that enables them to draw well-argued conclusions (however conditional) about the magnitude and timing of the impact of recent events on the overall economy in the medium term—not just the next few months.

  • Working Paper No. 494 | April 2007

    This paper deploys a simple stock-flow consistent (SFC) model in order to examine various contentions regarding fiscal and monetary policy. It follows from the model that if the fiscal stance is not set in the appropriate fashion—that is, at a well-defined level and growth rate—then full employment and low inflation will not be achieved in a sustainable way. We also show that fiscal policy on its own could achieve both full employment and a target rate of inflation. Finally, we arrive at two unconventional conclusions: first, that an economy (described within an SFC framework) with a real rate of interest net of taxes that exceeds the real growth rate will not generate explosive interest flows, even when the government is not targeting primary surpluses; and, second, that it cannot be assumed that a debtor country requires a trade surplus if interest payments on debt are not to explode.

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    Wynne Godley Marc Lavoie
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  • Conference Proceedings | April 2007
    Global Imbalances: Prospects for the U.S. and World Economies

    The 2007 Hyman P. Minsky Conference focused on monetary and fiscal policies for continued growth and employment; currency markets fluctuations and the consequent exchange-rate misalignments, as well as possible cures; and the United States' households and trade deficits, their implications for growth and employment, and their effect on the conduct of monetary and fiscal policy. The US role in the global marketplace was examined in view of the current international economic landscape.

     

    The conference was held April 19–20, 2007, at the Levy Institute’s research and conference center at Blithewood on the campus of Bard College, Annandale-on-Hudson, N.Y.

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  • Working Paper No. 488 | January 2007

    In a series of articles and books, Harold Vatter and John Walker attempted to make the case that the American economy suffers from chronically insufficient demand that leads to growth below capacity. Of particular interest are a 1989 Journal of Post Keynesian Economics article that extends Domar's work on the supply side effects of investment spending and a 1997 book that provides a comprehensive analysis of the evolution of the US "mixed" economy. Their analysis of secular growth complements the well-known writings of Hyman Minsky, who also emphasized the role of the "big government" and the "big bank" in stabilizing an unstable economy over the cycle. This article will summarize, provide support for, and extend the Vatter and Walker approach, concluding with an examination of some of the dangers facing the US economy today. As appropriate, the ideas of Minsky will be used to supplement the argument.

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  • Policy Note 2007/1 | January 2007
    Tax Reform Advice for the New Majority

    Anyone who reads a newspaper knows that most Americans have accumulated excessive levels of debt, and realizes that as interest rates climb, it becomes more difficult to service financial liabilities. To add insult to injury, wage growth has been slow, while prices—especially for energy—have risen sharply. What is not clear, however, is the fact that taxes have also been rising rapidly, relative to both income and government spending. In this Policy Note, we concentrate on the last issue, and argue that many middle-income earners will find themselves unprepared for the coming surprise in April.

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  • Working Paper No. 486 | December 2006

    Approaching the issue of mounting global imbalances from the perspective of the "Bretton Woods II hypothesis," this paper argues that the popular preoccupation with China's supposed export-led development strategy is misplaced. It also suggests, similar to Japan's depression, subdued growth in Euroland for most of the time since the Maastricht Treaty has been of first-order importance in these developments. Germany is identified as being at the heart of the European trouble. Globally, there is an ongoing clash between two approches to macroeconomic policy making: a highly dogmatic German approach, and a very pragmatic Anglo-Saxon one. The low levels of interest at which global demand imbalances have been smoothed out financially reflect deficient global demand in an environment of vast supply-side opportunities. After contributing greatly to the build-up of imbalances, Euroland is unlikely to play any constructive part in their unwinding. Hampered by an exchange-rate policy vacuum, a small-country mindset, and soaring intra-area imbalances, Euroland is also illpositioned to cope with fading external growth stimuli.

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  • Public Policy Brief No. 88 | November 2006
    A Rendezvous with Reality

    Over the past decade, deficit spending by consumers has supported the United States economy. Research Associate Robert Parenteau analyzes the financial balance of American households and finds that the pace of deficit spending is likely to stall and, possibly, reverse course. This reversion will jeopardize US profit and economic growth, as well as the growth of countries dependent on export-led development strategies. His research supports the position of other Levy Institute scholars who have urged policymakers to recognize the consequences of current imbalances in the US economy.

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  • Strategic Analysis | November 2006
    Policies for the U.S. Economy

    In this new Strategic Analysis, we review what we believe is the most important economic policy issue facing policymakers in the United States and abroad: the prospect of a growth recession in the United States. The possibility of recession is linked to the imbalances in the current account, government, and private sector deficits. The current account balance, which is a negative addition to US aggregate demand, is now likely to be above 6.5 percent of GDP and has been rising steadily for some time. The government balance has improved, again giving no stimulus to demand, which has therefore relied entirely on a large and growing private sector deficit. A rapidly cooling housing market is one of the signs showing that this growth path is likely to break down.

    We focus first on the current account deficit. Our analysis suggests that a necessary and sufficient condition to address this problem, without dire consequences for unemployment and growth, is that net export demand grow by a sufficient amount. For this to happen, three conditions need to be satisfied: foreign saving has to fall, especially in Europe and East Asia; US saving has to rise; and some mechanism, such as a change in relative prices, should be put in place to help the previous two phenomena translate into an improvement in the US balance of trade.

  • Public Policy Brief Highlights No. 88A | November 2006
    A Rendezvous with Reality
    Over the past decade, deficit spending by consumers has supported the United States economy. Research Associate Robert Parenteau analyzes the financial balance of American households and finds that the pace of deficit spending is likely to stall and, possibly, reverse course. This reversion will jeopardize US profit and economic growth, as well as the growth of countries dependent on export-led development strategies. His research supports the position of other Levy Institute scholars who have urged policymakers to recognize the consequences of current imbalances in the US economy.
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  • Public Policy Brief No. 86 | October 2006
    Gomory, Baumol, and Samuelson on Comparative Advantage

    The theory of comparative advantage says that there are gains from trade for the global economy as a whole. In this second brief of a three-part study of the international economy, Research Associate Thomas Palley observes that comparative advantage is driven by technology, which can be influenced by human action and policy. These associations have huge implications for the distribution of gains from trade and raise concerns about the future impact of international trade on the US economy. Palley calls for strategically designed US trade policy that can influence the nature of the global equilibrium and change the distribution of gains from trade.

    Recent works by Ralph Gomory and William Baumol and Paul Samuelson use pure trade theory to question the distribution of trade gains across countries over time and to challenge commonly held beliefs. These microeconomic and trade theorists identify a new issue: the dynamic evolution of comparative advantage and its impact on the distribution of gains from trade, which depends on changing global demand and supply conditions. (See also, Public Policy Brief No. 85.)

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    Thomas I. Palley
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  • Public Policy Brief Highlights No. 86A | October 2006
    Toward Convergence and Full Employment
    The theory of comparative advantage says that there are gains from trade for the global economy as a whole. In this second brief of a three-part study of the international economy, Research Associate Thomas Palley observes that comparative advantage is driven by technology, which can be influenced by human action and policy. These associations have huge implications for the distribution of gains from trade and raise concerns about the future impact of international trade on the US economy. Palley calls for strategically designed US trade policy that can influence the nature of the global equilibrium and change the distribution of gains from trade. Recent works by Ralph Gomory and William Baumol and Paul Samuelson use pure trade theory to question the distribution of trade gains across countries over time and to challenge commonly held beliefs. These microeconomic and trade theorists identify a new issue: the dynamic evolution of comparative advantage and its impact on the distribution of gains from trade, which depends on changing global demand and supply conditions. (See also, Public Policy Brief No. 85.)
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  • Strategic Analysis | May 2006
    The Growing Burden of Servicing Foreign-owned U.S. Debt
    Can the growth in the current account deficit be sustained? How does the flow of deficits feed the stock of debt? How will the burden of servicing this debt affect future deficits and economic growth? President Dimitri B. Papadimitriou and Research Scholars Edward Chilcote and Gennaro Zezza address these and other questions in a new Strategic Analysis.
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  • Policy Note 2006/4 | April 2006
    A Cri de Coeur
    Many papers published by the Levy Institute during the last few years have emphasized that the American economy has relied too much on the growth of lending to the private sector, most particularly to the personal sector, to offset the negative effect on aggregate demand of the growing current account deficit. Moreover, this growth in lending cannot continue indefinitely.
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  • Policy Note 2006/3 | April 2006
    In the mid-to-late 1980s, the American economy simultaneously produced—for the first time in the postwar period—huge federal budget deficits as well as large current account deficits, together known as the “twin deficits”. This generated much debate and hand-wringing, most of which focused on supposed “crowding-out” effects. Many claimed that the budgetdeficit was soaking up private saving, leaving too little for domestic investment, and that the “twin” current account deficit was soaking up foreign saving. The result would be higher interest rates and thus lower economic growth, as domestic spending—especially on business investment and real estate construction—was depressed. Further, the government debt and foreign debt would burden future generations of Americans, who would have to make interest payments and eventually retire the debt. The promulgated solution was to promote domestic saving by cutting federal government spending, and private consumption. Many pointed to Japan’s high personal saving rates as a model of the proper way to run an economy.
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  • Working Paper No. 445 | April 2006
    A Critique of Neoclassical Consumption Theory with Reference to Housing Wealth

    The development of the permanent income/life cycle consumption hypothesis was a key blow to Keynesian and Kaleckian economics. According to George Akerlof, it "set the agenda" for modern neoclassical macroeconomics. This paper focuses on the relationship of housing wealth to neoclassical consumption theory, and in particular, the degree to which homes can be treated collectively with other forms of "permanent income." The neoclassical analysis is evaluated as a partly normative and partly positive one, in recognition of the dual function of the neoclassical theory of rationality. The paper rests its critique primarily on the distinctive role of homes in social life; theories that fail to recognize this role jeopardize the social and economic goods at stake. Since many families do not own large amounts of assets other than their places of residence, these issues have important ramifications for the relevance of consumption theory as a whole.

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  • Policy Note 2006/2 | February 2006
    Public and Private Debts and the Future of the American Economy

    Today’s federal budget deficits are a preoccupation of many American citizens and more than a few political leaders. Is the American government going bankrupt? Does our fiscal condition warrant radical surgery, as some now prescribe? Or, are we in such deep trouble that there is no plausible route of escape?

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  • Working Paper No. 441 | February 2006
    A Theory of Intelligible Sequences

    This paper sets out a rigorous basis for the integration of Keynes-Kaleckian macroeconomics (with constant or increasing returns to labor, multipliers, markup pricing, et cetera) with a model of the financial system (comprising banks, loans, credit money, equities, and so on), together with a model of inflation. Central contentions of the paper are that there are virtually no equilibria outside financial markets, and the role of prices is to distribute the national income, with inflation sometimes playing a key role in determining the outcome.

    The model deployed here describes a growing economy that does not spontaneously find a steady state even in the long run, but which requires active management of fiscal and monetary policy if full employment without inflation is to be achieved. The paper outlines a radical alternative to the standard narrative method used by post-Keynesians as well as by Keynes himself.

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    Wynne Godley Marc Lavoie
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  • Strategic Analysis | January 2006

    Rising home prices and low interest rates have fueled the recent surge in mortgage borrowing and enabled consumers to spend at high rates relative to their income. Low interest rates have counterbalanced the growth in debt and acted to dampen the growth in household debt-service burdens. As past Levy Institute Strategic Analyses have pointed out, these trends are not sustainable: household spending relative to income cannot grow indefinitely.

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  • Strategic Analysis | September 2005
    Can the Symbiosis Last?

    The main arguments in this paper can be simply stated:

    1) If output in the United States grows fast enough to keep unemployment constant between now and 2010, and if there is no further depreciation in the dollar, the deficit in the balance of trade is likely to get worse, perhaps reaching 7.5 per cent by the end of the decade.

    2) If the trade deficit does not improve, let alone if it gets worse, there will be a large further deterioration in the United States’ net foreign asset position, so that, with interest rates rising, net income payments from abroad will at last turn negative and the deficit in the current account as a whole could reach at least 8.5 per cent of GDP.

  • Policy Note 2005/5 | June 2005
    Is it sufficiently realized how intractable those account imbalances—and how dangerous their potential consequences at home and abroad—have now become?
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  • Working Paper No. 422 | April 2005
    Analytical Results and Methodological Implications

    In dealing with the problematic relationship of morality to rational choice theory, neoclassical economists since Lionel Robbins have often argued that they can incorporate moral values into consumer theory by putting those values into the utility function. This paper tests the viability of such an approach in the context of international finance. The moral value at stake is autonomy, which may be lost when borrowers must submit to the edicts of international financial institutions. When such a value is inserted into the utility function of a small economy, the growth rate of consumption and the level of investment change. Furthermore, potential borrowers may lose their ability to credibly commit to paying back loans, resulting in a complete absence of borrowing where it might otherwise take place. The author argues that while this model illustrates the possibility of analyzing a noneconomic value (sovereignty) through rational choice theory, it also shows that standard methods of empirical inference, policy evaluation, and welfare analysis may fail in such a situation. To answer questions that mix morality and economics, economists must seek tools other than conventional rational choice theory.

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  • Policy Note 2005/4 | April 2005
    The latest batch of numbers from the United States makes for a disturbing read. The GDP growth rate of GDP has been adequate. However, the current account deficit was 6.3 percent of GDP in the fourth quarter of 2004, and the terrible trade figures for January and February promise an even bigger deficit in the first quarter of 2005 (BEA 2005). Let no one suppose that this deterioration is a temporary effect that will automatically turn around soon.
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  • Working Paper No. 421 | April 2005

    Despite being arguably the most rigorous form of structuralist/post-Keynesian macroeconomics, stock-flow consistent models are quite often complex and difficult to deal with. This paper presents a model that, despite retaining the methodological advantages of the stock-flow consistent method, is intuitive enough to be taught at an undergraduate level. Moreover, the model can easily be made more complex to shed light on a wealth of specific issues. 

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  • Strategic Analysis | March 2005

    As we projected in a previous Strategic Analysis, the United States' economy experienced growth rates higher than 4 percent in 2004. The question we want to raise in this Strategic Analysis is whether these rates will persist or come back down. We believe that several signs point in the latter direction. In what follows, we analyze the evidence and explore the alternatives facing the US economy.

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  • Strategic Analysis | August 2004
    Why Net Exports Must Now Be the Motor for U.S. Growth

    The American economy has grown reasonably fast since the second half of 2003, and the general expectation seems to be that satisfactory growth will continue more or less indefinitely. This paper argues that the expansion may indeed continue through 2004 and for some time beyond. But with the government and external deficits both so large and the private sector so heavily indebted, satisfactory growth in the medium term cannot be achieved without a large, sustained, and discontinuous increase in net export demand. It is doubtful whether this will happen spontaneously, and it certainly will not happen without a cut in domestic absorption of goods and services by the United States which would impart a deflationary impulse to the rest of the world. We make no short-term forecast. Instead, using a model rooted in a consistent system of stock and flow variables, we trace out a range of possible medium term scenarios in order to evaluate strategic predicaments and policy options without being at all precise about timing.

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    Wynne Godley Alex Izurieta Gennaro Zezza
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  • Book Series | August 2004
    Edited and with an introduction by Dimitri B. Papadimitriou
    This unique volume presents, for the first time in publication, the original doctoral thesis of Hyman P. Minsky, one of the most innovative thinkers on financial markets. Dimitri B. Papadimitriou’s introduction places the thesis in a modern context, and explains its relevance today. The thesis explores the relationship between induced investment, the constraints of financing investment, market structure, and the determinants of aggregate demand and business cycle performance. Forming the basis of his subsequent development of financial Keynesianism and his “Wall Street” paradigm, Minsky investigates the relevance of the accelerator-multiplier models of investment to individual firm behavior in undertaking investment dependent on cost structure. Uncertainty, the coexistence of other market structures, and the behavior of the monetary system are also explored.

     

    In assessing the assumptions underlying the structure and coefficient values of the accelerator models frequently used, the book addresses their limitations and inapplicability to real-world situations where the effect of financing conditions on the balance sheet structures of individual firms plays a crucial and determining role for further investment. Finally, Minsky discusses his findings on business cycle theory and economic policy.

    This book will greatly appeal to advanced undergraduate and graduate students in economics, as well as to policymakers and researchers. In addition, it will prove to be valuable supplementary reading for those with an interest in advanced microeconomics.

    Published By: Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc.

  • Working Paper No. 408 | May 2004
    Stock-flow Consistent Models As an Unexplored "Frontier" of Keynesian Macroeconomics

    This paper argues that the Stock-Flow Consistent Approach to macroeconomic modeling can be seen as a natural outcome of the path taken by Keynesian macroeconomic thought in the 1960s and 1970s, a theoretical frontier that remained largely unexplored with the end of Keynesian academic hegemony. The representative views of Davidson, Godley, Minsky, and Tobin as different closures of the same SFC accounting framework are presented, and similarities and problems discussed.

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  • Policy Note 2004/2 | May 2004
    Deficits, Debt, Deflation, and Depreciation

    Recent economic commentary has been filled with “D” words: deficits, debt, deflation, depreciation. Deficits—budget and trade—are of the greatest concern and may be on an unsustainable course, as federal and national debt grow without limit. The United States is already the world’s largest debtor nation, and unconstrained trade deficits are said to raise the specter of a “tequila crisis” if foreigners run from the dollar. Federal budget red ink is expected to imperil the nation’s ability to care for tomorrow’s retirees. While public concern with deflationary pressures has subsided, concern continues regarding America’s ability to compete in a global economy in which wages and prices are falling. In fact, the current situation is far more “sustainable” than that at the peak of the Clinton boom, which had federal budget surpluses but record-breaking private sector deficits. Nevertheless, it is time to take stock of the dangers faced by the US economy.

  • Strategic Analysis | April 2004
    Policies and Prospects in an Election Year

    Wynne Godley, our Levy Institute colleague, has warned since 1999 that the falling personal saving and rising borrowing trends that had powered the US economic expansion were not sustainable. He also warned that when these trends were reversed, as has happened in other countries, the expansion would come to a halt unless there were major changes in fiscal policy.

    Not long ago, official circles insisted that monetary policy was the most desirable tool, that fiscal deficits were not only unnecessary but also harmful (ERP 2000, pp.31–34; Greenspan 2000). Some economists, notably Edmund Phelps of Columbia University, went so far as to suggest that the economic expansion was not caused by rising demand, but rather because growth had become 'structural' (Financial Times, August 9, 2000).

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  • Working Paper No. 403 | February 2004

    This paper reviews the general tenets of "stock-flow consistent" and the "formal Minskyan" literatures and argues that the advantages and weaknesses of the latter become clearer when analyzed with the tools of the former. It also analyzes a small but representative and influential sample of seminal "formal Minskyan" models, particularly the Taylor-O'Connel model, in light of a fully consistent "Minskyan artificial economy." The paper also shows these models often assume oversimplified hypotheses (that don't do justice to the richness of Minskyan analyses) and, more seriously, often ignore the logical implications of these hypotheses. Finally, the authors arugue that most of these problems can be tackled when "formal Minskyan" models are phrased as "closures" of the "general Minskyan" accounting framework described in the paper.

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  • Working Paper No. 402 | February 2004
    Preliminary Results

    Stock-flow consistent models may be considered the rallying point for heterodox authors interested in modeling macroeconomic relations, since these models incorporate real and financial relations in an entirely consistent way, therefore providing macroeconomic constraints to individual behavior. The present model expands on the Godley-Lavoie model of growth, which was based on a two-asset world, with only bank deposits and the shares issued by private corporations. The present model incorporates the financial relations among the central bank, private banks, and the fiscal policy of government, showing the endogeneity of money under different assumptions on banks' behavior. The model is used to analyze the relationship between the distribution of income and growth, and to study the impact of monetary policy.

     

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  • Working Paper No. 401 | January 2004
    The Theory and Policy Implications of the Commodification of Finance

    Over the past 20 years, finance has become commodified. Firms increasingly obtain finance from securities markets, instead of borrowing from commercial banks with which they have long-term relationships, while Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac package a growing number of mortgages into bonds. When loans are priced by impersonal markets rather than by individual bankers, they become more like commodities. As in many cases when goods are commodified, this trend has important policy implications. This paper describes new Keynesian and social economics perspectives on the difference between traditional and securitized loans, and points out weaknesses in their account of the significance of banking relationships. A social theory of banking, and, particularly, of risk perception, is then developed. Finally, the policy implications of the commodification of finance are examined in light of the social theory.

     

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  • Strategic Analysis | October 2003
    A Reprieve but Not a Pardon

    These are fast-moving times. Two years ago, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO, 2001) projected a federal budget surplus of $172 billion for fiscal year 2003. Within a year, the projected figure had changed to a deficit of $145 billion (CBO 2002). The actual figure, near the end of fiscal year 2003, turned out to be a deficit of about $390 billion. And just one month ago, President Bush submitted a request to Congress for an additional $87 billion appropriation for war expenditures, over and above the $166 billion tallied so far. It is widely anticipated that even this will have to be revised upward by the end of the coming year (Stevenson 2003; Firestone 2003).

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  • Policy Note 2003/6 | September 2003
    A Note of Caution

    The current account deficit of the United States has been growing steadily as a share of GDP for more than a decade. It is now at an all-time high, over 5 percent of GDP. This steady deterioration has been greeted with an increasing amount of concern (U.S Trade Deficit Review Commission 2000; Brookings Papers 2001; Godley 2001; Mann 2002). At The Levy Economics Institute, we have long argued that this burgeoning deficit is unsustainable. A current account deficit implies a growing external debt, which in turn implies a continuing shift in net income received from abroad (net interest and dividend flows) in favor of foreigners. We have also noted that with the private sector headed toward balance, a growing current account deficit implies a corresponding growing “twin” deficit for the government sector (Papadimitriou et al. 2002; Godley 2003). This latter scenario has already come to pass: the latest figures show that the general government deficit rose to an annual rate of more than 4 percent of GDP in the first quarter of 2003 and will certainly rise even more in the near future, since the federal deficit alone is officially projected to reach 4 percent by the end of this fiscal year (CBO 2003).

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  • Policy Note 2003/5 | September 2003

    For the first time since the 1930s, many worry that the world's economy faces the prospect of deflation—accompanied by massive job losses—on a global scale. In a rather hopeful sign, policymakers from Euroland to Japan to America all seem to recognize the threat that falling prices pose to markets. Given the singleminded pursuit of deflationary policies over the past decade, this does come as something of a surprise. But policymakers—especially central bankers—in Europe and the United States seem to have little inkling of how to stave off deflation, with the result that prices are already falling in much of the world. Contrary to widespread beliefs, the worst outcome will not be avoided if the only response is to balance budgets and introduce new monetary policy gimmicks. To the contrary, policymakers should increase deficits to at least 7 percent of GDP.

  • Working Paper No. 387 | September 2003
    Methodology and Results

    This paper provides the details of the construction of new quarterly measures of the real GDPs of the 36 trading partners that are taken into consideration by the Federal Reserve in its "broad exchange rate" indexes. These new measures have some important advantages. First, they allow the construction of various income aggregates and sub-aggregates, which makes it possible, for example, to match the Federal Reserve's "broad," "major-currency," and "other important" trading partner effective exchange rates and, more broadly, to discuss the geographical and geopolitical determinants of US trade. Second, they allow the construction of variants of the two different types of measures that are utilized in the literature, namely direct and export-share-weighted sums of trading-partner real GDPs. Finally, given that our new measures of GDP for these countries can be directly compared to each other, they can be of interest for other researchers who need a consistent dataset on a quarterly basis.

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  • Working Paper No. 380 | May 2003

    The consumer has been on a tightrope since the bursting of the "new economy" bubble, as losses in equity markets have been partly offset by gains in real estate and fiscal support and mortgage refinancing have partly offset increased consumer cautiousness. The consumer will remain on a tightrope in the near future, but if the economy were to stumble, the fragile consumer might contribute to turning the downturn into a deep and protracted recession. There are two risks to the continuation of consumer resilience. The first arises from the fact that this has been a jobless recovery. The second arises from a growing personal sector imbalance that is fueled by the growing property bubble. Hence, the short-term outlook remains uncertain, but the long-term one is bleak.

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    Philip Arestis Elias Karakitsos
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  • Working Paper No. 378 | May 2003
    The Role of Investment

    The anemic US economic recovery and the threat of a double-dip recession stem from the weakness of investment, due to excess capacity created in the euphoric years of the "new economy" bubble. The current imbalances in the corporate sector (i.e., the all-time-high indebtedness in the face of falling asset prices) are preventing investment from picking up and are laying the foundations for a new, long-lasting expansion. Tax reductions may create a cyclical upturn in the short run, and may promote the anemic recovery, but such stimulus to demand is unsustainable in the long run. The root of the problem is the imbalance in the corporate sector, which will take time for correction.

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    Philip Arestis Elias Karakitsos
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  • Strategic Analysis | March 2003
    A Changing Strategic Predicament

    Right through the boom years prior to 2001, the American economy faced a strategic predicament in that the main engine of growth (credit-financed private spending) was unsustainable, from which it followed that the whole stance of the government's fiscal policy would have to be radically changed if the New Economy were not to become stagnant. The boom was indeed broken, because private expenditure fell relative to income. The potentially dire effects on the level of activity were mitigated by a transformation in the fiscal policy stance, accompanied by a radical change in attitudes toward budget deficits, which suddenly became respectable. This analysis argues that a new strategic predicament is on the horizon as a result of the exceptionally large and growing balance of payments deficit.

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  • Strategic Analysis | November 2002

    The long economic expansion was fueled by an unprecedented rise in private expenditure relative to income, financed by a growing flow of net credit to the private. On the surface, it seemed that the growing burden of the household sector’s debt was counterbalanced by a spectacular rise in the relative value of its financial assets, but this was never a match among equals, and the great meltdown in the financial markets has proved this imbalance to be true. The private sector has dramatically cut back its acquisition of new credit and reversed the path of its financial balance, but this adjustment has been uneven within the sector: the business sector has suffered a huge drop in investment while the household sector has continued to borrow.

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  • Strategic Analysis | April 2002

    Notwithstanding the great achievements of the American economy, the growth of aggregate demand during the past several years has been structured in a way that would eventually prove unsustainable. During the main period of economic expansion, the fiscal stance tightened at a much greater pace than in any period during the previous 40 years, and net export demand progressively deteriorated to record deficit levels. It follows that the expansion aggregate demand had been driven by a similarly unprecedented expansion of private expenditure relative to income, financed by growing injections of net credit, which caused the indebtedness of the nonfinancial private sector to escalate to unprecedented levels. The conclusion drawn was that this process must come to an end at some stage, and that when it did, the entire stance of fiscal policy would have to move in an expansionary direction, and that for economic growth to be sustained indefinitely, net export demand would have to recover as well.

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  • Strategic Analysis | October 2001

    The United States should now be prepared for one of the deepest and most intractable recessions of the post–World War II period, with no natural process of recovery in prospect unless a large and complex reorientation of policy occurs both here and in the rest of the world. The grounds for reaching this somber conclusion are that very large structural imbalances, with unique characteristics, have been allowed to develop. These imbalances were always bound to unravel at some stage, and it now looks as though the unraveling is well under way. There may be no spontaneous recovery because the unraveling that has started is a reversion toward what, in the relevant sense, is a normal situation. This consideration leads us to take issue with some distinguished commentators, such as Alan Blinder (2001) and Laura Tyson (2001), who apparently assume that because a spontaneous recovery will occur relatively soon, any fiscal relaxation should be temporary. The general predicament is made worse by a deteriorating world economy; US exports fell sharply in the first seven months of 2001, when the balance of payments was already heavily in deficit.

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    Wynne Godley Alex Izurieta
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  • Strategic Analysis | August 2001
    A Rejoinder to Goldman Sachs’s J. Hatzius’s “The Un-Godley Private Sector Deficit” in US Economic Analyst (27 July)

    Distinguished Scholar Wynne Godley and Research Scholar Alex Izurieta respond to Jan Hatzius’s rebuttal of their July 2001 Strategic Analysis, in which they stated that the American economy was probably already in recession, and that a prolonged period of subnormal growth and rising unemployment was likely unless there were another round of policy changes. Hatzius, a senior economist with Goldman Sachs, vigorously disagreed.

     

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    Wynne Godley Alex Izurieta
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  • Policy Note 2001/8 | August 2001

    There is no chance that events will right themselves in a few weeks, or that we will be saved by such underlying factors as technology and productivity growth or by lower interest rates or the provisions of the recent tax act. Rather, we are in for a crisis; the sooner this is recognized and acted upon, the better.

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  • Strategic Analysis | July 2001
    Prospects and Policies for the U.S. Economy: A Strategic View

    The American economy is probably now in recession, and a prolonged period of subnormal growth and rising unemployment is likely unless there is another round of policy changes. A further relaxation of fiscal policy will probably be needed, but if a satisfactory rate of growth is to be sustained, this will have to be complemented by measures that raise exports relative to imports.

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    Wynne Godley Alex Izurieta
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  • Policy Note 2001/7 | July 2001

    Consensus opinion sees the United States' economy growing by around 3 percent per year over the next few years, a high enough rate to keep unemployment low and outpace Europe. One problem with the consensus view is that it pays little heed to the very unusual nature of the American expansion. A minor downturn prompted by a bit of inflation and higher interest rates is one thing, and easily fixed by conventional means. But America's boom was unique and so, alas, will be its bust.

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    Bill Martin
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  • Working Paper No. 332 | June 2001
    Income Distribution and the Return of the Aggregate Demand Problem

    It is widely believed that the current economic slowdown will be mild and temporary in nature, the result of a momentary wobble in the stock market. This paper argues that the slowdown stands to be more deep-seated, owing to contradictions in the existing process of aggregate demand generation. These contradictions are the result of deterioration in income distribution. They have been held at bay for almost two decades by a range of different demand compensation mechanisms: steadily rising consumer debt, a stock market boom, and rising profit rates. However, these mechanisms are now exhausted, confronting the US economy with a serious aggregate demand generation problem. Fiscal policy adjustments may be the only way out of this impasse, but such adjustments should be accompanied by measures to rectify the structural imbalances at the root of the current impasse. Absent this, the problem of deficient demand will reassert itself, and the next time around public sector finances may not be in such a favorable position to deal with it.

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  • Strategic Analysis | January 2000
    Notes on the U.S. Trade and Balance of Payments Deficits

    If the United States’ balance of trade does not improve, the country could eventually find itself in a “debt trap,” the author says. The aim of this paper, the second in a series offering Godley’s strategic analysis, is to display what seems reasonably likely to happen if world output recovers but otherwise past trends, policies, and relationships continue. The potential usefulness of the exercise is to warn policymakers of dangers that may exist and to help them think out what policy instruments are, or should be made, available to deal with worst cases, should they arise.

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  • Strategic Analysis | January 1999
    Medium-term Prospects and Policies for the United States and the World

    The purpose of this Strategic Analysis is not to make short-term predictions about the life expectancy of the current economic expansion in the United States, but to determine if the present stance of fiscal and trade policy is appropriate in the medium term. The expansion has been generated by economic processes that are unsustainable—processes in private saving, private borrowing, and asset prices that have fueled the growth of demand against a negative impetus from both fiscal policy and net export demand. Given unchanged fiscal policy and the consensus forecast for growth in the rest of the world, continued expansion requires that private expenditure continue to expand relative to income on a record and growing scale. It seems impossible that this source of growth can be forthcoming indefinitely, although it may well continue into next year. When private demand falters, it will be necessary to bring about a substantial relaxation of fiscal policy and ensure a structural improvement in the United States’ balance of payments. (Table 1 revised October 2000.)

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  • Working Paper No. 246 | August 1998
    Applications to Asia

    Four factors in the current financial crisis in Asia have surprised observers. First, although capital flows in Asia appeared stable, the crisis was precipitated by the reversal of the very large proportion of short-term lending. Second, although Asia appeared to be an example of the maxim that capital flows to the region with the highest rates of return, now it appears that risk-adjusted returns were lower in Asia than in other regions. Third, although the foreign lending banks are the most sophisticated operators in global finance, they seem to have had difficulty assessing risk. Fourth, contrary to the belief that foreign equity investors will not liquidate their positions in response to currency devaluation, the equity and foreign exchange markets collapsed together. According to Visiting Scholar Jan Kregel, these four factors may be explained by the role of derivatives contracts in the flow of funds to Asia.

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  • Public Policy Brief No. 23 | September 1995
    The U.S. Balance of Payments, International Indebtedness, and Economic Policy

    According to Wynne Godley, the significance of the deficit in the United States' balance of payments has been underestimated in both public policy and academic discussions, despite the fact that American markets are increasingly dominated by foreign manufacturers. Godley analyzes the problem posed by the current balance of payments deficit. Breaking down the current account into its component parts, he traces the cause of the deficit. He refutes the arguments of other economists that the balance of payments deficit is self-correcting, unimportant, or the result of other domestic forces (namely, too low a level of national saving), and outlines policy approaches to solving the problem. Godley notes that although the strategic problems posed are specific to this country and the United States may have to take unilateral action to solve them, the problems have arisen because there is no significant international regulation of the system as a whole. Inherent flaws have developed in the system of international production, trade, and payments as that system has expanded and become increasingly deregulated. “All the difficulties that exist, or that are foreshadowed in this brief, would be best resolved by energetic international cooperation, of which there is at present little sign.”

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  • Public Policy Brief No. 2 | September 1992
    U.S. and Global Finance Prospects, by Robert Barbera; The Performance of the Economy Since the October 1987 Crash, by David A. Levy

    Robert Barbera and David A. Levy offer contrasting assessments of the United States' economy during the late 1980s and early 1990s. Barbera suggests that the behavior of the economy was typical for the early part of a recessionary stage in a standard business cycle: policymakers and business leaders, believing the downturn to be temporary, prolong economic distress by delaying action to reverse the trend. As hopes of recovery fade, they are forced to take drastic measures; corporations aggressively purge themselves of excesses and the Federal Reserve eases, thereby precipitating an economic rebound. Levy disagrees, asserting that the economic stagnation of that period was not simply a recessionary stage of the business cycle. Such a stage is characterized by overspeculation in inventories or short-term disruptions in demand, not by an extended period of severely reduced economic activity. Levy contends that massive federal government spending and the presence of financial safeguards (such as deposit insurance) were the only things containing the current recession from becoming a depression.

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    Robert J. Barbera David A. Levy
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  • Book Series | April 1992
    Edited by Dimitri B. Papadimitriou

    Business accounting defines profits as total revenue minus total costs. Economic theory uses various definitions of profits according to what is being measured (for example, return to ownership, national income profits, real profits) and for what purpose. The concept of profits, however, cannot and should not be reduced to a matter of measurement, but should be considered in terms of the role of profits in the workings of an economic system. The papers in this volume provide original insights into secular and cyclical changes in production and employment, and the interrelationships among profits, corporate investment and financing, instability, and government deficits.

    Published By: Palgrave Macmillan, Ltd.
    St. Martin's Press

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Europe

  • Strategic Analysis | February 2024
    In this report, Dimitri B. Papadimitriou, Nikolaos Rodousakis, Giuliano T. Yajima, and Gennaro Zezza investigate the determinants of the recent performance of the Greek economy.
     
    Despite geopolitical instability from the continuing Ukraine-Russia and Israel-Gaza wars and higher-than-expected inflation rates, the country has managed to register the highest growth rates among eurozone member-states in 2021 and 2022.
     
    Yet the authors’ projections, based on 2023Q3 official statistics, show that there will be a deceleration of GDP growth in the upcoming two years. This will be driven mainly by sluggish consumption demand due to the falling trend of real wages and persistent higher imported inflation, coupled with the inability of the government to deploy NGEU funds and a significant loss of production due to climate damage from floods and fires. These dynamics will likely continue the brain drain of skilled workers, who opt to move abroad for better employment opportunities. The overreliance of the Greek economy on tourism is also questioned, given the dependency on foreign industrial inputs.

  • Policy Note 2023/2 | June 2023
    Following the recent (June 25, 2023) elections in Greece, Institute President Dimitri B. Papadimitriou and Research Scholar Nikolaos Rodousakis outline the economic and policy challenges facing the Greek government.

  • Policy Note 2023/1 | May 2023
    In 2022, Greek GDP grew at a higher rate than the eurozone average as the nation’s economy rebounded from the COVID-19 shock.

    However, it was not all welcome news. In particular, Greece registered its largest current account deficit since 2009. Despite a widespread focus on fiscal profligacy, it is excessive current account and trade deficits—largely caused by private sector imbalances—that are at the root of Greece’s multiple economic challenges. This policy note identifies the major determinants causing the deterioration of the current account balance in order to devise appropriate corrective policies.

  • Strategic Analysis | October 2022
    In this strategic analysis, Institute President Dimitri B. Papadimitriou, Senior Scholar Gennaro Zezza, and Research Associate Nikolaos Rodousakis discuss the medium-term prospects for the Greek economy in a time of increasing uncertainty—due to the geopolitical turbulence emanating from the Ukraine–Russian conflict, with its impact on the cost of energy, as well as the increase in international prices of some commodities.

    Growth projections for the current year are lower than those recorded in 2021, indicating the economy needs to perform much better if it is to continue on the growth path that began in the pre-pandemic period.  Similarly, growth projections for 2023 and 2024 appear much weaker, denoting serious consequences may be in store.

    With increasing price levels and the euro depreciating, an economy like Greece’s that is highly dependent on increasingly costly imports will become more fragile as the current account deficit widens. In the authors’ view, the continuous recovery of the Greek economy rests with the government’s ability to utilize the NGEU funds swiftly and efficiently for projects that will increase the country’s productive capacity.
     

  • Working Paper No. 1010 | September 2022
    Angela Merkel is the second-longest-serving chancellor of modern Germany, with more than 16 years in office. During her tenure there were many years of economic stability, but there were also years of domestic, EU, and geopolitical tensions. Merkel inherited an economy that was recovering after the launching of probusiness policies known as the Hartz I IV Reforms, introduced by the government of the previous chancellor, Gerhard Schröder. Chancellor Merkel was criticized for mishandling the eurocrisis, as she failed to declare support for the financially distressed eurozone countries. Instead she convinced EU officials and country leaders to adopt a contractionary fiscal policy in the midst of a recession. As a result of the austerity measures, Merkel became popular among the German taxpayers and voters. This triggered credit rating agencies to downgrade the government bonds of the periphery eurozone countries and investors to sell these bonds, driving their prices to zero. Periphery eurozone countries came close to bankruptcy but were jointly bailed out by the EU and the IMF, though this prolonged the crisis. As a result of the imposed austerity, which was unnecessary and avoidable, millions of people became unemployed and experienced poverty, loss of dignity, and humiliation and Greece was the country hit hardest. For Merkel, placing national interests above EU interests was the most important mistake in her career; it took, however, a bigger crisis (i.e., the COVID-19 pandemic), to convince Merkel to place EU interests above national interests.
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    George Zestos Harrison Whittleton Alejandro Fernandez-Ribas
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    Europe

  • Policy Note 2022/2 | April 2022
    Measuring Income Loss and Poverty in Greece
    More than a decade after the 2009 crisis, the standards of living of the Greek population are still contracting and the prospects are gloomy. In this policy note, Vlassis Missos, Research Associate Nikolaos Rodousakis, and George Soklis deal with how to approach the measurement of income loss and poverty in Greece and argue for the use of household disposable income (HDI) in estimating adjustments, which offers a more accurate appreciation of the burden falling on the Greek population. They underline the significance of replacing a “southern-European model” of social protection with a passive safety net model—and the centrality to the latter model of embracing ideas of internal devaluation and fiscal consolidation—and suggest a better measure of poverty, for the case of Greece specifically and in general for developed economies in which front-loaded neoliberal policies are imposed. Finally, they comment on the sacrifice that would be required if fiscal discipline were to return in the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic lockdowns.
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    Author(s):
    Vlassis Missos Nikolaos Rodousakis George Soklis
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    Europe

  • Working Paper No. 1005 | April 2022
    Starting from the seminal works of Wynne Godley (1999; Godley and Lavoie 2005, 2007a, 2007b), the literature adopting stock-flow consistent (SFC) models for two or more countries has been flourishing, showing that consistently taking into account real and financial markets of two open economies will generate different results with respect to more traditional open economy models. However, few contributions, if any, have modeled two regions in the same country, and our paper aims at filling this gap. When considering a regional context, most of the adjustment mechanisms at work in open economy models—such as exchange rate movements, or changes in interest on public debt—are simply not present, as they are controlled by "external” authorities. So, what are the adjustment mechanisms at work?
     
    To answer this question, we adapt the framework suggested in Godley and Lavoie (2007a) to consider two regions that share the same monetary, fiscal, and exchange rate policies. We loosely calibrate our model to Italian data, where the South (Mezzogiorno) has both a lower level of real income per capita and a lower growth rate than the North. We also introduce a fragmented labor market, as discouraged workers in the South will move North in hopes of finding commuting jobs.
     
    Our model replicates some key features of the Italian economy and sheds light on the interactions between financial and real markets in regional economies with “current account” imbalances.

  • Strategic Analysis | March 2022
    In this strategic analysis, Institute President Dimitri B. Papadimitriou, Research Scholar Gennaro Zezza, and Research Associate Nikos Rodousakis analyze how the Greek economy started to recover from the shock of the COVID-19 pandemic and the prospects of continuing and sustaining its recovery. A key contribution is linked to tourism, which increased significantly in 2021, notwithstanding the pandemic, but was still very much below its 2019 level; it is expected, however, to continue its recovery in the current year. In addition, a key role will be played by NGEU funds and the Greek government’s capacity to use such funds in an effective and timely manner when starting and completing the already approved capital projects. A potential threat is linked to the possibility that persistent inflation will drive up the cost of borrowing, reducing the government’s fiscal space. Another “known unknown” —not considered in this report—is the geopolitical turbulence emanating from the Ukraine–Russian conflict, adding an additional layer of uncertainty to the medium-term prospects for Europe and Greece.

  • Policy Note 2022/1 | February 2022
    In 2020, the Hellenic Statistical Authority (ElStat) started a revision of the national accounts for Greece to bring them into line with the new European System of Accounts. Data from national accounts have gained more relevance as a crucial set of information for policy, especially in the eurozone, since many indicators—like the size of the public deficit relative to GDP—depend on them. It is therefore crucial that these data provide a realistic description of the actual state of the economy.
     
    Models that aim at understanding the medium-term trajectory of an economy usually need to abstract from short-term volatility due to the seasonal behavior of some variables, and it is therefore common practice to use seasonally adjusted data rather than the observed seasonal data. Research Scholar Gennaro Zezza, Institute President Dimitri Papadimitriou, and Research Associate Nikos Rodousakis recently noticed that the dynamics of relative prices, as measured by the ratios between the deflators of the different seasonally adjusted components of GDP, had an excess volatility, which made it more difficult to obtain meaningful econometric estimates of their determinants. They have therefore decided to investigate whether this excess volatility could be observed in the original seasonal data, and this note documents their results.
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  • Working Paper No. 999 | January 2022
    Does Financial “Bonanza” Cause Premature Deindustrialization?
    The outbreak of COVID-19 brought back to the forefront the crucial importance of structural change and productive development for economic resilience to economic shocks. Several recent contributions have already stressed the perverse relationship that may exist between productive backwardness and the intensity of the COVID-19 socioeconomic crisis. In this paper, we analyze the factors that may have hindered productive development for over four decades before the pandemic. We investigate the role of (non-FDI) net capital inflows as a potential source of premature deindustrialization. We consider a sample of 36 developed and developing countries from 1980 to 2017, with major emphasis on the case of emerging and developing economies (EDE) in the context of increasing financial integration. We show that periods of abundant capital inflows may have caused the significant contraction of manufacturing share to employment and GDP, as well as the decrease of the economic complexity index. We also show that phenomena of “perverse” structural change are significantly more relevant in EDE countries than advanced ones. Based on such evidence, we conclude with some policy suggestions highlighting capital controls and external macroprudential measures taming international capital mobility as useful tools for promoting long-run productive development on top of strengthening (short-term) financial and macroeconomic stability.
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    Author(s):
    Alberto Botta Giuliano Toshiro Yajima Gabriel Porcile
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    Region(s):
    United States, Latin America, Europe, Middle East, Africa, Asia

  • Policy Note 2021/4 | November 2021
    The Case of the Greek Tourism Sector
    The COVID-19 pandemic has revealed multiple risks faced by economies whose production structures depend on the volatility of international conditions. In the case of Greece, this has manifested itself in the severe impact the pandemic has had on one of the linchpins of the Greek economy: the tourism sector. Vlassis Missos, Nikolaos Rodousakis, and George Soklis document the impact of the pandemic on tourism and the significance of tourism revenues for Greece’s 2021 GDP recovery. They argue that the distributional effect of the tourism sector plays a significant role in overall income inequality in Greece and develop a number of policy recommendations aiming to correct some of the problematic aspects of the country’s tourism sector.
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    Author(s):
    Vlassis Missos Nikolaos Rodousakis George Soklis
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    Europe

  • Strategic Analysis | May 2021
    The Greek economy—still fragile due to the lingering effects of the 2009–10 crisis—was hit particularly hard by the COVID-19 pandemic. Greece’s 2020 GDP decline was one of the worst among the group of EU and eurozone member states, along with the highest levels of unemployment and underemployment.

    Dimitri B. Papadimitriou, Christos Pierros, Nikos Rodousakis, and Gennaro Zezza update their analysis of the state of the Greek economy on the basis of recently released provisional data for 2020Q4, and model three projections through 2023: (1) a baseline scenario in which no agreement is reached on the disbursement of EU funds (the Recovery and Resilience Facility); (2) a scenario in which EU grants and loans are distributed in a timely manner; and (3) an additional scenario that pairs EU funds with implementation of an employer-of-last resort program. The second scenario would see Greece’s GDP growth return to its pre-pandemic trend—albeit still leaving the economy below the level of real GDP it reached in 2008. The third scenario has the most favorable impact on growth and employment—raising real GDP above its pre-pandemic trend. Failure to achieve a proper recovery of GDP in Greece would be directly related to an absence of fiscal policy expansion.

    This Strategic Analysis is the joint product of the Levy Economics Institute of Bard College and INE-GSEE (Athens, Greece). It is simultaneously issued in both English and Greek.

  • Public Policy Brief No. 154 | February 2021
    Let Us Look Seriously at the Clearing Union
    This policy brief explores a route to remaking the international financial system that would avoid the contradictions inherent in some of the prevailing reform proposals currently under discussion. Senior Scholar Jan Kregel argues that the willingness of central banks to consider electronic currency provides an opening to reconsider a truly innovative reform of the international financial system, and one that is more appropriate to a digital monetary world: John Maynard Keynes’s original clearing union proposal.
     
    Kregel investigates whether such a clearing system could be built up from an already-existing initiative that has emerged in the private sector. He analyzes the operations of a private, cross-border payment system that could serve as a real-world blueprint for a more politically palatable equivalent of Keynes’s international clearing union.
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    Author(s):
    Jan Kregel
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    United States, Europe

  • Strategic Analysis | December 2020
    While the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic have been broadly similar for individuals, families, societies, and economies globally, the policy responses have varied significantly between countries. In the case of Greece, the pandemic abruptly ended the country’s fragile recovery and threw its economy into a dramatic contraction beginning in 2020Q2. Fiscal stimulus programs financed by reserve funds and European-backed structural funds have been implemented, but to date there is no evidence of a significant impact. Given the emergence of COVID-19’s second wave of contagion and the economic consequences of business shutdowns and further job losses, our own growth projections, as well as those from the European Commission, IMF, OECD, and the Greek government, have been revised downward for 2021 and prospects for the beginning of a recovery before the end of 2020 have died out.
     
    Using their stock-flow consistent macroeconomic model developed for Greece (LIMG), we run simulations for a baseline scenario and two alternative policy outcomes. The results of the projections for a “business as usual” baseline scenario are pessimistic and show that a V-shaped recovery is not in the cards. The European “recovery funds” alternative scenario projections, while more pessimistic than our report from May 2019, indicate that implementing these funds beginning in 2021Q3 will result in accelerating growth with positive outcomes. A more robust GDP growth rate and consequent employment growth can be realized with the combined effects of the European recovery funds together with an enhanced public job guarantee program. It is this mix of policies that can gain traction and bear fruit in putting the Greek economy on a path to sustainable and inclusive growth.
     
    This Strategic Analysis is the joint product of the Levy Economics Institute of Bard College and INE-GSEE (Athens, Greece). It is simultaneously issued in both English and Greek. 

  • Strategic Analysis | October 2020
    Italy was the first European country to be impacted by COVID-19, rapidly overwhelming healthcare facilities in some areas and prompting the government to shut down nonessential economic activities, with an inevitable (asymmetric) impact on production and income. Though the gradual reopening of most business activities began in 2020Q3, the extent of the shutdown’s damage is difficult to assess. The current political debate is now focusing on what can be achieved with European funds (in the form of both grants and loans), which should become available beginning in 2021. In this Strategic Analysis, Institute President Dimitri B. Papadimitriou, Research Associate Francesco Zezza, and Research Scholar Gennaro Zezza detail the shutdown’s impact on business activities in Italy, incorporating the planned government intervention with preliminary evidence available through 2020Q3 to evaluate a baseline projection for the Italian economy up to 2022.

  • Working Paper No. 967 | September 2020
    This paper assesses the quality of the statistical matching used in the LIMTIP estimates for Italy for 2008 and 2014. The match combines the 2008–9 and 2013–14 Italian Time Use Survey (IT-TUS) with the Italian data collected for the European Survey on Income and Living Conditions (IT-SILC) in 2009 and 2015. After the matching, the analysis of the joint distributions of the variables shows that the quality is good.
     
    The preliminary results of the LIMTIP estimates in Italy display widespread time poverty, which translates into significant hidden poverty. The LIMTIP also reveals that the increase in the poverty rate between 2008 and 2014 was even higher that what standard poverty measures report.

  • Public Policy Brief No. 151 | June 2020
    Recent Experience and Future Prospects in the Post-COVID-19 Era
    This policy brief provides a discussion of the relationships between austerity, Greece’s macroeconomic performance, debt sustainability, and the provision of healthcare and other social services over the last decade. It explains that austerity was imposed in the name of debt sustainability. However, there was a vicious cycle of recession and austerity: each round of austerity measures led to a deeper recession, which increased the debt-to-GDP ratio and therefore undermined the goal of debt sustainability, leading to another round of austerity. One of the effects of these austerity policies was the significant reduction in healthcare expenditure, which made Greece more vulnerable to the recent pandemic. Finally, it shows how recent pre-COVID debt sustainability analyses projected that Greek public debt would become unsustainable even under minor deviations from an optimistic baseline. The pandemic shock will thus lead to an explosion of public debt. This brings the need for a restructuring of the Greek public debt to the fore once again, as well as other policies that will address the eurozone’s structural imbalances.

  • Working Paper No. 958 | June 2020
    Macroeconomists and political officers need rigorous, albeit realistic, quantitative models to forecast the future paths and dynamics of some variables of interest while being able to evaluate the effects of alternative scenarios. At the heart of all these models lies a standard macroeconomic module that, depending on the degree of sophistication and the research questions to be answered, represents how the economy works. However, the complete absence of a realistic monetary framework, along with the abstraction of banks and more generally of real–financial interactions—not only in dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models but also in central banks’ structural econometric models—made it impossible to detect the rising financial fragility that led to the Great Recession.

    In this paper, we show how to address the missing links between the real and financial sectors within a post-Keynesian framework, presenting a quarterly stock-flow consistent (SFC) structural model of the Italian economy. We set up the accounting structure of the sectoral transactions, describing our “transaction matrix” and “balance sheet matrix,” starting from the appropriate sectoral data sources. We then “close” all sectoral financial accounts, describe portfolio choices, and define the buffer stocks for each class of assets and sector in the model. We describe our estimation strategy, present the main stochastic equations, and, finally, discuss the main channels of transmissions in our model.

  • Strategic Analysis | May 2020
    Greece’s fragile economic recovery was halted by the COVID-19 pandemic: GDP, employment, exports, and investment are expected to record significantly negative trends. While some projections for GDP growth show a quick V-shaped recovery beginning in 2021, this is rather improbable given the Greek economy’s structural inefficiencies.
     
    This strategic analysis explores the consequences of various assumptions about the fall in the different sources of aggregate demand in order to produce a baseline projection for the Greek economy. A more optimistic scenario is also analyzed, in which the European Commission’s recently announced Recovery Fund materializes, allowing the government to increase public consumption as well as investment through EU grants and loans. The authors recommend additional measures to alleviate the impact of the shock and help put Greece’s economy back on track when the epidemic has died out.

  • Working Paper No. 948 | February 2020
    This paper analyzes recent macroeconomic developments in the eurozone, particularly in Germany. Several economic indicators are sending signals of a looming German recession. Geopolitical tensions caused by trade disputes between the United States and China, plus the risk of a disorderly Brexit, began disrupting the global supply chain in manufacturing. German output contraction has been centered on manufacturing, particularly the automobile sector. Despite circumstances that call for fiscal intervention to rescue the economy, Chancellor Angela Merkel’s government was overdue with corrective measures. This paper explains Germany’s hesitancy to protect its economy, which has been based on a political and historical ideology that that rejects issuing new public debt to increase public spending, thus leaving the economy exposed to the doldrums. The paper also considers serious shortcomings in the European Union’s (EU) foreign and defense policies that recently surfaced during the Syrian refugee crisis. The eurocrisis revealed near-fatal weaknesses of the European Monetary Union (EMU), which is still incomplete without a common fiscal policy, a common budget, and a banking union. Unless corrected, such deficiencies will cause both the EU and the EMU to dissolve if another asymmetric shock occurs. This paper also analyzes recent geopolitical developments that are crucial to the EU/eurozone’s existential crisis.

  • Strategic Analysis | January 2020
    2019 marked the third year of the continuing economic recovery in Greece, with real GDP and employment rising, albeit at modest rates. In this Strategic Analysis we note that the expansion has mainly been driven by net exports, with tourism playing a dominant role. However, household consumption and investment are still too far below their precrisis levels, and a stronger and sustainable recovery should target these components of domestic demand as well.

    Fiscal austerity imposed on the Greek government has achieved its target in terms of public finances, such that some fiscal space is now available to stimulate the economy. Our simulations for the 2019–21 period show that under current conditions the economy is likely to continue on a path of modest growth, and that the amount of private investment needed for a stronger recovery is unlikely to materialize.

  • Policy Note 2019/1 | April 2019
    While a consensus has formed that the eurozone’s economic governance mechanisms must be reformed, and some progress has been made on this front, what has been agreed to so far falls short of what is needed to address the central imbalances caused by the eurozone setup, according to Paolo Savona.

    The key elements that are missing from the current package of reforms are interrelated: a common insurance scheme for bank deposits, the possible regulation of banks’ sovereign exposure, and the existence of a common safe asset. Savona outlines a proposal to increase the supply of safe assets provided by a common European issuer (the European Stability Mechanism) and explains how the plan could be made economically and politically satisfactory to all member states while facilitating progress on the deposit insurance and sovereign exposure issues.

  • Public Policy Brief No. 147 | March 2019
    As global market integration collides with growing demands for national political sovereignty, Senior Scholar Jan Kregel contrasts two diametrically opposed approaches to managing the tensions between international financial coordination and national autonomy. The first, a road not taken, is John Maynard Keynes’s proposal to reform the postwar international financial system. The second is the approach taken in the establishment of the eurozone and the development of its settlement and payment system. Analysis of Keynes’s clearing union proposal and its underlying theoretical approach highlights the flaws of the current eurozone setup.

  • Working Paper No. 919 | January 2019
    While the literature on theoretical macroeconomic models adopting the stock-flow-consistent (SFC) approach is flourishing, few contributions cover the methodology for building a SFC empirical model for a whole country. Most contributions simply try to feed national accounting data into a theoretical model inspired by Wynne Godley and Marc Lavoie (2007), albeit with different degrees of complexity.
     
    In this paper we argue instead that the structure of an empirical SFC model should start from a careful analysis of the specificities of a country’s sectoral balance sheets and flow of funds data, given the relevant research question to be addressed. We illustrate our arguments with examples for Greece, Italy, and Ecuador.
     
    We also provide some suggestions on how to consistently use the financial and nonfinancial accounts of institutional sectors, showing the link between SFC accounting structures and national accounting rules.

  • Strategic Analysis | November 2018
    The Greek government has managed to exit the stability support program and achieve a higher-than-required primary surplus so as not to require further austerity measures to depress domestic demand. At the same time, the economy has started to recover, mainly due to the good performance of both exports of goods and tourism and modest increases in investment

    In this report, we review recent developments in the determinants of aggregate demand and net exports, and provide estimates of two scenarios: one which assumes business as usual and the other an alternate scenario simulating the medium-term impact of an acceleration in investment.

    We conclude with a discussion on the sustainability of Greek government debt, showing that it is crucial that the cost of borrowing remains below the nominal growth of national income.

  • Working Paper No. 913 | August 2018
    There is no disputing Germany’s dominant economic role within the eurozone (EZ) and the broader European Union. Economic leadership, however, entails responsibilities, especially in a world system of monetary production economies that compete with each other according to political and economic interests. In the first section of this paper, historical context is given to the United States’ undisputed leadership of monetary production economies following the end of World War II to help frame the broader discussion developed in the second section on the requirements of the leading nation-state in the new system of states after the war. The second section goes on further to discuss how certain constraints regarding the external balance do not apply to the leader of the monetary production economies. The third section looks at Hyman P. Minsky’s proposal for a shared burden between the hegemon and other core industrial economies in maintaining the stability of the international financial system. Section four looks at Germany’s leadership role within the EZ and how it must emulate some of the United States’ trade policies in order to make the EZ a viable economic bloc. The break up scenario is considered in the fifth section. The last section summarizes and concludes.
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    Ignacio Ramirez Cisneros
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  • Working Paper No. 911 | August 2018
    This paper reviews the performance of the euro area since the euro’s launch 20 years ago. It argues that the euro crisis has exposed existential flaws in the euro regime. Intra-area divergences and the corresponding buildup of imbalances had remained unchecked prior to the crisis. As those imbalances eventually imploded, member states were found to be extremely vulnerable to systemic banking problems and abruptly deteriorating public finances. Debt legacies and high unemployment continue to plague euro crisis countries. Its huge current account surplus highlights that the euro currency union, toiling under the German euro and trying to emulate the German model, has become very vulnerable to global developments. The euro regime is flawed and dysfunctional. Europe has to overcome the German euro. Three reforms are essential to turn the euro into a viable European currency. First, divergences in competitiveness positions must be prevented in future. Second, market integration must go hand in hand with policy integration. Third, the euro is lacking a safe footing for as long as the ECB is missing a federal treasury partner. Therefore, establishing the vital treasury–central bank axis that stands at the center of power in sovereign states is essential.

  • One-Pager No. 56 | June 2018
    The European Commission's proposal for the regulation of sovereign bond-backed securities (SBBSs) follows the release of a high-level taskforce report, sponsored by the European Systemic Risk Board, on the feasibility of an SBBS framework. The proposal and the SBBS scheme, Mario Tonveronachi argues, would fail to yield the intended results while undermining financial stability.

    Tonveronachi articulates his alternative, centered on the European Central Bank's issuance of debt certificates along the maturity spectrum to create a common yield curve and corresponding absorption of a share of each eurozone country’s national debts. Alongside these financial operations, new reflationary but debt-reducing fiscal rules would be imposed.

  • Public Policy Brief No. 145 | June 2018
    An Assessment and an Alternative Proposal
    In response to a proposal put forward by the European Commission for the regulation of sovereign bond-backed securities (SBBSs), Mario Tonveronachi provides his analysis of the SBBS scheme and attendant regulatory proposal, and elaborates on an alternative approach to addressing the problems that have motivated this high-level consideration of an SBBS framework.

    As this policy brief explains, it is doubtful the SBBS proposal would produce its intended results. Tonveronachi’s alternative, discussed in Levy Institute Public Policy Briefs Nos. 137 and 140, not only better addresses the two problems targeted by the SBBS scheme, but also a third, critical defect of the current euro system: national sovereign debt sustainability.

  • Conference Proceedings | April 2018
    A conference organized by the Levy Economics Institute of Bard College

    The proceedings include the 2017 conference program, transcripts of keynote speakers’ remarks, synopses of the panel sessions, and biographies of the participants.
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    Author(s):
    Michael Stephens
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    United States, Latin America, Europe

  • Public Policy Brief No. 144 | September 2017
    A Radical Proposal Based on Keynes’s Clearing Union
    In light of the problems besetting the eurozone, this policy brief examines the contributions of John Maynard Keynes and Richard Kahn to early debates over the design of the postwar international financial system. Their critical engagement with the early policy challenges associated with managing international settlements offers a perspective from which to analyze the flaws in the current euro-based financial system, and Keynes’s clearing union proposal offers a template for a better approach. A system of regional federations employing a clearing system in which members either retained their own currency or used a common currency as a unit of account in registering debits and credits for settlement purposes would preserve domestic policy independence and retain regional diversity.
     

  • In the Media | May 2017
    By Georgios Georgiou
    Bloomberg, May 11, 2017. All Rights Reserved.

    Greece is confident that the country’s economic output will exceed 2 percent in 2017 boosted by investments, privatizations and exports, Economy and Development Minister Dimitri Papadimitriou said.

    Read more: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-05-11/greek-economy-to-grow-over-2-percent-in-2017-papadimitriou-says
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  • In the Media | May 2017
    By Axel Reiserer
    EBRD, May 11, 2017. All Rights Reserved.

    The EBRD has reiterated its support for Greece and sees “enormous opportunities” in the country. Alain Pilloux, the Bank’s Vice President, Banking, told a well-attended panel on the investment outlook for Greece: “We will continue to ramp up operations in Greece so that our contribution to economic recovery is maximised during our temporary mandate in the country.” . . .

    Read more: http://www.ebrd.com/news/2017/ebrd-sees-enormous-opportunities-in-greece.html
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    Europe
  • Working Paper No. 889 | May 2017

    This paper investigates the determinants of nominal yields of government bonds in the eurozone. The pooled mean group (PMG) technique of cointegration is applied on both monthly and quarterly datasets to examine the major drivers of nominal yields of long-term government bonds in a set of 11 eurozone countries. Furthermore, autoregressive distributive lag (ARDL) methods are used to address the same question for individual countries. The results show that short-term interest rates are the most important determinants of long-term government bonds’ nominal yields, which supports Keynes’s (1930) view that short-term interest rates and other monetary policy measures have a decisive influence on long-term interest rates on government bonds.

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    Author(s):
    Tanweer Akram Anupam Das
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  • In the Media | March 2017
    Athens-Macedonian News Agency, March 19, 2017. All Rights Reserved.

    The country's development plan focuses on the attraction of investments to dynamic and innovative businesses, stated Economy Minister Dimitris Papadimitriou in a statement to the Sunday edition of Ethnos newspaper....

    Read more: http://www.amna.gr/english/article/17744/Greece-needs-a-new-technologically-upgraded-and-extrovert-growth-model--says-Econ-Min-Papadimitriou  
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    Region(s):
    Europe
  • In the Media | February 2017
    By Nektaria Stamouli

    The Wall Street Journal, February 9, 2017. All Rights Reserved.

    ATHENS—Greece’s economy minister said he is optimistic the country can resolve its deadlock with its international creditors this month over how to fulfill its bailout program, allowing Greece to bring down its borrowing costs and return to bond markets late this year....

    Read more: https://www.wsj.com/articles/greeces-economy-minister-confident-of-reaching-deal-with-creditors-1486651074

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  • In the Media | February 2017
    Athens-Macedonian News Agency, February 6, 2017. All Rights Reserved.

    Developing the social economy in Greece could help stem the emigration of young Greek scientists and professionals abroad, putting the brakes on the so-called "brain drain," Alternate Labour Minister for fighting unemployment Rania Antonopoulou said in an interview with the Athens-Macedonian New Agency (ANA) released on Sunday.

    Read more: http://www.amna.gr/english/article/17055/Alt-Labour-Minister-Antonopoulou-highlights-potential-of-social-economy-in-Greece  
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  • In the Media | December 2016
    By David R. Sands
    The Washington Times, December 16, 2017. All Rights Reserved.

    It was a chain of events which neatly captured the grinding economic crisis that plagues Greece: Just as a light appeared at the end of the tunnel, the train broke down once again.

    In an interview last week, new Greek Economy and Development Minister Dimitri Papadimitriou said he was “very optimistic” the country had “turned the corner” addressing a crushing six-year public debt crisis that has left it wrangling with its fellow European Union members and the International Monetary Fund over bailouts, austerity and the best way to jump-start the economy....

    Read more: http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/dec/16/greek-minister-sees-progress-despite-debt-drama/
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    Europe
  • In the Media | December 2016
    Bloomberg Radio, December 13, 2016. All Rights Reserved.

    Dimitri Papadimitriou, Greece’s new minister of economy and development, talks to Pimm Fox and Lisa Abramowicz about the outlook for the Greek economy, the IMF, and the EU. The minister spoke at Capital Link’s 18th Annual Invest in Greece Forum in NYC.

    Listen to the podcast here: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/audio/2016-12-13/papadimitriou-goal-for-greece-to-participate-in-qe  
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    Europe
  • In the Media | December 2016
    Bloomberg News, December 12, 2017. All Rights Reserved.

    Dimitri B. Papadimitriou, president of the Levy Institute and Minister of Economy and Development for Greece, talks to Bloomberg's Mike McKee about the country's 2017 budget plan, GDP growth forecast, and expectations for concluding its second bailout review later this month.

    Read more: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/videos/2016-12-12/papadimitriou-on-greek-economy-2017-budget 
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    Europe
  • In the Media | December 2016
    By Mark Gilbert
    Bloomberg, December 6, 2016. All Rights Reserved.

    Here are two things I'll bet most people don't know about Greece. The country's just-appointed minister of economy and development, Dimitri Papadimitriou, was lured away from his position as head of the Levy Economics Institute at Bard College in America. He's not a member of the ruling Syriza party. And the man appointed secretary general for public revenue in January is Giorgos Pitsillis, a professional tax lawyer. He's not a party member either....

    Read more: https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2016-12-06/greece-deserves-credit-for-its-reform-efforts
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    Europe
  • In the Media | November 2016
    By Marcus Bensasson
    Bloomberg, November 28, 2016. All Rights Reserved.
     
    The time has come for the International Monetary Fund to make up its mind on Greece, according to the country’s economy minister.

    The path to recovery runs sequentially through completion of Greece’s bailout review, debt relief and then admission to the European Central Bank’s quantitative easing program, said Dimitri Papadimitriou, an economist who joined the government this month after a career championing alternatives to the macroeconomics espoused by the IMF. Now, the Washington-based fund must decide whether the Greek recovery will happen with or without it, he said in an interview.

    Read more: http://www.bloombergquint.com/global-economics/2016/11/27/imf-indecision-on-bailout-criticized-by-greek-economy-minister
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  • In the Media | November 2016
    Daily Freeman, November 6, 2016. All Rights Reserved.

    Economist Dimitri B. Papadimitriou, president of the Levy Economics Institute of Bard College and executive vice president and Jerome Levy Professor of Economics at Bard College, was appointed Greece’s minister of economy and development....

    Read more: http://www.dailyfreeman.com/general-news/20161106/bard-professor-appointed-greeces-minister-of-economy-and-development
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  • In the Media | November 2016
    The Guardian, November 6, 2016. All Rights Reserved.

    The Greek prime minister, Alexis Tsipras, has reshuffled his government to boost bailout reforms in the hope of getting the EU to agree to critical debt relief by the end of the year....

    Read more: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/nov/06/greek-prime-minister-tsipras-reshuffles-cabinet-to-boost-bailout-reforms
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  • In the Media | November 2016
    New Delhi Times, November 5, 2016. All Rights Reserved.

    Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras, beset by plummeting popularity and tough bailout talks, reshuffled his cabinet late Friday, retaining his ministers of finance and foreign affairs and enhancing the powers of his top official for immigration.

    U.S.-educated economics professor Dimitri Papadimitriou was appointed development minister, government spokeswoman Olga Gerovassili said....

    Read more: http://www.newdelhitimes.com/greek-cabinet-reshuffle-leaves-key-ministers-in-place123/
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  • In the Media | November 2016
    By Marcus Bensasson, Nikos Chrysoloras, and Eleni Chrepa
    Chicago Tribune, November 5, 2016. All Rights Reserved.

    Greece's president swore in a new Cabinet after Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras sought to turn around his political fortunes and work toward better terms from creditors by naming new ministers.

    Tsipras appointed George Stathakis as energy minister late Friday, replacing Panos Skourletis, who repeatedly clashed with the country's creditors and investors such as mining company Eldorado Gold Corp. Skourletis was moved to the interior ministry, while Stathakis' replacement as economy minister was Dimitri Papadimitriou, president of the Levy Economics Institute at Bard College in New York. President Prokopis Pavlopoulos inaugurated the new cabinet in Athens on Saturday....

    Read more: http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/sns-wp-blm-greece-16ea3e96-a362-11e6-8864-6f892cad0865-20161105-story.html
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  • In the Media | November 2016
    By Renee Maltezou and Lefteris Papadimas
    Reuters, November 5, 2016. All Rights Reserved.

    Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras promised "brighter days" on Saturday after a cabinet reshuffle aimed at speeding up reforms Athens has agreed to implement under its latest international bailout deal and to shore up his government's popularity....

    Read more: http://www.reuters.com/article/us-eurozone-greece-reshuffle-idUSKBN12Z2NE
     
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  • In the Media | November 2016
    By Marcus Bensasson, Nikos Chrysoloras, and Eleni Chrepa
    Bloomberg, November 4, 2016. All Rights Reserved.

    Greece’s president swore in a new cabinet after Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras sought to turn around his political fortunes and work toward better terms from creditors by naming new ministers.

    Tsipras appointed George Stathakis as energy minister late Friday, replacing Panos Skourletis, who repeatedly clashed with the country’s creditors and investors such as mining company Eldorado Gold Corp. Skourletis was moved to the interior ministry, while Stathakis’s replacement as economy minister was Dimitri Papadimitriou, president of the Levy Economics Institute at Bard College in New York. President Prokopis Pavlopoulos inaugurated the new cabinet in Athens on Saturday....

    Read more: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-11-04/tsipras-shakes-up-greek-cabinet-to-boost-support-ahead-of-review
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  • In the Media | November 2016
    Newsday, November 4, 2016. All Rights Reserved.

    Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras, beset by plummeting popularity and tough bailout talks, reshuffled his cabinet late Friday, retaining his ministers of finance and foreign affairs and enhancing the powers of his top official for immigration.

    U.S.-educated economics professor Dimitri Papadimitriou was appointed development minister, government spokeswoman Olga Gerovassili said.

    Papadimitriou, 70, is the president of the Levy Economics Institute of Bard College, New York. He replaces George Stathakis, who moved to the energy ministry....

    Read more: http://www.newsday.com/news/world/greek-cabinet-reshuffle-leaves-key-ministers-in-place-1.12562414
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  • In the Media | November 2016
    U.S. News & World Report, November 4, 2016. All Rights Reserved.

    Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras, beset by plummeting popularity and tough bailout talks, reshuffled his cabinet late Friday, retaining his ministers of finance and foreign affairs and enhancing the powers of his top official for immigration.

    U.S.-educated economics professor Dimitri Papadimitriou was appointed development minister, government spokeswoman Olga Gerovassili said.

    Papadimitriou, 70, is the president of the Levy Economics Institute of Bard College, New York. He replaces George Stathakis, who moved to the energy ministry....

    Read more: http://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2016-11-04/greek-cabinet-reshuffle-leaves-key-ministers-in-place
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  • In the Media | November 2016
    Miami Herald, November 4, 2016. All Rights Reserved.

    Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras, beset by plummeting popularity and tough bailout talks, reshuffled his cabinet late Friday, retaining his ministers of finance and foreign affairs and enhancing the powers of his top official for immigration.

    U.S.-educated economics professor Dimitri Papadimitriou was appointed development minister, government spokeswoman Olga Gerovassili said.

    Papadimitriou, 70, is the president of the Levy Economics Institute of Bard College, New York. He replaces George Stathakis, who moved to the energy ministry....

    Read more: http://www.miamiherald.com/news/business/article112603703.html
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  • In the Media | November 2016
    San Francisco Chronicle, November 4, 2016. All Rights Reserved.

    Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras, beset by plummeting popularity and tough bailout talks, reshuffled his cabinet late Friday, retaining his ministers of finance and foreign affairs and enhancing the powers of his top official for immigration.

    U.S.-educated economics professor Dimitri Papadimitriou was appointed development minister, government spokeswoman Olga Gerovassili said.

    Papadimitriou, 70, is the president of the Levy Economics Institute of Bard College, New York. He replaces George Stathakis, who moved to the energy ministry....

    Read more: http://www.sfchronicle.com/news/article/Greek-cabinet-reshuffle-leaves-key-ministers-in-10594178.php
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  • In the Media | November 2016
    ABC News, November 4, 2016. All Rights Reserved.

    Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras, beset by plummeting popularity and tough bailout talks, reshuffled his cabinet late Friday, retaining his ministers of finance and foreign affairs and enhancing the powers of his top official for immigration.

    U.S.-educated economics professor Dimitri Papadimitriou was appointed development minister, government spokeswoman Olga Gerovassili said.

    Papadimitriou, 70, is the president of the Levy Economics Institute of Bard College, New York. He replaces George Stathakis, who moved to the energy ministry....

    Read more: http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/wireStory/greek-cabinet-reshuffle-leaves-key-ministers-place-43312887
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  • In the Media | November 2016
    The Washington Post, November 4, 2016. All Rights Reserved.

    Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras, beset by plummeting popularity and tough bailout talks, reshuffled his cabinet late Friday, retaining his ministers of finance and foreign affairs and enhancing the powers of his top official for immigration.

    U.S.-educated economics professor Dimitri Papadimitriou was appointed development minister, government spokeswoman Olga Gerovassili said.

    Papadimitriou, 70, is the president of the Levy Economics Institute of Bard College, New York. He replaces George Stathakis, who moved to the energy ministry....

    Read more: https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/greek-cabinet-reshuffle-leaves-key-ministers-in-place/2016/11/04/78b2bef8-a2ce-11e6-8864-6f892cad0865_story.html
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  • In the Media | November 2016
    The New York Times, November 4, 2016. All Rights Reserved.

    Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras, beset by plummeting popularity and tough bailout talks, reshuffled his cabinet late Friday, retaining his ministers of finance and foreign affairs and enhancing the powers of his top official for immigration.

    U.S.-educated economics professor Dimitri Papadimitriou was appointed development minister, government spokeswoman Olga Gerovassili said.

    Papadimitriou, 70, is the president of the Levy Economics Institute of Bard College, New York. He replaces George Stathakis, who moved to the energy ministry....

    Read more: http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2016/11/04/world/europe/ap-eu-greece-cabinet-reshuffle.html?_r=0
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  • In the Media | November 2016
    Salon, November 4, 2016. All Rights Reserved.

    Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras, beset by plummeting popularity and tough bailout talks, reshuffled his cabinet late Friday, retaining his ministers of finance and foreign affairs and enhancing the powers of his top official for immigration.

    U.S.-educated economics professor Dimitri Papadimitriou was appointed development minister, government spokeswoman Olga Gerovassili said.

    Papadimitriou, 70, is the president of the Levy Economics Institute of Bard College, New York. He replaces George Stathakis, who moved to the energy ministry....

    Read more: http://www.salon.com/2016/11/04/greek-cabinet-reshuffle-leaves-key-ministers-in-place/

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  • In the Media | November 2016
    Kathimerini, November 4, 2016. All Rights Reserved.

    Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras proceeded on Friday with a long-awaited government reshuffle, moving out some ministers who have opposed bailout reforms and bringing some new blood into the administration.

    Read more: http://www.ekathimerini.com/213441/article/ekathimerini/news/pm-removes-some-who-opposed-reforms-brings-in-new-faces
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  • In the Media | November 2016
    By Nektaria Stamouli
    The Wall Street Journal, November 4, 2016. All Rights Reserved.

    Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras reshuffled his cabinet late Friday to speed up talks with Greece’s creditors and revive the morale of his ruling left-wing Syriza party after heavy setbacks....

    Read more: http://www.wsj.com/articles/greek-prime-minister-reorders-cabinet-1478295602
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  • Strategic Analysis | October 2016

    The Greek government has agreed to a new round of fiscal austerity measures consisting of a sharp increase in taxes on income and property and further reductions in pension and other welfare-related expenditures. Based on our model of the Greek economy, policies aimed at reducing the government deficit will cause a recession, unless other components of aggregate demand increase enough to more than offset the negative impact of fiscal austerity on output and employment.

    In this report we argue that the troika strategy of increasing net exports to restart the economy has failed, partly because of the low impact of falling wages on prices, partly because of the low trade elasticities with respect to prices, and partly because of other events that caused a sharp reduction in transport services, which used to be Greece’s largest export sector.

    A policy initiative to boost aggregate demand is urgently needed, now more than ever. We propose a fiscal policy alternative based on innovative financing mechanisms, which could trigger a boost in confidence that would encourage renewed private investment.

  • In the Media | September 2016
    By Marcus Bensasson
    Bloomberg, September 21, 2016. All Rights Reserved.

    Advantage Yannis Stournaras.

    In the battle of wits between Greece’s central bank governor and Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras, the former seems to have won the latest round, giving him a leg up should he harbor any ambitions of a return to politics....

    Read more:
    http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-09-21/tsipras-defeat-in-attica-battle-bolsters-bank-of-greece-governor  
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  • In the Media | May 2016
    Boom Bust (RT), May 25, 2016. All Rights Reserved.

    Anti-austerity protests take hold in Belgium as tens of thousands take to the streets in opposition. And the Eurogroup meets to discuss the Greek bailout as tension builds between creditors. Ameera David reports....

    After the break, Ameera is joined by Levy Economics Institute research associate Marshall Auerback to discuss the situation concerning Greece’s Troika debt and austerity program.... Full video of the interview is available here (15:52).
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  • Working Paper No. 867 | May 2016

    This paper examines the issue of the Greek public debt from different perspectives. We provide a historical discussion of the accumulation of Greece’s public debt since the 1960s and the role of public debt in the recent crisis. We show that the austerity imposed since 2010 has been unsuccessful in stabilizing the debt while at the same time taking a heavy toll on the Greek economy and society. The experience of the last six years shows that the country’s public debt is clearly unsustainable, and therefore a bold restructuring is needed. An insistence on the current policies is not justifiable either on pragmatic or on moral or any other grounds. The experience of Germany in the early post–World War II period provides some useful hints for the way forward. A solution to the Greek public debt problem is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the solution of the Greek and wider European crisis. A broader agenda that deals with the malaises of the Greek economy and the structural imbalances of the eurozone is of vital importance.

  • Working Paper No. 866 | May 2016
    Proposals for the Eurozone Crisis

    After reviewing the main determinants of the current eurozone crisis, this paper discusses the feasibility of introducing fiscal currencies as a way to restore fiscal space in peripheral countries, like Greece, that have so far adopted austerity measures in order to abide by their commitments to eurozone institutions and the International Monetary Fund. We show that the introduction of fiscal currencies would speed up the recovery, without violating the rules of eurozone treaties. At the same time, these processes could help transition the euro from its current status as the single currency to the status of “common clearing currency,” along the lines proposed by John Maynard Keynes at Bretton Woods as a system of international monetary payments. Eurozone countries could therefore move from “Plan B,” aimed at addressing member-state domestic problems, to a “Plan A” for a better European monetary system.

  • In the Media | April 2016
    Von Tom Fairless
    Finanz Nachrichten, 14 April 2016. Alle Rechte vorbehalten.

    Für das Instrument der negativen Zinsen gibt es nach Aussage des EZB-Vizepräsidenten Vitor Constancio "klare Grenzen". Die Schwelle, an der die Leute anfangen, Geld abzuziehen, um die Negativzinsen zu umgehen, scheine aber noch weit weg zu sein, sagte Constancio in einer Rede beim Bard College in New York....

    Weiterlesen: http://www.finanznachrichten.de/nachrichten-2016-04/37060417-ezb-constancio-instrument-der-negativzinsen-hat-grenzen-015.htm
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  • In the Media | April 2016
    Foreign Affairs, April 14, 2016. All Rights Reserved.

    Speech by Vítor Constâncio, Vice-President of the ECB, at the 25th Annual Hyman P. Minsky Conference on the State of the U.S. and World Economies at the Levy Economics Institute of Bard College, Blithewood, Annandale-on-Hudson, New York, 13 April 2016 

    Ladies and Gentlemen,

    I want to start by thanking the Levy Institute for inviting me again to address this important conference honouring Hyman Minsky, the economist that the Great Recession justifiably brought into the limelight. His work provides crucial insights not only identifying the key mechanisms by which periods of financial calm sow the seeds for ensuing crises, but also the specific challenges that economies face in recovering from such crises....

    Read more: http://foreignaffairs.co.nz/2016/04/14/speech-vitor-constancio-international-headwinds-and-the-effectiveness-of-monetary-policy/
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  • In the Media | April 2016
    Bloomberg, 14 Nisan 2016. Her Hakkı Saklıdır.

    Avrupa Merkez Bankası (AMB) Başkan Yardımcısı Vitor Constancio Çarşamba günü yaptığı açıklamada, negatif faiz oranının ekonomiyi destekleme konusunda yapabileceklerinin sınırlı olduğunu söyleyerek AMB'nin stratejisinin euro bölgesinin tamamı için olumlu olduğunu söyledi.

    Constancio, New York eyaletinde Bard College'de Levy Economics Institute'de yaptığı konuşmada, "Negatif mevduat faiz oranını bir politika aracı olarak kullanmanın açık sınıları olduğunu hatırlamak önemli, kademeli faiz sistemi bu endişeyi azaltabilir ama tamamen yok edemez" dedi....

    Daha fazla oku: http://www.bloomberght.com/haberler/haber/1872569-ambconstancio-negatif-faiz-politikasinin-limitleri-var
  • In the Media | April 2016
    Finanzen 100, 13 April 2016. Alle Rechte vorbehalten.

    Die vielumstrittenen Negativzinsen der EZB haben klare Grenzen der Wirksamkeit. Obwohl der EZB-Vizepräsident Vítor Constâncio die Strategie der Notenbank am Mittwochabend als positiv für die Eurozone verteidigt hat, gab er zu, dass negative Zinsen die Konjunktur nur beschränkt ankurbeln können....

    Weiterlesen: http://www.finanzen100.de/finanznachrichten/wirtschaft/geldpolitik-ezb-vizepraesident-negativzinsen-sind-kein-allheilmittel_H609679858_263944/
  • In the Media | February 2016

    Reuters, February 19, 2016. All Rights Reserved.

    All eyes are on Brussels as European leaders converge for meetings that could ultimately redefine the region, and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development has lowered its global economic forecast. Ameera David weighs in and then sits down with Marshall Auerback—research associate at the Levy Economics Institute—to continue the discussion on Europe….

    Interview begins at 4:45: https://www.rt.com/shows/boom-bust/332954-european-disunion-eu-negotiations/

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  • Policy Note 2016/1 | January 2016
    A complementary currency circulates within an economy alongside the primary currency without attempting to replace it. The Swiss WIR, implemented in 1934 as a response to the discouraging liquidity and growth prospects of the Great Depression, is the oldest and most significant complementary financial system now in circulation. The evidence provided by the long, successful operation of the WIR offers an opportunity to reconsider the creation of a similar system in Greece.

    The complementary currency is a proven macroeconomic stabilizer—a spontaneous money creator with the capacity to sustain and increase an economy’s aggregate demand during downturns. A complementary financial system that supports regional development and employment-targeted programs would be a U-turn toward restoring people’s purchasing power and rebuilding Greece’s desperate economy.

  • One-Pager No. 52 | January 2016

    Even under optimistic assumptions, the policy status quo being enforced in Greece cannot be relied upon to help recover lost incomes and employment within any reasonable time frame. And while a widely discussed public investment program funded by European institutions would help, a more innovative, better-targeted solution is required to address Greece’s protracted unemployment crisis: an “employer of last resort” (ELR) plan offering paid work in public projects, financed by issuing a nonconvertible “fiscal currency”—the Geuro.

  • Strategic Analysis | January 2016
    The Greek economy has not succeeded in restoring growth, nor has it managed to restore a climate of reduced uncertainty, which is crucial for stabilizing the business climate and promoting investment. On the contrary, the new round of austerity measures that has been agreed upon implies another year of recession in 2016.

    After reviewing some recent indicators for the Greek economy, we project the trajectory of key macroeconomic indicators over the next three years. Our model shows that a slow recovery can be expected beginning in 2017, at a pace that is well below what is needed to alleviate poverty and reduce unemployment. We then analyze the impact of a public investment program financed by European institutions, of a size that is feasible given the current political and economic conditions, and find that, while such a plan would help stimulate the economy, it would not be sufficient to speed up the recovery. Finally, we revise our earlier proposal for a fiscal stimulus financed through the emission of a complementary currency targeted to job creation. Our model shows that such a plan, calibrated in a way that avoids inflationary pressures, would be more effective—without disrupting the targets the government has agreed upon in terms of its primary surplus, and without reversing the improvement in the current account. 

  • One-Pager No. 51 | December 2015
    Until market participants across the euro area face a single risk-free yield curve rather than a diverse collection of quasi-risk-free sovereign rates, financial market integration will not be complete. Unfortunately, the institution that would normally provide the requisite benchmark asset—a federal treasury issuing risk-free debt—does not exist in the euro area, and there are daunting political obstacles to creating such an institution.

    There is, however, another way forward. The financial instrument that could provide the foundation for a single market already exists on the balance sheet of the European Central Bank (ECB): legally, the ECB could issue “debt certificates” (DCs) across the maturity spectrum and in sufficient amounts to create a yield curve. Moreover, reforming ECB operations along these lines may hold the key to addressing another of the euro area’s critical dysfunctions. Under current conditions, the Maastricht Treaty’s fiscal rules create a vicious cycle by contributing to a deflationary economic environment, which slows the process of debt adjustment, requiring further deflationary budget tightening. By changing national debt dynamics and thereby enabling a revision of the fiscal rules, the DC proposal could short-circuit this cycle of futility.

  • Working Paper No. 856 | December 2015
    Evidence from Europe, 2006–13

    We examine the relationship between changes in a country’s public sector fiscal position and inequality at the top and bottom of the income distribution during the age of austerity (2006–13). We use a parametric Lorenz curve model and Gini-like indices of inequality as our measures to assess distributional changes. Based on the EU’s Statistics on Income and Living Conditions SLIC and International Monetary Fund data for 12 European countries, we find that more severe adjustments to the cyclically adjusted primary balance (i.e., more austerity) are associated with a more unequal distribution of income driven by rising inequality at the top. The data also weakly suggest a decrease in inequality at the bottom. The distributional impact of austerity measures reflects the reliance on regressive policies, and likely produces increased incentives for rent seeking while reducing incentives for workers to increase productivity.

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    Markus P.A. Schneider Stephen Kinsella Antoine Godin
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    Europe

  • In the Media | December 2015
    RT, December 4, 2015. All Rights Reserved.

    Edward Harrison sits down with Research Associate Marshall Auerback to talk about Europe in this broadcast interview (04:17): https://www.rt.com/shows/boom-bust/324713-auerback-isis-funding-turkey/
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  • Working Paper No. 855 | November 2015
    Debt, Central Banks, and Functional Finance

    The scientific reassessment of the economic role of the state after the crisis has renewed interest in Abba Lerner’s theory of functional finance (FF). A thorough discussion of this concept is helpful in reconsidering the debate on the nature of money and the origin of the business cycle and crises. It also allows a reevaluation of many policy issues, such as the Barro–Ricardo equivalence, the cause of inflation, and the role of monetary policy.

    FF, throwing a different light on these issues, can provide a sound foundation for discussing income, fiscal, and monetary policy rules in the right context of flexibility in the management of national budgets, assessing what kind of policies should be awarded priority, and the effectiveness of tackling the crisis with the different part of public budget. It also allows us to understand ways of increasing efficiency through public investment while reducing the total operational costs of firms. In the specific context of the eurozone, FF is useful for assessing the institutional framework of the euro and how to improve it in the face of protracted low growth, deflation, and weak public finances.

  • Public Policy Brief No. 140 | November 2015

    Mario Tonveronachi, University of Siena, builds on his earlier proposal (The ECB and the Single European Financial Market) to advance financial market integration in Europe through the creation of a single benchmark yield curve based on debt certificates (DCs) issued by the European Central Bank (ECB). In this policy brief, Tonveronachi discusses potential changes to the ECB’s operations and their implications for member-state fiscal rules. He argues that his DC proposal would maintain debt discipline while mitigating the restrictive, counterproductive fiscal stance required today, simultaneously expanding national fiscal space while ensuring debt sustainability under the Maastricht limits, and offering a path out of the self-defeating policy regime currently in place.

  • In the Media | November 2015
    By Nikos Chrysoloras and Christos Ziotis
    Bloomberg, November 13, 2015. All Rights Reserved.

    The National Bank of Greece SA and Eurobank Ergasias SA joined Piraeus Bank SA and Alpha Bank AE on Thursday in starting book-building processes as they seek to fill part of 14.4 billion-euro ($15.5 billion) hole in their accounts identified by the European Central Bank. The state-owned Hellenic Financial Stability Fund will contribute the rest from loans from Greece’s latest bailout, but not before imposing mandatory losses or "burden sharing” on shareholders and creditors of the banks....

    Read more: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-11-13/greek-banks-ask-investors-to-take-leap-of-faith-amid-uncertainty
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    Europe
  • In the Media | November 2015
    Investorideas.com, November 12, 2015. All Rights Reserved.

    The battered Greek banks will soon face yet another round of recapitalization this November and December. For the banks to have any prospect of returning to their precrisis role as liquidity providers to the Greek economy, it is imperative that the country’s EU creditors and supervisors avoid the pitfalls of previous recapitalizations, argues a new report from the Levy Economics Institute of Bard College. In their Policy Note What Should Be Done with Greek Banks to Help the Country Return to a Path of Growth? Emilios Avgouleas, professor and chair of international banking law and finance at the University of Edinburgh School of Law, and Levy Institute President Dimitri B. Papadimitriou stress that the recapitalization of Greek banks—perhaps the central issue for the Greek state today—has entered its most critical stage.... 

    Read more: http://www.investorideas.com/news/2015/main/11123.asp
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  • Conference Proceedings | November 2015

    A conference organized by the Levy Economics Institute of Bard College with support from the Ford Foundation

    The 2015 Minsky Conference addressed, among other issues, the design, flaws, and current status of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act, including implementation of the operating procedures necessary to curtail systemic risk and prevent future crises; the insistence on fiscal austerity exemplified by the recent pronouncements of the new Congress; the sustainability of the US economic recovery; monetary policy revisions and central bank independence; the deflationary pressures associated with the ongoing eurozone debt crisis and their implications for the global economy; strategies for promoting an inclusive economy and a more equitable income distribution; and regulatory challenges for emerging market economies. The proceedings include the conference program, transcripts of keynote speakers’ remarks, synopses of the panel sessions, and biographies of the participants.

    Download:
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    Barbara Ross Michael Stephens
    Region(s):
    United States, Europe

  • Policy Note 2015/6 | October 2015

    The recapitalization of Greek banks is perhaps the most critical problem for the Greek state today. Despite direct cash infusions to Greek banks that have so far exceeded €45 billion, with corresponding guarantees of around €130 billion, credit expansion has failed to pick up. There are two obvious reasons for this failure: first, the massive exodus of deposits since 2010; and second, the continuous recession—mainly the product of strongly deflationary policies dictated by international lenders.

    Following the 2012–13 recapitalization, creditors allowed the old, now minority, shareholders and incumbent management (regardless of culpability) to retain effective control of the banks—a decision that did not conform to accepted international practices. Sitting on a ticking time bomb of nonperforming loans (NPLs), Greek banks, rather than adopting the measures necessary to restructure their portfolios, cut back sharply on lending, while the country’s economy continued to shrink.

    The obvious way to rehabilitate Greek banking following the new round of recapitalization scheduled for later this year is the establishment of a “bad bank” that can assume responsibility for the NPL workouts, manage the loans, and in some cases hold them to maturity and turn them around. This would allow Greek banks to make new and carefully underwritten loans, resulting in a much-needed expansion of the credit supply. Sound bank recapitalization with concurrent avoidance of any creditor bail-in could help the Greek banking sector return to financial health—and would be an effective first step in returning the country to the path of growth.

  • Working Paper No. 850 | October 2015

    We describe the medium-run macroeconomic effects and long-run development consequences of a financial Dutch disease that may take place in a small developing country with abundant natural resources. The first move is in financial markets. An initial surge in foreign direct investment targeting natural resources sets in motion a perverse cycle between exchange rate appreciation and mounting short- and medium-term capital flows. Such a spiral easily leads to exchange rate volatility, capital reversals, and sharp macroeconomic instability. In the long run, macroeconomic instability and overdependence on natural resource exports dampen the development of nontraditional tradable goods sectors and curtail labor productivity dynamics. We advise the introduction of constraints to short- and medium-term capital flows to tame exchange rate/capital flows boom-and-bust cycles. We support the implementation of a developmentalist monetary policy targeting competitive nominal and real exchange rates in order to encourage product and export diversification.

  • Working Paper No. 849 | October 2015
    A Micro- and Macroprudential Perspective

    Bank leverage ratios have made an impressive and largely unopposed return; they are mostly used alongside risk-weighted capital requirements. The reasons for this return are manifold, and they are not limited to the fact that bank equity levels in the wake of the global financial crisis (GFC) were exceptionally thin, necessitating a string of costly bailouts. A number of other factors have been equally important; these include, among others, the world’s revulsion with debt following the GFC and the eurozone crisis, and the universal acceptance of Hyman Minsky’s insights into the nature of the financial system and its role in the real economy. The best examples of the causal link between excessive debt, asset bubbles, and financial instability are the Spanish and Irish banking crises, which resulted from nothing more sophisticated than straightforward real estate loans. Bank leverage ratios are primarily seen as a microprudential measure that intends to increase bank resilience. Yet in today’s environment of excessive liquidity due to very low interest rates and quantitative easing, bank leverage ratios should also be viewed as a key part of the macroprudential framework. In this context, this paper discusses the role of leverage ratios as both microprudential and macroprudential measures. As such, it explains the role of the leverage cycle in causing financial instability and sheds light on the impact of leverage restraints on good bank governance and allocative efficiency.

  • Working Paper No. 847 | October 2015
    A Post-Keynesian Interpretation of the Spanish Crisis

    The Spanish crisis is generally portrayed as resulting from excessive spending by households, associated with a housing bubble and/or excessive welfare spending beyond the economic possibilities of the country. We put forward a different hypothesis. We argue that the Spanish crisis resulted, in the main, from a widening deficit position in the nonfinancial corporate sector—the most important explanatory factor behind the country’s rising external imbalance—and a declining trend in profitability under a regime of financial liberalization and loose and unregulated lending practices. This paper argues that the central cause of the crisis is related to the nonfinancial corporate sector’s increasingly fragile financial position, which originated from the financial convergence that followed adoption of the euro.

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    Esteban Pérez Caldentey Matías Vernengo
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  • Working Paper No. 845 | September 2015
    Assessing the ECB’s Crisis Management Performance and Potential for Crisis Resolution
    This study assesses the European Central Bank’s (ECB) crisis management performance and potential for crisis resolution. The study investigates the institutional and functional constraints that delineate the ECB’s scope for policy action under crisis conditions, and how the bank has actually used its leeway since 2007—or might do so in the future. The study finds that the ECB may well stand out positively when compared to other important euro-area or national authorities involved in managing the euro crisis, but that in general the bank did “too little, too late” to prevent the euro area from slipping into recession and protracted stagnation. The study also finds that expectations regarding the ECB’s latest policy initiatives may be excessively optimistic, and that proposals featuring the central bank as the euro’s savior through even more radical employment of its balance sheet are misplaced hopes. Ultimately, the euro’s travails can only be ended and the euro crisis resolved by shifting the emphasis toward fiscal policy; specifically, by partnering the ECB with a “Euro Treasury” that would serve as a vehicle for the central funding of public investment through the issuance of common Euro Treasury debt securities. 

  • In the Media | September 2015
    By John Cassidy
    The New Yorker, September 21, 2015. All Rights Reserved.

    How long will the smile on the face of Alexis Tsipras last? On Monday night, Tsipras was sworn in as the head of a new Greek government that looks very similar to the previous one. The left-wing Syriza party is again forming a coalition with a small nationalist party, Independent Greeks; together, the two parties will have a small majority in parliament….

    Read more: http://www.newyorker.com/news/john-cassidy/alexis-tsipras-and-greece-are-still-trapped
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  • Conference Proceedings | August 2015

    A conference coorganized by the Levy Economics Institute of Bard College and Economia Civile with support from the Ford Foundation, the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, and Marinopoulos AE

    Athens, Greece
    November 21–22, 2014

    This conference was organized as part of the Levy Institute’s international research agenda and in conjunction with the Ford Foundation Project on Financial Instability, which draws on Hyman Minsky’s extensive work on the structure of financial systems to ensure stability, and on the role of government in achieving a growing and equitable economy.

    Among the key topics addressed: systemic instability in the eurozone; proposals for banking union; regulation and supervision of financial institutions; monetary, fiscal, and trade policy in Europe, and the spillover effects for the US and global economies; the impact of austerity policies on US and European markets; and the sustainability of government deficits and debt.

  • In the Media | August 2015
    Bloomberg Radio, August 20, 2015. All Rights Reserved.

    Levy Institute President Dimitri B. Papadimitriou talks to Bloomberg's Michael McKee and Kathleen Hays about the resignation of Greek PM Alex Tsipras, public reaction to the latest bailout package, and the forthcoming snap elections. 

    Podcast: http://media.bloomberg.com/bb/avfile/v8Dhep9k7w6o.mp3
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  • Policy Note 2015/5 | August 2015
    An Assessment in the Context of the IMF Rulings for Greece

    Developing countries, led by China and other BRICS members (Brazil, Russia, India, and South Africa), have been successfully organizing alternative sources of credit flows, aiming for financial stability, growth, and development. With their goals of avoiding International Monetary Fund loan conditionality and the dominance of the US dollar in global finance, these new BRICS-led institutions represent a much-needed renovation of the global financial architecture. The nascent institutions will provide an alternative to the prevailing Bretton Woods institutions, loans from which are usually laden with prescriptions for austerity—with often disastrous consequences for output and employment. We refer here to the most recent example in Europe, with Greece currently facing the diktat of the troika to accept austerity as a precondition for further financial assistance.

    It is rather disappointing that Western financial institutions and the EU are in no mood to provide Greece with any options short of complying with these disciplinary measures. Limitations, such as the above, in the prevailing global financial architecture bring to the fore the need for new institutions as alternative sources of funds. The launch of financial institutions by the BRICS—when combined with the BRICS clearing arrangement in local currencies proposed in this policy note—may chart a course for achieving an improved global financial order. Avoiding the use of the dollar as a currency to settle payments would help mitigate the impact of exchange rate fluctuations on transactions within the BRICS. Moreover, using the proposed clearing account arrangement to settle trade imbalances would help in generating additional demand within the BRICS, which would have an overall expansionary impact on the world economy as a whole.

  • Working Paper No. 844 | July 2015

    We present a model where the saving rate of the household sector, especially households at the bottom of the income distribution, becomes the endogenous variable that adjusts in order for full employment to be maintained over time. An increase in income inequality and the current account deficit and a consolidation of the government budget lead to a decrease in the saving rate of the household sector. Such a process is unsustainable because it leads to an increase in the household debt-to-income ratio, and maintaining it depends on some sort of asset bubble. This framework allows us to better understand the factors that led to the Great Recession and the dilemma of a repeat of this kind of unsustainable process or secular stagnation. Sustainable growth requires a decrease in income inequality, an improvement in the external position, and a relaxation of the fiscal stance of the government.

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  • Working Paper No. 842 | July 2015
    The Euro Treasury Plan

    The euro crisis remains unresolved and the euro currency union incomplete and extraordinarily vulnerable. The euro regime’s essential flaw and ultimate source of vulnerability is the decoupling of central bank and treasury institutions in the euro currency union. We propose a “Euro Treasury” scheme to properly fix the regime and resolve the euro crisis. This scheme would establish a rudimentary fiscal union that is not a transfer union. The core idea is to create a Euro Treasury as a vehicle to pool future eurozone public investment spending and to have it funded by proper eurozone treasury securities. The Euro Treasury could fulfill a number of additional purposes while operating mainly on the basis of a strict rule. The plan would also provide a much-needed fiscal boost to recovery and foster a more benign intra-area rebalancing.

  • In the Media | July 2015
    By Julie Verhage and Alex Balogh
    Bloomberg Business, July 15, 2015. All Rights Reserved.

    Although the problems in Greece didn't begin making big headlines until 2009, a number of economists, politicians and professors spotted cracks in the European currency union as early as the 1990s. Among the nine listed here? Levy Institute scholars Wynne Godley, L. Randall Wray, Stephanie A. Kelton, and Mathew Forstater. 

    Read more: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-07-15/nine-people-who-saw-the-greek-crisis-coming-years-before-everyone-else-did
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  • In the Media | July 2015
    The American Prospect, July 14, 2015. All Rights Reserved.

    Good evening, podcast listeners! We’ve got a great episode for you this week as Richard Aldous speaks with his Bard colleague Pavlina Tcherneva about the recently announced deal with Greece before discussing the promise of disruptive new healthcare technologies with Philip Auerswald....

    Full audio of the interview is available here.

     


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  • In the Media | July 2015
    By Robert Peston
    BBC News, July 13, 2015. All Rights Reserved.

    Greece's economy will contract a further 3%, Athens minister Rania Antonopoulos has told me in a BBC interview.

    The alternate minister for combating unemployment, who was a professional economist, said that the combination of the closure of the banks and austerity measures being forced on the country by eurozone and IMF creditors will tip Greece back into serious recession.... 

    Full video of the interview is available here.
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  • In the Media | July 2015
    Bloomberg Business, July 10, 2015. All Rights Reserved.

    Ahead of Greek PM Alex Tsipras's meeting with eurozone finance ministers on July 11, Syriza MP and Levy Institute economist Rania Antonopoulos expressed confidence that a "mutually beneficial" agreement between Greece and its creditors would be put in place within the week, and stated that the government's commitment to remaining in the eurozone "is as strong as ever."

    Full video of the interview is available here.
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  • In the Media | July 2015
    Bloomberg Radio, July 8, 2015. All Rights Reserved.

    Dimitri Papadimitriou talks to Kathleen Hays about anti-left sentiment in the eurozone, the possibility of a Grexit, and Greece's strategic value, as the deadline for submitting a new reform proposal to its creditors approaches.

    Full audio of the interview is available here.
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  • In the Media | July 2015
    Background Briefing with Ian Masters, July 7, 2015. All Rights Reserved.

    From Athens, Greece, Levy President Dimitri B. Papadimitriou provides an update on emergency negotiations between the new Greek finance minister and his European counterparts, amid warnings by German Chancellor Angela Merkel that “it is no longer about weeks, but a matter of days” before time runs out on striking a deal.

    Listen to the complete interview here: 
    http://ianmasters.com/sites/default/files/bbriefing_2015_07_07c_dimitri%20papadimitrou.mp3  
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  • Working Paper No. 840 | July 2015

    A technical analysis shows that the doomsayers who support the euro at all costs and those who naively theorize that a single currency is the root of all evil are both wrong. A euro exit could be a way of getting back to growth, but at the same time it would entail serious risks, especially for wage earners. The most important lesson we can learn from the experience of the past is that the outcome, in terms of growth, distribution, and employment, depends on how a country remains in the euro; or, in the case of a euro exit, on the quality of the economic policies that are put in place once the country regains control of monetary and fiscal matters, rather than on abandoning the old exchange system as such. It all depends on how a country stays in the eurozone, or on how it leaves if need be.

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    Riccardo Realfonzo Angelantonio Viscione
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  • In the Media | July 2015
    RT, July 2, 2015. All Rights Reserved.

    Research Associate Pavlina R. Tcherneva outlines the conditions that would encourage Greece to accept a bailout offer and provides her take on the government’s debt reconstruction deal.

    Video of the interview is available here (3:35):  http://rt.com/shows/boom-bust/271168-greece-defaults-imf-creditors/  
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  • In the Media | June 2015
    Bloomberg Radio, June 29, 2015. All Rights Reserved.

    Papadimitriou provides a picture of what it’s like on the ground in Athens, where the prevailing mood is defined by “negotiation fatigue” and anxiety about the end of the bailout agreement on June 30. Greece is being asked to do the impossible, says Papadimitriou: to impose extra austerity measures to maintain a primary surplus—a prescription even the IMF concedes just doesn’t work. The solution, he says, is to roll over Greek debt and put austerity policies aside. “We’re talking about simple economics here, not ideology.”

    The full interview is available here (01:25): http://media.bloomberg.com/bb/avfile/Markets/Analyst_Calls/vXNvCeDOi46M.mp3
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  • In the Media | June 2015
    By James K. Galbraith
    The American Prospect, June 12, 2015. All Rights Reserved.

    On our way back from Berlin on Tuesday, Greek Finance Minister Yanis Varoufakis remarked to me that current usage of the word “reform” has its origins in the middle period of the Soviet Union, notably under Khrushchev, when modernizing academics sought to introduce elements of decentralization and market process into a sclerotic planning system. In those years when the American struggle was for rights and some young Europeans still dreamed of revolution, “reform” was not much used in the West. Today, in an odd twist of convergence, it has become the watchword of the ruling class....

    Read more: http://prospect.org/article/what-reform-strange-case-greece-and-europe
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  • In the Media | June 2015
    Jörg Bibow
    The Conversation, June 10, 2015. All Rights Reserved.

    It was never going to be easy. That much was known from the outset.

    Greece’s newly elected government and the country’s creditors started from too far apart to quickly settle on anything that would be easily sellable to their respective constituencies....

    Read more: https://theconversation.com/time-to-end-europes-disgrace-of-holding-greek-people-hostage-42939
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  • In the Media | June 2015
    Genaro Grasso
    Tiempo, 07 de Junio de 2015. Todos los derechos reservados.

    El economista griego señala que los especuladores deberían estar regulados de la misma manera que las entidades financieras, tanto en forma global como a nivel país.

    Apunta contra los efectos de la globalización en tanto ha sido el canal de difusión de una nueva ola de determinismo neoliberal, en los países en desarrollo y también en los desarrollados....

    Leer más:
    http://tiempo.infonews.com/nota/154525/los-fondos-buitre-deben-ser-abolidos-del-sistema
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    Latin America, Europe
  • Strategic Analysis | May 2015

    The Greek economy has the potential to recover, and in this report we argue that access to alternative financing sources such as zero-coupon bonds (“Geuros”) and fiscal credit certificates could provide the impetus and liquidity needed to grow the economy and create jobs. But there are preconditions: the existing government debt must be rolled over and austerity policies put aside, restoring trust in the country’s economic future and setting the stage for sustainable income growth, which will eventually enable Greece to repay its debt.

  • In the Media | May 2015
    Background Briefing, May 10, 2015. All Rights Reserved.

    From Athens, Levy Institute President Dimitri B. Papadimitriou updates Ian Masters on the financial crisis as Greece teeters on the brink of default, with an $840 million payment to the IMF looming and fears that there is no credible plan to reach an agreement with the country’s eurozone creditors.

    Full audio of the interview is available here.
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  • In the Media | April 2015
    By Joseph Adinolfi
    MarketWatch, April 8, 2015. All Rights Reserved.

    NEW YORK (MarketWatch) — The idea has been bandied about for years by economists who fear a Greek exit from the euro could trigger a global financial crisis. 

    To create the fiscal flexibility that Greece’s economy so sorely needs to reinvigorate economic growth, meet its debt payments and, ultimately, stay in the eurozone, the Greek government could adopt what economists at the Levy Institute call a “parallel financial system” that would allow the government to make payments without using hard currency.

    Read more:
     http://www.marketwatch.com/story/this-unorthodox-plan-may-keep-greece-in-the-eurozone-2015-04-08  
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  • In the Media | April 2015
    By C. J. Polychroniou
    Al Jazeera, April 8, 2015. All Rights Reserved.

    Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras' visit to Moscow this week for talks with President Vladimir Putin has fuelled wild speculations about the real intentions of the Greek government.

    The visit is taking place while bailout talks between Greece and Europe have reached a very critical juncture.

    Read more:
     https://en-maktoob.news.yahoo.com/greeces-overtures-russia-may-not-sideshow-110052332--finance.html
     
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    C. J. Polychroniou
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    Europe
  • In the Media | March 2015
    By C. J. Polychroniou
    Al Jazeera, March 20, 2015. All Rights Reserved.

    The European Central Bank's (ECB) quantitative easing (QE) programme seems to have created a state of euphoria among global investors, but it will do very little to ameliorate Europe's economic problems.

    A close look into the state of Europe's economies reveals a much ignored fact by most professional economists and the media alike: Europe is the sick man of the global economy once again.

    Read more:
     https://uk.news.yahoo.com/quantitative-easing-wont-cure-europes-economic-woes-070940559.html#ITWWghr  
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    C. J. Polychroniou
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  • In the Media | March 2015
    By Klaus Jurgens
    Today's Zaman, March 18, 2015. All Rights Reserved.

    The current escalation of disagreement between Athens and Berlin symbolizes that there may be more at stake than simply extending repayment deadlines. Could perhaps the entire monetary union project and thus the vision of political union be at stake?

    Nothing less is what a brand-new study published by the Levy Economics Institute of Bard College suggests. In it Senior Scholar Jan Kregel analyzes the creation of the eurozone and how Germany is trying to deal with the recent currency problems -- actually, problems almost exclusively in a limited number of eurozone family members, notably Greece.

    Read more:
     http://www.todayszaman.com/columnist/klaus-jurgens/forced-austerity-nothing-but-a-ponzi-scheme_375591.html  
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  • In the Media | March 2015
    By Dimitri B. Papadimitriou
    The Huffington Post, March 18, 2015. All Rights Reserved.

    "Greece's government and people have indulged in excesses and corruption; now it is time to pay the price." The argument for full repayment of Greece's debt is well known, easily understood, and widely accepted, particularly in Germany. Sacrifice, austerity and repayment are righteous, fair, and just.

    That view is coloring this and next week's coming meetings between Greece and its international lenders, and with European leaders. A revision of Greece's debt terms has not been on the agenda. 

    Read more:
     http://www.huffingtonpost.com/dimitri-b-papadimitriou/greek-debt-do-the-right-t_b_6894678.html
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  • In the Media | February 2015
    Interview with James K. Galbraith
    The Real News Network, February 27, 2015. All Rights Reserved.

    Initially, Germany stood firm in saying that Greece would have to sign the existing loan program in order to secure an extension, but this was always an untenable position, says Research Scholar James K. Galbraith. 

    For the complete interview: http://therealnews.com/t2/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=31&Itemid=74&jumival=13320
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  • In the Media | February 2015
    Interview with Dimitri B. Papadimitriou
    Bloomberg Radio, February 24, 2015. All Rights Reserved.

    Levy Institute President Dimitri Papadimitriou discusses the approval of Greece’s reform package and the four-month extension of the bailout agreement with its eurozone partners in this interview with Kathleen Hays.

    To listen to the podcast: http://media.bloomberg.com/bb/avfile/Economics/On_Economy/vLaWHOte5hq4.mp3 
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  • Policy Note 2015/2 | February 2015

    The Greek economic crisis started as a public debt crisis five years ago. However, despite austerity and a bold “haircut,” public debt is now around 175 percent of Greek GDP. In this policy note, we argue that Greece’s public debt is clearly unsustainable, and that a significant restructuring of this debt is needed in order for the Greek economy to start growing again. Insistence on maintaining the current policy stance is not justifiable on either pragmatic or moral grounds.

    The experience of Germany in the early post–World War II period provides some useful insights for the way forward. In the aftermath of the war, there was a sweeping cancellation of the country’s public and foreign debt, which was part of a wider plan for the economic and political reconstruction of Germany and Europe. Seven decades later, while a solution to the unsustainability of the Greek public debt is a necessary condition for resolving the Greek and European crisis, it is not, in itself, sufficient. As the postwar experience shows, a broader agenda that deals with both Greece’s domestic economic malaise and the structural imbalances in the eurozone is also of vital importance.

  • In the Media | February 2015
    By Robert W. Parenteau
    Credit Writedowns, February 16, 2015. All Rights Reserved.

    The recent election of an explicitly anti-austerity party in Greece has upset the prevailing policy consensus in the eurozone, and raised a number of issues that have remained ignored or suppressed in policy circles. Expansionary fiscal consolidations have proven largely elusive. The difficulty of achieving GDP growth while reaching primary fiscal surplus targets is very evident in Greece. Avoiding rapidly escalating government debt to GDP ratios has consequently proven very challenging. Even if the arithmetic of avoiding a debt trap can be made to work, the rise of opposition parties in the eurozone suggests there are indeed political limits to fiscal consolidation. The Ponzi like nature of requesting new loans in order to service prior debt obligations, especially while nominal incomes are falling, is a third issue that Syriza has raised, and it is one that informed their opening position of rejecting any extension of the current bailout program. 

    Read more:
     https://www.creditwritedowns.com/2015/02/tax-anticipation-notes-timely-alternative-financing-instrument-greece.html
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  • In the Media | February 2015
    By Sasha Abramsky
    The Nation, February 2, 2015. All Rights Reserved.

    By many measures, the American economy has recovered from the 2008 implosion. The stock market is soaring, housing values in many markets have rebounded and GDP is growing at a healthy rate of more than 4 percent. Compared to Spain and Greece, where debt, mass unemployment and hardship remain widespread following the Eurozone crisis, America looks to be on easy street.

    Yet scratch below the surface and you’ll see that the United States still has a considerable economic problem. While the official unemployment rate has fallen to 5.6 percent, the lowest since 2008, the percentage of the adult population participating in the labor market remains far lower than it was at the start of the recession. At least in part, headline unemployment numbers look respectable because millions of Americans have grown so discouraged about their prospects of finding work that they no longer try, and thus are no longer counted among the unemployed. Depending on the measures, only 59 to 63 percent of the working-age population is employed, far below recent historical norms.

    Read more:
     http://www.thenation.com/article/196721/workers-think-tank
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  • In the Media | January 2015
    By C. J. Polychroniou
    The New York Times, January 28, 2015. All Rights Reserved.

    The reason for the meteoric rise of Syriza is clear. The Greek electorate has had enough of the imposition of the harsh austerity measures that are behind the bailout loan agreements that have been in effect since May 2010 when Greece was on the brink of an official default. Undoubtedly, a Greek default would have had a catastrophic impact on Europe’s major banks and could have led to the dissolution of the eurozone, at least in its present form, so a bailout by Greece’s euro partners was inevitable.

    Read more:
     http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2015/01/27/can-greeces-anti-austerity-government-succeed/syriza-is-offering-a-new-deal-for-the-people-of-greece
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    Author(s):
    C. J. Polychroniou
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  • In the Media | January 2015
    By Ned Resnikoff
    Al Jazeera America, January 26, 2015. All Rights Reserved.

    Greece’s socialist left has won power. Now it needs to wield it.

    For Syriza, the left-wing, anti-austerity party that seized control of the government in Sunday’s snap parliamentary elections, that means following through on its number one campaign promise: to renegotiate the terms of Greece’s economic bailout with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the European Central Bank (ECB). Those three financial institutions, collectively known as the “Troika,” have made their economic assistance contingent on Greece’s willingness to pass a series of draconian austerity cuts.

    Read more:
     http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2015/1/26/greek-voters-set-stage-for-tense-austerity-negotiation.html
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  • In the Media | January 2015
    By Maria Helena dos Santos André
    Social Europe, January 26, 2015. All Rights Reserved.

    In a time when in Paris Marine Le Pen is “Ante Portas”, when xenophobic populists are marching through the streets of Dresden, when in London the UKIP sets the tone for an ever more anti-European hysteria, and when in Helsinki the Finnish government becomes the most ardent proponent of more austerity for Greece, for no other reason but the fear of a success of the “Real Finns” at the next ballot box, the Greek people have given a clear signal, voting against more austerity and for the European values of democracy, the welfare state, tolerance and inclusive societies.

    Read more:
     http://www.socialeurope.eu/2015/01/thank-greece/
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  • In the Media | January 2015
    Background Briefing with Ian Masters, January 5, 2015. All Rights Reserved.

    Papadimitriou joins Masters to discuss the upcoming January 25 election in Greece that is likely to bring the anti-austerity left-wing Syriza party to power, sparking fears that Greece will reject the terms of the EU, ECB, and IMF bailouts and exit the euro.

    Listen to the complete interview here: http://ianmasters.com/content/january-5-markets-tank-greece-poised-leave-euro-weaponization-finance-gop-114th-congress-80-
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  • Strategic Analysis | December 2014
    With the anti-austerity Syriza party continuing to lead in polls ahead of Greece’s election on January 25, what is the outlook for restoring growth and increasing employment following six years of deep recession?   Despite some timid signs of recovery, notably in the tourism sector, recent short-term indicators still show a decline for 2014. Our analysis shows that the speed of a market-driven recovery would be insufficient to address the urgent problems of poverty and unemployment. And the protracted austerity required to service Greece’s sovereign debt would merely ensure the continuation of a national crisis, with spillover effects to the rest of the eurozone—especially now, when the region is vulnerable to another recession and a prolonged period of Japanese-style price deflation.   Using the Levy Institute’s macroeconometric model for Greece, we evaluate the impact of policy alternatives aimed at stimulating the country’s economy without endangering its current account, including capital transfers from the European Union, suspension of interest payments on public debt and use of these resources to boost demand and employment, and a New Deal plan using public funds to target investment in production growth and finance a direct job creation program. 

  • In the Media | December 2014
    Interview with Dimitris Rapidis
    Bridging Europe, December 16, 2014. All Rights Reserved.

    As part of the Bridging Dialogue Initiative, Dimitris Rapidis discusses with Levy Institute President Dimitri B. Papadimitriou the ECB's interest rates policy, deflation, EC President Jean-Claude Junckers's fiscal stimulus plan, debt management and the Stability Pact, the US economy, and the economic crisis in Greece. 

    Read more:
     http://www.bridgingeurope.net/interview-with-dimitri-b-papadimitriou-president-of-the-levy-economics-institute.html
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  • Conference Proceedings | November 2014
    A conference organized by the Levy Economics Institute with support from the Ford Foundation

    In the context of a sluggish economic recovery and global uncertainty, with growth and employment well below normal levels, the 2014 Minsky Conference addressed both financial reform and prosperity, drawing from Hyman Minsky’s work on financial instability and his proposal for achieving full employment. Panels focused on the design of a new, more robust, and stable financial architecture; fiscal austerity and the sustainability of the US and European economic recovery; central bank independence and financial reform; the larger implications of the eurozone debt crisis for the global economic system; the impact of the return to more traditional US monetary policy on emerging markets and developing economies; improving governance of the social safety net; the institutional shape of the future financial system; strategies for promoting an inclusive economy and more equitable income distribution; and regulatory challenges for emerging-market economies. The proceedings include the conference program, transcripts of keynote speakers’ remarks, synopses of the panel sessions, and biographies of the participants. 
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    Associated Program(s):
    Author(s):
    Barbara Ross Michael Stephens
    Region(s):
    United States, Europe

  • Working Paper No. 819 | November 2014
    How a Five-year Suspension of the Debt Burden Could Overthrow Austerity

    The present study puts forward a plan for solving the sovereign debt crisis in the euro area (EA) in line with the interests of the working classes and the social majority. Our main strategy is for the European Central Bank (ECB) to acquire a significant part of the outstanding sovereign debt (at market prices) of the countries in the EA and convert it to zero-coupon bonds. No transfers will take place between individual states; taxpayers in any EA country will not be involved in the debt restructuring of any foreign eurozone country. Debt will not be forgiven: individual states will agree to buy it back from the ECB in the future when the ratio of sovereign debt to GDP has fallen to 20 percent. The sterilization costs for the ECB are manageable. This model of an unconventional monetary intervention would give progressive governments in the EA the necessary basis for developing social and welfare policies to the benefit of the working classes. It would reverse present-day policy priorities and replace the neoliberal agenda with a program of social and economic reconstruction, with the elites paying for the crisis. The perspective taken here favors social justice and coherence, having as its priority the social needs and the interests of the working majority.

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    Associated Program:
    Author(s):
    Dimitris P. Sotiropoulos John Milios Spyros Lapatsioras
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    Europe

  • Working Paper No. 816 | September 2014
    Policy Alternatives Addressing Divergences and Disparities between Member Countries

    In this paper we outline alternative policy recommendations addressing the problems of differential inflation, divergence in competitiveness, and associated current account imbalances within the euro area. The major purpose of these alternative policy proposals is to generate sustainably high demand and output growth in the euro area as a whole, providing high levels of noninflationary employment, as well as preventing “export-led mercantilist” and “debt-led consumption boom” types of development, both within the euro area and with respect to the role of the euro area in the world economy. We provide a basic framework in order to systematically address the related issues, making use of Anthony Thirlwall’s model of a “balance-of-payments-constrained growth rate.” Based on this framework, we outline the required stance for alternative economic policies and then discuss the implications for alternative monetary, wage/incomes, and fiscal policies in the euro area as a whole, as well as the consequences for structural and regional policies in the euro-area periphery in particular.

  • In the Media | September 2014
    By Dimitri B. Papadimitriou
    New Geography, September 25, 2014

    It's September, but island beaches from the Aegeans to Zante are still buzzing in Greece. Mykonos has been the summer's Go-To spot for superstars and supermodels; the mainland and cities are also seeing the British and Europeans coming back....

    Read more:
     http://www.newgeography.com/content/004533-will-lindsay-lohan-save-greece
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  • Public Policy Brief No. 137 | September 2014
    A Proposal to Repair Half of a Flawed Design
    The flaws of the Maastrict Treaty are a frequent object of commentary but, as yet, Europe remains unable—or, perhaps more accurately, unwilling—to address these flaws. The European project will remain unfinished and the ability of the European Central Bank to implement effective monetary policies will continue to be hobbled. As Mario Tonveronachi observes in this public policy brief, Europe has a currency union, but this does not mean that Europe has achieved a single financial market, an essential element for a functioning union. He reminds us that a single European market requires pricing in relation to common risk-free assets rather than in relation to a collection of individual idiosyncratic sovereign rates. And financial operators must have access to the same risk-free assets for trading and liquidity operations. The euro provides neither of these functions, and thus, while there has been a measure of convergence, a single financial market, and the financial integration it represents, remains unachieved. 

  • In the Media | August 2014
    By C. J. Polychroniou
    Truthout, August 27, 2014

    Is the Greek crisis nearly over as the International Monetary Fund, the European Commission and the Greek government like to proclaim because of the sharp decline in Greek bond yields, the attainment of a primary surplus and an increase in foreign tourism? If so, what about the 27.2 per cent of the population that remains unemployed and the widespread poverty across the nation, the ever growing public debt ratio and the dismal state of Greek exports? And what about the United States? Is America on the way to becoming Greece as many Republicans claimed a couple of years ago? Dimitri B. Papadimitriou, executive vice president and Jerome Levy professor of economics at Bard College, and president of the Levy Economics Institute at Bard, who foresees Greece emerging into a debt prison and a rather gloomy economic future for the United States, discusses these questions in an exclusive interview for Truthout with C. J. Polychroniou.

    Read the entire post here: 
    http://www.truth-out.org/news/item/25796-greek-crisis-and-the-dark-clouds-over-the-american-economy-an-interview-with-dimitri-b-papadimitriou
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  • In the Media | August 2014
    By Dimitri B. Papadimitriou
    The Huffington Post, August 21, 2014

    Do European lenders want unemployment to keep rising in Greece?

    It looks that way. The commitment to economic austerity policies by the "troika"–the European Central Bank, the European Commission, and the International Monetary Fund–hasn't wavered. Meanwhile, the country's unemployment rate has soared to yet another unexpected high. In a population of 9.3 million, 1.3 million are out of work....

    Read the full article here: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/dimitri-b-papadimitriou/are-eu-bankers-trying-to-_b_5696270.html
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  • Strategic Analysis | August 2014
    What are the prospects for economic recovery if Greece continues to follow the troika strategy of fiscal austerity and internal devaluation, with the aim of increasing competitiveness and thus net exports? Our latest strategic analysis indicates that the unprecedented decline in real and nominal wages may take a long time to exert its effects on trade—if at all—while the impact of lower prices on tourism will not generate sufficient revenue from abroad to meet the targets for a surplus in the current account that outweighs fiscal austerity. The bottom line: a shift in the fiscal policy stance, toward lower taxation and job creation, is urgently needed. 

  • Conference Proceedings | August 2014
    This conference was organized as part of the Levy Institute’s international research agenda and in conjunction with the Ford Foundation Project on Financial Instability, which draws on Hyman Minsky’s extensive work on the structure of financial systems to ensure stability, and the role of government in achieving a growing and equitable economy.
      Among the key topics addressed: the challenges to global growth and employment posed by the continuing eurozone debt crisis; the impact of austerity on output and employment; the ramifications of the credit crunch for economic and financial markets; the larger implications of government deficits and debt crises for US and European economic policies; and central bank independence and financial reform. 

  • Working Paper No. 810 | June 2014
    Monetization Fears and Europe’s Narrowing Options

    With the creation of the Economic and Monetary Union and the euro, the national government debt of eurozone member-states became credit sensitive. While the potentially destabilizing impact of adverse cyclical conditions on credit-sensitive debt was seriously underestimated, the design was intentional, framed within a Friedman-Fischer-Buchanan view that “no monetization” rules provide a powerful means to discipline government behavior. While most countries follow some kind of “no monetization” rule, the one embraced by the eurozone was special, as it also prevented monetization on the secondary market for debt. This made all eurozone public debt defaultable—at least until the European Central Bank (ECB) announced the Outright Monetary Transactionsprogram, which can be seen as an enhanced rule-based approach that makes governments solvent on the condition that they balance their budgets. This has further narrowed Europe’s options for policy solutions that are conducive to job creation. An approach that would require no immediate changes in the European Union’s (EU) political structure would be for the EU to fund “net government spending in the interest of Europe” through the issue of a eurobond backed by the ECB.

  • Public Policy Brief No. 134 | June 2014

    This September, voters in Scotland will decide whether to break away from the United Kingdom. If supporters of independence carry the day, pivotal choices that affect the scope of Scotland’s economic sovereignty and its future relationship to the UK will need to be made, particularly with respect to the question of its currency. As the disaster in the eurozone makes clear, it is essential to get these arrangements right.

    In this policy brief, Philip Pilkington outlines a monetary framework designed to meet the macroeconomic challenges that would be faced by a newly separate Scotland. His conclusion: while it would be in Scotland’s best interests to continue using the sterling in the short run, making the transition to issuing its own, freely floating currency would place the country on a more stable economic footing.

  • Public Policy Brief No. 133 | May 2014
    The “happy talk” emanating from eurozone officials regarding the economic crises in the periphery deserves some vigorous pushback. Focusing on the four bailed-out countries of Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain, Research Associate and Policy Fellow C. J. Polychroniou argues in this policy brief that, contrary to the burgeoning optimism in official communications, these countries’ economies are still not on track for vigorous, sustainable recoveries in growth and employment—and that there is nothing surprising in this result. 

  • In the Media | May 2014
    By C. J. Polychroniou
    Truthout, May 4, 2014. All Rights Reserved.

    When the global financial crisis of 2008 reached Europe's shores sometime in late 2009, Greece was the first victim of the euro system's failure. Facing persistently large deficits and very high public debt levels, the country ended up being shut out of the global bond markets, raising the prospect of a sovereign bankruptcy. In light of these developments, in May 2010, the Eurozone countries and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) agreed to provide a 110 billion euro bailout loan to Greece in exchange for severe austerity measures and strict conditions. The "rescue" plan, as has been openly admitted by now, was designed not for the purpose of reviving Greece's ailing economy but to save Europe's banks. Thus, as many economists had anticipated, the bailout plan made things worse, spreading havoc with its "economics of social disaster." Less than two years later - and with the debt-to-GDP ratio having increased substantially - a second international bailout plan went into effect for the sum of 130 billion euros. All the money lent to Greece was being used to pay off debt obligations on time while the radical budget cuts and sharp tax hikes that were adopted were meant to readjust the nation's fiscal condition, with no regard for the economic and social costs which these policies entailed.

    Four years later, Greece looks like a badly battered boxer. Its economy has shrunk by 20%; the unemployment rate has reached stratospheric levels; poverty has become widespread; the debt-to-GDP ratio has increased dramatically and Greeks are leaving the country in record numbers. However, both EU and Greek government officials are claiming that the country is moving in the right direction, hailing its recent re-emergence in international credit markets as a sign the economy is recovering. Indeed, the government now talks of the Greek "success story," hoping that this narrative will tilt the electoral balance as Greece's main opposition Radical Left Coalition party (Syriza) is expected to win the European Parliamentary and local elections in May.

    For an analysis of the latest developments in Greece, C. J. Polychroniou (a research associate and policy fellow at the Levy Economics Institute and a columnist for the Greek nationally distributed newspaper, The Sunday Eleftherotypia) interviewed Dimitri B. Papadimitriou, president of the Levy Economics Institute of Bard College, executive vice president and Jerome Levy Chair Professor of Economics, for Truthout. An edited and shorter version of the interview appears simultaneously in Greek on the Sunday edition of Eleftherotypia).  

    C.J. Polychroniou for Truthout: After four years as the pariah of the financial markets, in the course of which 330 billion euros was granted/guaranteed in international bailouts in order to avoid an official bankruptcy, Greece has made a successful return to the international bond markets. Why did Greece return to the bond markets now when the country's debt-to-GDP ratio is much bigger than it was back in 2010?

    Dimitri B. Papadimitriou:
     The return to the bond markets was an act of pure symbolism. The government purposely made the success of the austerity program dependent on achieving a primary surplus as opposed to the return to growth in output and employment. Recall that the idea of expansionary austerity embraced by the country's international lenders was spectacularly discredited. Thus, the Troika (IMF, EU and European Central Bank ) and Greece's compliant government needed to invent a new metric of success, and it was associated with achieving a primary surplus as large as it could be so that financial markets can be impressed. However, no one else is impressed, especially the international lenders, for three main reasons: (1) The primary surplus was achieved by a one-off (non-recurring) excess revenue from the gains of Greek bonds in the portfolios of Eurozone's central banks and the European Central Bank's (ECB) holding that were returned to Greece; (2) collections of old tax revenue; and (3) non-recurring spending cuts and delayed payment of the government's debt to the private sector, whether VAT refunds or non-payments to private sector vendors.

    Finally, the return to the markets was costly to the country - the apparent low interest rate of 4.95% notwithstanding - since the interest rate of the funds borrowed from the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) is at a very much lower interest rate. To be sure, the hedge funds and the private sector [parties] buying the new bonds knew that there was an implicit guarantee from the ECB that would accept these bonds under its Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) program. So the bonds were not backed by the progress of the Greek economy - it would be ludicrous to assume so, for an economy in continuing recession and increasing debt to GDP ratio, especially if its credit rating is still below investment grade. So, all in all, it was an act of desperation and a strategy to give the government extra help in the soon-to-be-held local and European Parliament elections.

    The government has hailed the return to the financial markets as a sign that the crisis is over. Yet, the unemployment rate right now stands at 28%; the education and health care systems have been decimated; 1 out of 3 Greeks live below the poverty line and, according to some estimates, the debt could grow to 190% of GDP by the end of 2015. Do these numbers spell out an economic "success story" or a national tragedy?

    All these statistics point to the failure of the harsh program of fiscal consolidation, but if you are interested in presenting a portrait of success, you need to invent a condition that will persuade the non-critical mind that things are much better. No one likes Cassandras, even though they turn out to be quite accurate in the end. As has become clear by now, the Greek mass media industry has played an inappropriate role in persuading people that economic conditions are much better than they think, that the country has reached bottom and it is just about to turn the corner. How many times have we heard that we are seeing the light at the end of the tunnel? But the tunnel is unfortunately very, very long and it will take either a decade or more for conditions to be turned around if present policy continues, with more erosion of living standards and very high structural unemployment, or a relatively quick improvement with an immediate reversal of policy. For this, the omens are very clear, but the political will is not. And one should not expect any change of policy to happen without a change in political leadership. Brussels, Berlin and Frankfurt have a lot to lose with a change of the prevailing policy, and thus they must continue to enforce it despite the destroyed lives that it leaves behind as it moves forward. So we are seeing a tragedy which I am afraid will expand unless the European Parliamentary elections give a different message either with a significant showing of the extreme right or left parties. Marine Le Pen's impressive showing in the relatively recent local [French] elections speaks to my point. It would be ironic if voters, despite the catastrophic consequences they continue to endure, give the present European leadership another message of approval. It will be self-flagellation with a vengeance.

    The feeling one gets as a result of the implementation of austerity in the case of Greece and the other fiscallytroubled countries in the Eurozone is that this is not simply a fine-tuning policy. If that is indeed the case, what is then the ultimate strategy of austerity?

    In my view, the idea of austerity was not a policy of fine-tuning. To the contrary, it was a policy of radical change to allow markets to reign supreme with no government interference. This is a doctrine first put to test by the late US President Reagan and UK Prime Minister Thatcher. They both embraced the view that government is the problem to economic ills and not the solution. But the real world has taught us time and again that government at difficult times and downturns is the only solution. We saw it to be the case in the US, Germany, China, Japan and every other economy in trouble. Why Greece and the other fiscally troubled economies should become experiments of contrarian policy whose results were predicted is something that really boggles the mind. No one would dare apply the idea of austerity to the extent it has been applied to countries such as the US or even Germany and other countries of the industrial world irrespective of how high their debt-to-GDP ratios are. Why aren't we forcing Germany and France with their mighty GDP machines to have high public surpluses so they can decrease their debt to GDP ratios to the 69% limit as required by the Maastricht Treaty? After all, Germany is a growing economy. So it is clear that member states in the Eurozone are not equal. When Germany was the sick man in Europe, it was acceptable for the government to follow the Keynesian prescription, but now that its status has changed to that of hegemon, the laissez-faire paradigm returned in vogue. There will always be many thoughtless leaders, but sooner rather than later people take steps to remove them from positions of strength and power.

    The advocates of austerity claim that this policy will improve the external fundamentals of fiscally troubled countries in the Eurozone. Has this happened in the case of Greece?

    People who are not knowledgeable about structure of economies on which they impose policies should never be surprised with contrarian results. The Greek economy cannot be improved just because policy makers impose policies that supposedly restructure labor markets - read here, suppression of wages and eliminating labor rights and standards - if import and export elasticities are different than those assumed in the policy implementation. The sum of import and export elasticities in Greece is barely above one, which makes a substantial increase in net exports the goal of a wild imagination, at least in a relevant time frame. No wonder Greece's net exports have failed to offset the public spending cuts, and thus not contributed to the growth of GDP. And those increases are primarily from oil-related products that are volatile in concert with oil price volatility. To be sure, tourism is important, but despite last year's "huge" increase in foreign tourist arrivals to Greece, net employment continued to plummet. The external fundamentals are not dependent on labor reforms, but on large investment, public partnership with the private sector, which will not be forthcoming any time soon. It won't happen with the privatization of the old Athens airport or with other similar "privatization" schemes.

    Radical structural reforms, which include labor and product markets and blanket privatizations, constitute the second component of the conditions behind Greece's bailout plans. First, is there in economic literature a direct connection between labor market flexibility, productivity growth and national economic performance?

    The economic literature, as economists know, can produce conflicting results. It will not be surprising to find cases when statistics will prove that there is a positive outcome in terms of increasing productivity with flexible labor conditions, but this is always dependent on the level of technology diffusion. To be sure, German workers have the highest productivity in Europe along with those in the Netherlands, but it is not because they are paid less than other Eurozone workers but because of the high level of effective technology used. So they are about 70% more productive as compared to Greeks, Portuguese or Spaniards despite the fact that the latter work substantially many more hours during the week. Clearly, Germany's and other North European economies enjoy better economic performance, but this is not due to so-called labor flexibility only. Germany is successful because it is lucky, having an extraordinary number of idle and low-wage workers from East Germany when the unification took place. Unification gave Germany the ability to hold West German wages down. But this should not be used as an example of a successful application of a labor flexibility policy. The literature also abounds in studies showing that labor productivity is not dependent on labor flexibility. Indeed, the theory and policy of "efficiency" wages, promoted by none other than Nobel Laureate George Akerlof and current Fed Chair Janet Yellen, is part of the economic research which shows there are productivity gains and other positive outcomes to firms which pay higher than market wages. All in all, then, the argument of flexible wages does not, I am afraid, hold water.

    The international experience with privatizing electricity, gas, water, sanitation, and public health services indicates that there are anti-social effects behind privatization. So why are Greek governments so eager to privatize virtually everything in Greece?

    As has been shown in certain cases, the public sector can be inefficient, but this is not tantamount to the private sector being efficient either. There are key industries that must be in the public domain because their goods or services are considered public goods. In many advanced countries, such as in the US, the goods and services mentioned are mostly in the private sector's hands, but it does not mean that they are efficient or price competitive. To the contrary, whenever a service was privatized or became unregulated, it never gave the desired effects in being price competitive. For countries like Greece marked with high income distribution inequality, some of the services (such as health services, for example) must be the business of the public sector. Other services can be privatized, but they must be highly regulated. The privatization process in Greece is a fire sale of public property just because the international lenders have imposed it. If profitable, and in the public interest, then some of these services can be privatized, but should continue to be regulated. In the US, however, no one would dream of privatizing the national lotteries; they are the most profitable and high revenue sources of government revenue, yet in Greece it was the first public company to go on sale. There is no general rule that these services should be privatized. They need to be run efficiently either under the aegis of the government or the private sector - absent the corruption, nepotism or other ills of the up-to-now Greek clientist political system. The absence of transparency should not be the reason for privatizing them.

    You have argued in a number of publications in the recent past that what Greece needs is a European type of a Marshall Plan. Doesn't this suggestion run counter to existing political structures and economic realities in Europe?

    I am pleasantly surprised to read of late that even the government speaks of a European Marshall-type plan of aid to Greece. The existing political structure in Europe may be seeing such an aid program as anathema, but I believe it recognizes that if the European project is to be kept intact, it must begin to think along those lines. An economic and monetary union requires various types of support from the economically strong to the weak. This will eventually take place willingly or not, and the evidence shows that it not to the benefit of the weak only - but more so to the strong. The announcement of the creation of a Greek Investment Fund with the support of Germany's KfW is a step in the right direction even though the details of the plan are rather sketchy. Thus, even though I have been labeled by many the Cassandra of Greece, I want to be optimistic that such aid may not be that farfetched.

    The European Union and the International Monetary Fund have disagreed all along about the sustainability of the Greek debt load. Who is right, if any?

    There is no question in anyone's mind that the debt load is unsustainable. It was known from early on that a debt restructuring will be needed. The haircut that took place was ill-conceived and hurt the country more than it helped since it decimated the balance sheets of Greek and Cypriot banks along with public pension trust funds and middle-class Greek citizens. It occurred much too late after the German, French and Italian banks unloaded their Greek holdings to their counterparts in Greece and Cyprus. When it happened, it was a thoughtless decision despite the government celebrating it as a major accomplishment. I haven't agreed on anything with former ECB Vice President Papademos' views about the Greek economy except with his opposition to such a haircut when it happened. All in all, the IMF is, of course, correct - but Brussels, Berlin and Frankfurt are trapped, having convinced every European citizen that Greece's debt load is sustainable. The government will celebrate a new accomplishment after the European elections when the debt will be restructured by extending its maturity to perhaps 50 years and lowering the interest rate. This is in economic terms a present-value "haircut," but not a debt-load reduction. It is the proverbial kicking the can further down the road, which will subject the country to continued vigilance and restrict its sovereignty over its fiscal policy stance.

    Syriza represents itself as a viable alternative to the current economic, social and political malaise in Greece by claiming that, when it comes to power, it will put an end to austerity and will force the European Union to rethink its policies towards Greece. However, while a good percentage of Greek voters have shifted to the left, many others seem to believe that Syriza's political rhetoric rests either on naive thinking or plain opportunism. What are your own thoughts on this matter?

    I believe Syriza is the only viable alternative that Greece has at the present time if a change in policy direction is to be achieved. Its mandate to change policy would be very difficult indeed. But it can be done, although not free of risks. But risks are endemic in any policy prescription that would be implemented, and I believe the current policy being followed entails higher risks for the economic future of Greece. What I fear more is the disappearance of what used to be a middle class, let alone the immiseration of low-income, low-skilled workers. What these groups need right now is a lifeline - which, unfortunately, is not in the cards. Given the additional financing that will be needed in 2014 and 2015, more austerity will be needed which will affect even further the country's living standards, a process which will have even further adverse effects for the middle class and the low-income and low-skilled segments of the population. With conditions worsening, even more people are expected to question the prevailing policy. And if there is one political force which can offer a viable alternative to the current nightmare, it is none other than Syriza. Yes, perhaps there is an element of political naivete characterizing Syriza, but there is seriousness of purpose and the work of the gifted in its midst is very refreshing and encouraging. To be sure, political analysts talk about the importance of the incumbent candidates and this would be a very difficult problem to overcome. I want to believe, however, that despite the internal squabbling which frequently occurs among the different groups inside Syriza, the party will, at the end, prevail. At least I hope so. To those who oppose them, I can only respond by saying be careful what you wish for.

    If the economic "success story" of Greece turns out in the end to be nothing more than a politically constructed myth, and the prospects of the European integration project remain what they are today, why shouldn't Greeks opt to leave the euro?

    There is plenty of evidence that the success story is a politically constructed myth with the acquiescence of the European leadership. The question about the country remaining in the euro club is interesting and very important. I believe that Greece cannot leave the euro since the costs associated with an exit are very consequential. As I have written elsewhere, Greece has a number of options that it can follow, if the European leadership continues with its intransigence and continuing policy of the dangerous idea of austerity. If all other options fail, the introduction of a carefully designed parallel financial system is a very viable alternative in order to get a handle on both domestic financial market liquidity and employment growth and output. This is not a novel idea. The Greek government used a similar program in 2010, although very haphazardly conceived, but it was introduced nevertheless. It is not a crackpot idea and has been embraced by both conservative and liberal thinkers. This will address some of the most serious challenges the Greek economy and society face without endangering the country's membership in the euro. So, there are other alternatives available before the unthinkable becomes the only option.
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  • In the Media | April 2014
    Class Editori, April 11, 2014. All Rights Reserved.

    MILANO (MF-DJ)--La Banca centrale europea e' pronta a intervenire per affrontare il problema della bassa inflazione che continua a rimanere sotto il target ufficiale della Bce. Lo ha dichiarato il vice presidente della Bce Vitor Constancio, aggiungendo che i policy maker stanno ancora cercando di capire quali misure devono prendere e confermando che l'acquisto di titoli e' una possibilita'. "Faremo qualcosa perche' l'inflazione e' troppo bassa, e anche considerando solo il compito principale sulla stabilita' dei prezzi, noi chiaramente, nel medio termine, non stiamo raggiungendo il nostro target di inflazione del 2%. Quindi dobbiamo affrontare seriamente il nostro compito", ha detto Constancio in una conferenza a Washington sponsorizzata dal Levy Economics Institute. Il vice presidente ha sottolineato che neanche se il sistema bancario europeo ritornasse in piena salute si potrebbe garantire una ripresa della crescita economica. La Banca centrale ha posto grande enfasi sulla valutazione dei bilanci degli istituti europei prima di diventare supervisore unico alla fine dell'anno. Si spera che l'esercizio costringera' le banche a ripulire i bilanci e a raccogliere capitali, con l'obiettivo di renderli piu' forti in modo da concedere maggiori prestiti all'economia reale. Ma secondo Constancio questo modo di agire e' troppo semplicistico. "I bilanci delle banche sono gia' stati largamente riparati". Inoltre, ha aggiunto il membro della Bce, non e' assolutamente chiaro che "la finanza sia una condizione sufficiente per far ripartire la crescita europea". L'Eurozona deve affrontare numerosi problemi che "potenzialmente sono molto piu' seri dei danni inflitti dalla crisi finanziaria e la conseguente crisi del settore bancario". Questi problemi sono anche molto piu' difficili da affrontare", ha concluso il vice presidente. 
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  • In the Media | April 2014
    The Wall Street Journal, April 11, 2014. All Rights Reserved.

    ECB’s Constancio: “We Will Do Something” About Low Inflation.  The ECB is poised to take action to tackle the problem of low inflation that continues to consistently undershoot its official target, ECB Vice President Vitor Constancio said Thursday. He said policy makers are still trying to figure out which measures to take, adding that bond buying is a possibility.   “We will do something because the situation is that inflation is indeed very low, and even considering only our primary mandate of price stability we are clearly not achieving our target of having, on a medium-term basis, inflation below but close to 2%,” Mr. Constancio told a conference in Washington sponsored by the Levy Economics Institute. http://on.wsj.com/1n92J4q 

    ECB Constancio Says Healthy Bank Sector Won’t Guarantee Quick Economic Rebound. 
    http://on.wsj.com/1sHfLdz

    ECB’s Praet: Euro-Zone Economies ‘Will See Economic Slack Until 2017.’ The euro zone economy will see economic slack persist until 2017 at least, European Central Bank executive board member Peter Praet said Thursday, suggesting that the ECB will maintain its easy-money policies well into the future. Still, Mr. Praet signaled that the ECB is in no rush to provide additional stimulus through rate cuts or other measures, saying that the bank’s inflation outlook remains in place despite a string of weak reports. http://on.wsj.com/1ixBFaW  
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  • In the Media | April 2014
    ECB VP: Euro Zone Faces Problems That Are More Profound Than Just Weakness in the Banking Sector
    By Todd Buell and Christopher Lawton

    The Wall Street Journal, April 10, 2014. All Rights Reserved.


    The euro zone faces problems that are more profound than just weakness in the banking sector and that are harder to address, European Central Bank Vice President Vitor Constancio said Thursday.

    In remarks prepared for delivery in Washington, Mr. Constancio said that even if banks in the euro zone could completely erase the damage from the financial crisis, it wouldn't be a guarantee that strong growth and low unemployment would return quickly.

    The ECB has placed great emphasis on its assessment of banks' balance sheets, which it is carrying out before becoming the single currency's banking supervisor later this year. It is hoped that the exercise, culminating in a stress test, will force banks to clean up their balance sheets, raise capital, which should put them in a stronger position to lend to the real economy.

    But Mr. Constancio said this story line is too simplistic.

    Firstly, "bank balance sheets in the euro area have to a large degree already been repaired," he said. Furthermore, he said it was "far from clear that finance is a sufficient condition for jump-starting growth in Europe."

    "Even a complete rehabilitation of the euro area's banking system…will not guarantee a quick return to high growth and low unemployment," he added. The euro zone's economy faces numerous issues, he said, that are "are potentially more serious than the damage inflicted by the financial crisis and the subsequent euro area crisis on the euro area banking sector. These issues are also far more difficult to address."

    Mr. Constancio mentioned three issues that he called the "chief obstacles" to growth in Europe: the "remarkable" slowdown in emerging markets, the "large" drop in domestic private investment in Europe since the financial crisis, and weak domestic demand.

    The last point "is often left out of the public discourse, but micro evidence suggests that it is a problem that cannot be underestimated." He added that survey data suggest that euro-zone firms face problems on the demand side that are more serious than problems coming from bank lending.

    Mr. Constancio said that while bank deleveraging "certainly plays an important role in the inadequate current levels of credit supply to the real economy, factors related to the demand side are even more important," he said.

    Lending to the private sector has been declining in annual terms for nearly two years in the euro zone and many experts have said that this is a signal of the weakness of the recovery in the currency bloc and a factor that may force the ECB to pump more money into the 18-nation currency bloc.

    Mr. Constancio, however, said that a "creditless" recovery is "far from unusual," especially after a financial crisis.

    He said that based on current trends, the euro zone faces a future over the medium term of "stable but low growth, with unemployment evolving to lower levels in 15 years as a result of a declining active population."

    "Europe has to react swiftly if it wants to avoid a whole generation being wasted and sacrificed," he said.

    Turning to monetary policy, he said that while ECB policy will continue "to provide stimulus", the central bank can't be called upon to "do everything." Indeed, "people seem to expect too much from central banks." Rather, governments must accept responsibility to promote investment, increase demand, and implement active labor market policies, he said.

    In an apparent reference to Samuel Beckett, Mr. Constancio said that commentators have been "waiting for the Godot of a new wave of technical innovations that will save the day" out of a trap of low growth and low inflation.

    "Maybe it will come," he said. "But I am sure that we also need active policies and new economic thinking to deal with the income distribution problems that the coming technology will aggravate as well as the role of finance and demand in monetary economies where it is wrong to try to reduce macroeconomics to narrow real and long-term supply-side considerations, as our present predicament so impressively demonstrates."
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  • In the Media | April 2014
    By Brian Blackstone and Christopher Lawton
    The Wall Street Journal, April 10, 2014. All Rights Reserved.

    WASHINGTON—The euro zone economy will see economic slack persist until 2017 at least, European Central Bank executive board member  Peter Praet  said Thursday, suggesting that the ECB will maintain its easy-money policies well into the future.

    Still, Mr. Praet signaled that the ECB is in no rush to provide additional stimulus through rate cuts or other measures, saying that the bank's inflation outlook remains in place despite a string of weak reports.

    "The degree of slack in the economy is very high," Mr. Praet said in a speech at a conference in Washington, D.C., sponsored by the Levy Economics Institute. "Whatever the measure you take of output gap, this output gap is unlikely to be closed in the euro zone before 2017."

    The output gap refers to the difference between the present level of gross domestic product with where it should typically be based on the economy's growth potential. When economies experience recession, as the euro zone did from late 2011 until early last year, this gap rises, limiting inflationary pressures and giving central banks added leeway to ease monetary policy.

    Mr. Praet, who heads the ECB's economics department, also noted that bank lending to the private sector remains weak in the euro zone, although there seems to be some substitution toward greater debt issuance in the capital markets.

    Mr. Praet is in Washington, D.C. for the spring meetings of the International Monetary Fund, which brings together top central bankers and finance ministers from around the world. The IMF has in recent weeks pressed the ECB to consider more dramatic stimulus measures to keep inflation from staying too low. But outside of a small rate reduction last November, the ECB has largely resisted such steps, saying inflation should gradually accelerate toward its target of just under 2%.

    Annual euro-zone inflation was 0.5% in March, more than a four-year low.

    "We have a sequence of monthly inflation that have been weaker than what we have expected. But we are still in our base scenario," Mr. Praet. The ECB expects a gradual acceleration in annual consumer-price growth toward 1.7% by the end of 2016.

    "There is a lot of noise also in the monthly figures," he said.

    At its monthly meeting last week, the ECB held interest rates steady, but it beefed up its commitment to ease policy if needed. The ECB's rate board "is unanimous in its commitment to using also unconventional instruments within its mandate to cope effectively with risks of a too prolonged period of low inflation," the bank said in its policy statement last week.

    Mr. Praet called this signal "quite important." Still, he added that expectations of future inflation remain well anchored. The design of any future ECB stimulus program will depend on the problem the bank is trying to tackle, he said.

    In his speech, Mr. Praet said divergent economic growth and productivity continues to plague the euro zone, and urged the monetary bloc's various members to embark on reforms to narrow the gap between richer and poorer countries.

    "The first decade of Economic and Monetary Union failed to produce real convergence," Mr. Praet said.

    "What the euro area needs, in my view, is to 'rerun' the convergence process."
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  • In the Media | April 2014
    By Pedro Nicolaci da Costa
    The Wall Street Journal, April 10, 2014. All Rights Reserved.

    The European Central Bank is poised to take action to tackle the problem of low inflation that continues to consistently undershoot its official target, ECB Vice President Vitor Constancio said Thursday.

    Mr. Constancio said policy makers are still trying to figure out which measures to take, adding that bond buying is a possibility.

    “We will do something because the situation is that inflation is indeed very low, and even considering only our primary mandate of price stability we are clearly not achieving our target of having, on a medium-term basis, inflation below but close to 2%. So we do take seriously our mandate,” Mr. Constancio told a conference in Washington sponsored by the Levy Economics Institute.

    During his prepared remarks, Mr. Constancio argued returning Europe’s banking system to full health would not be enough to ensure economic growth picks up.

    The ECB has placed great emphasis on its assessment of banks’ balance sheets, which it is carrying out before becoming the single currency’s banking supervisor later this year. It is hoped that the exercise, culminating in a stress test, will force banks to clean up their balance sheets, raise capital, which should put them in a stronger position to lend to the real economy. But Mr. Constancio suggested this story line is too simplistic.

    “Bank balance sheets in the euro area have to a large degree already been repaired,” he said. Furthermore, he said it was “far from clear that finance is a sufficient condition for jump-starting growth in Europe.”

    “Even a complete rehabilitation of the euro area’s banking system…will not guarantee a quick return to high growth and low unemployment,” he added. The euro zone’s economy faces numerous issues, he said, that are “are potentially more serious than the damage inflicted by the financial crisis and the subsequent euro area crisis on the euro area banking sector. These issues are also far more difficult to address.” 
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  • In the Media | April 2014
    By Brai Odion-Esene
    MNI | Deutsche Börse Group, April 9, 2014. All Rights Reserved.

    WASHINGTON (MNI) - Federal Reserve Board Gov. Daniel Tarullo Wednesday night sounded bullish in his outlook for the U.S. economy the rest of this year, saying the Fed's aggressive actions have continued to play a major role.

    "Unconventional monetary policies have been critical in supporting the moderate recovery that we have had, which I think now is looking reasonably well-grounded going forward," he said during a question and answer question following a speech at the Levy Economic Institute's Hyman Minsky Conference.

    This is reflected in the "fairly large" expectations that growth is going to be picking up over the course of this year," he said.

    The U.S. economy is recovering at a modest pace, Tarullo said, and he argued that the policy pursued by the Fed "has been essential to ensure that moderate pace of recovery."

    At the same time, he acknowledged that the Fed's aggressive actions have not created "the kind of recovery that everybody would have preferred."

    Tarullo said the Fed's asset purchase program and its zero interest rate policies have had "a pretty demonstrable effect" on interest rate-sensitive sectors such as auto sales and the housing market.

    "In doing what we have done to try to affect longer term rates and not just short-term rates, I think we've actually facilitated a bunch of economic activity that would not have otherwise taken place," he added.

    The level of aggregate demand continues to be inadequate, he said, a fact that is highlighted by the "relatively low rates" of capital investments by businesses.

    This is because firms have decided that "the demand they expect does not justify the additional investment in capacity," Tarullo said.
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  • Working Paper No. 794 | March 2014
    What’s New for Industrial Policy in the EU?

    In this paper, we analyze and try to measure productive and technological asymmetries between central and peripheral economies in the eurozone. We assess the effects such asymmetries would likely bring about on center–periphery divergence/convergence patterns, and derive some implications as to the design of future industrial policy at the European level. We stress that future European Union (EU) industrial policy should be regionally focused and specifically target structural changes in the periphery as the main way to favor center–periphery convergence and avoid the reappearance of past external imbalances. To this end, a wide battery of industrial policy tools should be considered, ranging from subsidies and fiscal incentives to innovative firms, public financing of R & D efforts, sectoral policies, and public procurements for home-produced goods. All in all, future EU industrial policy should be much more interventionist than it currently is, and dispose of much larger funds with respect to the present setting in order to effectively pursue both short-run stabilization and long-run development goals.

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  • In the Media | March 2014
    Dimitri B. Papadimitriou
    Huffington Post, March 25, 2014. All Rights Reserved.

    Negotiations between the Greek government and its international lenders were finally resolved last week, after seven long months. In January, Prime Minister Antonis Samaras made a celebratory announcement projecting a small, 2013 primary budget surplus of 1.5 billion euros. Also recently announced: European Union co-funding for a long-delayed 7.5 billion euro road construction project in 2014.

    Sounds good. No reason to suggest that Greece needs an extreme monetary makeover right now, is there? Yes, there is. Talk of a recovery isn't just premature, it reflects a complete fantasy. For starters, at today's rate of net job creation Greece won't reach a reasonable employment level for more than a decade. That's too long.

    An alternative domestic currency could be the basis for a solution. A parallel currency that was used to finance a government employment program would provide a relatively quick restoration of a lost standard of living to a large fraction Greece's population. We reached that conclusion at the Levy Institute after modeling multiple scenarios based on the narrow range of available options.

    Here's the context that makes such a radical move rational: The failures of the current strategy have been so great that even a total abandonment of austerity programs now would provide relief only at a very slow pace. A modest increase in government spending like the infrastructure project, while the right approach, isn't nearly powerful enough to fuel a turnaround; once it's finished the economy will contract again. And the primary surplus stems from conditions unlikely to be sustained: dramatic spending cuts, higher taxes, and a one-off return of earnings by European central banks on their holdings of Greek government bonds.

    Bank lending is down (by 3.9 percent), real interest is up to its highest rate since Greece joined the European Monetary Union (8.3 percent), and price deflation has set in. Unemployment just reached a new high of 24.9 percent for men, 32.2 percent for women, and a breathtaking 61.4 percent for youths. Even the shots at reducing the debt to GDP ratio, the foremost priority of Greece's creditors, have been spectacular misfires. It has risen from 125 percent at the crisis onset to 175 percent now.

    To repair Greece's position, numerous ideas have been floated for a currency that would function alongside the euro. Proposals have been termed everything from 'government IOUs' to 'tax anticipation notes' to 'new,' 'local,' or 'fiscal' currencies; most visibly, Thomas Mayer of Deutsche Bank coined (so to speak) 'geuros.' Some plans envisioned an orderly exit out of the euro. Most shared the perspective of the troika -- the European Central Bank, the European Commission, and the International Monetary Fund -- that export-led growth through increased price competitiveness and lower wages is central to solving the problem.

    Our policy synthesis fundamentally differs from those views. We see Greece remaining in the Eurozone and initiating a parallel financial system that, most importantly, restores liquidity in the domestic market.

    Why not stress exports? Price elasticity in Greece's trade sector is low, our analysis shows, which explains why there hasn't been much evidence of success in export growth. Of course exports are important, but even China, with its gigantic export-guided economy, has recognized the need to increase and stabilize domestic demand.

    That should be the focus in Greece, too. We modeled a parallel financial system that would stimulate demand by financing an employment guarantee program known as an ELR; the government serves as the Employer of Last Resort. It would hire anyone able and willing to work to produce public goods. Wage levels would be low enough to make private employment more attractive, but high enough to ensure a decent living standard. The program would be financed by a government issue of a parallel currency... call it the geuro.

    Geuros would essentially be small denomination zero-coupon bonds: transferable instruments with no interest payment, no repayment of principal, and no redemption, that would be acceptable at par for tax payments. This kind of arrangement is well-known in public finance.

    The government would use the alternative currency to pay domestic debts, unemployment benefits, and a portion of wages for public employees. And it would demand that a share of taxes and social benefits be paid in geuros.

    Foreign trade would still require euros, which would remain in circulation, and Greece's private sector would still do business in euros. The currency would be convertible only in one direction, from euro to geuro.

    In our simulation, 550,000 jobs (and many more indirect ones, via a sensible fiscal multiplier) would be created at a net cost of 3.5b geuros per year. The infusion would contribute a 7 percent GDP increase, and there would still be a sizable euro surplus. As with any fiscal stimulus, the overall deficit would increase and there would be a deterioration in the balance of payments, although a manageable one.

    Restoring domestic demand needs to be Greece's economic policy emphasis. Despite any downsides, a parallel currency that supports an employment guarantee program would be a U-turn towards rebuilding the population's purchasing power -- and rebuilding Greece's ravished economy.

    This article originally appeared on EconoMonitor on March 24, 2014, under the title "The Currency/Jobs Connection in Greece."
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  • Policy Note 2014/3 | February 2014
    In 2001, a three-year, multicountry study by the Structural Adjustment Participatory Review International Network (SAPRIN), prepared in cooperation with the World Bank, national governments, and civil society organizations, offered a damning indictment of the policies of structural adjustment reform pursued by the IMF and the World Bank in third world countries. The structural adjustment programs in Greece, combined with the policies of austerity, are producing results that fit the patterns outlined in the SAPRIN study like a glove.   This policy note rejects the myth of Greece as an economic success story and argues that current trends and developments in the country make for a bleak economic future. The experiment under way in Greece will produce an economy resembling, not the Celtic Tiger of the mid-1990s to early 2000s, as the current government envisions, but an underdeveloped Latin America country of the 1980s.
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  • Strategic Analysis | February 2014
    In this report, we discuss alternative scenarios for restoring growth and increasing employment in the Greek economy, evaluating alternative policy options through our specially constructed macroeconometric model (LIMG). After reviewing recent events in 2013 that confirm our previous projections for an increase in the unemployment rate, we examine the likely impact of four policy options: (1) external help through Marshall Plan–type capital transfers to the government; (2) suspension of interest payments on public debt, instead using these resources for increasing demand and employment; (3) introduction of a parallel financial system that uses new government bonds; and (4) adoption of an employer-of-last-resort (ELR) program financed through the parallel financial system. We argue that the effectiveness of the different plans crucially depends on the price elasticity of the Greek trade sector. Since our analysis shows that such elasticity is low, our ELR policy option seems to provide the best strategy for a recovery, having immediate effects on the Greek population's standard of living while containing the effects on foreign debt.

  • In the Media | January 2014
    Rania Antonopoulos
    Kathimerini, January 31, 2014. All Rights Reserved.

    The responses to unemployment by the last three governments [in Greece] have been characterized by sloppy proposals and an insignificant amount of funds in relation to the size of the problem. Regardless of whether there were political considerations behind it (or not), the recent announcement of the Prime Minister highlights, unfortunately, a relentless continuation of lack of understanding of reality.

    The Prime Minister recently, on January 29, told us that unemployment is a "sneaky enemy" and proceeded to announce measures to tackle the problem. He also indicated that "we do not promise things we cannot do, and we say no to populism and fine words." The goal of the proposed measures, we heard, is to create 440,000 "work opportunities" of which 240,000 will target the unemployed 15–24 years of age, with no prior work experience. The announced measures totaling 1.4 billion Euro, will be financed by funds from the National Strategic Reference Framework (NSRF), social funds from the EU, and are classified into three pillars.

    Specifically, the first pillar sets a target to recruit 114,000 unemployed for the private sector, an initiative that essentially subsidizes wages and social security contributions for businesses that hire unemployed who are up to 29 years old and some who are unemployed between the ages of 30 to 60 years of age. The second pillar concerns 240,000 young persons. This program will provide work experience and training for all unemployed up to 24 years old, who have no prior work experience. These unemployed, will also go to private companies for some time, or participate in vocational training centers (VTC) to improve their skills in order to find their first job, or both. The third pillar concentrates in hiring  90,000 unemployed from households who have no employed person, who will work in community service projects in the public sector and local government.

    Assuming that strict rules are in place, with dedicated control mechanisms that will guarantee nonreplacement of existing positions in the private and public sector (really, is there  a sufficient number of public sector inspectors for this task?), prima facie, it all sounds positive and leads to the conclusion that at last the Prime Minister himself has publicly accepted his responsibility towards the citizens that have been left without a job. But, appearances can be deceiving.

    Let's start with the obvious. If we divide the 1.4 billion euros with 440,000 job opportunities to be created in the next two years, we arrive at an average of 220,000, now unemployed, future employed per year, who will receive a total of 3,182 euros during one year. Namely, 265 euros per month. So these jobs offer underemployment, or starvation wages or both. Job opportunities? These interventions in reality provide employment for four to five months. Then what?

    But, also, there was nothing new proposed. The present government, on January 10, 2013 had presented us with a National Action Plan for Youth Employment.  The "Action Plan" consisted essentially of a compilation of already existing interventions, which, it should be noted, had already received miserably failing grades by ELIAMEP, through a study that they produced at the request of the National Bank of Greece. Mr. Samaras suggested the same and identical measures. If these “actions” have not worked in the past, why should we expect them to help now? This is important, because at this difficult hour it would be wise not to throw out the window EU funds. At the end, if the aim is to provide income support, let’s expand unemployment coverage, and not pretend we are creating jobs.

    But the essential problem is that the proposed action plan is based on the wrong diagnosis. First, its focus is on the young unemployed, and secondly, it mistakenly identifies the causes of youth unemployment in "employability"–namely, inthe absence of knowledge, experience, and seniority.

    Let's start with the second question first. The proposal carries a message that youth unemployment will fought through the acquisition and improvement of knowledge on the one hand (through VTC), and  practical experience in temporary jobs in private sector companies. Success should be evaluated by the ability of participants to find a permanent job after termination of participation in these programs. Do we then expect the young graduates to find a job? how many new jobs were announced in 2013? What has changed since 2008 is demand for labor due to the tremendous reduction of GDP and not the quality of the labor supply of young people. Unemployment has sky rocketed [from 7.7 to over 27%] due to austerity, lack of liquidity SMEs face, and the rapid, albeit legal, reduction of salaries and pensions. These are more or less commonly accepted facts. 2008 employees aged 15–24 included approximately 270,300 young aged workers, when in 2013 there were only 125,300 (a 145,000 reduction). Similarly, today the total number of unemployed people aged 15–24 is approximately 178,500—in 2008 there were 72,300 (an increase of 106,200). The numbers speak for themselves.

    Measures of "improving knowledge" will not do, not when our well-educated graduates migrate abroad massively.  These "solutions" are of European origin and are ineffective because the main problem we face is that the private sector has shrunk and this has produced a plummeting of demand of the existing workforce due to the depth and duration of the recession—the problem is not lack of quality and skills of the labor force.

    Let us now consider the first issue, the problem of youth unemployment. Indeed, the unemployment rate is very high among the youth and especially for 15–24 years, from 22.1% in 2008 to 57.2% today. But among the 1.3 billion unemployed (average of the first three quarter of 2013) the 1,186,000 are over 25 years old. According to the Hellenic Statistical Authority, all unemployed aged 15–24 amounted to 178,500. Recall that the second pillar consists of 240,000 unemployed young people aged up to 24 years! All the newcomers put together, among the 15–24 years of age, are less than 130.00. Even if we include new entrants ages 25–29, we reach 225,000 persons. The numbers are not consistent, at least not for the youth category of 15–24. Unless the same young person who participates one month in a training program and is then engaged in the private sector represents two “jobs.”

    The age targeted measures are ill conceived, as is the focus on employability. Most tragic of all is that long-term unemployed by now hits approximately 900,000 unemployed, of which 844,000 are not in the category of “youth.” Among them, 224,100 have been out of paid work for more than 48 months (4 years) and an additional 317.00 unemployed, for 24–47 months. For all these long-term unemployed, including those who have exhausted their resources and cannot pay even their electricity bill, for the 777, 000 unemployed who have a high school education level or lower, the announcement of Mr. Samaras highlights that there will be some lucky 200,000 young and more mature workers (440,000 minus 240, 000 people) that will be offered an “employment opportunity” for a few months out of a year in the private or public sector, receiving the meager earnings mentioned earlier.

    What must be urgently understood is that although the economy is now approaching the area of balancing the internal and external balance of payments and the pressure on further depressing the economy gradually slows down, this does not automatically lead to recovery. The economy can remain at frighteningly low production levels, high unemployment and income inequality of catastrophic dimensions. Recovery needs high and sustained private and public investment rates, and certainly gradual relief from the austerity measures. But let us remember that the decade before the crisis, with on average GDP growth about 4%, the economy created each year, on average, 55–60 thousand new jobs. Even if the growth rate returns to precrisis levels, at 4%, generating even 50–60 thousand new jobs per year, to reach the employment levels of 1998 to 2008 will be impossible in the near future; the figures for unemployment are so high, that the next decade will be 'lost', including for people sent to educational training centers.

    It is reasonable to ask, What can the poor government do when it has to deal with the Troika "requirements" of the one hand and the NSRF European Unon funds on the other, which are focused on these specific "actions"? Negotiate hard and convince their "partners" that the yardstick for introducing or maintaining conditionality measures, structural and otherwise, at this time is whether they increase unemployed or not; and  point out to other partners that these "actions" against unemployment are incompatible with the Greek reality—that the "Youth Guarantee" and the rest should be channeled to other types of interventions.

    The time has come to stop recycling the same distorted views. This crisis requires urgently a custom tailored Greek New Deal, which should last for at least the next three years. That is, the extension of a radically reorganized job guarantee program*, a community-based program of "koinofelis ergasia" not for five months but for 11 months per year, not for the 50,000–90,000 jobs for the unemployed but 440,000 real year-round jobs. As for what it will cost and where will we find the money, I reserve the right to provide relevant information next month through a study of the Levy Institute in cooperation with INE / GSEE [General Confederation of Trade Unions]. There is a solution, but it requires getting rid of current obsessions and to not follow the beaten track. Whether the political will of the current government to do so exists, is another matter.

    *The Levy Institute was instrumental in proposing a Job Guarantee policy for Greece, which was adopted by the Ministry of Labor in 2011, as a pilot program for 55,000 unemployed. It was rolled out in 2012 and was run through the NGO sector in collaboration with local and community governing bodies. For a background document that includes guidance notes on how best to design and implement such an initiative see http://www.levyinstitute.org/publications/?docid=1458
  • Policy Note 2013/10 | December 2013

    In a policy note published last year by the Levy Institute, Philip Pilkington and Warren Mosler argued that the eurozone sovereign debt crisis could be solved by national governments without the assistance of the European Central Bank (ECB) and without their leaving the currency union, through the issuance of a proposed financial innovation called “tax-backed bonds.” These bonds would be similar to standard government bonds except that, should the country issuing the bonds not make its payments, the tax-backed bonds would be acceptable to make tax payments within the country in question, and would continue to earn interest.

    In the current policy note, Pilkington examines the continued relevance of the bond proposal in light of changes that have taken place with respect to ECB policy since the original proposal was made, as well as the case made by Ireland’s finance minister that tax-backed bonds would violate current Irish law (and, by implication, the law in other eurozone countries). He also outlines some changes made to the initial proposal in response to constructive criticisms received since its publication, and briefly notes another area in which the proposal might be utilized—outside the eurozone. His conclusion? That tax-backed bonds remain a valid policy tool, one that can be implemented at the national rather than at the federal level, and a stepping stone to solving the eurozone’s economic problems.

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  • In the Media | November 2013
    By Dimitri B. Papadimitriou
    Reuters, November 26, 2013. All Rights Reserved.

    A recent visit by President Obama to an Ohio steel mill underscored his promise to create 1 million manufacturing jobs. On the same day, Commerce Secretary Penny Pritzker announced her department’s commitment to exports, saying “Trade must become a bigger part of the DNA of our economy.”

    These two impulses — to reinvigorate manufacturing and to emphasize exports — are, or should be, joined at the hip. The U.S. needs an export strategy led by research and development, and it needs it now. A serious federal commitment to R&D would help arrest the long-term decline in manufacturing, and return America to its preeminent and competitive positions in high tech. At the same time, increasing sales of these once-key exports abroad would improve our also-declining balance of trade.

    It’s the best shot the U.S. has to energize its weak economic recovery. R&D investment in products sold in foreign markets would yield a greater contribution to economic growth than any other feasible approach today. It would raise GDP, lower unemployment, and rehabilitate production operations in ways that would reverberate worldwide.

    The Obama administration is proud of the 2012 increase of 4.4 percent in overall exports over 2011. But that rise hasn’t provided a major jolt to employment and growth rates, because our net exports — that is, exports minus imports — are languishing. Significantly, the U.S. is losing ground in the job-rich arena of exported manufactured goods with high-technology content. Once the world leader, we’ve now been surpassed by Germany.

    America’s economic health won’t be strong while its trade deficit stands close to a problematically high 3 percent of GDP (and widening). Up until the Reagan administration, we ran trade surpluses. Then, manufacturing and net exports began to shrink almost in tandem.

    Our past performance proves that we have plenty of room to grow crucial manufacturing exports, and even eliminate the trade gap. The rehabilitation should begin with a national commitment to basic research, which in turn boosts private sector technology investment. The resulting rise in GDP would be an important counterbalance to a slightly higher federal deficit.

    Just-completed Levy Economics Institute simulations measured how a change in the target of government spending could influence its effectiveness. The best outcomes came about when funds were used to stoke innovation specifically in those export-oriented industries that might yield new products or cost-saving production techniques. When a relatively small stimulus was directed towards, for example, R&D at high tech manufacturing exporters, its effects multiplied. The gains were even better than the projections for a lift to badly needed infrastructure, which was also considered.

    Economists haven’t yet pinpointed a percentage figure that reflects the added value of R&D, but there’s a strong consensus that it is significant. Despite the riskiness of each research-inspired experiment, R&D overall has proven to be a safe bet. Government-supported research tends to be pure rather than applied, but, even so, when aimed to complement manufacturing advances, small doses have a good track record.

    Recognition that R&D outlays bring quantifiable returns partly explains why the federal National Income and Product Accounts have recently been altered to conform with international standards. NIPA will now treat R&D spending as a form of fixed investment. This will be a powerful tool to help reliably gauge its aftermath.

    Private sector-based innovation has also proved to be far more likely to occur when it is catalyzed by a high level of public finance. (For amazing examples, check out this just-released Science Coalition report.) Contractors spend more once government has kicked in; productivity rises and prices drop.

    The prospect of a worldwide positive-sum game is far more realistic than the “currency wars” dynamic so often raised by the media. Overseas buyers experience lower prices and the advantages of novel products. Domestic consumers, meanwhile, enjoy higher incomes and more employment, with some of the earnings spent on imports.

    An export-oriented approach faces multiple barriers. Anemic economies across the globe could spell insufficient demand. Another challenge lies in the small absolute size of the U.S. export sector.

    But the range of strategic policy options for the U.S. is limited. A rapid increase in research-based exports is the only way we see to simultaneously comply with today’s politically imposed budget restrictions and still promote strong job and GDP growth.

    Instead of stimulating tech-dependent producers, though, we’ve been allowing manufacturing to stagnate and competitiveness to erode. Public R&D spending as a percentage of GDP has dropped, and is scheduled for drastic cuts under the sequester.

    Sticking with the current plan means being caught up in weak growth and low employment for years. Jobs are being created at a snail’s pace, with falling unemployment rates largely a reflection of a shrinking workforce.

    For our R&D/export model, we posited a modest infusion of $160 billion per year — about 1 percent of GDP — until 2016. We saw unemployment fall to less than 5 percent by 2016, compared with CBO forecasts that unemployment will remain over 7 percent. Real GDP growth — instead of hovering around 3.5 percent, by CBO estimates, on the current path — gradually rose to near 5.5 percent by the end of the period.

    We need this boost. It’s urgent that we bring down joblessness and grow the economy. A change in fiscal policy biased towards R&D shows real promise as a viable way to help rescue the recovery.
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  • Working Paper No. 780 | November 2013
    The Euro Needs a Euro Treasury

    The euro crisis remains unresolved even as financial markets may seem calm for now. The current euro regime is inherently flawed, and recent reforms have failed to turn this dysfunctional regime into a viable one. Our investigation is informed by the “cartalist” critique of traditional “optimum currency area” theory (Goodhart 1998). Various proposals to rescue the euro are assessed and found lacking. A “Euro Treasury” scheme operating on a strict rule and specifically designed not to be a transfer union is proposed here as a condition sine qua non for healing the euro’s potentially fatal birth defects. The Euro Treasury proposed here is the missing element that will mend the current fiscal regime, which is unworkable without it. The proposed scheme would end the currently unfolding euro calamity by switching policy from a public thrift campaign that can only impoverish Europe to a public investment campaign designed to secure Europe’s future. No mutualization of existing national public debts is involved. Instead, the Euro Treasury is established as a means to pool eurozone public investment spending and have it funded by proper eurozone treasury securities.

  • In the Media | November 2013
    Bank for International Settlements, November 11, 2013
    Speech by Mr Yves Mersch, Member of the Executive Board of the European Central Bank, at the Minsky Conference in Greece, organised by the Levy Economics Institute, Athens, 8 November 2013.

    Ladies and gentlemen,

    The last time I gave a speech here in Athens was in early January 2008. How much the world has changed since then.
     
    Yet it has not always changed in the ways that observers predicted. I still remember clearly, in the early weeks of May 2010, the prophetic claims that Greece would leave the euro area within weeks, that other countries would follow within months, and that the collapse of the euro would be complete before the year was out.

    Those claims were wrong - and the Greek people have played an important part in proving them so.

    Since the loss of market access in early 2010, the Greek people have made extraordinary efforts to refute the naysayers and turn the economy around. They have executed a fiscal adjustment of historic proportions and embarked on the difficult road of structural reforms. The results of these actions have accrued first and foremost to Greece - but they have also accrued to the wider euro area.

    However, this turnaround is still only half complete. There is still much work to do. And what I would like to emphasise in my remarks today is that staying on the path of reform is essential not only for the citizens of today. It is also essential for those of tomorrow.

    Like all Western societies, and some rapidly ageing Eastern ones, Greece faces long-term fiscal challenges linked to high public debt levels and demographic developments. These challenges raise profound questions about intergenerational justice. And it is only through reforms that they can be answered in a fair way.

    For all ageing societies, this implies, first, ensuring sustainable public finances and, second, achieving stronger economic growth. Both are necessary because they are mutually reinforcing: fiscal sustainability creates the stability and confidence necessary for future growth; and higher growth creates the revenues and debt-to-GDP ratios necessary for fiscal sustainability.

    Let me therefore deal with each in turn, starting with what is being done to ensure fiscal sustainability in the context of intergenerational justice.

    Strengthening sustainability

    The fiscal challenges that Greece is facing today, while more severe than others, are not unique to this country. All Western societies are being confronted with difficult questions about the distribution of consolidation and spending between current and future generations.

    A first question is how the burden of high public debt levels in Western societies will be shared between generations. This question is particularly pertinent in the euro area because all countries are bound by law to start reducing their debts to below 60% of GDP - and average public debt levels in the euro area are currently in excess of 95% of GDP.

    If fiscal consolidation starts today, then the generation which has benefited most from this debt will play the largest role in reducing it. But if consolidation is delayed, then future generations will have to bear the burden of debt reduction - this would constitute a direct transfer from our children and grandchildren to ourselves.

    And it is only us who are taking the decision. Our children and grandchildren have no power to raise their objections.

    A second question with intergenerational consequences is how to spread the costs of demographic change. In the EU, it is projected that by 2060 there will be just two working-age people for every person over 65, compared with a ratio of 4:1 today. This means the weight of supporting an ageing population will rest on ever fewer shoulders.

    If current generations are proactive in reforming pension systems, they can reduce the load that the shrinking working age population will have to carry. But if they choose instead to preserve their entitlements, then they make the lives of future generations commensurately harder. They would be effectively sacrificing their descendants' quality of life for their own.

    In other words, all Western societies are facing choices about the distribution of responsibility. Do we, the current generation, take responsibility for the long-term fiscal challenges that we have played a large part in creating? Or do we delay and pass the consequences of our choices onto our children and grandchildren? I think it is fairly clear what a perspective of intergenerational justice would imply.

    This perspective is of course not new. The so-called "demographic time bomb" has been predictable for many years. Indeed, I pointed to this issue when I spoke here in Greece in early 2008. But what has changed today is the urgency for action. The crisis has meant that these difficult choices can no longer be delayed. One might say it has pressed the fast-forward button and brought the challenges of the future into the present.

    This is the broader context for the ongoing consolidation process in Greece. Certainly, it is about increasing spending control and tax collection. But it is also about putting Greece on a sustainable path for the future; limiting the load that is bequeathed to our descendants; and ensuring that those that created fiscal problems take responsibility for them.

    What Greece has achieved

    And indeed, this is what is happening in Greece today. The commitment the Greek people have shown to fiscal consolidation has been remarkable, even in international comparison.

    The primary deficit has declined by almost 10 percentage points of GDP between 2009 and 2012. Taking into account the deep and prolonged recession, the underlying fiscal adjustment has been even larger. The OECD estimates that structural adjustment was nearly 14 percentage points of GDP in this period.

    As Greece is one of the smaller euro area Member States, the scale of its efforts is not always appreciated appropriately. If the level of expenditure consolidation we have seen in Greece were applied in Germany, it would be equivalent to a permanent reduction in public spending of 174 billion euro. That is more than the total sum of social spending.

    Greece has also made important progress in addressing the long-term fiscal challenges linked to its ageing population. There is little doubt that before the crisis the Greek pension system was unsustainable. In the Commission's 2009 Ageing Report, age-related spending in Greece was projected to increase from 22% of GDP in 2007 to a staggering 38% of GDP in 2060. By contrast, the average for the euro area would be under 30% of GDP in 2060.

    But thanks to the pension reforms the authorities have introduced, the Greek system is now comparable to others. In the 2012 Ageing Report, age-related spending in Greece was projected to increase to just under 30% of GDP in 2060 - so around than 8 percentage points lower than the previous estimate. This is almost identical to the euro area average. If we take into account as well the recently legislated increase in the pension age, Greece may even be ahead of others.

    In short, the Greek people have taken vital measures to ensure long-term fiscal sustainability. This will reduce the burden that will be passed to future generations. And I recognise that in doing so, current generations have made considerable sacrifices. Real earnings have fallen by over 20% between 2009 and 2012, undoing the gains made since adopting the euro. Far too many people are currently without work, with unemployment at over 27% and youth unemployment reaching 57%. For so much potential to be lying idle is a tragedy.

    What remains to be done

    Nevertheless, this is the painful cost of reversing the misguided economic policies and lack of reforms in the past. And fiscal sustainability - and hence intergenerational justice - is not yet assured. While the government appears to be on track to meet its 2013 primary balance target, Greece still has some way to go to reach the primary surplus targets of 1.5% of GDP in 2014, 3% of GDP in 2015 and 4.5% of GDP in 2016. This means that fiscal consolidation has to continue.

    Based on current projections, a fiscal gap has emerged for 2014. It comes mainly from delayed gains from the tax administration reform, shortfalls in the collection of social security contributions and the continuing underperformance of the instalment schemes for outstanding tax obligations. Measures will have to be identified to close it.

    Looking forward, failure by the authorities to proceed with tax administration reform and to accelerate the fight against tax evasion will unavoidably widen the fiscal gap - and imply the need for higher savings on the expenditure side. This simple truth should provide sufficient incentives for stepping up the pace of tax administration reform.

    To put tax collection in Greece in context, according to the most recent OECD data, the tax debt in Greece as a share of annual net tax revenue was almost 90% in 2010, compared with an OECD average of under 14%. Fighting tax evasion now is therefore key to enhancing social fairness - both on an intra-generational and an inter-generational basis.

    To this effect, the recently legislated semi-autonomous tax agency will need to become fully operational and be shielded from political interference.

    Beyond that, accelerating the implementation of public administration reform is key to the success of the wider reform agenda. Significant delays have occurred in finalising staffing plans and transferring employees to the new mobility scheme, and this is slowing down the identification of redundant positions and the necessary modernisation of the public sector.

    Of course, consolidation would be made easier by higher rates of growth. But we should not treat growth as an exogenous variable. On the contrary, it depends critically on the decisions of the Greek authorities - namely on their willingness to implement the growth-enhancing measures in the programme. The relatively closed and rigid nature of the Greek economy is both a challenge and an opportunity: it makes the process of reform harder, but it also means that the potential for reforms to raise growth is commensurately greater.

    Let me therefore turn to the subject of growth, which forms the second part of my remarks today.

    Strengthening growth

    The economic situation in Greece has started to pick up this year, with the economy stabilising and seasonally-adjusted real GDP increasing by 0.2% quarter-on-quarter in Q2 2013. Overall, GDP growth is expected to turn positive next year at 0.6%.

    But while these are welcome developments, they still represent a relatively weak recovery, especially given the depth of the recession that preceded it. In my view, to add momentum to this recovery and lay the foundations for medium-term growth, the authorities need to address three challenges. First, increasing the economy's external competitiveness; second, ensuring the banking sector can fund the recovery; and third, attracting productive foreign investment.

    Increasing external competitiveness

    As Greece is undergoing a simultaneous deleveraging in its public and private sectors, sectoral accounting tells us that its external sector must go into surplus. The key for growth is to ensure that this happens as much as possible through higher exports rather than import compression. The best way Greece can achieve this is by improving its price competitiveness.

    Price competitiveness is particularly important for Greek firms as their exports are largely concentrated in low-tech products. At the end of the last decade, high-tech or intermediate-tech products represented only 28% of total exports, compared to nearly 50% for the EU average. Yet since euro entry price competitiveness in Greece has actually been on a worsening trend. According to the Commission, the real effective exchange rate (on an HICP basis) in Greece was still rising until 2011.

    To facilitate an export-led recovery, this trend has to be corrected and there is no way this can be achieved in the short run other than by adjusting prices and costs. I know the difficulties that such adjustment creates and the criticisms that are levelled against it. But we are in a monetary union and this is how adjustment works. Sharing a currency brings considerable microeconomic benefits but it requires that relative prices can adjust to offset shocks.

    This process has already begun in Greece today. Thorough labour market reforms have reduced labour costs significantly. costs have now fallen by around by 18% since 2009, with wage adjustment being the main driver of that fall. Indeed, compensation per employee has fallen by about 20% in this period.

    But the translation of cost competitiveness gains into prices has been too slow - notwithstanding the encouraging recent trend of disinflation. This is largely because reforms in product markets have not kept pace with those in labour markets. And this not only limits the potential for the external sector to generate growth, but also lowers citizens' real incomes.

    Speeding up the pace of product market reforms is therefore a priority. The authorities have introduced several recent reforms, for example removing barriers to entry in transportation services, repealing restrictions in the retail sector and removing mandatory recourse to services for a number of regulated professions. However, as of today product market regulations are still among the most restrictive in Europe. Further reform will help remove unjustified privileges and the related excess profits, and by helping prices adjust, this will in turn strengthen social fairness.

    Funding the recovery

    While product market reforms are an essential part of building a more competitive economy, their ability to generate growth depends also on other developments - in particular, the condition of the banking sector.

    If banks do not make new loans, this impedes the entry of new players into liberalised sectors, which then reduces competitive pressures and price adjustments. And if banks do not write off loans to insolvent debtors, in particular "zombie" companies, this slows down the necessary reallocation of resources toward exports and higher-productivity sectors.

    In other words, cleaning up bank balance sheets and ensuring a well-functioning bank lending channel is an equally important part of the adjustment process. This is the second challenge for growth.

    The authorities in Greece have taken important steps to preserve the stability of the banking sector. The recapitalisation of the four core banks was completed in June 2013, while the consolidation of the banking sector has continued through the resolution of non-viable banks and the absorption of Greek subsidiaries of foreign banks. Deposit inflows have continued, in part offsetting the deposits lost between the end of 2009 and the middle of 2012.

    But despite these improvements, credit growth to the private sector remains very weak, in particular for the small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) that make up about 60% of business turnover in Greece. The last ECB survey on SME financing showed that 31% of SMEs had applications for bank loans rejected, well above the euro area average of 11%. Moreover, the sectoral allocation of credits has not substantially shifted towards export-oriented sectors since 2010, suggesting that banks are not facilitating internal rebalancing.

    To some extent, these developments are cyclical: the weak economic environment means banks are attaching higher credit risk to SMEs. But there is also a more structural explanation. Non-performing loans (NPLs) increased from 16% at the end of 2011 to 29% of total loans in the first quarter of 2013. This is acting as a barrier to new lending to higher- growth sectors.

    Unfortunately, this problem is in part being created by government policy. The ongoing moratorium on auctioning the properties of debtors in default has slowed down resolution of NPLs and balance sheet restructuring. Moreover, suggestions by policy-makers about horizontal debt relief for bank debtors are leading to a steep rise in strategic defaults, with banks estimating that 25% of NPLs in the mortgage and SME sectors are now strategic.

    This deterioration in the payment culture, even if it helps individuals on a micro level, is deeply damaging to the economy as a whole. If it continues, it will ultimately lead to higher costs for banks, new recapitalisation needs and further constrictions in bank lending. In my view, to restart lending to the real economy, this self-fulfilling cycle must be broken.

    I welcome the fact that the Greek authorities have established an inter-agency working group to identify ways to improve the effectiveness of debt resolution processes. Its priority should be to establish a time-bound framework to facilitate the settlement of borrower arrears using standardised protocols. This would help to remove expectations about future debt relief, and as such, remove the debilitating moral hazard this is creating.

    Otherwise, the ultimate result would be that excessively high risk premia become structural and choke off investment and job creation - thus punishing the whole of society for the actions of those in strategic default.

    Attracting productive foreign investment

    The third challenge for growth is to attract higher foreign investment. This is important to add momentum to the recovery in the short term, while also increasing the capital and knowledge base of the Greek economy over the medium term. Indeed, before the crisis, investment in knowledge-based capital in Greece was among the lowest in the euro area.

    From the available signals, there seems to be significant investor interest in Greece. While total investment in Greece has fallen by around 43% from 2008-2012, foreign direct investment (FDI) flows have recently been positive, driven largely by investment in the banking sector. But anecdotal evidence suggests that foreign interest in the real economy is also growing, with several multinational companies announcing plans to increase their output at Greek units in the coming years. To maximise such investments, I see three actions as key.

    First, the authorities need to redouble their efforts to improve the business environment. Product and labour market flexibility is certainly a part of this, but there is also a wider challenge related to reducing bureaucracy, red tape and corruption. Progress has been made in these areas but Greece still ranks second to last among euro area countries on the World Bank's Ease of Doing Business Index.

    Second, foreign investment would naturally rise if privatisation were increased. In 2012 only 0.1 billion euro was derived from privatisation receipts, instead of the 3.6 billion euro originally forecast. Yet the example of the Port of Piraeus shows what well-targeted privatisation can achieve. Since the transfer of management of part of the port to the company COSCO in 2009, container traffic has tripled and its market share in the Mediterranean has risen from 2% to 6%.

    Third, it is crucial for foreign investors that uncertainty about Greece's medium-term outlook is dispelled. The greatest source of such uncertainty in the past was persistent questions about Greece's place in the euro area, but thanks to the joint efforts at the European and national levels, this seems to have significantly declined over the last year. The main source of uncertainty today is the continued commitment of the authorities to the programme. I therefore trust that the authorities will do everything possible to remove such doubts.

    Conclusion

    Let me conclude.

    Greece has made tremendous progress in recent years to close its fiscal deficit. By any standards, what has been achieved is remarkable.

    But the process of restoring sustainability and growth in Greece is not yet complete - and neither is the progress so far secured. If the authorities fail to address the remaining challenges, they will put at risk what has already been achieved.

    In other words, Greece today stands at a crossroads.

    In the one direction lies the path of difficult choices. This is the steep and thorny way, and it requires great commitment to negotiate, but it is the one that will lead to a reformed state, a sustainable economy and justice between generations.

    In the other direction lies the path of easy answers. This path is littered with false alternatives, such as recurrent proposals for debt restructuring.

    To some, debt restructuring or larger haircuts on government bonds may seem politically attractive. But such practices can only be a last resort. They are by no means a sustainable option to ease a government's financial obligations. They would not help to promote fiscal discipline and could create higher costs in the long run. And they would do nothing to address the fundamental weaknesses in the Greek economy.

    In short, the path of easy answers leads to stagnation, decline and an over-burdening of the young and future generations.

    From what I see today, I trust that the Greek people know which path they need to take. A recent poll shows that 69% of the public supports the euro - and being part of the euro means taking tough but necessary decisions.

    Responsible choices and reliability are the preconditions for solidarity. Greece has already received support from other euro area countries equivalent to 17,000 euro per Greek citizen. And, provided that it complies with the programme, those countries are committed to supporting Greece until it regains market access.

    In short, all the conditions are present for Greece to return to prosperity - and for the sake of both current and future generations, I trust that Greece will make the most of them.

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  • In the Media | November 2013
    By Martin Baccardax
    MNI News, November 8, 2013. All Rights Reserved.

    FRANKFURT (MNI) - European Central Bank Executive Board member Yves Mersch praised the efforts of Greece's government to tackle its structural and fiscal reforms but said there was much left to be done in order to ensure a lasting recovery for the struggling economy.

    In prepared remarks for a speech at the Minsky Conference in Athens organised by the Levy Economics Institute, Mersch urged the continued efforts of the Greek government to tackle tax evasion, attract foreign investment and increase internal competitiveness.

    "The Greek people have taken vital measures to ensure long-term fiscal sustainability. This will reduce the burden that will be passed to future generations," Mersch said "And I recognise that in doing so, current generations have made considerable sacrifices."

    "Nevertheless, this is the painful cost of reversing the misguided economic policies and lack of reforms in the past. And fiscal sustainability - and hence intergenerational justice - is not yet assured," he added. "While the government appears to be on track to meet its 2013 primary balance target, Greece still has some way to go to reach the primary surplus targets of 1.5% of GDP in 2014, 3% of GDP in 2015 and 4.5% of GDP in 2016. This means that fiscal consolidation has to continue."

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  • In the Media | November 2013
    Matina Stevis
    The Wall Street Journal, November 8, 2013. All Rights Reserved.

    ATHENS—Further haircuts on Greek government debt should only be "the last resort" in the country's efforts at an economic turn-around, European Central Bank Executive Board member Yves Mersch said Friday.

    Speaking at a conference here in Athens, organized by the Levy Institute of Bard College, Mr. Mersch cautioned that "Greece today stands at a crossroads."

    Hard-earned reforms towards a sustainable economy is one way, "easy answers" the other, he said.

    Greece's privately-held debt was restructured in May 2012 in the biggest debt restructuring in history. Most of its debt is now held by euro-zone governments and the International Monetary Fund, which have been keeping the country afloat since 2010 through bailouts worth a total of some EUR240 billion.

    The IMF has called on euro-zone governments to accept losses on their loans to Greece in a form of debt forgiveness, in order to ease the debt burden on the country and give it breathing room to grow. Greece's economy has lost about one-quarter of its output since 2008.

    But euro-zone leaders have rejected the idea, noting that the terms of the bailout loans to Greece are very favorable, with an interest rate near the refinancing cost of the loans and maturities that stretch out over the next three decades.

    Mr. Mersch said debt forgiveness wouldn't "help promote fiscal discipline and could create higher costs in the long run."

    A haircut on Greece's debt would "do nothing to address the fundamental weakness in the Greek economy," Mr. Mersch added.

    A delegation from the troika of institutions overseeing Greece's bailout--the IMF, the ECB and the European Commission--is currently in Athens conducting a review of its progress. The mission had been suspended in September and has been fraught with disagreements over fresh austerity measures in the 2014 budget, as well as the speed at which the Greek government is implementing structural reforms.

    Greece can only hope to get a fresh slice from its aid package if the review is successfully completed and euro-zone finance ministers approve a new disbursement. The earliest this might happen, given the delays in the review, is December.
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  • In the Media | November 2013
    By Jörg Bibow
    Investors Chronicle, November 4, 2013. All Rights Reserved.

    The news that euro area inflation fell to a four-year low of 0.7 per cent last month raises a paradox.

    On the one hand, it’s widely agreed that such a rate is, as Societe Generale’s Michala Marcussen says, “uncomfortably low”. This is because it poses the risk of deflation - falling prices. And this could be a big problem. It would tighten monetary policy because falling prices mean a higher real interest rate. And if consumers expect deflation to last, they might postpone spending in the hope of picking up bargains later, and in doing so kill off the fragile recovery. Many economists therefore expect the ECB to react by cutting interest rates, possibly as soon as this week.

    However, for the most stricken countries in the euro area, deflation is supposed to be a solution, not a problem. The reason for this is simple. The euro area’s crisis was due in large part to current account imbalances within the region, with the south borrowing heavily from the north. These occurred because southern economies lost price competitiveness against the north and so sucked in imports whilst exports faltered. For example, between 2000 and 2010 Germany’s relative unit labour costs fell by 11.7 per cent, whilst Portugal’s rose by 9.2 per cent and Greece’s by 22.5 per cent. As Jorg Bibow of New York’s Levy Economics Institute put it: “At the heart of today’s euro debt crisis is an intra-area balance of payments crisis caused by seriously unbalanced intra-area competitiveness positions.”

    The official solution to these imbalances is for the south to cut wages relative to the north to restore competitiveness. The IMF is calling on Portugal to “reduce production costs” and Greece to use “wage adjustment” (a euphemism for cuts) to close the “competitiveness gap” with Germany. And – thanks to mass unemployment - they are doing just this. David Owen at Jefferies Fixed Income points out that hourly labour costs are falling in Greece and Portugal. And falling wages mean falling prices. In September, Greek consumer price inflation was minus one per cent, Portugal’s was 0.3 per cent and Spain’s 0.5 per cent.

    This poses the question. How can deflation be a danger for the euro area as a whole, when it is supposed to be a solution for the south?

    One could argue that the export and import sectors are a bigger fraction of GDP in individual countries than they are for the eurozone as a whole, and so improved competitiveness would do more to boost growth in Greece or Portugal than it would for the euro area as a whole. And one might add that investment is more sensitive to costs within the eurozone than it is between the eurozone and rest of the world, and so improved competitiveness would do more to attract inward investment into Greece or Portugal than it would into the euro area.

    These, though, aren’t the whole story. As I argue elsewhere, it’s not at all certain that falling wages will be sufficient to turn around Greece and Portugal.

    Instead, this paradox highlights a flaw within the euro area - that it contains a bias towards unemployment and deflation. In theory, Greek and Portuguese competitiveness could be improved not just by wage cuts there but by inflation (and higher demand) in the north. But this isn’t happening. Yes, German wages are rising. But only slowly. And it is still running a big external surplus which is, as the US Treasury recently said, creating “a deflationary bias for the euro area.” In this sense, low inflation in the euro area isn’t merely a problem in itself, but is a symptom of a deeper structural malaise.
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  • In the Media | October 2013
    Reforms Are Beginning to Bite and to Stimulate a Broad Economic Recovery
    By Catherine Bolger

    The Wall Street Journal, October 11, 2013. All Rights Reserved.


    Investing in Greece has been highly profitable for a number of foreign investors, and they're going back for more. Levy Institute President Dimitri B. Papadimitriou comments on the outlook for long-term investment.
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  • In the Media | October 2013
    Agência Brasil
    DCI, 26 Setembro 2013. © 2013 DCI - Diário Comércio Indústria & Serviços. Todos os direitos reservados.

    RIO DE JANEIRO - Batista citou como dado favorável a força do mercado de trabalho brasileiro, que vem apresentando números positivos, apesar da crise econômica mundial...

    RIO DE JANEIRO - O diretor executivo do Fundo Monetário Internacional (FMI), Paulo Nogueira Batista, que representa o Brasil e mais dez países no órgão, disse nesta quinta-feira (26) que os fundamentos da economia brasileira estão razoáveis e que o ponto que merece mais atenção são as contas externas.

    “Os [fundamentos] fiscais estão bastante razoáveis, a política monetária também, a regulação do sistema financeiro boa. No setor externo, a deterioração da conta corrente preocupa um pouco, mas as reservas são altas e a entrada de investimentos diretos é alta. Então, eu diria que está razoável. Acho que tem de ficar de olho [nas contas externas], porque não convém ter déficit em conta corrente muito alto. É um ponto preocupante, mas não é alarmante”, avaliou Batista, que frisou estar declarando opinião própria, e não do fundo.

    Batista participou do seminário Governança Financeira Depois da Crise, promovido pelo Multidisciplinary Institute on Development and Strategie (Minds) e o Levy Economics Institute.

    Sobre a reportagem da revista britânica The Economist intitulada Has Brazil blown up? (Será que o Brasil estragou tudo?, em tradução livre), que foi às bancas hoje, questionando se o país fracassou na política econômica atual, depois de ter ido bem nos anos anteriores, Batista acredita que o país está apresentando recuperação progressiva.

    “O Brasil passou por uma fase de grande sucesso, era moda e referência. Havia um certo exagero naquela época, até 2011. Agora houve uma reavaliação mais negativa e está indo para o extremo oposto. Acho que o Brasil está crescendo menos do que o esperado, menos do que pode crescer. Na verdade, a desaceleração de 2011 foi desejada e planejada pelo governo brasileiro, porque havia a percepção, correta, de que em 2010 o país estava superaquecendo. Houve medidas deliberadas para desaquecer a economia, isso provocou uma queda na taxa de crescimento, o que não foi surpresa. O que foi uma surpresa negativa foi a dificuldade de se recuperar em 2012 e em 2013. Mas eu creio que agora estamos vivendo uma recuperação mais clara, ainda incipiente, mas os dados estão mostrando que a economia está se reativando”, disse.

    O diretor do FMI citou como dado favorável a força do mercado de trabalho brasileiro, que vem apresentando números positivos, apesar da crise econômica mundial, o que pode sinalizar um início de recuperação. “O mercado de trabalho é uma surpresa positiva nesse período todo. Apesar da desaceleração forte da economia, o mercado de trabalho continua forte. A taxa de desemprego aberta está bastante baixa, os salários continuam crescendo. O desempenho não é tão favorável quanto se esperava, mas eu acho que vem uma recuperação”, acrescentou.
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  • Working Paper No. 776 | September 2013
    A Critique of the German Debt Brake from a Post-Keynesian Perspective

    The German debt brake is often regarded as a great success story, and has therefore served as a role model for the Euro area and its fiscal compact. In this paper we fundamentally criticize the debt brake. We show that (1) it suffers from serious shortcomings, and its success is far from certain even from a mainstream point of view; (2) from a Post-Keynesian perspective, it completely neglects the requirements for fiscal policies of member-countries in a currency union and will prevent fiscal policy from contributing to the necessary rebalancing in the Euro area; and (3) alternative scenarios, which could avoid the deflationary pressures of the German debt brake on domestic demand and contribute to internally rebalancing the Euro area, are extremely unlikely, as they would have to rely on unrealistic shifts in the functional income distribution and/or investment and savings behavior in Germany.

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  • In the Media | September 2013
    Financial Times, September 27, 2013. © The Financial Times Ltd.

    Sir, Professor Christopher Gilbert in his letter of September 25 suggests that "some of the most important southern countries [including Italy] ... do so little to help themselves" that they therefore should not seek greater co-operation from euro institutions, as advocated by Professors Emiliano Brancaccio and other economists including myself (Letters, September 23). Prof Gilbert himself does not offer suggestions on which further reforms should be implemented in Italy to restore prosperity through "serious adjustment".

    Italy has already undergone a major reform in its pension system, which implied a large structural reduction in perspective payments from the public sector. It should also be noted that the number of parttime workers has risen from about 13 per cent of total employment in 2004 to about 18 per cent this year, with full-time employment steadily declining since the beginning of the recession period in 2007, surely a sign of increased flexibility ("serious adjustment?") in the labour market. Public employees' wages have been frozen and public employment has been in free fall since 2007.

    It seems that "more radical domestic efforts" in these directions, as advocated by Prof Gilbert, would surely imply a further increase in poverty and social exclusion, further weakening of the industrial structure due to depressed domestic demand and stronger political support to nationalistic parties, exactly the fears that motivated the letter of warning from economists.

    Gennaro Zezza, Associate Professor, Università di Cassino, Italy 
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  • In the Media | September 2013
    Marcos Barbosa
    RBV News, 27 Setembro 2013. © 2012 www.rbvnews.com.br. Todos os Direitos Reservados.

    O diretor executivo do Fundo Monetário Internacional (FMI), Paulo Nogueira Batista, que representa o Brasil e mais dez países no órgão, disse hoje (26) que os fundamentos da economia brasileira estão razoáveis e que o ponto que merece mais atenção são as contas externas.

    “Os [fundamentos] fiscais estão bastante razoáveis, a política monetária também, a regulação do sistema financeiro boa. No setor externo, a deterioração da conta corrente preocupa um pouco, mas as reservas são altas e a entrada de investimentos diretos é alta. Então, eu diria que está razoável. Acho que tem de ficar de olho [nas contas externas], porque não convém ter déficit em conta corrente muito alto. É um ponto preocupante, mas não é alarmante”, avaliou Batista, que frisou estar declarando opinião própria, e não do fundo.

    Batista participou do seminário Governança Financeira Depois da Crise, promovido pelo Multidisciplinary Institute on Development and Strategie (Minds) e o Levy Economics Institute.

    Sobre a reportagem da revista britânica The Economist intitulada Has Brazil blown up? (Será que o Brasil estragou tudo?, em tradução livre), que foi às bancas hoje, questionando se o país fracassou na política econômica atual, depois de ter ido bem nos anos anteriores, Batista acredita que o país está apresentando recuperação progressiva.

    “O Brasil passou por uma fase de grande sucesso, era moda e referência. Havia um certo exagero naquela época, até 2011. Agora houve uma reavaliação mais negativa e está indo para o extremo oposto. Acho que o Brasil está crescendo menos do que o esperado, menos do que pode crescer. Na verdade, a desaceleração de 2011 foi desejada e planejada pelo governo brasileiro, porque havia a percepção, correta, de que em 2010 o país estava superaquecendo. Houve medidas deliberadas para desaquecer a economia, isso provocou uma queda na taxa de crescimento, o que não foi surpresa. O que foi uma surpresa negativa foi a dificuldade de se recuperar em 2012 e em 2013. Mas eu creio que agora estamos vivendo uma recuperação mais clara, ainda incipiente, mas os dados estão mostrando que a economia está se reativando”, disse.

    O diretor do FMI citou como dado favorável a força do mercado de trabalho brasileiro, que vem apresentando números positivos, apesar da crise econômica mundial, o que pode sinalizar um início de recuperação. “O mercado de trabalho é uma surpresa positiva nesse período todo. Apesar da desaceleração forte da economia, o mercado de trabalho continua forte. A taxa de desemprego aberta está bastante baixa, os salários continuam crescendo. O desempenho não é tão favorável quanto se esperava, mas eu acho que vem uma recuperação”, acrescentou. 
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  • In the Media | September 2013
    Fator Brasil, 27 Setembro 2013. © Copyright 2006 - 2013 Fator Brasil.

    Rio de Janeiro – O diretor executivo do Fundo Monetário Internacional (FMI), Paulo Nogueira Batista, que representa o Brasil e mais dez países no órgão, disse no dia 26 de setembro (quinta-feira), que os fundamentos da economia brasileira estão razoáveis e que o ponto que merece mais atenção são as contas externas. 

    “Os [fundamentos] fiscais estão bastante razoáveis, a política monetária também, a regulação do sistema financeiro boa. No setor externo, a deterioração da conta corrente preocupa um pouco, mas as reservas são altas e a entrada de investimentos diretos é alta. Então, eu diria que está razoável. Acho que tem de ficar de olho [nas contas externas], porque não convém ter déficit em conta corrente muito alto. É um ponto preocupante, mas não é alarmante”, avaliou Batista, que frisou estar declarando opinião própria, e não do fundo. 

    Batista participou do seminário Governança Financeira Depois da Crise, promovido pelo Multidisciplinary Institute on Development and Strategie (Minds) e o Levy Economics Institute. 

    Sobre a reportagem da revista britânica The Economist intitulada Has Brazil blown up? (Será que o Brasil estragou tudo?, em tradução livre), que foi às bancas hoje, questionando se o país fracassou na política econômica atual, depois de ter ido bem nos anos anteriores, Batista acredita que o país está apresentando recuperação progressiva.  “O Brasil passou por uma fase de grande sucesso, era moda e referência. Havia um certo exagero naquela época, até 2011. Agora houve uma reavaliação mais negativa e está indo para o extremo oposto. Acho que o Brasil está crescendo menos do que o esperado, menos do que pode crescer. Na verdade, a desaceleração de 2011 foi desejada e planejada pelo governo brasileiro, porque havia a percepção, correta, de que em 2010 o país estava superaquecendo. Houve medidas deliberadas para desaquecer a economia, isso provocou uma queda na taxa de crescimento, o que não foi surpresa. O que foi uma surpresa negativa foi a dificuldade de se recuperar em 2012 e em 2013. Mas eu creio que agora estamos vivendo uma recuperação mais clara, ainda incipiente, mas os dados estão mostrando que a economia está se reativando”, disse. 

    O diretor do FMI citou como dado favorável a força do mercado de trabalho brasileiro, que vem apresentando números positivos, apesar da crise econômica mundial, o que pode sinalizar um início de recuperação. “O mercado de trabalho é uma surpresa positiva nesse período todo. Apesar da desaceleração forte da economia, o mercado de trabalho continua forte. A taxa de desemprego aberta está bastante baixa, os salários continuam crescendo. O desempenho não é tão favorável quanto se esperava, mas eu acho que vem uma recuperação”, acrescentou.
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  • In the Media | September 2013
    Lucianne Carneiro
    O Globo Econômico, 26 Setembro 2013.  © 1996–2013. Todos direitos reservados a Infoglobo Comunicação e Participações S.A. 

    RIO – Professor da Universidade de Buenos Aires e pesquisador do Centro de Estudos de Estado e de Sociedade (Cedes), Roberto Frenkel afirma que os países emergentes, especialmente na América do Sul, não escaparão de um processo de desvalorização cambial para se ajustar ao novo cenário mundial, com elevação das taxas de juros nos Estados Unidos e menor ritmo de expansão da economia chinesa. A atual situação do câmbio muito apreciado tende a dificultar esse ajuste, com consequências como inflação.

    — Peru, Colômbia, Chile, Brasil e Argentina são alguns dos países que apreciaram demais suas moedas e agora terão que subir o câmbio — diz Frenkel, que está no Rio para participar do seminário “Governança Financeira depois da Crise”, promovido pelo Minds, Instituto Multidisciplinar de Desenvolvimento e Estratégia, em parceria com o Levy Economics Institute.

    Na avaliação de Frenkel, a vulnerabilidade externa dos países sul-americanos recuou e não se deve ver uma crise como no passado. A região não aproveitou integralmente, no entanto, o bom momento da economia mundial nos últimos anos. Crítico às políticas do governo de Cristina Kirchner, Frenkel diz que a Argentina tem um grave desequilíbrio em seu balanço de pagamentos, além de uma inflação “insustentável”.

    Alguns economistas afirmam que a recuperação da economia mundial está forte, outros dizem que o movimento não é sustentável. Qual é a sua avaliação?

    Os Estados Unidos estão se recuperando lentamente. Aliás, é isso que tem provocado o ajuste na política monetária. A Europa, por sua vez, continua na crise, a situação não está resolvida para nenhum país. Houve um incremento do Produto Interno Bruto (PIB, soma dos bens e riquezas de um país), mas a União Europeia vai continuar com sua grande crise. O que se vê de diferente é o ritmo de crescimento econômico dos países emergentes. Os países emergentes continuam crescendo mais rápido que os desenvolvidos, mas a taxa de expansão desacelerou. Aquele ganho mais rápido dos emergentes acabou.

    Países emergentes tiveram um certo alívio quando o Federal Reserve (Fed, o banco central americano) manteve os estímulos à economia na última semana. O que veremos agora?

    A decisão do Federal Reserve (Fed, banco central americano) de manter os estímulos é temporária. É certo que em algum momento as taxas de juros dos Estados Unidos vão subir. Essa perspectiva é bem concreta, mesmo que o Fed diga que vai manter o estímulo. É certo que a política monetária vai mudar. E a China também está mudando seu ritmo de crescimento para permitir a transição de seu modelo de crescimento de uma base de exportações para ser puxado pelo consumo interno. O que vemos é um novo ritmo de crescimento da economia mundial, e é preciso se ajustar a isso.

    Como os emergentes devem ficar nesse cenário?

    O crescimento menor da China afeta principalmente os exportadores de minerais e metais, já que o investimento será menor. E muitos emergentes estão com o câmbio apreciado e terão que se ajustar. A Índia, com um déficit grande em conta corrente e saída de capitais, tem uma situação mais complicada.

    A vulnerabilidade externa dos países da América do Sul está menor?

    A situação hoje na maioria dos países é robusta, existe um endividamento menor e esse ajustamento (ao novo ritmo da economia) não vai gerar crise como no passado. A vulnerabilidade externa foi muito reduzida. Mas o que na verdade se viu é que quase uma década excepcionalmente boa para a economia (entre 2002 e 2012) não foi aproveitada pelos países da América do Sul. A Argentina vive hoje tomada pelo forte populismo. O Brasil, por sua vez, alcançou um crescimento baixo. A região precisa de um crescimento econômico maior, que seja suficiente para alcançar um novo nível de desenvolvimento.

    Como os países da América do Sul terão que lidar com o câmbio?

    O tema central da economia da América do Sul hoje é como lidar com a desvalorização do câmbio neste momento de ajustamento ao novo cenário mundial, que complica a política econômica. Os países da região estão com o câmbio muito apreciado. Os exportadores foram beneficiados pela melhora do preço de exportações. Houve uma desvalorização transitória, mas seguiu-se uma apreciação cambial. Nessa situação de câmbio apreciado, fica mais difícil se ajustar a um novo cenário mundial. Esse ajuste se faz pelo câmbio mais alto. Quanto mais apreciado o câmbio, mais custoso é o ajustamento. E a desvalorização cambial traz consequências como o impacto na inflação e a queda salarial a curto prazo. Peru, Colômbia, Chile, Brasil, Argentina são alguns dos países que apreciaram demais suas moedas e agora terão que subir o câmbio.

    Quais as principais dificuldades hoje da economia argentina?

    Há um problema grave no balanço de pagamentos. Nós estamos perdendo reservas e, por causa do risco político, não temos acesso ao financiamento do mercado externo. E nesse contexto temos um controle forte do câmbio. Há o câmbio paralelo e o fixo, com uma diferença de cerca de 60%. Esse câmbio paralelo é o sintoma do grande desequilíbrio atual. Vamos ter que sair dessa situação.

    É possível esperar um ajuste pelo governo?

    Está claro que o governo de Cristina Kirchner não deve ser reeleito. A dúvida é se esse governo vai fazer esse ajuste antes de sair ou deixar os problemas para o próximo presidente.

    A desvalorização do câmbio deve ter impacto maior na Argentina por causa de uma inflação já elevada?

    A inflação na Argentina está muito distante dos números oficiais, o governo falsifica os dados. É uma situação insustentável. Nós temos uma inflação de 25% ao ano. No Brasil, os economistas estão preocupados com o efeito do câmbio na inflação. Agora imagine o impacto na Argentina. O país vai enfrentar uma aceleração inflacionária grande por causa do câmbio, que terá que passar por uma desvalorização significativa.
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  • In the Media | September 2013
    Ana Paula Grabois
    Brasil Econômico, 26 Setembro 2013. © Copyright 2009–2012 Brasil Econômico. Todos os Direitos Reservados.

    Dimitri Papadimitriou defende uma regulação do sistema financeiro mais forte: “A vigente não foi capaz de evitar o colapso de 2008.”

    Pesidente do Instituto Levy Economics, de Nova York, Dimitri Papadimitriou, é um crítico feroz da autorregulação do mercado financeiro. O economista grego, radicado há 45 anos nos Estados Unidos, dirige o instituto que elabora pesquisas sobre os mercados financeiros e sobre o que se pode fazer para evitar crises, como a de 2008. Papadimitriou defende uma regulação financeira mais forte que se antecipe aos choques. "Precisamos re-regular o sistema financeiro. Porque a regulação vigente não foi capaz de evitar o colapso de 2008".

    Em sua primeira visita ao Brasil, para participar da conferência "Governança financeira depois da crise", organizada pelo instituto que preside em parceria com o Instituto Multidisciplinar de Desenvolvimento e Estratégia (Minds), o economista diz que a instabilidade é inexorável ao sistema capitalista. "O aspecto mais importante é como regular esse sistema para prevenir que esse tipo de coisa aconteça de novo. Ou se entende as crises como acasos que ocorrem por choques e que não podem ser regulados", afirma o economista, ao Brasil Econômico, na véspera da conferência, que ocorre hoje e amanhã, no Rio.

    Para o economista, é possível prever eventos que determinam instabilidades futuras, e assim, evitar crises mais complexas. Apesar de governos espalhados pelo mundo defenderem a ampliação dos mecanismos de regulação financeira, Papadimitriou diz que muito pouco foi feito.

    "Desde o colapso de Lehman Brothers, nós ainda não tivemos nenhum progresso para prevenir que isso aconteça de novo", afirma. Parte do progresso quase nulo diz respeito à concentração das transações financeiras mas mãos de um grupo pequeno de grandes bancos. "É mais fácil regular os bancos pequenos porque você sabe o que realmente ele faz. Algumas vezes, é difícil entender o que os grandes bancos fazem e precificar o risco. A tendência desde 2008 é subprecificar os riscos dos bancos".

    Com tantos tipos de transações, entre depósitos, empréstimos, títulos, investimento, derivativos em poucos bancos, a atual estrutura regulatória - seja nos Estados Unidos, na Europa ou na América Latina - é ineficaz. "É preciso saber quem regula e supervisiona quem e o quê", completa.

    Na sua avaliação, os grandes bancos atingidos pela crise e depois ajudados pelo governo americano, como Citibank, JPMorgan e Chase Manhattan, continuam no controle das transações financeiras no mundo, sem avanços na regulação de suas atividades. "As restrições foram incapazes, por exemplo, de controlar questões como o caso da Baleia de Londres. O JP Morgan perdeu US$ 6 bilhões para seus clientes e teve US 1 bilhão de multa. Isso mostra que ainda falta regulação", diz. O escândalo do JP Morgan envolveu operações de alto risco com papeis derivativos.

    O presidente do Levy Economics afirma que num mundo onde as transações financeiras equivalem a 35 vezes o valor do comércio de bens e serviços entre os países, a complexidade das transações aumenta, o que dificulta ainda mais a supervisão do mercado. Papadimitriou defende a modificação das estruturas de regulação no mundo, a começar pelos Estados Unidos. "O grande problema é o lobby dos bancos no Congresso, que querem evitar a regulação. O governo Obama não é muito agressivo em implementar novas regulamentações", complementa.

    Totalmente favorável ao controle de capitais, o economista do instituto de pesquisa ressalta a conexão entre as crises financeiras e a economia real de vários países no ambiente globalizado atual.

    "Wall Street não é isolado da economia real", diz. Uma crise financeira pode aumentar desemprego, retrair o crescimento da atividade econômica de vários países, além de forçar o corte de gastos do governo para evitar déficits de orçamento. "Isso significa menos infraestrutura, menos educação, menos seguridade social", afirma.
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  • In the Media | September 2013
    Agência Brasil
    Correio Braziliense, 20 Setembro 2013.

    O diretor executivo do Fundo Monetário Internacional (FMI), Paulo Nogueira Batista, que representa o Brasil e mais dez países no órgão, disse nesta quinta-feira (26/9) que os fundamentos da economia brasileira estão razoáveis e que o único ponto que merece mais atenção são as contas externas.

    “Os [fundamentos] fiscais estão bastante razoáveis, a política monetária também, a regulação do sistema financeiro boa. No setor externo, a deterioração da conta corrente preocupa um pouco, mas as reservas são altas e a entrada de investimentos diretos é alta. Então, eu diria que está razoável. Acho que tem de ficar de olho [nas contas externas], porque não convém ter déficit em conta corrente muito alto. É um ponto preocupante, mas não é alarmante”, avaliou Batista, que frisou estar declarando opinião própria, e não do fundo.

    Batista participou do seminário Governança Financeira Depois da Crise, promovido pelo Multidisciplinary Institute on Development and Strategie (Minds) e o Levy Economics Institute.

    Sobre a reportagem da revista britânica The Economist intitulada Has Brazil blown up? (O Brasil estragou tudo?, em tradução livre), que foi às bancas hoje, questionando se o país fracassou na política econômica atual, depois de ter ido bem nos anos anteriores, Batista acredita que o país está apresentando recuperação progressiva.

    “O Brasil passou por uma fase de grande sucesso, era moda e referência. Havia um certo exagero naquela época, até 2011. Agora houve uma reavaliação mais negativa e está indo para o extremo oposto. Acho que o Brasil está crescendo menos do que o esperado, menos do que pode crescer. Na verdade, a desaceleração de 2011 foi desejada e planejada pelo governo brasileiro, porque havia a percepção, correta, de que em 2010 o país estava superaquecendo. Houve medidas deliberadas para desaquecer a economia, isso provocou uma queda na taxa de crescimento, o que não foi surpresa. O que foi uma surpresa negativa foi a dificuldade de se recuperar em 2012 e em 2013. Mas eu creio que agora estamos vivendo uma recuperação mais clara, ainda incipiente, mas os dados estão mostrando que a economia está se reativando”, disse.

    O diretor do FMI citou como dado favorável a força do mercado de trabalho brasileiro, que vem apresentando números positivos, apesar da crise econômica mundial, o que pode sinalizar um início de recuperação. “O mercado de trabalho é uma surpresa positiva nesse período todo. Apesar da desaceleração forte da economia, o mercado de trabalho continua forte. A taxa de desemprego aberta está bastante baixa, os salários continuam crescendo. O desempenho não é tão favorável quanto se esperava, mas eu acho que vem uma recuperação”, acrescentou. 
    Associated Program:
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    Latin America, Europe
  • In the Media | September 2013
    Jornal do Brasil, 26 Setembro 2013. Copyright © 1995-2013 | Todos os direitos reservados

    Paulo Nogueira Batista ressalta que o único ponto que merece atenção são as contas externas

    O diretor executivo do Fundo Monetário Internacional (FMI), Paulo Nogueira Batista, que representa o Brasil e mais dez países no órgão, disse hoje (26) que os fundamentos da economia brasileira estão razoáveis e que o único ponto que merece mais atenção são as contas externas.

    “Os [fundamentos] fiscais estão bastante razoáveis, a política monetária também, a regulação do sistema financeiro boa. No setor externo, a deterioração da conta corrente preocupa um pouco, mas as reservas são altas e a entrada de investimentos diretos é alta. Então, eu diria que está razoável. Acho que tem de ficar de olho [nas contas externas], porque não convém ter déficit em conta corrente muito alto. É um ponto preocupante, mas não é alarmante”, avaliou Batista, que frisou estar declarando opinião própria, e não do fundo.

    Batista participou do seminário Governança Financeira Depois da Crise, promovido pelo Multidisciplinary Institute on Development and Strategie (Minds) e o Levy Economics Institute.

    Sobre a reportagem da revista britânica The Economist intitulada Has Brazil blown up? (O Brasil estragou tudo?, em tradução livre), que foi às bancas hoje, questionando se o país fracassou na política econômica atual, depois de ter ido bem nos anos anteriores, Batista acredita que o país está apresentando recuperação progressiva.

    “O Brasil passou por uma fase de grande sucesso, era moda e referência. Havia um certo exagero naquela época, até 2011. Agora houve uma reavaliação mais negativa e está indo para o extremo oposto. Acho que o Brasil está crescendo menos do que o esperado, menos do que pode crescer. Na verdade, a desaceleração de 2011 foi desejada e planejada pelo governo brasileiro, porque havia a percepção, correta, de que em 2010 o país estava superaquecendo. Houve medidas deliberadas para desaquecer a economia, isso provocou uma queda na taxa de crescimento, o que não foi surpresa. O que foi uma surpresa negativa foi a dificuldade de se recuperar em 2012 e em 2013. Mas eu creio que agora estamos vivendo uma recuperação mais clara, ainda incipiente, mas os dados estão mostrando que a economia está se reativando”, disse.

    O diretor do FMI citou como dado favorável a força do mercado de trabalho brasileiro, que vem apresentando números positivos, apesar da crise econômica mundial, o que pode sinalizar um início de recuperação. “O mercado de trabalho é uma surpresa positiva nesse período todo. Apesar da desaceleração forte da economia, o mercado de trabalho continua forte. A taxa de desemprego aberta está bastante baixa, os salários continuam crescendo. O desempenho não é tão favorável quanto se esperava, mas eu acho que vem uma recuperação”, acrescentou. 
    Associated Program:
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  • In the Media | September 2013
    Vladimir Platonow / Agência Brasil
    Exame, 26 Setembro 2013. Copyright © Editora Abril - Todos os direitos reservados

    Rio de Janeiro – O diretor executivo do Fundo Monetário Internacional (FMI), Paulo Nogueira Batista, que representa o Brasil e mais dez países no órgão, disse hoje (26) que os fundamentos da economia brasileira estão razoáveis e que o ponto que merece mais atenção são as contas externas.

    “Os [fundamentos] fiscais estão bastante razoáveis, a política monetária também, a regulação do sistema financeiro boa. No setor externo, a deterioração da conta corrente preocupa um pouco, mas as reservas são altas e a entrada de investimentos diretos é alta.

    Então, eu diria que está razoável. Acho que tem de ficar de olho [nas contas externas], porque não convém ter déficit em conta corrente muito alto. É um ponto preocupante, mas não é alarmante”, avaliou Batista, que frisou estar declarando opinião própria, e não do fundo.

    Batista participou do seminário Governança Financeira Depois da Crise, promovido pelo Multidisciplinary Institute on Development and Strategie (Minds) e o Levy Economics Institute.

    Sobre a reportagem da revista britânica The Economist intitulada Has Brazil blown up? (Será que o Brasil estragou tudo?, em tradução livre), que foi às bancas hoje, questionando se o país fracassou na política econômica atual, depois de ter ido bem nos anos anteriores, Batista acredita que o país está apresentando recuperação progressiva.

    “O Brasil passou por uma fase de grande sucesso, era moda e referência. Havia um certo exagero naquela época, até 2011. Agora houve uma reavaliação mais negativa e está indo para o extremo oposto. Acho que o Brasil está crescendo menos do que o esperado, menos do que pode crescer. Na verdade, a desaceleração de 2011 foi desejada e planejada pelo governo brasileiro, porque havia a percepção, correta, de que em 2010 o país estava superaquecendo. Houve medidas deliberadas para desaquecer a economia, isso provocou uma queda na taxa de crescimento, o que não foi surpresa. O que foi uma surpresa negativa foi a dificuldade de se recuperar em 2012 e em 2013. Mas eu creio que agora estamos vivendo uma recuperação mais clara, ainda incipiente, mas os dados estão mostrando que a economia está se reativando”, disse.

    O diretor do FMI citou como dado favorável a força do mercado de trabalho brasileiro, que vem apresentando números positivos, apesar da crise econômica mundial, o que pode sinalizar um início de recuperação. “O mercado de trabalho é uma surpresa positiva nesse período todo. Apesar da desaceleração forte da economia, o mercado de trabalho continua forte. A taxa de desemprego aberta está bastante baixa, os salários continuam crescendo. O desempenho não é tão favorável quanto se esperava, mas eu acho que vem uma recuperação”, acrescentou.
    Associated Program:
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    Latin America, Europe
  • In the Media | September 2013
    Vladimir Platonow, Agência Brasil
    Brasil 247, 26 de Setembro de 2013.  © Brasil 247. Todos os direitos reservados.

    Segundo Paulo Nogueira Batista, que representa o Brasil e mais dez países no órgão, os fundamentos fiscais estão bastante razoáveis, a política monetária também, a regulação do sistema financeiro boa; "no setor externo, a deterioração da conta corrente preocupa um pouco, mas as reservas são altas e a entrada de investimentos diretos é alta", afirma

    Rio de Janeiro
    – O diretor executivo do Fundo Monetário Internacional (FMI), Paulo Nogueira Batista, que representa o Brasil e mais dez países no órgão, disse hoje (26) que os fundamentos da economia brasileira estão razoáveis e que o ponto que merece mais atenção são as contas externas.

    “Os [fundamentos] fiscais estão bastante razoáveis, a política monetária também, a regulação do sistema financeiro boa. No setor externo, a deterioração da conta corrente preocupa um pouco, mas as reservas são altas e a entrada de investimentos diretos é alta. Então, eu diria que está razoável. Acho que tem de ficar de olho [nas contas externas], porque não convém ter déficit em conta corrente muito alto. É um ponto preocupante, mas não é alarmante”, avaliou Batista, que frisou estar declarando opinião própria, e não do fundo.

    Batista participou do seminário Governança Financeira Depois da Crise, promovido pelo Multidisciplinary Institute on Development and Strategie (Minds) e o Levy Economics Institute.

    Sobre a reportagem da revista britânica The Economist intitulada Has Brazil blown up? (O Brasil estragou tudo?, em tradução livre), que foi às bancas hoje, questionando se o país fracassou na política econômica atual, depois de ter ido bem nos anos anteriores, Batista acredita que o país está apresentando recuperação progressiva.

    “O Brasil passou por uma fase de grande sucesso, era moda e referência. Havia um certo exagero naquela época, até 2011. Agora houve uma reavaliação mais negativa e está indo para o extremo oposto. Acho que o Brasil está crescendo menos do que o esperado, menos do que pode crescer. Na verdade, a desaceleração de 2011 foi desejada e planejada pelo governo brasileiro, porque havia a percepção, correta, de que em 2010 o país estava superaquecendo. Houve medidas deliberadas para desaquecer a economia, isso provocou uma queda na taxa de crescimento, o que não foi surpresa. O que foi uma surpresa negativa foi a dificuldade de se recuperar em 2012 e em 2013. Mas eu creio que agora estamos vivendo uma recuperação mais clara, ainda incipiente, mas os dados estão mostrando que a economia está se reativando”, disse.

    O diretor do FMI citou como dado favorável a força do mercado de trabalho brasileiro, que vem apresentando números positivos, apesar da crise econômica mundial, o que pode sinalizar um início de recuperação. “O mercado de trabalho é uma surpresa positiva nesse período todo. Apesar da desaceleração forte da economia, o mercado de trabalho continua forte. A taxa de desemprego aberta está bastante baixa, os salários continuam crescendo. O desempenho não é tão favorável quanto se esperava, mas eu acho que vem uma recuperação”, acrescentou. 
    Associated Program:
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    Latin America, Europe
  • In the Media | September 2013
    Vladimir Platonow / Agência Brasil
    RedeTV, 26 Setembro 2013. Copyright © 2013 - RedeTV! Todos os direitos reservados.

    O diretor executivo do Fundo Monetário Internacional (FMI), Paulo Nogueira Batista, que representa o Brasil e mais dez países no órgão, disse nesta quinta-feira (26) que os fundamentos da economia brasileira estão razoáveis e que o ponto que merece mais atenção são as contas externas.

    “Os [fundamentos] fiscais estão bastante razoáveis, a política monetária também, a regulação do sistema financeiro boa. No setor externo, a deterioração da conta corrente preocupa um pouco, mas as reservas são altas e a entrada de investimentos diretos é alta. Então, eu diria que está razoável. Acho que tem de ficar de olho [nas contas externas], porque não convém ter déficit em conta corrente muito alto. É um ponto preocupante, mas não é alarmante”, avaliou Batista, que frisou estar declarando opinião própria, e não do fundo.

    Batista participou do seminário Governança Financeira Depois da Crise, promovido pelo Multidisciplinary Institute on Development and Strategie (Minds) e o Levy Economics Institute.

    Sobre a reportagem da revista britânica The Economist intitulada "Has Brazil blown up" ("Será que o Brasil estragou tudo", em tradução livre), que foi às bancas hoje, questionando se o país fracassou na política econômica atual, depois de ter ido bem nos anos anteriores, Batista acredita que o país está apresentando recuperação progressiva.

    “O Brasil passou por uma fase de grande sucesso, era moda e referência. Havia um certo exagero naquela época, até 2011. Agora houve uma reavaliação mais negativa e está indo para o extremo oposto. Acho que o Brasil está crescendo menos do que o esperado, menos do que pode crescer. Na verdade, a desaceleração de 2011 foi desejada e planejada pelo governo brasileiro, porque havia a percepção, correta, de que em 2010 o país estava superaquecendo. Houve medidas deliberadas para desaquecer a economia, isso provocou uma queda na taxa de crescimento, o que não foi surpresa. O que foi uma surpresa negativa foi a dificuldade de se recuperar em 2012 e em 2013. Mas eu creio que agora estamos vivendo uma recuperação mais clara, ainda incipiente, mas os dados estão mostrando que a economia está se reativando”, disse.

    O diretor do FMI citou como dado favorável a força do mercado de trabalho brasileiro, que vem apresentando números positivos, apesar da crise econômica mundial, o que pode sinalizar um início de recuperação. “O mercado de trabalho é uma surpresa positiva nesse período todo. Apesar da desaceleração forte da economia, o mercado de trabalho continua forte. A taxa de desemprego aberta está bastante baixa, os salários continuam crescendo. O desempenho não é tão favorável quanto se esperava, mas eu acho que vem uma recuperação”, acrescentou. 
    Associated Program:
    Region(s):
    Latin America, Europe
  • In the Media | September 2013
    Vladimir Platonow
    Vio Mundo, 26 Setembro 2013. Copyright 2005-2013 - Todos os direitos reservados

    Fundamentos da economia estão razoáveis e país está em recuperação, diz diretor do FMI

    Rio de Janeiro – O diretor executivo do Fundo Monetário Internacional (FMI), Paulo Nogueira Batista, que representa o Brasil e mais dez países no órgão, disse hoje (26) que os fundamentos da economia brasileira estão razoáveis e que o ponto que merece mais atenção são as contas externas.

    “Os [fundamentos] fiscais estão bastante razoáveis, a política monetária também, a regulação do sistema financeiro boa. No setor externo, a deterioração da conta corrente preocupa um pouco, mas as reservas são altas e a entrada de investimentos diretos é alta. Então, eu diria que está razoável. Acho que tem de ficar de olho [nas contas externas], porque não convém ter déficit em conta corrente muito alto. É um ponto preocupante, mas não é alarmante”, avaliou Batista, que frisou estar declarando opinião própria, e não do fundo.

    Batista participou do seminário Governança Financeira Depois da Crise, promovido pelo Multidisciplinary Institute on Development and Strategie (Minds) e o Levy Economics Institute.

    Sobre a reportagem da revista britânica The Economist intitulada Has Brazil blown up? (Será que o Brasil estragou tudo?, em tradução livre), que foi às bancas hoje, questionando se o país fracassou na política econômica atual, depois de ter ido bem nos anos anteriores, Batista acredita que o país está apresentando recuperação progressiva.

    “O Brasil passou por uma fase de grande sucesso, era moda e referência. Havia um certo exagero naquela época, até 2011. Agora houve uma reavaliação mais negativa e está indo para o extremo oposto. Acho que o Brasil está crescendo menos do que o esperado, menos do que pode crescer. Na verdade, a desaceleração de 2011 foi desejada e planejada pelo governo brasileiro, porque havia a percepção, correta, de que em 2010 o país estava superaquecendo. Houve medidas deliberadas para desaquecer a economia, isso provocou uma queda na taxa de crescimento, o que não foi surpresa. O que foi uma surpresa negativa foi a dificuldade de se recuperar em 2012 e em 2013. Mas eu creio que agora estamos vivendo uma recuperação mais clara, ainda incipiente, mas os dados estão mostrando que a economia está se reativando”, disse.

    O diretor do FMI citou como dado favorável a força do mercado de trabalho brasileiro, que vem apresentando números positivos, apesar da crise econômica mundial, o que pode sinalizar um início de recuperação. “O mercado de trabalho é uma surpresa positiva nesse período todo. Apesar da desaceleração forte da economia, o mercado de trabalho continua forte. A taxa de desemprego aberta está bastante baixa, os salários continuam crescendo. O desempenho não é tão favorável quanto se esperava, mas eu acho que vem uma recuperação”, acrescentou.
    Associated Program:
    Region(s):
    Latin America, Europe
  • In the Media | September 2013
    Lucianne Carneiro
    O Globo Economia, 26 Setembro 2013. © 1996 - 2013. Todos direitos reservados a Infoglobo Comunicação e Participações S.A.

    RIO - O diretor executivo para o Brasil e outros países do Fundo Monetário Internacional, Paulo Nogueira Batista Jr., afirmou nesta quinta-feira que a economia brasileira já está se recuperando e há um exagero da imprensa internacional sobre a situação do Brasil, ao comentar a capa da revista britânica “The Economist”.

    - O Brasil passou por uma fase de grande sucesso, era moda, referência, havia um certo exagero. Agora (a percepção) está indo para o extremo oposto. O Brasil está crescendo menos do que poderia (...), mas agora estamos vendo uma recuperação clara. O desempenho não é tão favorável, mas a recuperação já começou - disse Nogueira Batista, ao participar do seminário “Governança Financeira depois da Crise”, promovido pelo Minds, Instituto Multidisciplinar de Desenvolvimento e Estratégia, em parceria com o Levy Economics Institute e a Fundação Ford.

    Na avaliação do economista, os fundamentos fiscais e a política monetária do Brasil vão bem. Embora a deterioração do déficit em contas correntes preocupe, apontou, as reservas internacionais são elevadas. Na contramão da opinião de Nogueira Batista, o professor da Universidade de Georgetown Albert Keidel afirmou mais cedo, no mesmo evento, que o Brasil tem um nível baixo de reservas internacionais, considerando a ausência de mecanismos de controle de capitais.

    Pressão por melhora nas moedas emergentes
    Nogueira Batista negou que o fim dos estímulos do Federal Reserve (Fed, o banco central americano) à economia vá provocar uma crise nos países emergentes.

    Acho que há muito exagero (sobre a reação dos emergentes ao fim da política do Fed).

    A situação hoje é muito diferente da época da crise asiática. As reservas estão muito mais altas, a situação fiscal teve muita melhora, com a dívida líquida caindo. É claro que a situação não é perfeita, mas acho exagerado dizer que podemos ter uma crise - afirmou o economista, destacando que falava em seu próprio nome e não como diretor do Fundo.

    Nogueira Batista disse que o alívio nos mercados com a decisão do banco central americano não suspender por enquanto seus estímulos já se refletiu em uma pressão de valorização das moedas emergentes, como o real. E que é preciso minimizar esses efeitos.

    - O programa de intervenção do Banco Central lançado no momento de tensão deu impacto para segurar o câmbio, o Brasil está apertando a política monetária. Apesar das capas das revistas, as pessoas veem isso lá fora.

    Em sua apresentação, Nogueira Batista afirmou que os emergentes ganharam espaço na governança global, mas que as mudanças nessa estrutura estão estagnadas desde 2011 e algumas metas no âmbito do Fundo Monetário Internacional (FMI) já passaram dos prazos estabelecidos, como a redistribuição dos votos e das cotas.

    - Após o Lehman Brothers, o G-20 emergiu com um importante fórum de líderes. No âmbito do FMI, fizemos algumas mudanças no sistema de votos. (...) Desde 2011, no entanto, o processo de mudanças na governança global vive uma certa estagnação. A implementação de acordos já assinados, por exemplo, têm sido adiada - disse o economista.

    Ele alertou sobre o risco de “uma tentação” de se voltar ao formato antigo, em que apenas Estados Unidos e europeus tinham peso forte nas decisões internacionais.

    Para combater este retrocesso, defende Paulo Nogueira, é preciso aprofundar ainda mais a cooperação entre os países dos Brics (Brasil, Rússia, Índia, China e África do Sul). Ele ressaltou os avanços tanto na criação de um fundo de reservas internacionais dos países dos Brics - para proteger contra oscilações cambiais e também de um banco de desenvolvimento. O primeiro rascunho do projeto de um fundo de reservas dos Brics será apresentado em uma reunião dos Brics em Washington, em duas semanas.

    O economista lembrou as dificuldades ainda existentes para uma participação maior dos emergentes no Fundo. Em 2011, quando Dominique Strauss-Khan deixou a entidade, os europeus defenderam a candidatura de Christine Lagarde antes mesmo do fim do período de inscrição de candidatos, disse Nogueira Batista.

    Segundo ele, até que se mude a estrutura dos votos no Fundo será difícil conseguir uma candidatura vitoriosa de um país emergentes. Hoje, Estados Unidos, europeus e Japão têm peso de mais de 50% nos votos.

    - Se o cargo de diretor-geral ficar vago em breve, pode ser que tenhamos o mesmo tipo de dificuldades que tivemos em 2011.

    Cálculo da dívida bruta será discutido em outubro
    Sobre o atraso na divulgação de algumas partes do Relatório Artigo IV do FMI sobre o Brasil, Nogueira Batista explicou que o país pediu a revisão de alguns aspectos do documento, como faz todos os anos, mas que a equipe do Fundo está demorando a responder. Sua expectativa é que isso pode ser concluído em breve.

    O relatório é divulgado para os diferentes países e analisa o desempenho macroeconômico das nações. Revisões podem ser pedidas no caso de erros factuais e passagens que podem ser consideradas ambíguas, entre outros aspectos.

    A questão sobre o cálculo da dívida bruta - que foi alterado pelo Brasil, mas vem sendo questionado pelo Fundo - será tratado em outubro, com uma equipe do Ministério da Fazenda que vai ao FMI. 
    Associated Program:
    Region(s):
    Latin America, Europe
  • In the Media | September 2013
    Lucianne Carneiro
    Ex-secretário executivo da Fazenda acredita que governo pode trazer a taxa para o centro da meta, de 4,5%, até 2015

    O Globo Economia, 26 Setembro 2013. © 1996 - 2013. Todos direitos reservados a Infoglobo Comunicação e Participações S.A.

    RIO – Na primeira aparição pública no Brasil desde que deixou o governo, o ex-secretário-executivo do Ministério da Fazenda e hoje professor da UFRJ, Nelson Barbosa Filho, afirmou que não existe mais espaço para apreciar o câmbio de maneira a ajudar no controle da inflação. O câmbio se apreciou demais nos últimos anos, segundo ele, e é preciso atingir a meta de inflação mesmo num cenário de taxa de câmbio estável ou até mesmo de depreciação. 

    - Todos os anos em que o Brasil cumpriu a meta da inflação, a taxa de câmbio se apreciou, com exceção do ano passado. O ajuste já começou. Estamos numa fase da economia brasileira de cumprir a meta de inflação sem depender tanto da apreciação cambial. Só que aí fica mais difícil a inflação cair mais rápido - disse Barbosa, ao participar do seminário "Governança Financeira depois da Crise", promovido pelo Minds, Instituto Multidisciplinar de Desenvolvimento e Estratégia, em parceria com o Levy Economics Institute e a Fundação Ford. 

    Sua avaliação é que o cenário com que o governo trabalha de trazer a inflação para 4,5% ao ano, que é o centro da meta, até 2015, é possível. O que vai influenciar esse resultado é a desvalorização cambial e a magnitude de um eventual aumento nos preços de combustíveis. Para Barbosa, a discussão sobre a necessidade de reduzir a atual meta da inflação brasileira só deve ocorrer depois que a taxa for mantida em 4,5% por um ou dois anos. 

    O governo vai trazer a inflação para 4,5% mas talvez leve um pouco mais de tempo porque houve esses choques recentemente. O principal esforço para isso é o aumento da produtividade - apontou. 

    Barbosa defendeu a manutenção do câmbio flutuante no país, lembrando que tanto depreciação quanto apreciação cambial excessiva têm consequências para a economia. A depreciação pressiona a inflação, enquanto a apreciação ajuda no cumprimento mais rápido da meta de inflação, mas prejudica a longo prazo a competitividade da economia. 

    Para o ex-secretário-executivo do Ministério da Fazenda, o câmbio ideal no momento deve variar entre R$ 2,20 e R$ 2,50, embora destaque que essa taxa de câmbio ideal para a economia está em constante mudança:

    - Um câmbio muito apreciado ou muito depreciado é ruim para a economia. Ir para muito abaixo de R$ 2,20 neste momento não é muito recomendável, assim como ficar acima de R$ 2,50 seria muito excessivo comparado com o que aconteceu com outros países.

    O economista, que deixou o governo em junho, disse que embora o país não tenha uma meta de taxa de câmbio, a oscilação cambial tem sido controlada por causa da meta de inflação. Quando a taxa de câmbio é elevada, a inflação também tende a ser elevada. Se a taxa de câmbio é mais baixa, a tendência é de uma inflação menor. 

    Barbosa explicou que existem três alternativas teóricas para reduzir o custo unitário do trabalho e aumentar a competitvidade. A primeira é uma desvalorização interna, com desaceleração do crescimento econômico e redução de salário. A segunda é uma desvalorização externa, com elevação da taxa de câmbio. A terceira é por aumento de produtividade. 

    - Na prática, o ajuste acontece nas três coisas. Na Europa, tem sido um pouco no salário. No Brasil, o que o governo tem tentado fazer é que seja mais na produtividade, para que seja menos via câmbio e desemprego - disse.
    Associated Program:
    Region(s):
    Latin America, Europe
  • In the Media | September 2013
    La Sinistra per Gualdo, 25 Settembre 2013. Tutti i diritti riservati.

    La crisi economica in Europa continua a distruggere posti di lavoro. Alla fine del 2013 i disoccupati saranno 19 milioni nella sola zona euro, oltre 7 milioni in più rispetto al 2008: un incremento che non ha precedenti dal secondo dopoguerra e che proseguirà anche nel 2014. La crisi occupazionale affligge soprattutto i paesi periferici dell’Unione monetaria europea, dove si verifica anche un aumento eccezionale delle sofferenze bancarie e dei fallimenti aziendali; la Germania e gli altri paesi centrali dell’eurozona hanno invece visto crescere i livelli di occupazione. Il carattere asimmetrico della crisi è una delle cause dell’attuale stallo politico europeo e dell’imbarazzante susseguirsi di vertici dai quali scaturiscono provvedimenti palesemente inadeguati a contrastare i processi di divergenza in corso. Una ignavia politica che può sembrare giustificata nelle fasi meno aspre del ciclo e di calma apparente sui mercati finanziari, ma che a lungo andare avrà le più gravi conseguenze.

    Come una parte della comunità accademica aveva previsto, la crisi sta rivelando una serie di contraddizioni nell’assetto istituzionale e politico dell’Unione monetaria europea. Le autorità europee hanno compiuto scelte che, contrariamente agli annunci, hanno contribuito all’inasprimento della recessione e all’ampliamento dei divari tra i paesi membri dell’Unione. Nel giugno 2010, ai primi segni di crisi dell’eurozona, una lettera sottoscritta da trecento economisti lanciò un allarme sui pericoli insiti nelle politiche di “austerità”: tali politiche avrebbero ulteriormente depresso l’occupazione e i redditi, rendendo ancora più difficili i rimborsi dei debiti, pubblici e privati. Quell’allarme rimase tuttavia inascoltato. Le autorità europee preferirono aderire alla fantasiosa dottrina dell’“austerità espansiva”, secondo cui le restrizioni dei bilanci pubblici avrebbero ripristinato la fiducia dei mercati sulla solvibilità dei paesi dell’Unione, favorendo così la diminuzione dei tassi d’interesse e la ripresa economica. Come ormai rileva anche il Fondo Monetario Internazionale, oggi sappiamo che in realtà le politiche di austerity hanno accentuato la crisi, provocando un tracollo dei redditi superiore alle attese prevalenti. Gli stessi fautori della “austerità espansiva” adesso riconoscono i loro sbagli, ma il disastro è in larga misura già compiuto.

    C’è tuttavia un nuovo errore che le autorità europee stanno commettendo. Esse appaiono persuase dall’idea che i paesi periferici dell’Unione potrebbero risolvere i loro problemi  attraverso le cosiddette “riforme strutturali”. Tali riforme dovrebbero ridurre i costi e i prezzi, aumentare la competitività e favorire quindi una ripresa trainata dalle esportazioni e una riduzione dei debiti verso l’estero. Questa tesi coglie alcuni problemi reali, ma è illusorio pensare che la soluzione prospettata possa salvaguardare l’unità europea. Le politiche deflattive praticate in Germania e altrove per accrescere l’avanzo commerciale hanno contribuito per anni, assieme ad altri fattori, all’accumulo di enormi squilibri nei rapporti di debito e credito tra i paesi della zona euro. Il riassorbimento di tali squilibri richiederebbe un’azione coordinata da parte di tutti i membri dell’Unione. Pensare che i soli paesi periferici debbano farsi carico del problema significa pretendere da questi una caduta dei salari e dei prezzi di tale portata da determinare un crollo ancora più accentuato dei redditi e una violenta deflazione da debiti, con il rischio concreto di nuove crisi bancarie e di una desertificazione produttiva di intere regioni europee.

    Nel 1919 John Maynard Keynes contestò il Trattato di Versailles con parole lungimiranti: «Se diamo per scontata la convinzione che la Germania debba esser tenuta in miseria, i suoi figli rimanere nella fame e nell’indigenza […], se miriamo deliberatamente alla umiliazione dell’Europa centrale, oso farmi profeta, la vendetta non tarderà». Sia pure a parti invertite, con i paesi periferici al tracollo e la Germania in posizione di relativo vantaggio, la crisi attuale presenta più di una analogia con quella tremenda fase storica, che creò i presupposti per l’ascesa del nazismo e la seconda guerra mondiale. Ma la memoria di quegli anni sembra persa: le autorità tedesche e gli altri governi europei stanno ripetendo errori speculari a quelli commessi allora. Questa miopia, in ultima istanza, è la causa principale delle ondate di irrazionalismo che stanno investendo l’Europa, dalle ingenue apologie del cambio flessibile quale panacea di ogni male fino ai più inquietanti sussulti di propagandismo ultranazionalista e xenofobo.

    Occorre esser consapevoli che proseguendo con le politiche di “austerità” e affidando il riequilibrio alle sole “riforme strutturali”, il destino dell’euro sarà segnato: l’esperienza della moneta unica si esaurirà, con ripercussioni sulla tenuta del mercato unico europeo. In assenza di condizioni per una riforma del sistema finanziario e della politica monetaria e fiscale che dia vita a un piano di rilancio degli investimenti pubblici e privati, contrasti le sperequazioni tra i redditi e tra i territori e risollevi l’occupazione nelle periferie dell’Unione, ai decisori politici non resterà altro che una scelta cruciale tra modalità alternative di uscita dall’euro.

    Promosso da Emiliano Brancaccio e Riccardo Realfonzo (Università del Sannio), il “monito degli economisti” è sottoscritto da Philip Arestis (University of Cambridge), Georgios Argeitis (Athens University), Wendy Carlin (University College of London), Jesus Ferreiro (University of the Basque Country), Giuseppe Fontana (Università del Sannio), James Galbraith (University of Texas), Mauro Gallegati (Università Politecnica delle Marche), Eckhard Hein (Berlin School of Economics and Law), Alan Kirman (University of Aix-Marseille III), Jan Kregel (University of Tallin), Heinz Kurz (Graz University), Alfonso Palacio-Vera (Universidad Complutense Madrid), Dimitri Papadimitriou (Levy Economics Institute), Pascal Petit (Université de Paris Nord), Dani Rodrik (Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton), Malcolm Sawyer (Leeds University), Willi Semmler (New School University, New York), Felipe Serrano (University of the Basque Country), Engelbert Stockhammer (Kingston University), Tony Thirlwall (University of Kent). 
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    Latin America, Europe
  • In the Media | September 2013
    Léa De Luca
    Brasil Econômico, 24 Setembro 2013. © Copyright 2009-2012 Brasil Econômico. Todos os Direitos Reservados.


    Para Leonardo Burlamaqui lobby dessas instituições impede o avanço de uma governança financeira global

    São Paulo - Cinco anos depois da crise financeira internacional, as coisas mudaram muito pouco no mercado financeiro. Para Leonardo Burlamaqui, diretor da Fundação Ford, e Rogério Silveira, diretor executivo do Minds (Instituto multidisciplinar para desenvolvimento e estratégias, na sigla em inglês), a saída para evitar novas crises seria estabelecer uma governança financeira global. Entre as propostas, estão aumentar a regulação (inclusive de funcionamento dos fundos de "hedge"), adotar o controle de entrada de capitais como uma rotina e acabar com os paraísos fiscais, por exemplo.

    Mas a ideia de um novo conjunto de regras para o sistema financeiro global enfrenta dificuldades para avançar e uma das razões, segundo eles, é o forte poder político e econômico das instituições financeiras. "Elas não querem mais regulação. Vivemos uma governança movida pelo lobby dessas instituições. É uma ameaça à democracia", diz Burlamaqui.

    Silveira concorda, mas acredita que, ao menos, a crise de 2008 abriu espaço para discussão, apesar das resistências. "Pode não acontecer de forma orgânica e organizada, mas confio que caminharemos sim para mais regulação", diz. Para ele, a defesa da autorregulação das instituições financeiras, somada ao "mantra" de que a desregulamentação seria benéfica e aumentaria a eficiência do mercado, reduzindo custos de intermediação, foi uma combinação desastrosa. "A ideia de que a desregulamentação tornaria mais eficiente a intermediação na transferência de recursos, de quem poupa para os que investem, mostrou-se equivocada com a crise", diz Silveira. Para ele, a falta de leis não aumentou a eficiência, e pior : aumentou a especulação. "Os bancos não vivem só de intermediação. O que dá dinheiro mesmo é a especulação. E como instituições privadas, visam lucrar mais".

    Burlamaqui lembra que países como Brasil e China, com forte presença dos bancos públicos no sistema - e também leis mais rígidas - foram os que menos sofreram com a crise. "Não adianta querer eliminar os bancos públicos, como fizeram os Estados Unidos. Os bancos privados não tem apetite para fazer o que eles fazem", diz Silveira. Para ele, é urgente resgatar o que chama de "funcionalidade" dos bancos - financiar o sistema produtivo. "No Brasil, apenas um banco fornece recursos de longo prazo para investimentos, que é o BNDES", completa Burlamaqui.

    O diretor da Fundação Ford lembra ainda que até hoje não existe nenhuma entidade global para cuidar da governança financeira. Tanto ele quanto Silveira consideram as regras da terceira fase do acordo de capitais entre bancos, conhecido como Basileia III (cujo objetivo é reforçar o capital das instituições e protegê-las contra crises) são "o mínimo do mínimo necessário". Para ele, o acordo anterior (Basileia II) era "irresponsável, permitia muita margem de manobra". Burlamaqui diz que ao contrário do que defendiam alguns, a globalização financeira foi prejudicial: "Criou-se um cassino em escala global", diz. "Se não for possível estabelecer uma governança financeira global, melhor será promover uma ‘desglobalização' dos mercados", acredita.

    Na próxima quinta-feira, no Rio de Janeiro, Burlamaqui e Silveira farão os discursos de abertura de um evento promovido pelo Minds e o Levy Economics Institute, sobre a governança financeira pós-crise. O evento é parte de um programa patrocinado pela Fundação Ford desde 2006.
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  • In the Media | September 2013
    Financial Times, September 23, 2013. 

    The European crisis continues to destroy jobs. By the end of 2013 there will be 19 million unemployed in the eurozone alone, over 7 million more than in 2008, an increase unprecedented since the end of World War II and one that will stretch on into 2014. The employment crisis strikes above all the peripheral member countries of the European Monetary Union, where an exceptional rise in bankruptcy is also under way, whereas Germany and the other central countries of the eurozone have instead witnessed growth on the job front. This asymmetry is one of the causes of Europe’s present-day political paralysis and the embarrassing succession of summit meetings that result in measures glaringly incapable of halting the processes of divergence under way. While this sluggishness of political response may appear justified in the less severe phases of the cycle and moments of respite on the financial market, it could have the most serious consequences in the long run.

    As foreseen by part of the academic community, the crisis is revealing a number of contradictions in the institutions and policies of the European Monetary Union. The European authorities have taken a series of decisions that have in actual fact, contrary to announcements, helped to worsen the recession and widen the gaps between the member countries. In June 2010, when the first signs of the eurozone crisis became apparent, a letter signed by three hundred economists pointed out the inherent dangers of austerity policies, which would further depress the demand for goods and services as well as employment and incomes, thus making the payment of debts, both public and private, still more difficult. This alarm was, however, unheeded. The European authorities preferred to adopt the fanciful doctrine of “expansive austerity”, according to which budget cuts would restore the markets’ confidence in the solvency of the EU countries and thus lead to a drop in interest rates and economic recovery. As the International Monetary Fund itself recognises, we know today that the policies of austerity have actually deepened the crisis, causing a collapse of incomes in excess of the most widely-held expectations. Even the champions of “expansive austerity” now acknowledge their errors, but the damage is now largely done. 

    The European authorities are, however, now making a new mistake. They appear to be convinced that the peripheral member countries can solve their problems by implementing “structural reforms”, which will supposedly reduce costs and prices, boost competitiveness, and hence foster export-driven recovery and a reduction of foreign debt. While this view does highlight some real problems, the belief that the solution put forward can safeguard European unity is an illusion. The deflationary policies applied in Germany and elsewhere to build up trade surpluses have worked for years, togeteher with other factors, to create huge imbalances in debt and credit between the eurozone countries. The correction of these imbalances would require concerted action on the part of all the member countries. Expecting the peripheral countries of Union to solve the problem unaided means requiring them to undergo a drop in wages and prices on such a scale as to cause a still more accentuated collapse of incomes and violent debt deflation with the concrete risk of causing new banking crises and crippling production in entire regions of Europe.

    John Maynard Keynes opposed the Treaty of Versailles in 1919 with these far-sighted words: “If we take the view that Germany must be kept impoverished and her children starved and crippled […] If we aim deliberately at the impoverishment of Central Europe, vengeance, I dare predict, will not limp.” Even though the positions are now reversed, with the peripheral countries in dire straits and Germany in a comparatively advantageous position, the current crisis presents more than one similarity with that terrible historical phase, which created the conditions for the rise of Nazism and World War II. All memory of those dreadful years appears to have been lost, however, as the German authorities and the other European governments are repeating the same mistakes as were made then. This short-sightedness is ultimately the primary reason for the waves of irrationalism currently sweeping over Europe, from the naive championing of flexible exchange rates as a cure for all ills to the more disturbing instances of ultra-nationalistic and xenophobic propaganda.

    It is essential to realise that if the European authorities continue with policies of austerity and rely on structural reforms alone to restore balance, the fate of the euro will be sealed. The experience of the single currency will come to an end with repercussions on the continued existence of the European single market. In the absence of conditions for a reform of the financial system and a monetary and fiscal policy making it possible to develop a plan to revitalise public and private investment, counter the inequalities of income and between areas, and increase employment in the peripheral countries of the Union, the political decision makers will be left with nothing other than a crucial choice of alternative ways out of the euro.

    Emiliano Brancaccio and Riccardo Realfonzo (Sannio University, promoters of “the economists’ warning”), Philip Arestis (University of Cambridge), Wendy Carlin (University College of London), Giuseppe Fontana (Leeds and Sannio Universities), James Galbraith (University of Texas), Mauro Gallegati (Università Politecnica delle Marche), Eckhard Hein (Berlin School of Economics and Law), Alan Kirman (University of Aix-Marseille III), Jan Kregel (University of Tallin), Heinz Kurz (Graz University), Alfonso Palacio-Vera (Universidad Complutense Madrid), Dimitri Papadimitriou (Levy Economics Institute), Pascal Petit (Université de Paris Nord), Dani Rodrik (Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton), Willi Semmler (New School University, New York), Engelbert Stockhammer (Kingston University), Tony Thirlwall (University of Kent).

    ...and also: Georgios Argeitis (Athens University), Marcella Corsi (Sapienza University of Rome), Jesus Ferreiro (University of the Basque Country), Malcolm Sawyer (Leeds University), Sergio Rossi (University of Fribourg), Francesco Saraceno (OFCE, Paris), Felipe Serrano (University of the Basque Country), Lefteris Tsoulfidis (University of Macedonia).
     
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  • One-Pager No. 43 | September 2013

    Unemployment in Greece has climbed to a new record of 27.9 percent and the country is headed toward a third bailout. The obsession with reducing the budget deficit is crippling the Greek economy. Extreme fiscal consolidation in the midst of a major depression can only have extreme effects on output, leading to greater unemployment, widening poverty, massive loss of faith in political and social institutions, and the potential for political violence. This is precisely what has been taking place in Greece since 2010, as fiscal brutality intensifies from one year to the next. Offering Greece yet another bailout package is not the answer.

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  • In the Media | September 2013
    By Chanan Tigay
    The New Yorker, September 17, 2013. © 2013 Condé Nast. All Rights Reserved.


    A bullet hole mars the window in the office of Yannis Stournaras, the finance minister of Greece. It is tempting to see it as yet another unpleasant outcome of austerity: in the face of crippling government debt, maybe he can’t afford to fix it.

    But he insists that austerity has nothing to do with his decision to leave the window unrepaired; he’s kept the hole, a pot shot at a predecessor from a 2010 protest, as a “memoir” of the rough path he’s had to hew. The central figure in Greece’s economic maelstrom, Stournaras, a fifty-six-year-old economics professor, has become the face of painful deprivations—firings, tax hikes, slashed wages and pensions—as the country struggles to emerge from its fiscal troubles.

    The concern about whether he has money for renovations isn’t too far-fetched. Recently, the aging wallpaper in a number of Ministry of Finance offices began to crumble, and Stournaras had the rooms painted at a cost of fifteen hundred euros. When word of this extravagance leaked, the rightist newspaper Democracy condemned him as “wasteful.”

    Stournaras laughed as he told me this story; his office appeared to have been furnished sometime during the first Bush Administration. It featured laminate floors, scruffy wood bookshelves, and shiny red sofas arranged in an L. In the waiting room, a month-old copy of the Financial Times grew brittle on an unused coffee table.

    The underlying rot—in the walls and in the economy—long preceded Stournaras’s ascendance. And, by some measures, the belt-tightening is working: two weeks after we spoke, the government reported that the shrinking of Greece’s economy had slowed in the second quarter of this year. Yet Stournaras has, perhaps inevitably, become a target for criticism. In February, a prominent parliamentarian slammed him as “arrogant” after he questioned a prior government’s proclivity for spending. In July, another blasted the “knife he puts against our throats.” In August, a third member of Parliament threatened to seek Stournaras’s removal.

    It is worth noting that the politicians unleashing these attacks were members of Stournaras’s own governing coalition, which includes the conservative New Democracy and the socialist Pasok parties, historical adversaries.

    “There is no friendship at all,” said Theodore Pelagidis, an economist and friend of Stournaras’s. “Yannis is alone.”
     

    In 2010, an alliance
    of international creditors known as the troika—the European Commission, European Central Bank, and International Monetary Fund—agreed to bail out Greece to the tune of a hundred and ten billion euros, on the condition that the country starve itself into solvency. When economic problems persisted, the troika agreed to a second rescue package, to be doled out in stages, this one running a hundred and thirty billion euros. By the time Antonis Samaras became Prime Minister in the summer of 2012, Greece was still living up to its reputation as “the last Soviet economy.” The bloated public sector was addicted to outsize salaries and pensions, patronage was rampant, and tax evasion seemed to outpace soccer as the national sport.

    Samaras, representing the New Democracy party, was elected on a promise to slow austerity. Yet in appointing a finance minister, he chose Stournars, an Oxford-educated economist whose work had called for public-sector reductions. Stournaras is widely seen as a straight-talking “technocrat” and not a politician. If the troika demanded austerity, he could push reforms forward without being distracted by an angry political base.

    Within hours of taking office in July of 2012, Stournaras found himself across a table from representatives of the troika. They were back in Athens to decide whether to award a tranche of thirty-one and a half billion euros to a desperate Greece. This time, in return, they wanted even deeper spending cuts.

    Without the billions of euros, Greece risked going broke and being forced out of the eurozone, which Stournaras believed could lead to the collapse of Greek banks and, he told me, “looting of supermarkets.” Squeezed between intense domestic pressure to roll back reductions and what he believed was economic necessity, Stournaras sided with the troika and its austerity program. “We can’t ask for anything from our creditors before we get it back on course,” he had told journalists shortly after taking office. This was not the message many ordinary Greeks wanted to hear, and their representatives in Parliament castigated him. In his defense, Stournaras reëmphasized that Greece had to show skeptical creditors that it could be trusted, by owning up to past indulgences and trying to correct them.

    Negotiations with the troika dragged on for five months. Then, in November of 2012, European finance ministers gathered in Brussels for a series of dramatic meetings to determine Greece’s fate.

    In Belgium, Stournaras negotiated constantly. He went two days without sleep. He quarreled with Austria’s finance minister. He communicated constantly with Samaras. “Our two mobile phones were on fire,” the Prime Minister told me.

    Between meetings, Stournaras shuttled home to Athens to help cajole a reluctant Parliament into passing new austerity legislation to pacify the paymasters in Brussels. The omnibus bill would, among other things, raise the retirement age, cut pensions, and slash lump-sum payments for retirees. A vote was slated for midnight on November 8th—just in time to meet a troika deadline.

    At six o’clock on the evening before the vote, Stournaras introduced an amendment that would have ended the “special salaries” enjoyed by employees at the Hellenic Parliament. The staffers revolted: their union announced an immediate strike that threatened to paralyze Parliament and prevent a vote altogether. With the troika deadline looming, Stournaras was forced to relent. He withdrew his amendment, but did not do so quietly. In an address to Parliament later that evening, he denounced the bitterly anti-austerity parties who had painted him as a puppet of the troika: "We condemn them. Because of what’s at stake tonight, and because of the urgent nature of the bill, I am forced to withdraw the amendment in question. He who has eyes let him see."
    The measures passed, narrowly, setting up Greece’s moment of truth. Would it all be enough to convince the troika that Greece had changed its ways?

    “I’ve called it the ‘thriller,’” said Raphael Moissis, the deputy chairman of the Foundation for Economic and Industrial Research, the think tank from which Stournaras was plucked to lead the Ministry of Finance. “We literally stayed up the night to hear whether the Europeans were going to say yes to a restructuring program for Greece, or whether they were going to say ‘the hell with you.’”

    On November 27th, the troika announced that it would release the next round of loans. Greece would remain in the Eurozone. The decision was a victory for Stournaras, one step forward in what he described as a “multifaceted war.”


    But was the triumph
    really so clear-cut?

    One morning in 2009, Chris Spirou was laid off by an Athens bakery. A divorced father, he spent three months looking diligently for a job but found nothing, eventually making his way to Norway and the Netherlands to find work before returning home when his father died. After getting the boot from a friend’s trailer, he suddenly became homeless—an “indescribable” realization, he said.

    “I am below zero. Wrecked. Devastated,” said Spirou, who is fifty-four. He said he feels “hate” for the people who put him in this position: members of Parliament and technocrats like Stournaras. “He doesn’t look at the political cost even if human beings are committing suicide, losing their jobs, their children are hungry.” Austerity, Spirou said, has killed the economy.

    Some prominent economists echo Spirou’s analysis. Dimitri Papadimitriou, president of the Levy Economics Institute of Bard College, said that although large-scale cutbacks may in fact be reducing Greece’s budget deficit, these gains have come with “catastrophic consequences”: homelessness, suicides, unemployment, once-comfortable families reduced to rummaging through trash bins.

    Other economists, meanwhile, are asking a larger question: Does austerity even work? Paul Krugman has argued that Europe’s reliance on austerity—not just in Greece—is precisely the opposite of what should be done: according to the logic popularized by John Maynard Keynes, economies falter when people stop spending, and when that happens, only governments can step in as spenders to get things going again.

    Of course, given Greece’s economic woes, the country could not have implemented this theory on its own. Other Europeans, with Germany in the lead, were willing to kick in enough for Athens to close its deficits over a period of years, but they would not offer up sufficient sums for the Greeks to spend their way out of the desert. To the contrary, they insisted on cuts.

    Describing the decisions he made, Stournaras, whose compact, athletic build and frequent smile made him look younger than his years, was resolute. Along with Prime Minister Samaras, he said, he fought to mitigate the pain—by cutting property taxes, for example. But even now, Stournaras—who calls himself a “reconstructed Keynesian”—believes that cuts, though upsetting, are working; unfortunately, there aren’t many other ways to reduce the public-sector deficit, and to forgo the cuts would only damage the economy further.

    “But this is not something easy that you can tell the public,” he said. “That the alternative is Argentina or even Syria.”

    It was muggy during my visit, and while Stournaras spoke, he wore shirtsleeves and a tightly cinched purple tie, having removed a dark suit jacket. He ticked off the government’s accomplishments: an operating budget surplus for the first seven months of this year, increased competitiveness in once-closed markets, and a slowing of the economy’s contraction. Most of which means little to the twenty-eight per cent of Greeks who are out of work, or to those who have suffered debilitating cuts to their pay and pensions.

    “It’s not easy for somebody who was earning two thousand euros suddenly to earn one thousand,” Stournaras said. The cuts he has championed have affected even his own mother. “A poor woman, because my father had died very young,” he said. “So she lives on the minimum pension.”

    How does that make you feel? I asked.

    “Very bad,” said the father of two, his eyes now fixed on his desk. “Very bad, really.”


    Stournaras was born
    in Athens, in 1956. His father was a Communist, he told me, whom “ultra-rightist” gangs persecuted and tried to have arrested; years later, when Stournaras was doing graduate work at Oxford, his father, who died at the age of sixty-two, asked him not to return home because he feared his own politics would haunt his son. Early on, Stournaras took up swimming and still regularly swims long distances. (He also jogs and plays ping-pong.) In his car on the way to a meeting with the Prime Minister, he told me that swimming was the best preparation he received for the rigors of his position. These days, he avoids swimming in pools, which could seem luxurious while other Greeks are forced into homeless shelters. “So I have to train myself and go to the sea,” he said. During a recent six-kilometre swim, the waters near his vacation home on the island of Syros turned rough. When I met him, he was unable to hear from his right ear.

    In many ways, Stournaras is the ideal messenger for Greece’s tough news: he is respected in European economic circles, seen as someone who operates above partisan politics. Before taking office, he was a professor at the University of Athens, chairman and C.E.O. of Emporiki Bank, and advised prior governments. Stournaras was appointed to the Ministry of Finance, not elected. This gives him the freedom to make controversial decisions, but on the flip side, of course, if his policies become too unpopular, Prime Minister Samaras can summarily fire him. The afternoon before I met Stournaras, Michael Massourakis, the chief economist at Alpha Bank, told me that in choosing Stournaras, “the political parties wanted to find somebody who is nonpolitical so they can scapegoat him if things go bad.”

    For the moment that seems unlikely. Although Samaras came to office on a pledge to slow austerity measures and Stournaras has supported them, the two are now friends who work together closely, meeting often, sharing jokes.

    In the midst of our discussion, Stournaras’s phone rang. It was the Prime Minister.

    “I have a reporter here from the The New Yorker,” Stournaras told him. “Shall I put you on?”

    Stournaras activated the speakerphone setting so I could hear. Samaras—laughing knowingly—informed me that despite “previous ideological differences” he and Stournaras share a common goal: keeping Greece in the eurozone.

    “That’s what I told him!” Stournaras said.

    “Do you hear me, Yannis?”

    “Yeah, yeah, I do.”

    “Am I correct in this assessment?”

    “Absolutely.”

    Then Samaras quoted Neil Diamond. “You know that song that says, ‘Used-to-bes don’t count anymore, they just lay on the floor till we sweep them away?’” he said. “The idea is that differences don’t matter as long as there is a common cause that links us together.”

    As Samaras spoke, Stournaras smiled appreciatively. Despite this display of seemingly genuine affection, it was hard for me to forget what I’d been told a day earlier: that for all this friendship, Stournaras could yet prove dispensable.



    Greece still has
    a long way to go. The government is again under pressure from its lenders, with the troika evaluating the country’s economic recovery and money-saving efforts as it weighs a third bailout package. “All the low-hanging fruit has been reaped at this point,” Alpha Bank’s Massourakis said. “It has to do major things that Greek governments were not very eager to do.”

    Future objectives include reforming Greece’s tax system, opening closed markets, and restructuring or even privatizing some public businesses. A new round of protest marches has already begun, with civil servants taking to the streets in late August to oppose planned suspensions and firings.

    “Stournaras is very unlucky in the sense that now people are very tired,” Alexis Papahelas, the executive editor of the respected newspaper Kathimerini, said. “Every time someone hears about a reform, they think they’re going to lose part of their income.”

    Compounding Stournaras’s problems, observers said, is the fact that the Samaras-led coalition, with an advantage of just five seats in Parliament, could be sunk by even a small disagreement. And if the coalition falls apart, many believe it will be succeeded by extremists—from either the far right or the far left, a scenario Samaras called “catastrophic.”

    Nonetheless, a March poll found that Stournaras’s approval rating was unusually high for a finance minister. This may reflect his penchant for directness, and his distance from the political elite that has ruled Greece for decades. When I asked Stournaras why he took his current job—and with it a large pay cut—after having rejected several prior ministerial appointments, he sounded a philosophical note. “Patriotic duty,” he responded. “It’s like being at war and you’re asked to participate and you say no. You cannot say no.”

    Chanan Tigay is the author of the forthcoming book “Unholy Scriptures: Fraud, Suicide, Scandal & the Bible that Rocked the Holy City” (Ecco/HarperCollins).
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  • One-Pager No. 41 | September 2013
    Why the Troika’s Greek Strategy Is Failing

    Greece’s unemployment rate just hit 27.6 percent. That wasn’t supposed to happen. Why has the troika—the European Commission, International Monetary Fund (IMF), and European Central Bank—been so consistently wrong about the effects of its handpicked policies? The strategy being imposed on Greece depends in large part on the idea of “internal devaluation”: that reducing wages will make its products more attractive, thus spurring a return to economic growth powered by rising exports. Our research, based on a macroeconomic model specifically constructed for Greece, indicates that this strategy is not working. Achieving significant growth in net exports through internal devaluation would, at best, take a very long time—and a great deal of immiseration and social disintegration would take place while we waited for this theory to bear fruit. Despite some recent admissions of error along these lines by the IMF, the troika still relies on a theory of how the economy works that badly underestimates the negative effects of austerity.

  • In the Media | August 2013
    By Ronald Janssen

    Social Europe Journal, August 27, 2013. All Rights Reserved.

    While the German public opinion, courtesy of the debate in the run up to the next political elections, is discovering the fact that Greece will be needing a third bail out, a team of economists from the US – based Levy Institute describes how things look like from the side of Greece.

    Click here for the full article.

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  • In the Media | August 2013
    By Dimitri B. Papadimitriou
    Ekathimerini.com, August 12, 2013. © 2013 H Kaθhmepinh. All Rights Reserved.

    At their White House meeting last week, U.S. President Barack Obama assured Greek Prime Minister Antonis Samaras of his support as Greece prepares for talks with creditors on additional debt relief amid record-high unemployment.

    The U.S. should also endorse a new blueprint for recovery based on one of the most successful economic assistance programs of the modern era: the Marshall Plan.

    It is clear by now that the European Union’s policies in Greece have failed. Projections that government spending cutbacks would stop the economy’s free-fall proved to be wildly optimistic. The 240 billion euro ($319 billion) bailout from the euro area and International Monetary Fund has shown little sign of success, and Greece is experiencing its sixth year of recession.

    The spending cuts and tax increases, along with the dismissal of huge numbers of public-sector employees, demanded as a condition of the loans and assistance have only deepened the economic pain.

    Instead of changing course, however, euro-area economists have responded to bad news by revising their forecasts to reflect lower expectations. Those numbers document a staggering record of mistaken assumptions that has led to today’s failure.

    In December 2010, the so-called troika of lenders—the European Commission, the European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund—predicted that their measures would move Greece’s unemployment rate to just under 15 percent by 2014. A year later, it changed the forecast to almost 20 percent.

    This month, the Hellenic Statistical Authority reported that unemployment rose to a record in May, with a seasonally adjusted jobless rate of 27.6 percent. The rate was 64.9 percent for people 15 to 24.

    Bold declarations that belt-tightening would produce growth have been pared back, too. Since 2010, the troika has gradually dropped its forecast for 2014 gross domestic product (in money terms) by almost 40 percent. IMF staff reported last week that GDP contracted 6.4 percent in 2012 and will drop 4.2 percent this year before expanding only a little in 2014.

    Yet, despite admissions that mistakes were certainly made, no consideration is being given to ending austerity measures. Nor has there been effort to devise a renewal agenda for Greece. The Marshall Plan offers a spectacularly successful model that could easily be adapted.

    Greece last faced economic ruin immediately after World War II. By 1949, the country was bankrupt, with virtually no industry; transportation networks, farmland and villages had been devastated, and about a quarter of the population was homeless.

    Marshall Plan funds allowed Greece to rebuild, start power utilities, finance businesses and aid the poor. And, because social chaos had created an opening for communist and extremist parties, the U.S. hoped the stimulus would stabilize democracy, even as it created wealth.

    Like other Marshall Plan nations, Greece experienced growth on a scale it had never known. The astonishing transformation was widely hailed as an “economic miracle,” and the nation continued to surge more than 20 years after the assistance ended.

    With that enormous achievement in mind, the Levy Economics Institute has constructed a macroeconomic model of what a Marshall-type recovery plan could do for the Greek economy today. We assumed a modest stimulus from EU institutions of 30 billion euros between 2013 and 2016 that would be directed at public consumption and investment, and particularly jobs. Here is how an EU-funded plan for recovery could succeed. Although past bailout funds benefited banks and financial institutions, with a large portion devoted to interest payments for creditors, the new program would focus on debt forgiveness, and then turn to reconstruction projects to rebuild national infrastructure and create public projects at the local level.

    A rebuilding plan could address Greece’s tremendous need to renovate schools, hospitals, libraries, parks, roads and bridges. Forests need to be replenished: Catastrophic fires have led to deforestation. Tourism once accounted for more than 25 percent of the economy; now, extraordinary beach cleanups are badly needed to attract visitors.

    University graduates, after having been trained at public expense, are now forced to seek opportunity outside Greece. They could make valuable contributions, introducing information technology and other know-how to the government, health and education sectors.

    These efforts could draw an idled, but ready and trained labor force, to construction, education, social service and technology. More employment would increase aggregate demand, which is now severely depressed. In turn, the multiplier effect of these expenditures would increase GDP substantially.

    Instead, Greece is applying “expansive austerity.” The idea is based on a contested theory, and the real-world results have been a humanitarian disaster. These policies are lowering demand by reducing incomes, which cuts into tax revenue. The inevitable result is higher deficits and debt-to-GDP ratios.

    For comparison, we modeled what we expect to happen in the coming years if Greece stays on its scheduled fiscal diet. The government has consistently been unable to meet troika-mandated deficit-reduction targets, and the lenders have consistently required further cutbacks.

    The results of our modeling exercise were clear: Under today’s policies, unemployment would continue to increase, reaching almost 34 percent by the end of 2016. Under a Marshall Plan scenario, the rate would fall to about 20 percent.

    Similarly, if Greece institutes the currently planned austerity measures, we calculate that its gross domestic product would reach about 158 billion euros by the end of 2016, compared with 162 billion euros projected for 2013. That would be more than 15 billion euros short of the troika-mandated target.

    If, alternatively, government squeezes harder to meet the required deficit-to-GDP ratio goals, the endgame will be even worse: A poor and increasingly out of work population, among other factors, will push GDP to about 148 billion euros, more than 30 percent below its 2008 peak. A Marshall Plan scenario would put GDP a little above the troika’s target.

    The first Marshall Plan wasn’t an act of charity or a bailout: It was an effective investment strategy to create a vibrant European economic market and prevent political disintegration. To institute a modern version, we need to revise discredited austerity theories—or the euro-area institutions that promote them.

    *Dimitri B. Papadimitriou is president of the Levy Economics Institute of Bard College.
     
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  • In the Media | August 2013
    By Dimitri B. Papadimitriou
    Bloomberg, August 11, 2013. All Rights Reserved.

    At their White House meeting last week, U.S. President Barack Obama assured Greek Prime Minister Antonis Samaras of his support as Greece prepares for talks with creditors on additional debt relief amid record-high unemployment.

    The U.S. should also endorse a new blueprint for recovery based on one of the most successful economic assistance programs of the modern era: the Marshall Plan.

    It is clear by now that the European Union’s policies in Greece have failed. Projections that government spending cutbacks would stop the economy’s free-fall proved to be wildly optimistic.

    The 240 billion euro ($319 billion) bailout from the euro area and International Monetary Fund has shown little sign of success, and Greece is experiencing its sixth year of recession.

    The spending cuts and tax increases, along with the dismissal of huge numbers of public-sector employees, demanded as a condition of the loans and assistance have only deepened the economic pain.

    Instead of changing course, however, euro-area economists have responded to bad news by revising their forecasts to reflect lower expectations. Those numbers document a staggering record of mistaken assumptions that has led to today’s failure.

    Shifting Forecasts
    In December 2010, the so-called troika of lenders—the European Commission, the European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund—predicted that their measures would move Greece’s unemployment rate to just under 15 percent by 2014. A year later, it changed the forecast to almost 20 percent.

    This month, the Hellenic Statistical Authority reported that unemployment rose to a record in May, with a seasonally adjusted jobless rate of 27.6 percent. The rate was 64.9 percent for people 15 to 24.

    Bold declarations that belt-tightening would produce growth have been pared back, too. Since 2010, the troika has gradually dropped its forecast for 2014 gross domestic product (in money terms) by almost 40 percent. IMF staff reported last week that GDP contracted 6.4 percent in 2012 and will drop 4.2 percent this year before expanding only a little in 2014.

    Yet, despite admissions that mistakes were certainly made, no consideration is being given to ending austerity measures. Nor has there been effort to devise a renewal agenda for Greece. The Marshall Plan offers a spectacularly successful model that could easily be adapted.

    Greece last faced economic ruin immediately after World War II. By 1949, the country was bankrupt, with virtually no industry; transportation networks, farmland and villages had been devastated, and about a quarter of the population was homeless.

    Marshall Plan funds allowed Greece to rebuild, start power utilities, finance businesses and aid the poor. And, because social chaos had created an opening for communist and extremist parties, the U.S. hoped the stimulus would stabilize democracy, even as it created wealth.

    Like other Marshall Plan nations, Greece experienced growth on a scale it had never known. The astonishing transformation was widely hailed as an “economic miracle,” and the nation continued to surge more than 20 years after the assistance  ended.

    With that enormous achievement in mind, the Levy Economics Institute has constructed a macroeconomic model of what a Marshall-type recovery plan could do for the Greek economy today. We assumed a modest stimulus from EU institutions of 30 billion euros between 2013 and 2016 that would be directed at public consumption and investment, and particularly jobs.

    Debt Forgiveness
    Here is how an EU-funded plan for recovery could succeed. Although past bailout funds benefited banks and financial institutions, with a large portion devoted to interest payments for creditors, the new program would focus on debt forgiveness, and then turn to reconstruction projects to rebuild national infrastructure and create public projects at the local level.

    A rebuilding plan could address Greece’s tremendous need to renovate schools, hospitals, libraries, parks, roads and bridges. Forests need to be replenished: Catastrophic fires have led to deforestation. Tourism once accounted for more than 25 percent of the economy; now, extraordinary beach cleanups are badly needed to attract visitors.

    University graduates, after having been trained at public expense, are now forced to seek opportunity outside Greece. They could make valuable contributions, introducing information technology and other know-how to the government, health and education sectors.

    These efforts could draw an idled, but ready and trained labor force, to construction, education, social service and technology. More employment would increase aggregate demand, which is now severely depressed. In turn, the multiplier effect of these expenditures would increase GDP substantially.
    Instead, Greece is applying “expansive austerity.” The idea is based on a contested theory, and the real-world results have been a humanitarian disaster. These policies are lowering demand by reducing incomes, which cuts into tax revenue. The inevitable result is higher deficits and debt-to-GDP ratios.

    For comparison, we modeled what we expect to happen in the coming years if Greece stays on its scheduled fiscal diet. The government has consistently been unable to meet troika-mandated deficit-eduction targets, and the lenders have consistently required further cutbacks.

    The results of our modeling exercise were clear: Under today’s policies, unemployment would continue to increase, reaching almost 34 percent by the end of 2016. Under a Marshall Plan scenario, the rate would fall to about 20 percent.

    Shrinking GDP
    Similarly, if Greece institutes the currently planned austerity measures, we calculate that its gross domestic product would reach about 158 billion euros by the end of 2016, compared with 162 billion euros projected for 2013. That would be more than 15 billion euros short of the troika-mandated target.

    If, alternatively, government squeezes harder to meet the required deficit-to-GDP ratio goals, the endgame will be even worse: A poor and increasingly out of work population, among other factors, will push GDP to about 148 billion euros, more than 30 percent below its 2008 peak. A Marshall Plan scenario would put GDP a little above the troika’s target.

    The first Marshall Plan wasn’t an act of charity or a bailout: It was an effective investment strategy to create a vibrant European economic market and prevent political disintegration. To institute a modern version, we need to revise discredited austerity theories—or the euro-area institutions that promote them.

    (Dimitri B. Papadimitriou is president of the Levy Economics Institute of Bard College.)
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  • In the Media | August 2013
    By C. J. Polychroniou
    Truthout, August 7, 2013. All Rights Reserved.

    Further austerity can only worsen Greece's economic plight, particularly already-catastrophic unemployment, warns Dimitri B. Papadimitriou, president of the Levy Economics Institute, according to the Institute's macro-economic model. But "unthinkable" economic policies—suggested by conservative and progressive economists alike—could.

    In early 2010, Greece's staggering deficit/debt problems turned into a major financial crisis when its sovereign debt was downgraded by rating agencies into junk territory, freezing Greece out of international capital markets. On May of that year, Europe and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) agreed to a €110 billion financing plan for Greece, which involved major budget cuts, slashes in wages and pensions, sharp tax increases, labor market reforms and privatization of state assets—i.e., a financing plan with the usual neoliberal adjustment strings attached. The plan was such a flop that it led less than two years later to a second bailout program worth €130 billion, which included even harsher structural adjustment and austerity measures than the first loan agreement.

    The primary aim of the first financial bailout of Greece was the repayment of loans, mainly to German and France banks, which were highly exposed to Greek sovereign debt. Today—and after a rather large haircut for private holders of Greek debt—most Greek public debt is held by the official sector—European Union (EU) government treasuries, the IMF, and the European Central Bank (ECB).

    Greece's financial sovereignty is under the direct command of the troika of the European Commission, the IMF and the European Central Bank (ECB), and virtually all of the money received by Greece's international lenders and through the privatization of state assets and publicly owned enterprises goes toward the repayment of debt. In the meantime, the Greek economy and society are administered shock therapy of the kind described by Naomi Klein in her book The Shock Doctrine, with the explicit aim of institutionalizing an extreme neoliberal order. Already, Greek wages are being steadily reduced to 1970s levels (the actual intent is to bring Greek wages in line with those of other Balkan nations—i.e., Bulgaria, Romania); workers' rights have all but disappeared; social public services are being dismantled and the unemployment rate, currently at 27.4%, is the highest in the European Union. Amazingly enough, IMF, EU and Greek government officials treat these developments as evidence that the Greek program is on the right track—in fact, insisting on more austerity measures.

    In the midst of this economic catastrophe, Greece is experiencing social decomposition not seen in Western societies since the end of the second world war—highlighted by the massive shrinkage of the middle class and the meteoric rise of the new poor—and a profound political crisis, underlined by the complete distrust exhibited by 90% of the population toward the government and the parliament (i.e., the political system as a whole). According to the same recent poll, 80% of the population mistrusts the European Union, while 68% brace themselves for worse days ahead. It is no surprise, therefore, that the sharpest rise of a neo-Nazi party in all of Europe is taking place today in Greece. Most of the support for Golden Dawn, a political party of thugs whose members do their best to imitate Hitler's "brown shirts," comes from unemployed and uneducated youth.

    On the positive side, Greece's Coalition of the Radical Left (Syriza) has also surged in the polls, receiving in the last round of national elections, held in June 2012, nearly 27% of the popular vote, slightly less than three percentage points below the conservatives who came first. In the 2009 national elections, Syriza had managed to attract only 4.6% of the popular vote. However, in the event of a victory in the next elections, the challenges it faces are daunting: Will it form a government with the conservatives? If not, will it opt for political anarchy? Will it be able to secure the renegotiation of the loan terms with the troika, which has so far been its main strategy for dealing with the catastrophe of Greece? If not, will it force Greece out of the euro?

    The international bailouts of Greece have been an unmitigated economic and social disaster, as a recently released econometric analysis of the Greek economic crisis by the Levy Economics Institute of Bard College attests, dispelling EU/IMF and Greek government officials' myths and lies about the alleged success of the Greek program. Even so, the options for the future of Greece remain starkly limited.

    In an interview for Truthout, Dimitri B. Papadimitriou, president of the Levy Economics Institute of Bard College, executive vice president and Jerome Levy Professor of Economics at Bard, discusses with C. J. Polychroniou (a research associate and policy fellow at the Levy Institute and columnist for the Greek newspaper Eleftherotypia) the findings of the Institute's study on the Greek economic crisis and their implications for the future of Greece.

    The Levy Economics Institute of Bard College has just published a major econometric analysis of the impact of "expansionary austerity" in Greece, with you as its lead author, which contradicts European Union (EU) and International Monetary Fund (IMF) claims that the experiment is producing positive results and actually makes a mockery of the Greek government's portrayal of the experiment as a "success story." How would you summarize the state of the Greek economy?

    This is the sixth year of Greece's Great Depression, with an economy in free fall after the EU/IMF austerity kicked into effect as part of the May 2010 bailout agreement, a policy which not only continues unabated but insists on an even higher dosage of the same medicine when the patient's condition deteriorates. The Greek GDP shrank by almost 5% in 2010, by over 7% in 2011, by 6.5% in 2012, and it is expected to shrink by an additional 4.5-5% by the end of 2013. The country's unemployment rate hit double digits shortly after the austerity measures were implemented and is currently above 27%. As expected, poverty and inequality have skyrocketed during the last three and a half years, and suicides plague a nation that was traditionally immune to such phenomena. Moreover, in spite of all the sacrifices made by average Greek citizens who have seen their standard of living reduced to 1970s levels because of major cuts in wages, social benefits and pensions and sharp tax increases as part of the classic IMF structural adjustment program imposed by the country's international lenders and followed by the compliant Greek governments, the nation's debt has been steadily increasing and currently stands at 160.50% of the GDP even after a large "haircut" of sovereign debt held by the private sector took place in 2012.

    In this context, it is simply mind boggling that anyone can possibly consider such outcomes as positive signs of an economic policy at work, let alone a "success story." But the dreadful economic and social trends we are witnessing are not surprising at all; on the contrary, they were long expected as consequences of discredited economic dogmas associated with neoliberalism. The simulations of the Levy Institute's specially constructed stock-flow macro-model show clearly that any fiscal consolidation during recessionary times does not result in a "success story" but, instead, in further economic decline.

    The ongoing Greek catastrophe is so immense that it staggers the imagination. Reversing Greece's downward economic trend poses now severe policy challenges as the options have become truly narrow. In the course of three and a half years of wild neoliberal experimentation, Greece has been transformed from an advanced economy into an emerging economy on the verge of a humanitarian crisis.

    Indeed, on what grounds then did the IMF and the EU expect austerity to work in the case of Greece, especially when the economy was already in a recession, and why don't they terminate this dangerous pursuit when all economic evidence is stacked against it?

    Recent reports from the IMF reveal that concerns from employees of the Fund about the first bailout program succeeding were voiced in 2010. But it's obvious that they were ignored and, instead of doing the obvious, that is, providing Greece with a much larger bailout program and in the spirit of true assistance rather than in the spirit of punishment, they focused on saving large French and German banks from incurring big losses on their holdings of Greek sovereign debt and, in so doing, hoping to prevent erosion of investors' confidence and contagion for other Eurozone highly indebted countries like Spain and Italy.

    Both the IMF and the EU produced rather optimistic scenarios about the effects of their policies on Greece, but all their projections were based on faulty evaluations of the country's public finances and erroneous estimates of the fiscal multipliers and their effect on austerity for an economy already in recession. However, despite the Fund's admission of big errors, both the IMF and the EU dismiss the need for either a revision or termination of the program, insisting dogmatically in turn that the program is "broadly correct." In the end, though, they will have to consider yet another debt restructuring before terminating the program, since the failure of the Greek program may seal the ultimate demise of the Fund and the dissolution of the Eurozone.

    One of the major arguments often made by troika in defense of neoliberal economic reforms in Greece is that the nation's labor market is highly inflexible. How does one define inflexible labor markets, and do they actually exact a high economic toll as neoliberals claim that they do?

    The word "inflexible" is cosmetic; it means workers should not be protected by strong unions with bargaining agreements covering wages and benefits, adhering to hiring and separation, and nondiscrimination clauses with recourse to state authority for noncompliance. The neoliberal doctrine makes no distinction between product and labor markets. But labor is not like rice where its price is bid up or pushed down dependent on supply and demand. In this line of thought, labor is simply a cost that can be cut and not an asset that can be developed. More and more evidence provides contrary results to those claimed by the neoliberal thinking.

    Wages have been dramatically cut in Greece, yet the unemployment rate continues to rise. Who benefits from low-income workers?

    Based on a Harmonized Competitiveness Indicator measuring unit labor costs, the relative Greek unit labor costs have decreased more than in any other Eurozone member country except for Germany, which systematically maintains lower values by severely suppressing wages. Despite the lower wages, unemployment is soaring because the country is in a deepening recession caused by the continuing and ever stronger grip of austerity that compresses both private and public consumption and investment. Under these circumstances, rising unemployment will further push wages downward - benefiting the private corporate sector, to be sure, much smaller now than its precrisis size. And as it has been widely reported, in Greece, many workers are either not "officially" employed, or paid regularly (in many private sector jobs workers are paid in small installments or are unpaid for several months) and/or have their social insurance contributions made on their behalf. Above all, the declining fortunes do not affect consumer prices that are continuously rising, pushing more and more people into deeper poverty.

    Both the Greek government and the EU have shown remarkable indifference so far to the problem of unemployment in Greece, which, among other things, has led to the increasing strength of the neo-Nazi party "Golden Dawn." Why isn't anything being done to address the unemployment problem?

    I don't think the Greek government is indifferent to the scourge of unemployment. But once you are forced to accept other people's money you have no choice but to abide with conditions placed from the lenders. Lenders are indifferent about lost output and unemployment, rising poverty and all other social and economic ills that come along. Where a government can be faulted is in its very poor negotiation skills with its lenders. The Greek governments clearly did not play their cards right against Berlin, Brussels and Frankfurt and Washington. The Greek governments can be blamed for continuously accepting even harsher austerity, pretending that ideological shifts are divorced from the economic conditions emanating from its very actions. The blame game is already a tired and unconvincing ploy.

    The econometric analysis on the state of the Greek economy involves model simulations in order to assess the impact of austerity for the next three years. What should we expect if the current policies of austerity continue?

    Our projections, which are derived from a stock-flow-consistent macroeconomic model especially constructed for Greece, show the faulty design of the troika program that yields inconsistent targets of deficit to GDP ratios, growth of GDP and unemployment. Our own simulations show that, should the agreed program of austerity continue unrevised, it will deliver a rising unemployment - reaching a high rate of 34% by the end of 2016, contradicting the troika's corresponding rate of slightly more than 20%. It is astonishing to think that even if their projections are correct - and there is plenty of evidence from their past four worsening revisions that they are not - that a higher than 20% unemployment should render the effort "successful."

    Greek political life is undergoing profound changes, and the Coalition of the Radical Left (Syriza) has an historic opportunity to rise to power. What should it do in the event that it forms a government but fails to compel Greece's international lenders to put an end to the vicious austerity measures and the ongoing national catastrophe?

    A progressive party like Syriza may have the unique opportunity by its sheer rise to power to engage in a different sort of negotiation. We should not forget that there is already a division in the house of troika. If Syriza were able to band with the other South European Eurozone members, this can become easier. Irrespective of this synergy, the division between the IMF and the European Commission can turn out to be advantageous to the strategy that Syriza has advocated: suspension of interest payments until growth emerges and then resumption of interest payments linked to GDP growth.

    Furthermore, this will need to be supplemented with a higher allocation of structural funds with no matching contribution for a number of years. (More than 40 billion euros have been paid toward interest that can be refunded). This can be made possible only if the present government's pronouncements of achieving a primary budget balance are realized. If this is not achievable—most likely it is not—then the options are more or less of the unthinkable sort. This includes the introduction of a parallel national nonconvertible currency, including government tax-based bonds traded and used for payment of taxes at par. The parallel currency can start with government consumption expenditures including the instituting of a carefully designed and monitored guaranteed public service employment program as advocated by the late Hyman Minsky. The experience of such jobs programs is encouraging. Design, monitoring and evaluation of the program would be under the aegis of a central state authority with many regional branches along the lines of the successfully designed Americorps structure in the US. The parallel currency will eventually replace the euro for all internal transactions, but more importantly, as mentioned, it will not be convertible to the euro—avoiding speculative attacks. Even though this may sound like a radical idea, it has been suggested by many conservative and progressive economists alike. 
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  • Working Paper No. 771 | August 2013
    In Search of Causality
    This paper analyzes the trajectories of the Greek public deficit and sovereign debt over the last three decades and their connection to the political and economic environment, paying special attention to the causality between the public and the foreign deficit. The authors argue that, from 1980 to 1995, causality ran from the public deficit to the foreign deficit but has since reversed, a result of the European monetary unification process and the adoption of the common currency. This hypothesis is tested and verified econometrically using the Granger causality and cointegration analyses. 
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    Michalis Nikiforos Laura Carvalho Christian Schoder
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  • In the Media | July 2013
    By Ellen Freilich
    Reuters, July 30, 2013. @2013 Thomson Reuters. All rights reserved. 

    The spectacular failure of “expansionary austerity” policies has set Greece on a path worse than the Great Depression, according to a study from the Levy Economics Institute of Bard College.

    Using their newly-constructed macroeconomic model for Greece, the Levy scholars recommend a recovery strategy similar to the Marshall Plan to increase public consumption and investment.

    “A Marshall-type recovery plan directed at public consumption and investment is realistic and has worked in the past,” the authors of the report said.

    Employment in Greece is in free fall, with more than one million jobs lost since October 2008 — a drop of more than 28 percent, leaving the “official” unemployment rate in March at 27.4 percent, the highest level seen in any industrialized country in the free world during the last 30 years, the Levy Institute scholars said.

    The study argues the austerity policies espoused by the “troika,” the group of international lenders who funded Greece’s bailouts, have failed and that continuing those prescriptions will only worsen Greece’s jobs, growth, and deficit outlook.

    “With joblessness in Greece now above 27 percent – a stark indicator of the troika’s failure to accurately project the consequences of their own policies, it’s astonishing that (European Commission) and (International Monetary Fund) officials continue to ask for more of the same,” Levy Institute President Dimitri Papadimitriou and Research Scholars Michalis Nikiforos and Gennaro Zezza wrote in their analysis.

    “The Greek Economic Crisis and the Experience of Austerity: A Strategic Analysis,” seeks answers to Greece’s downward spiral of lost growth and employment combined with higher public deficits and debt.

    That spiral is the consequence of “foolish policy” enacted by the Greek government as it tried to comply with the terms of a fiscal consolidation program imposed by its international lenders, the economists said.

    Using the Levy Institute macroeconomic model of the Greek economy, or LIMG – a stock-flow consistent model similar to the Institute’s model of the U.S. economy, the Levy scholars analyze the economic crisis in Greece and recommend policies to restore growth and increase employment.

    Based on the LIMG simulations, the authors found that a continuation of austerity policies would lead to lower GDP and higher unemployment numbers than those forecast by the troika.

    In their baseline scenario, the authors contend that, based on the troika’s projections for changes in government revenues and outlays, GDP will grow more slowly and the unemployment rate will rise more sharply (to near 34 percent by the end of 2016) than the troika contends they will.

    The baseline scenario asserts that deficit targets will not be met, with the deficit-to-GDP ratio reaching 7.6 percent by 2016.

    Meeting the troika’s deficit targets, the LIMG model shows, would cause GDP and employment to decline even further than in the baseline scenario – another example of the “faulty thinking” used to support the troika’s projections, which the Levy scholars call too optimistic.

    “In addition to the errors in the values of the fiscal multipliers and the doctrine of ‘expansionary austerity,’ there are implicit supply-side effects emanating from market liberalization and internal devaluation, with all effects converging to produce higher output growth and employment, together with lower deficit-to-GDP ratios,” Papadimitriou, Nikiforos, and Zezza argue.

    “These flaws help to explain why, in the absence of any level of economic stimulus, the troika projections are so optimistic,” they said.

    The study’s authors conclude by recommending a recovery strategy centered on an expanded direct public-service job creation program.

    Their projections show that, using funds from the European Investment Bank or other EU institution, a modest fiscal boost of $30 billion (used at a rate of about $2 billion each quarter) would fundamentally change the outlook for Greece’s economy.

    GDP growth would exceed all previous scenarios. Jobs would  increase more than 200,000 jobs over the baseline “troika” scenario, and the government deficit would be lower than their baseline and GDP-target scenarios.

    “The simulations discussed show clearly that any form of fiscal austerity results in output growth and employment falling into a tailspin that becomes harder and harder to reverse,” the Levy scholars write.

    “We have shown that a relatively modest fiscal boost funded by the appropriate European Union institutions could not only arrest the further declines in GDP and employment, but also reverse their trend and put them on the road to recovery,” the authors of the study said.
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  • In the Media | July 2013
    Open Democracy, July 24, 2013. All Rights Reserved.

    The lead author of a major econometric analysis of the Greek economic crisis discusses the disastrous outcomes of the policies enforced on Greece by its international lenders, and the IMF’s admission that it made serious errors in its assessment of the impact of austerity on the Greek economy and society. 

    C. J. Polychroniou: The Levy Economics Institute has just released a Strategic Analysis report (pdf), with you as its lead author, on the Greek economic crisis and the effects of austerity on growth and employment. The analysis relies on the Institute’s specially designed macroeconomic model for the Greek economy, which is similar to the Institute’s model of the US economy. First, what does the model consist of and how accurate has it been so far in assessing and predicting trends in the US economy?

    Dimitri B. Papadimitriou
    :
    The model’s theoretical foundations are rooted in Wynne Godley’s new Cambridge approach to economics, developed in the 1980s, enabling economists and the public alike to produce a serious study of how the whole economic system functions. The determination of national income, GDP growth, inflation and unemployment are all predominant concerns by which the public judges the success or failure of governments. The US model on which the model for Greece is based has had a rather spectacular success in predicting first the 2001-02 recession and subsequently very early on the American and the global financial crisis of 2007-08. An increasing number of economists and policymakers have come to realize the power of its predictive capacity, at least for the US.

    C.J.P: Reading the report, the first thing that stands out is that Greece is in a depression today (in addition to suffering from malaria, hungry school children and a surge in suicides) which is worse than anything experienced during the Great Depression of the 1930s in the US. This is shocking when we consider that benefits for those in retirement and the unemployed for example, did not even exist in the US until 1935. From this analysis, what is the driving force behind the ongoing and deepening economic crisis in Greece?


    D.B.P:
     
    It is true the Great Depression never looked so good as seen currently from Greece. Whereas during the Great Contraction, US government spending for consumption not infrastructure continued to grow, helping to arrest the economy’s decline, in Greece the same spending has fallen severely every year since 2008 with last year being the steepest drop in the country’s continuing downturn.

    This continuous decline is in concert with the country’s international lenders’ requirement in exchange for the two bail-out plans. This is an application of the dangerous idea of austerity that has been proven catastrophic wherever it has been applied during recessions, with the predictable consequences we are currently witnessing. During downturns, private consumption and investment are on declining paths and it falls on the public purse to stimulate the declining aggregate demand. The economic and social conditions you mention are the consequences of a foolish policy based on a discredited economic theory of “expansive austerity” along with labour market reforms as the best, most appropriate medicine for growth in countries like Greece running large government deficits and debt as percentages of GDP.       

    C.J.P: The IMF has admitted to miscalculations of the fiscal multipliers in the implementation of the austerity measures in Greece, yet the European authorities insist on fiscal restraint and implicitly accuse the IMF of playing politics. Who’s kidding whom here?  The IMF and the EU represent today what I call the “twin monsters of global neoliberalism.” So why should any economist be paying attention to what the IMF says? Action, after all, is what matters – and theirs towards Greece certainly haven’t changed. Correct? 

    D.B.P
    :
    The IMF’s confession to big errors in the first rescue programme about three years ago has been viewed as irrelevant, and the Fund still insists that no matter what it did, then, Greece would have suffered a deep downturn. In effect, all three - IMF, EC and ECB (the troika) - still refuse to acknowledge the flawed handling of the Greek sovereign debt crisis, maintaining to the contrary that the overall policy was correct.

    As my colleagues and I at the Levy Institute suggested when the first bailout programme was arranged, the amount was far smaller than required and the consequences of government spending cuts and tax increases were deeply underestimated.  But those charged with running the European Union and the IMF would not increase the bail-out funds to assist Greece, opting instead for muddling through until the big European banks (read German and French primarily) were willing to slough off their Greek bond holdings, thereby not risking contagion and the erosion of investor confidence in other troubled southern European economies, i.e., Spain and Italy. 

    Conventional wisdom and free market ideology are alive and well, and very many economists consider themselves as high priests and defenders of this religion that informs IMF’s standard austerity remedies, despite the overwhelming evidence to the contrary.   

    C.J.P: These “twin monsters of global neoliberalism” and the Greek government seem to have placed their recovery hopes for the domestic economy on an exports boost.  The Institute’s report analysis challenges this assumption. Why?

    D.B.P
    :
    Exports have been on caught up in an unstable trend before and after the crisis and unable to offset the drop in domestic demand. The strategy imposed by the troika aimed at increasing exports through internal devaluation (a decrease in unit labour costs) has not brought about the anticipated effects, despite the reduction in relative unit labour costs achieved since in 2010.

    Despite this decline in unit labour costs, consumer prices have not followed suit unlike in the single case of the European hegemon, Germany, that systematically maintains lower values in both. An analysis of the country’s exports by destination and technology content shows that the countries that import the bulk of Greek agricultural and medium-low technology goods and services are outside the euro area.

    Greece has suffered a reduction in its exports to countries such as Germany, once a major foreign market. The recent large increase in the value of Greek exports is due to oil refinery operations positively affected by increases in the price of oil. In short, the current strategy of grounding Greece’s recovery on exports is not only wrong-headed but also will shift production toward sectors with lower value added, and larger volatility in oil-related trade.

    C.J.P: Levy Institute projections are also highly pessimistic about unemployment and GDP growth rates in the middle term, questioning once again the rather optimistic predictions made recently by the European Commission and the IMF.  How much worse can unemployment get in Greece, which, as the Institute’s report states, already suffers“the highest level of any industrialized country in the free world during the last 30 years?”

    D.B.P
    :
    IMF and EC projections of GDP growth and employment are bizarrely incompatible within the framework of the imposed austerity policy. As our model simulations show, to meet the troika’s targets of government deficit to GDP ratios from now to 2016, even more austerity would be necessary, further depressing GDP and employment.

    On the other hand, to meet the troika’s growth and employment targets will require the reversal of austerity and a fiscal stimulus of close to a further 41 billion euros between now and 2016. Their projections have been consistently revised downwards four times between May 2010 and the latest occasion in June 2013. 

    The fact is that since the peak in October 2008, over 1 million jobs have been lost, and there are no signs of meaningful easing of the flawed programme forthcoming. With joblessness now at 27%, a stark indicator of the troika’s and the government’s failure to accurately project the consequences of their own policies, it is astonishing that they continue to ask for more of the same. Our own simulations of unemployment show that more jobs would be lost should the current austerity policy be continued, with unemployment climbing the charts, and soaring close to 34% by the end of 2016.  

    C.J.P: To the surprise of many observers abroad, the Greek population has remained rather stoical (or, some might say, politically apathetic) in the midst of a deepening crisis and the collapse of the nation. How do you explain this attitude when, for years, the impression given to the outside world was that contemporary Greek society thrived on a culture based on political radicalism?

    D.B.P
    :
    One easy answer would be that Greeks have are suffering from austerity fatigue. The other and perhaps more important explanation is that we should never take underestimate the capacity for a social meltdown. The Greek population may appear politically apathetic at present but the continuing social chaos has created a ever-wider opening for an extremist party. Only a progressive party of the left can reverse today’s carnage on the ground.    

    C.J.P: The way out of the crisis, according to the Institute’s Strategic Analysis report, is a recovery strategy along the lines of the Marshall Plan. Is it economics or politics and ideology that blocks discussions and initiatives from relying on the public sector for providing the necessary economic stimulus, via increases in public consumption and investment for a return to growth?


    D.B.P
    :
    Our model’s simulations demonstrate that an EU-funded Marshall-type recovery programme would be a real “success story” for Greece. If it were directed at public consumption and investment and particularly at jobs this would put Greece on the road to recovery. The first Marshall plan wasn’t charity or a bailout. It was an effective investment strategy to create a vibrant European economic market and prevent political disintegration.

    As Winston Churchill told us, we should learn from history. European leaders and our government need to learn fast. Instituting such a programme would necessitate our revising what are now discredited economic theories, together with the European institutions that continue to promote them. 
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  • Policy Note 2013/6 | July 2013
    The International Bailouts of Greece
    Research Associate and Policy Fellow C. J. Polychroniou argues that a political solution based on a new economic vision is needed to bring an end to the Greek crisis.  Polychroniou observes that what began as a financial crisis has been transformed into a full-fledged economic and social crisis by the neoliberal policies of the International Monetary Fund and the European Union (EU). Instead of growth, these policies have destroyed Greece’s economy, divided the eurozone states, and hobbled a fragile global recovery. The past six years have seen Greece’s descent into economic and social ruin. Exiting the current crisis, for Greece and countries throughout the eurozone, requires more than an end to austerity.  Broadly, EU institutions must be radically restructured around the principles of sustainable, equitable growth. Specifically, Greece needs a comprehensive development plan, with massive public spending and investment. 

  • Technical Paper
    In this report Levy Institute President Dimitri B. Papadimitriou and Research Scholars Gennaro Zezza and Michalis Nikiforos present the technical structure of the Levy Institute's macroeconomic model for the Greek economy (LIMG). LIMG is a stock-flow consistent model that reflects the “New Cambridge” approach that builds on the work of Distinguished Scholar Wynne Godley and the current Levy Institute model for the US economy. LIMG is a flexible tool for the analysis of economic policy alternatives for the medium term and is also the analytic framework for a forthcoming Strategic Analysis series focusing on the Greek economy.  

  • Strategic Analysis | July 2013
    A Strategic Analysis
    Employment in Greece is in free fall, with more than one million jobs lost since October 2008—a drop of more than 28 percent. In March, the “official” unemployment rate was 27.4 percent, the highest level seen in any industrialized country in the free world during the last 30 years.

    In this report, Levy Institute President Dimitri B. Papadimitriou and Research Scholars Michalis Nikiforos and Gennaro Zezza present their analysis of Greece’s economic crisis and offer policy recommendations to restore growth and increase employment. This analysis relies on the Levy Institute’s macroeconomic model for the Greek economy (LIMG), a stock-flow consistent model similar to the Institute’s model of the US economy. Based on the LIMG simulations, the authors find that a continuation of “expansionary austerity” policies will actually increase unemployment, since GDP will not grow quickly enough to arrest, much less reverse, the decline in employment. They critically evaluate recent International Monetary Fund and European Commission projections for the Greek economy, and find these projections overly optimistic. They recommend a recovery plan, similar to the Marshall Plan, to increase public consumption and investment. Toward this end, the authors call for an expanded direct public-service job creation program.

  • Working Paper No. 767 | June 2013
    The Making of a Vulnerable Haven

    This paper investigates Germany’s vulnerability to the ongoing Euroland crisis. In 2010–11, Germany experienced a strong rebound from the global financial crisis of 2008–09. The Euroland crisis then meant record low interest rates and a depressed euro that boosted German extra-area exports. But the crisis that started in Euroland’s so-called periphery has meanwhile reached the core. With pro-euro sentiments dwindling fast across the European Union (EU), the future of the euro remains uncertain no matter what European Central Bank President Mario Draghi may promise. Germany’s “safe haven” status may turn out to be a double-edged sword. In case of a euro breakup, swift appreciation of the new deutschmark would abruptly worsen German competitiveness and the German economy would crater as a result. Additional wealth losses on Germany’s international investment position would also loom. Appreciating Germany’s own vulnerability to the euro crisis should help the German authorities to understand that their policy prescriptions are anything but in Germany’s own best interest, which is also good for the authorities in euro partner countries to recognize. Germany is bound to catch up with the reality that it is very vulnerable to the enormous wreckage and unnecessary hardship German-style policies are causing across Europe. The EU, most likely under French leadership, will have to convince Germany to embark on a fundamental policy course change, or else call an ugly end to the euro disaster.

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  • In the Media | May 2013
    Interview by Kostas Kalloniatis
    Eleftheritypia, May 19, 2013. All Rights Reserved.

    Youth unemployment is just one part of the wider problem of unemployment and of course requires specialized interventions to tackle it, according to Rania Antonopoulou, professor at Bard College, director of the research division for gender equality of the Levy Economics Institute, and associate researcher with the Labour Institute of the GSEE.

    Antonopoulos considers largely inadequate, if not hypocritical, the recent interest of the European political leadership in youth unemployment and considers the motivation to be in part fear of the risk of social explosion (recent media statements by Draghi, Barroso Leta, etc., provide support for this claim).

    She informs us that in the eurozone in 2012 there were 3.4 million unemployed young people aged 15–24, but roughly four times more unemployed were between 25 and 54 years old (12.6 million), with the result that young people constitute 27 percent of this total unemployed (up to 54 years old). In Greece, respectively, young unemployed stood at 173,000 persons in 2012, as compared to 950,000 unemployed aged 25–54 years, comprising a mere 18.2 percent.

    Antonopoulos underlines a crucial difference, especially for policy, between:

    A. the unemployment rate: for youth it was 55.3 percent in Greece in 2012; namely, for every 100 employed and unemployed young people, 55.3 were unemployed, when for the 24–54 age working age population group this rate was 23.4 percent;

    B. the ratio of unemployment to the total population of a certain age group, which includes everyone (the employed, the unemployed, and those not looking for work): for the young in Greece was only 16.2 percent in 2012 due to the fact that the vast majority are students, soldiers, etc. (i.e, a rate that is much less than the rate of unemployment) when the comparable number for ages 24–54 years was 20 percent ( much closer to their corresponding unemployment rate above); and

    C. the share of the unemployed by age group among the total number of persons that are unemployed, which for the young unemployed in Greece amounted in 2012 to 14.4 percent, which means that the remaining 85.6 percent of the unemployed were 25 years of age or older.

    Now, for Mr. Barroso and Co. the most important criterion is the unemployment rate. But for Ms. Antonopoulos the most important measure for guiding policy is the last measure, the share by age composition of the unemployed.

    With all this, Antonopoulos does not claim that there is  no need to pay attention to youth unemployment or university graduates seeking their first job. Instead, she proposes that equal attention, perhaps more attention, needs to be directed  to those who lost their jobs and are not as young.

    Therefore, she believes that the issue of unemployment in general needs to be addressed with anti-austerity pro-growth policies based on domestic demand stimulus, and that a focus in this particular period exclusively on youth unemployment based on erroneous calculations or political considerations (supposedly in response to the lost generation) is misguided. Priority should be given to the creation of an employer-of-last-resort policy—like the New Deal—capable of designing employment programs that match the capabilities of the unemployed to social needs, with the assistance of the trade unions, local communities and their elected governments, and the unemployed themselves.

    For youth unemployment, she indicated that specialized interventions along the lines of current interventions in Sweden and Finland are appropriate.
  • Policy Note 2013/5 | May 2013
    The EU and the Pillage of the Indebted Countries
    The European Union (EU) is a treaty-based organization that was set up after World War II as a means of putting an end to a favorite practice of the Europeans: sorting out their national differences by engaging in bloody warfare. The European experiment—the formation of a Common Market, which led eventually to economic and monetary union—has been linked to some remarkable outcomes: Europe has experienced its longest period of peace since the end of World War II, and war among European member-states now seems highly unlikely. Naturally, senior EU officials never miss an opportunity to remind the public of this achievement whenever the policies of the “new Rome” are questioned by a European citizenship fed up with authoritarian decision-making processes by the EU core, bank bailouts masquerading as national bailouts, austerity policies—and what amounts to the pillaging of the debtor countries by the center.

  • Policy Note 2013/4 | April 2013
    In March of this year, the government of Cyprus, in response to a banking crisis and as part of a negotiation to secure emergency financial support for its financial system from the European Union (EU) and International Monetary Fund (IMF), proposed the assessment of a tax on bank deposits, including a levy (later dropped from the final plan) on insured demand deposits below the 100,000 euro insurance threshold. An understanding of banks’ dual operations and of the relationship between two types of deposits—deposits of customers’ currency and coin, and deposit accounts created by bank loans—helps clarify some of the problems with the Cypriot deposit tax, while illuminating both the purposes and limitations of deposit insurance.
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  • Working Paper No. 762 | April 2013

    Highlighting that France and Germany held largely contradicting hopes and aspirations for Europe’s common currency, this paper analyzes how the resulting euro contradiction conditioned the ongoing euro crisis as well as current strategies to resolve it. While Germany generally prevailed in hammering out the design of the euro policy regime, the German authorities have failed to see the inconsistency in their policy endeavors: the creation of a model whose workability presupposes that others behave differently cannot be made to work by forcing everyone to behave like Germany. This fundamental misunderstanding has made Germany the main culprit in the euro crisis, but it has yet to face the full consequences of its actions. Germany had sought every protection against the much-dreaded euro “transfer union,” but its own conduct has made that very outcome inevitable. Conversely, having been disappointed in its own hopes for the euro, France is now facing the prospect of a lost generation—a prospect, shared with other debtor nations in the union, that has undermined the Franco-German alliance and may soon turn it into the ultimate euro battleground.

     

  • In the Media | March 2013
    March 27, 2013
    “Rethinking the State” is a video project funded by the Ford Foundation and the Institute for New Economic Thinking (INET) with the aim of using the recent economic crisis to question assumptions behind economic theory and to rethink the role of the state, finance, and austerity in promoting growth and innovation. In the first of a series of interviews with leading economists, Senior Scholar Jan Kregel discusses the causes and consequences of the Greek crisis, and the ineffectiveness and side effects of austerity. Click here for the complete interview. More information on “Rethinking the State” is available from INET
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  • In the Media | March 2013
    By Tom Krisher
    The Associated Press, March 25, 2013. All Rights Reserved.

    The last-ditch effort to save the banking system in Cyprus should bring a rally when U.S. stock markets open today, according to several investment managers.

    Cyprus and its international creditors agreed early today on key elements of a deal for a 10-billion-euro ($13-billion) bailout. Cyprus’ second-biggest bank, Laiki, will be restructured, and holders of deposits exceeding 100,000 euros will have to take losses, a European Union diplomat said. The diplomat spoke on condition of anonymity pending the official announcement.

    It was unclear just how big of a hit big depositors will have to take, but the tax on deposits was expected to net several billion euros, reducing the amount of rescue loans the country needs.

    U.S. investors won’t care too much about who takes losses in Cyprus, as long as there’s a bailout that stops the run on banks in the Mediterranean island nation and keeps the eurozone stable, said Karyn Cavanaugh, market strategist at ING Investment Management in New York.

    “If this works out, regardless of the terms, this is going to be good for the market,” she said Sunday night.

    The tax on large deposits likely will be 10 to 20 per cent, in order to raise about $7.5 billion, said Jack Ablin, chief investment officer for BMO Private Bank in Chicago.

    The move should be well received by U.S. investors because it’s the third bailout deal in the eurozone, including Greece and Spain, and in each case the countries have agreed to austerity plans.

    “I suspect investors will take that news pretty well,” he said.

    The Dow Jones industrial average dropped more than 90 points Thursday in part on fears that the crisis in Cyprus will intensify. But it rebounded and erased the loss on Friday.

    Late Sunday, Dow Jones industrial futures were up 42 points to 14,501. The broader S&P futures added six points to 1,558.00 and Nasdaq futures rose fractionally as well. Japan’s benchmark Nikkei 225 gained 1.35 per cent to 12,505.51 in early trading.

    The European Central Bank had threatened to stop providing emergency funding to Cyprus’ banks after today if there is no agreement on a way to raise 5.8billion euros needed to get a 10-billion-euro rescue loan package from the International Monetary Fund and the other countries that use the euro currency.

    If Cyprus fails to get a bailout, some of its banks could collapse within days, rapidly dragging down the government and possibly forcing the country of around one million people out of the eurozone.

    Analysts say that could threaten the stability of the currency used by more than 300 million people in 17 EU nations.

    A plan agreed to in marathon negotiations earlier this month called for a one-time levy on all bank depositors in Cypriot banks. But the proposal ignited fierce anger among Cypriots and failed to garner a single vote in the Cypriot Parliament.

    The idea of some sort of deposit grab has returned to the fore after Cyprus’ attempt to gain Russian financial aid failed this past week, with deposits above 100,000 euros at the country’s troubled largest lender, Bank of Cyprus, possibly facing a levy of up to 25 per cent.

    Monday’s deal between Cyprus, the International Monetary Fund and the European Commission still needs approval by the 17-nation eurozone’s finance ministers. The deal could still be scuttled if Parliament rejects the tax on depositors, said Dimitri Papadimitriou, president of the Levy Economics Institute of Bard College.

    And Cavanaugh said any glitch that thwarts the deal could still cause U.S. markets to plunge later. She’s still concerned that the U.S. economy, with recent weak corporate earnings, may be hurt by economic troubles in Europe. She’s advising investors to be defensive, staying in the market but moving some of their portfolios into bonds.

    However, Ablin said tiny Cyprus shouldn’t have much of an impact on U.S. markets short of a total default.

    “We’ve been through a lot, and the euro has not yet fallen off the table,” he said. “I guess the conventional wisdom is the euro can sustain a big setback in Cyprus and still continue to move forward.”
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  • In the Media | March 2013
    Background Briefing: Ian Masters Interviews Dimitri B. Papadimitriou
    March 18, 2013. Copyright © 2013 KPFK. All Rights Reserved.

    Pacifica Radio host Ian Masters interviews Levy Institute President Dimitri B. Papadimitriou about the banking meltdown in Cyprus that has revived concerns about the viability of the eurozone. They also look into the exposure that Russian companies and individuals have in troubled banks in Cyprus, where banking assets are eight times the size of the country’s economy.

    Full audio is available here.  
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  • Policy Note 2013/2 | March 2013
    General Reflections and Considerations on an Era Ripe for Change
    The global economy is in trouble. Indeed, the era of global neoliberalism, while still supreme, is fraught with serious problems and contradictions, as evidenced by both the recent global financial crisis and the inability of advanced economies to maintain steady growth and improve the condition of citizens. Global neoliberalism suppresses wages, increases inequality, and destroys the social fabric. It is a socioeconomic system in dire need of a replacement—and the responsibility falls clearly on progressive economics to chart a full-fledged alternative course.
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  • In the Media | March 2013
    "Exiting The Crisis: The Challenge of an Alternative Policy Road Map," a policy forum oganized by the Athens Development and Governance Institute and the Levy Economics Institute of Bard College, was held at the Athinais Cultural Centre in Athens, Greece, March 8–9.
    Speaking at the Athens policy forum on March 9, Senior Scholar James K. Galbraith noted that Greece is effectively powerless in its present situation because what’s being done within the country—a program of austerity that has led to widespread poverty and the highest unemployment rate in the European Union—is dictated and constrained from without. Real change, said Galbraith, will come about only when the north of Europe realizes that things cannot continue. At that point, Germany in particular must decide whether to save the eurozone with a policy of solidarity and mutual support, or to follow what is an emerging political tendency, which is to effectively break the eurozone in two.

    Click here for a video of his remarks.
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  • In the Media | March 2013
    “Exiting The Crisis: The Challenge of an Alternative Policy Road Map,” a policy forum oganized by the Athens Development and Governance Institute and the Levy Economics Institute of Bard College, was held at the Athinais Cultural Centre in Athens, Greece, March 8–9.
    Speaking at the Athens forum on March 8, Senior Scholar Jan Kregel observed that, on a global level, productivity is higher than it’s ever been, yet policies have been imposed within the European Union that prevent large segments of its population from benefitting. Policies that bring about a resumption of income growth and employment are the only solution—a solution that is wholly dependent upon north-south cooperation.
    Click here for a video of his remarks.
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  • Policy Note 2013/1 | March 2013
    A Case against Neoliberal Economics, the Domestic Political Elite, and the EU/IMF Duo
    The crisis in Greece reflects the deep structural problems of the country’s economy, its bureaucratic inefficiency, and a pervasive culture of corruption. But it also reflects the deadly failure of the neoliberal project, which has become institutionalized throughout the European Union’s operational framework—with the International Monetary Fund the world’s single most powerful enforcer of market fundamentalism.

  • In the Media | February 2013
    By Dimitri B. Papadimitriou
    The Huffington Post, February 20, 2013. All Rights Reserved.

    Why has the world’s premiere deficit-reduction laboratory produced such a dismal failure? European leadership still expects the painful über austerity measures imposed on Greece to result in a dramatic improvement of its debt to GDP ratio. But the experiment in endurance is not succeeding for an important reason: Austerity programs have been rooted in myths about what caused the crisis in the first place.

    The popular notion that government overspending is the basis of Greece’s deficit woes is simply wrong. Evidence doesn’t support what seems to be a never-ending scolding about profligate spending.

    Greek national expenditures were at about 45 percent of GDP in 1990, long before the crisis. That share remained stable through 2006. Proportionally, its size was well below that of France, Italy, or even Germany. While Greece has a reputation for a nasty, historically oversized public sector, in the lead up to the crisis it behaved no differently than its neighbors, and its rate of spending didn’t prevent it from catching and surpassing affluent eurozone nations in growth. Rapid spending increases weren’t notable until the 2008 recession. The timeline reinforces the conviction that long-term government extravagance hasn’t been key to the Greek meltdown.

    Its debt picture was also steady. For years, Greece ran a deficit of 3 to 5 percent of GDP, and roughly a 120 percent debt to GDP ratio without any market upheaval. In 2000, just before it joined the euro, its deficit was 3.8 percent, where it more or less remained through the early euro years. Government borrowing didn’t explode until the sovereign debt crisis surfaced in 2009, which indicates that its record of national debt wasn’t the primary cause of Greece’s deficit crunch, either.

    Other trends were more worrisome than government spending and borrowing. Revenues, for one, had been a creeping problem. Even before Greece joined the euro, it lagged considerably behind other European economies in tax collection. A Levy Institute analysis shows that by 2005, revenues from income and wealth taxes in particular, were still well below other European countries. The notable increase in government revenue, from 9.8 percent of GDP in 1988 to 2005’s high of 13.5 percent (before stabilizing at a slightly lower level), was mainly from an increase in social contributions. Tax evasion was rampant in the robust shadow economy.

    In the late 1990s another danger emerged. Investment was concentrated in construction, while machinery and transportation equipment, more important for creating productive capacity, played a smaller part. Greece’s increase in investment relative to savings and its strong growth in real GDP became dependent on private sector demand that was driven by debt. Household consumption, meanwhile, was being financed by running down family financial assets, as well as by borrowing. The private sector became a net borrower against the rest of the world.

    Sound familiar?

    These weren’t the only issues underlying the Greek crisis, of course. To tick a few more linked fundamentals off the list: A problematic effective exchange rate was propelling a deterioration in the trade balance. Export prices had risen much faster in Greece than in the rest of the eurozone, with Greek companies unable or unwilling to absorb euro appreciation by lowering their margins. At the same time, the transfer balance—mostly remittances from abroad—declined. Then property income fell.

    Most importantly for the future, in contrast to some other troubled countries, Greece’s private sector, as well as its government, has a net debt against foreigners. This combination means that Greece must transfer real assets, rather than just financial ones, if it is going to reduce total debt.

    Not one of these problems is likely to improve under a continued austerity regime. And while the probability of reaching European Commission targets is a fantasy, the fallout from making deficit reduction the foremost priority has been radioactive. Poverty and unemployment have increased disastrously. The threat of even more worker lay-offs, with a resulting national collapse, remains. Per capita GDP has declined by at least 5 percent in each of the last four years. By these and numerous other measures, cost-cutting has fueled a deep recession and devastating economic and social corrosion.

    Before Greece’s debt and deficit troubles can be resolved, GDP growth needs to be restored, not the other way around. This in no way minimizes the debt’s alarming potential, and the need to roll it over at low or even zero rates. Even at the current lower interest level, payments could quickly become astronomical. Despite this, a focus on growth must be central.

    Last year we finally saw small, scattered walk-backs from support for austerity policies. Let’s hope that this year will bring a giant step away from cherished—but nonetheless imaginary—legends of Greece’s fall.
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  • Policy Note 2012/12 | December 2012
    On November 27, 2012, the Eurogroup reached a new “Greek deal” that once more discloses that there is no political will to address Greece’s debt crisis—or the country’s economic and social catastrophe.

  • Working Paper No. 742 | December 2012
    The Economic Consequences of Parochial Policy

    Financial market crises with the threat of a subsequent debt-deflation depression have occurred with increasing regularity in the United States from 1980 through the present. Almost reflexively, when confronted with such circumstances, US institutions and the policymakers that run them have responded in a fashion that has consistently thwarted debt-deflation-depression dynamics. It is true that these “remedies,” as they succeeded, increasingly contributed to a moral hazard in US and global financial markets that culminated with the crisis that began in 2007. Nonetheless, the straightforward steps taken by established institutions enabled the United States to derail depression dynamics, while European 1930s-style austerity proved as ineffective as it was almost a century ago. Europe’s, and specifically Germany’s, steadfast refusal to embrace the US recipe has fostered mushrooming economic hardship on the continent. The situation is gruesome, and any serious student of economic history had to have known, given European policy commitments, that it was destined to turn out this way.

    It is easy to understand why misguided policies drove initial European responses. Economic theory has frowned on Keynes. Economic successes, especially in Germany, offered up the wrong lessons, and enduring angst about inflation was a major distraction. At the outset, the wrong medicine for the wrong disease was to be expected.

    What is much harder to fathom is why such a poisonous elixir continues to be proffered amid widespread evidence that the patient is dying. Deconstructing cognitive dissonance in other spheres provides an explanation. Not surprisingly, knowing what one wants to happen at home completely informs one’s claims concerning what will be good for one’s neighbors. In such a construct, the last best hope for Europe is ECB President Mario Draghi. He seems to be able to speak German and yet act European.

  • In the Media | December 2012
    By Mitja Stefancic
    The University of Ljubljana Faculty of Economics provides an overview of the Institute's Minsky Conference on Financial Instability here.
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  • Working Paper No. 740 | December 2012
    Austerity’s Myopic Logic and the Need for a European Federal Union in a Post-Keynesian Eurozone Center–Periphery Model

    In this paper, we analyze the role of the current institutional setup of the eurozone in fostering the ongoing peripheral euro countries’ sovereign debt crisis. In line with Modern Money Theory, we stress that the lack of a federal European government running anticyclical fiscal policy, the loss of euro member-states’ monetary sovereignty, and the lack of a lender-of-last-resort central bank have significantly contributed to the generation, amplification, and protraction of the present crisis. In particular, we present a Post-Keynesian eurozone center–periphery model through which we show how, due to the incomplete nature of eurozone institutions with respect to a full-fledged federal union, diverging trends and conflicting claims have emerged between central and peripheral euro countries in the aftermath of the 2007–08 financial meltdown. We emphasize two points. (1) Diverging trends and conflicting claims among euro countries may represent decisive obstacles to the reform of the eurozone toward a complete federal entity. However, they may prove to be self-defeating in the long run should financial turbulences seriously deepen in large peripheral countries. (2) Austerity packages alone do not address the core problems of the eurozone. These packages would make sense only if they were included in a much wider reform agenda whose final purpose was the creation of a government banker and a federal European government that could run expansionary fiscal stances. In this sense, the unlimited bond-buying program recently launched by the European Central Bank is interpreted as a positive, albeit mild step in the right direction out of the extreme monetarism that has thus far shaped eurozone institutions.

  • Working Paper No. 738 | November 2012

    Research Associate Jörg Bibow investigates the role of the European Central Bank (ECB) in the (mal)functioning of Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), focusing on the German intellectual and historical traditions behind the euro policy regime and its central bank guardian. His analysis contrasts Keynes’s chartalist conception of money and central banking with the postwar traditions nourished by the Bundesbank and based on a fear of fiscal dominance. Keynes viewed the central bank as an instrument of the state, controlling the financial system and wider economy but ultimately an integral part of, and controlled by, the state. By contrast, the “Maastricht (EMU) regime” (of German design) positions the central bank as controlling the state. Essentially, Bibow observes, the national success of the Bundesbank model in pre-EMU times has left Europe stuck with a policy regime that is wholly unsuitable for the area as a whole. But regime reform is complicated by severely unbalanced competitiveness positions and debt overhang legacies. Refocusing the ECB on growth and price stability would have to be a part of any solution, as would refocusing area-wide fiscal policy on growth and investment.

  • In the Media | November 2012
    By Andrea Hopkins and Sarah Marsh
    Yahoo! News, November 27, 2012. (c) Copyright Thomson Reuters 2012.

    TORONTO/BERLIN Nov 27 (Reuters) — Deep divisions at the Federal Reserve were on display on Tuesday, just two weeks before the U.S. central bank's next policy-setting meeting, with one top Fed official pushing for more easing, and another advocating limits.

    The divide underscores the hurdles Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke faces as he tries to win consensus among his fellow policymakers on the central bank's sometimes controversial efforts to bring down the nation's lofty unemployment rate, which registered 7.9 percent last month.

    Charles Evans, president of the Chicago Federal Reserve Bank and one of the Fed's most outspoken doves, said interest rates should stay near zero until the jobless rate falls to at least 6.5 percent. Such a policy would carry "only minimal inflation risks," and could boost growth faster than otherwise, he said.

    Evans, who rotates into a voting seat on the Fed's policy-setting panel in January, also said the Fed should step up its program of quantitative easing in the new year to keep its overall level of asset purchases at $85 billion a month for most, if not all, of 2013.

    But Dallas Fed President Richard Fisher, a self-identified inflation hawk, said the U.S. central bank could get into trouble if it does not set a limit on the amount of assets it is willing to buy.

    "You cannot expand without limits without horrific consequences," he told reporters on the sidelines of the conference organized by the Levy Economics Institute in Berlin. "There is no infinity in monetary policy, we know that from the German experience."

    In September the Fed launched an open-ended asset-purchase program, kicking it off with a monthly $40 billion in mortgage-backed securities and promising to continue or ramp up the program unless the outlook for the labor market improves substantially.

    Those purchases come on top of the $45 billion in long-term Treasuries the Fed is buying each month under Operation Twist, purchases that are funded with sales of a like amount of short-term Treasuries.

    "It's important to maintain the overall level of asset purchases at $85 billion, at least for a time until we can see whether or not we are doing better or things are going more slowly, and we can adjust, depending on that assessment," Evans told reporters attending a speech at the C.D. Howe Institute in Toronto.

    "I think we have to have discussion about what is 'substantial improvement.' Have we seen it? In my opinion, we have not," he said.

    Evans said he would judge the labor market as substantially improved once he sees monthly job gains of a least 200,000 for about six months, as well as above-trend growth in gross domestic product that would lead to declines in unemployment.

    "I would be very surprised if we could achieve that before six months have passed, and I would not be surprised if it takes until the end of 2013," he said.

    Evans said the Fed should keep rates low well beyond that date, until the jobless rate hits at least 6.5 percent, as long as the inflation outlook for the next two to three years remains below 2.5 percent. The Fed's inflation target is 2 percent.

    Evans for the past year had called for low rates until the jobless rate falls to 7 percent, as long as inflation does not threaten to breach 3 percent.

    On Tuesday Evans said he now views a 7 percent unemployment threshold as "too conservative," and sees a 2.5 percent inflation safeguard as appropriate, given that a higher threshold makes some people "apoplectic" and is not needed in order for the policy to work.

    "We're much more likely to reach the 6.5 percent unemployment threshold before inflation begins to approach even a modest number like 2.5 percent," he said.

    Fed policymakers have been ramping up discussions on so-called thresholds—economic data points such as specific unemployment and inflation rates - that would signal when the central bank is likely to begin raising benchmark interest rates from near zero.

    Minneapolis Fed President Narayana Kocherlakota, Boston Fed President Eric Rosengren and the Fed's influential vice chair, Janet Yellen, have all expressed support for the idea.

    In Berlin, Fisher also chimed into the debate. "One option I believe we might pursue is to have a definition of our unemployment target as well as our long-term inflation target," he said, noting it would be difficult, however, and setting an overall limit on asset purchases was preferable.

    Fed Chairman Bernanke said last week that adopting numerical thresholds for unemployment and inflation could be a "very promising" step to develop the Fed's communication strategy, but stressed that it was still under discussion.

    On at least one issue, Fisher and Evans agreed: lack of jobs, not high inflation, is the biggest problem for the U.S. economy.

    "I am not worried about inflation right now, I am worried about an underemployed workforce in America," said Fisher.
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  • In the Media | November 2012
    Reuters, November 27, 2012. ©2012 Thomson Reuters. All rights reserved.

    (Reuters) — Dallas Fed President Richard Fisher, a top Federal Reserve official, said on Tuesday the U.S. central bank could get into trouble if it doesn’t set a limit on the amount of assets it is willing to buy.

    But Fisher, a critic of easy Fed policy, also said his main concern now was unemployment, not inflation.

    He said another option the Fed might consider to signal its aims to markets was a target for unemployment, although this would be difficult because monetary policy alone was not responsible for creating jobs. Fiscal policy was also key.

    Fisher kicked off his speech at a conference in Berlin with a reference to German policies in the 1920s that led to hyperinflation, saying that while inflation was not his main concern now, unlimited quantitative easing was risky.

    “You cannot expand without limits without horrific consequences,” he told reporters on the sidelines of the conference organized by the Levy Economics Institute. “There is no infinity in monetary policy, we know that from the German experience.”

    The Fed announced a third, open-ended round of asset purchases in September that it says will continue until there is a substantial turnaround in the labor market.

    A self-described anti-inflation hawk, Fisher said the Fed should announce “sooner rather than later” limits on the amount of assets it would purchase, preferably in December.

    Fisher said inflation need not be the inevitable consequence of quantitative easing, but the Fed must remain mindful.

    He said that while he backed the first round of the Fed’s purchases of mortgage-backed securities, he doubted it should be continued as it had not reduced interest rate differentials as he had hoped.

    He also said that he was not in favor of extending Operation Twist, under which the Fed has been selling short-term securities to buy $45 billion in longer-term debt every month to push down long-term borrowing costs.

    Over to Fiscal Policy Fisher chimed into the debate on setting specific numerical rates for unemployment and inflation as markers for when the Fed would consider lifting interest rates.

    “One option I believe we might pursue is to have a definition of our unemployment target as well as our long-term inflation target,” he said, noting it would be difficult however and setting an overall limit on asset purchases was preferable.

    Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke said last week that adopting numerical thresholds for unemployment and inflation could be a “very promising” step to develop the Fed’s communication strategy, but stressed that it was still under discussion.

    “I am not worried about inflation right now, I am worried about an underemployed workforce in America,” said Fisher.

    “American businesses are ready to roll ... they are just not doing so, and that requires the fiscal authorities to incentivize them properly, in whatever way they choose.” He also said that after dealing with its fiscal policy, the U.S. government should seek a free trade deal with Europe.

    “It is very important our government, in addition to getting its act together on fiscal policy, resist with every fiber in their body the temptation to follow a protectionist course.”

    (Reporting by Sarah Marsh and Reinhard Becker, editing by Gareth Jones/Ruth Pitchford)
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  • In the Media | November 2012
    By Greg Robb
    MarketWatch, November 27, 2012. Copyright © 2012 MarketWatch, Inc. All rights reserved.   WASHINGTON (MarketWatch) — The U.S. financial system and its regulators need to “update our thinking” about the threat of cyber-attacks given the spike and magnitude of recent events, said Dennis Lockhart, president of the Atlanta Federal Reserve Bank, on Tuesday. “What was previously classified as an unlikely but very damaging event affecting one or a few institutions should now probably be thought of as a persistent threat with potential systemic implications,” Lockhart told a conference in Berlin on financial instability, sponsored by the Levy Economics Institute. Banks have been defending themselves against such attacks for a while, but recent episodes carry up to 20 times more volume of traffic than before, he noted. Lockhart said that another financial-stability concern facing the United States that does not get headlines is the underfunding of public-pension plans. The gap might be as much as $3 trillion to $4 trillion because of losses on investment portfolios during the crisis, according to the Fed president.
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  • In the Media | November 2012
    By Harriet Torry
    TradingCharts.com, November 26, 2012. © TradingCharts.com, Inc. All Rights Reserved.

    BERLIN—European Central Bank Vice President Vitor Constancio expects Spain to apply for the ECB's new bond-buying program, known as "Outright Monetary Transactions," he said after a speech in Berlin on Tuesday.

    In his speech at a conference held by the Levy Economics Institute, he said countries can only qualify for OMT if they meet strict conditions.

    Asked about the outcome he expects from the meeting of Greece's international creditors in Brussels later Monday, Mr. Constancio said he sees no grounds for a haircut of publicly held Greek sovereign debt, although he does expect agreement on disbursing the next tranche of aid.

    He also said the ECB is ready to assume its role in the supervision of the proposed banking union, the "most urgent pillar of a stable European monetary union.

    A closer financial union would allow the ECB to exit its current exceptional measures, Mr. Constancio said.

    "For us to contemplate exit from the exceptional measures, which we will do some time in the future, depends on several aspects, not just the progress of financial integration, it also depends on the overall economic conditions that affect inflation risks," the central banker told reporters after his speech.

    "If and when the economic conditions change, that would be the moment to change also the unconventional policies," he added.

    Economic growth in the euro area has slowed, and Mr. Constancio said he doesn't see visible risks to inflation on the horizon, "so we continue with our stance on monetary policy.

    "Our policy is already very accommodative," Mr. Constancio said when asked whether interest rates could change.
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  • In the Media | November 2012
    Andreas Kissler
    Märkische Allgemeine, 26.11.2012, 16:00

    BERLIN—Finanz-Staatssekretär Steffen Kampeter sieht “sehr gute Chancen”, dass die Euro-Finanzminister bei ihrem Treffen am Montag in Brüssel eine Einigung über Hilfen für Griechenland erreichen werden. Wie zuvor bereits Regierungssprecher Steffen Seibert machte er aber klar, dass Deutschland weiterhin keinen öffentlichen Schuldenschnitt mittragen werde.

    “Wir glauben nicht an die vertrauensbildende Wirkung eines Schuldenschnitts”, sagte Kampeter bei einer Veranstaltung des Levy Economics Institute. “Das wird sich auf absehbare Zeit auch nicht ändern.” Seibert hatte zuvor bei einer Pressekonferenz betont, ein Schuldenschnitt sei für Deutschland wie auch für andere Euro-Staaten “kein Thema”. Er begründete die Haltung unter anderem mit haushaltsrechtliche Beschränkungen in Deutschland.

    Kampeter sah 80 Prozent der erforderlichen Arbeiten für eine Einigung in Brüssel schon erfüllt. “Die (verbleibenden) 20 Prozent sind letzten Endes die schwierigsten, das setzt voraus, dass sich alle Seiten noch ein Stück weit bewegen”, sagte der Parlamentarische Staatssekretär von Finanzminister Wolfgang Schäuble (CDU) zu Journalisten. “Wir haben eine ganze Reihe von anderen Instrumenten im Bereich der Zinsen, im Bereich der Zeitschiene, die wir heute diskutieren.”

    Kampeter lehnte auch einen Schuldenschnitt zu einem späteren Zeitpunkt ab, wie etwa 2015 im Gegenzug für dann erfolgte griechische Reformen. “Das Argument überzeugt mich nicht, weil es ja nicht dazu führt, dass wir 2015 mehr Vertrauen in Investitionen in Griechenland haben”, machte er klar. Die Unsicherheit über zukünftige politische Beschlüsse sei ein wesentliches Investitionshemmnis und damit auch eine wesentliche Wachstumsbremse. “Deswegen sind Spekulationen über zukünftige Maßnahmen eher wachstumsbremsend als investitionsfördernd.”
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  • In the Media | November 2012
    By Harriet Torry
    The Wall Street Journal, November 26, 2012. Copyright © 2012 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved.

    BERLIN--German Deputy Finance Minister Steffen Kampeter sees a "very good chance" of an agreement on Greece's bailout program at the meeting of international creditors in Brussels later Monday, but said his government continues to oppose a haircut on publicly held Greek sovereign debt.
      "We don't believe in the trust-creating effect of a haircut," Mr. Kampeter said Monday in Berlin. A row of other instruments, involving interest rates and granting extra time, is on the table for the meeting of Greece's international creditors later Monday, the minister said.
    His expectation is that a deal will be reached at Monday's meeting of the European Commission, euro-zone finance ministers, the European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund, which can be delivered to the German Bundestag for parliamentary approval "and in the next week we should be on track."
      Mr. Kampeter said that at the moment he doesn't view as necessary further austerity measures by Greece, other than those already agreed.
      "Greece has delivered, now it's Europe's turn to deliver," Mr. Kampeter said at a Levy Economics Institute conference in Berlin. He added that the IMF is "on board."
      Speaking about a readjustment of labor costs in the euro zone, the minister expressed concerns about rising German labor costs in the medium term.
      "We are losing competitiveness," Mr. Kampeter told the conference.
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  • In the Media | November 2012
    Milano Finanza, 26/11/2012. © Milano Finanza 2012. All Rights Reserved.   Il vice presidente della Banca centrale europea, Vitor Constancio, si aspetta che la Spagna chieda l’attivazione del programma di acquisti di bond sul secondario della Bce (Omt) per ridurre il costo di finanziamento sui mercati.

    Durante un discorso tenuto al Levy Economics Institute di Berlino, Constancio ha detto che i Paesi possono ottenere l’attivazione dell’Omt se rispettano le condizionalità. Riferendosi alla crisi della Grecia, il vice presidente della Bce ha affermato di non vedere spazio per un haircut del debito ellenico ma che la tranche di aiuti dovrebbe essere rilasciata.

    L’Eurotower - ha aggiunto - è pronta inoltre ad assumersi il ruolo di supervisore bancario unico per creare l’Unione bancaria, “il pilastro più urgente per un’Unione monetaria europea stabile”. Con un’Unione finanziaria, la Bce potrebbe uscire dalle misure straordinarie che ha attuato per constrastare la crisi. “Uscire dalle misure eccezionali, che continueranno ad esserci per un pò in futuro, dipende da diverse aspetti, non solo dai progressi sull’integrazione finanziaria, ma anche dalle condizioni economiche generali che impattano sui rischi di inflazione”, ha detto Constancio. A chi poi gli chiedeva se ci sarà un taglio dei tassi di interesse al meeting di dicembre, l’esponente della Bce ha dichiarato che “la nostra politica è

    gia molto accomodante”.

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  • In the Media | November 2012
    By Andy Robinson
    The Nation, November 20, 2012. All Rights Reserved.

    In a spectacular display of widening popular discontent, strikes and anti-austerity protests broke out across the eurozone on November 14—the first time there has been broad coordinated action in multiple countries simultaneously since the beginning of a crisis rooted in the design failures of the European Monetary Union. General strikes in Spain and Portugal closed car plants and shut down other industries, drastically curtailing mass transit from Barcelona to Lisbon. There were strikes and huge demonstrations in Greece and Italy. Even in France and Belgium, countries less immediately threatened by the creeping debt crisis, big rallies were staged. 

    In Madrid, hundreds of thousands of protesters flowed past the Prado for five hours. Many seemed newly aware of a common European struggle. Some waved blue-and-white Greek flags in solidarity with the victims of the most ruthless shock therapy pursued so far. Others held placards painted with Iceland’s national colors, suggesting that the Icelandic default might show the way for the debt-laden euro periphery, especially Greece. 

    In Portugal and Greece, as in Spain, protesters took aim at the IMF as well as German Chancellor Angela Merkel. “IMF means hunger and misery,” was a slogan in Lisbon. “We are fed up to our ovaries with the IMF,” joked a feminist contingent at the Madrid demonstration. Yet the truth is that IMF leaders, themselves frustrated with austerity madness, might have grabbed a banner and joined the protest. A very public dispute has erupted between the fund and the European Union over the pace of fiscal adjustment and the need for a second restructuring of Greek debt. 

    At its semiannual meeting in Tokyo in October, the IMF announced that the austerity packages applied throughout southern Europe since 2009 have been counterproductive, undermining economic growth and increasing rather than bringing down public debt ratios. Greece provides ghastly proof of the failed logic of the euro orthodoxy. After three years of shock therapy, the Greek economy is in depression and will have shrunk by more than 22 percent at the end 2013, the IMF warns.

    Employment in Greece has fallen to 1980 levels, and Greek debt dynamics have only deteriorated. Public sector debt has soared from 144 percent of GDP in 2010 to 170 percent, and unless the official lenders agree to take a haircut in a controlled restructuring of debt—as private lenders did earlier in the year—Greece may be forced to leave the euro. “The IMF has admitted the blunder, but tell that to the Greeks,” said Zoe Lanara, international relations secretary of the Greek General Confederation of Labor at a conference organized in October by left think tank TASC in Dublin. 

    The incompetence and negligence in the management of the crisis is staggering. In 2010, the troika of the European Commission, the European Central Bank and the IMF had calculated a manageable impact on growth of the adjustment packages in Greece, Ireland and Portugal, with fiscal multipliers in the region of 0.5. That means for every 2 billion euros’ worth of cuts, maybe 1 billion would have been lost in GDP. But the fund now believes this is far too low: “IMF staff research suggests that fiscal cutbacks had larger-than-expected negative short-term multiplier effects on output,” says the fund’s latest Economic Outlook report. Far from 0.5, “our results indicate that multipliers have actually been in the 0.9 to 1.7 range.” This, the IMF notes, “may explain part of the growth shortfalls.” 

    In other words, overzealous fiscal adjustment cripples an economy, driving down tax revenues, forcing up welfare costs and causing more debt problems. While labor unions and sections of the European left have expressed concern at the impact of austerity on growth since the very beginning, “a year or so ago, most finance ministers didn’t even know what fiscal multipliers were,” said Terrence McDonough, a Marxist economist at the National University of Ireland.

    Despite applause from Brussels and Berlin for its steady progress in deficit reduction, Ireland holds sobering lessons. Its exports have helped it avoid outright depression, but with debt at around 140 percent of GNP, Dublin may be as close to insolvency as Athens, warn the unions. “We are in the sixth year of contraction of domestic demand, and they are still cutting spending. If the IMF is right and multipliers are 1.7, this will be devastating for Ireland,” said Michael Taft of the Irish union Unite. 

    The IMF 2013 forecast for Portugal, meanwhile, has been revised downward to a full-blown recession with a 3 percent fall in GDP. Only Latvia—recovering strongly and keen to join the eurozone after its own dose of shock treatment—remains to vindicate the EU orthodoxy’s penchant for austerity, wage cuts and internal devaluation. Yet the tiny Baltic state was close to expiring on the operating table, losing a quarter of GDP and one-seventh of its youth to emigration. Even with its current growth rates, it will take five years to get back to where it started. 

    Notwithstanding the discouraging evidence from the eurozone, pressure is being piled on the Obama administration to agree to a “grand bargain” of fiscal consolidation with the Republicans in Congress. Here, too, the IMF has warned that a front-loaded fiscal adjustment could abort an already weak recovery. Given that interest rates on US bonds are at rock bottom, Congress could instead be legislating public investment programs at virtually no cost. “The European monetary union has created its own constraints and needs to be overhauled, but the US should be using fiscal policy to boost growth,” says Greek economist Dimitri Papadimitriou, president of the Keynesian Levy Economics Institute at Bard College. 

    The IMF’s methodology, at least, is being hastily adapted to the landscape of destruction and strife across the EU periphery. Yet it is still not clear that the European leaders will change tack. In Greece, the troika ordered more than 9 billion euros’ worth of cuts and tax increases, which, if multipliers are indeed 1.7, will reduce GDP by another 8 percent. Meanwhile, as Spain prepares to request a bailout package that will activate the European Central Bank’s bond purchasing program, the troika teams in Madrid appear to be designing something similar to the disastrous Irish program. The troika had raised hopes with a promising commitment to recapitalize Spain’s banks, but it now appears that so-called legacy debt—the bad loans inherited from previous bubbles—will not be covered. This means that in Spain, just as in Ireland, the state will be left to provide the capital needed to help banks absorb the impact of a deteriorating housing market. This will feed what the IMF calls a “pernicious feedback loop” where bailouts to stricken banks undermine public sector finances.

    As Spain slides further into recession (the IMF forecasts a 1.3 percent drop in GDP next year, after a 1.5 percent contraction in 2012), concerns about debt sustainability will deepen and the bank will be forced to intervene at increasing intervals against a backdrop of mass unrest. That is a recipe for backlash in Germany that could end the eurozone once and for all.
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  • In the Media | November 2012
    Leading European and U.S. Policymakers to Discuss Financial Instability and Its Global Economic Implications at the Levy Economics Institute's Hyman P. Minsky Conference, in Berlin, November 26-27
    BERLIN, Nov. 6, 2012 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) -- From November 26 to 27, the Levy Economics Institute of Bard College will gather top policymakers, economists, and analysts at the Hyman P. Minsky Conference on Financial Instability to gain a better understanding of the causes of financial instability and its implications for the global economy. The conference will address the challenge to global growth affected by the eurozone debt crisis; the impact of the credit crunch on economic and financial markets; the larger implications of government deficits and the debt crisis for U.S., European, and Asian economic policy; and central bank independence and financial reform. Organized by the Levy Economics Institute and ECLA of Bard with support from the Ford Foundation, The German Marshall Fund of the United States, and Deutsche Bank AG, the conference will take place Monday and Tuesday, November 26 to 27, in Frederick Hall, 4th fl., Deutsche Bank AG, Unter den Linden 13–15, Berlin.

    Participants include Philip D. Murphy, U.S. Ambassador, Federal Republic of Germany; Steffen Kampeter, parliamentary state secretary, German Ministry of Finance; Lael Brainard*, under secretary for international affairs, U.S. Department of the Treasury;  Mary John Miller*, Treasury under secretary for domestic finance; Vítor Constâncio, vice president, European Central Bank; Peter Praet, chief economist and executive board member, European Central Bank; Richard Fisher, president and CEO, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas; Dennis Lockhart, president and CEO, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta; Christine M. Cumming, first vice president, Federal Reserve Bank of New York; George Stathakis, member of the Greek Parliament (Syriza) and professor of political economy,University of Crete; Jack Ewing, European economics correspondent, International Herald TribuneBrian Blackstone, European economics correspondent, The Wall Street JournalWolfgang Münchau, associate editor, Financial TimesRobert J. Barbera, chief economist, Mount Lucas Management LP; Andrew Smithers, founder, Smithers & Co.; Frank Veneroso, president, Veneroso Associates, LLC; Michael Greenberger, professor, School of Law, and director, Center for Health and Homeland Security, The University of Maryland; Leonardo Burlamaqui, program officer, Ford Foundation; Dimitri B. Papadimitriou, president, Levy Institute; Jan Kregel, senior scholar, Levy Institute, and professor, Tallinn Technical University; Dimitrios Tsomocos, reader in financial economics, Saïd Business School, and fellow, St. Edmund Hall, University of Oxford; Alexandros Vardoulakis, research economist, European Central Bank and Banque de France; Michael Pettis, professor, Guanghua School of Management, Peking University, and senior associate, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; Eckhard Hein, professor, Berlin School of Economics; L. Randall Wray, senior scholar, Levy Institute, and professor, University of Missouri–Kansas City; Éric Tymoigne, research associate, Levy Institute, and professor, Lewis and Clark College; and Jörg Bibow, research associate, Levy Institute, and professor, Skidmore College. *to be confirmed

    The Levy Economics Institute of Bard College, founded in 1986 through the generous support of the late Bard College trustee Leon Levy, is a nonprofit, nonpartisan, public policy research organization. The Institute is independent of any political or other affiliation, and encourages diversity of opinion in the examination of economic policy issues while striving to transform ideological arguments into informed debate.
     
    ECLA of Bard is a liberal arts university offering an innovative, interdisciplinary curriculum with a global sensibility. Students come to Berlin from 30 countries in order to study with our international faculty. The curriculum focuses on value studies, in which the norms and ideals we live by, and the scholarly attention they inspire, come together in integrated programs. Small seminars and tutorials encourage lively and thoughtful dialogue. The Ford Foundation is an independent, nonprofit grant-making organization. For more than half a century it has worked with courageous people on the frontlines of social change worldwide, guided by its mission to strengthen democratic values, reduce poverty and injustice, promote international cooperation, and advance human achievement. With headquarters in New York, the foundation has offices in Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, and Asia.

    © 2012 GlobeNewswire, Inc. All Rights Reserved.

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  • In the Media | October 2012
    Interview with Dimitri B. Papadimitriou

    CNBC, October 26, 2012. All Rights Reserved.

    President Dimitri B. Papadimitriou talks to CNBC's Rick Santelli about the failure of the bailouts in Greek and Spain, and the need for a completely different approach to the "European problem," including a broad-reaching plan to aid development in Europe's southern tier, a banking union to insure deposits, and true fiscal union for the eurozone—because clearly, monetary union has not worked. Full video of the interview is available here.

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  • Working Paper No. 734 | October 2012

    In this paper the euro crisis is interpreted as the latest episode in the crisis of finance-dominated capitalism. For 11 initial Euro area countries, the major features of finance-dominated capitalism are analyzed; specifically, the increasing inequality of income distribution and the rising imbalances of current accounts. Against this background, the euro crisis and the economic policy reactions of European governments and institutions are examined. It is shown that deflationary stagnation policies have prevailed since 2010, resulting in massive real GDP losses; some improvement in the price competitiveness of the crisis countries but considerable and persistent current account imbalances; reductions in government deficit–to-GDP ratios but continuously rising trends in gross government debt–to-GDP ratios; a risk of further recession for the euro area as a whole—and the increasing threat of the euro’s ultimate collapse. Therefore, an alternative macroeconomic policy approach tackling the basic contradictions of finance-dominated capitalism and the deficiencies of European economic policy institutions and strategies—in particular, the lack of (1) an institution convincingly guaranteeing public debt and (2) a stable and sustainable financing mechanism for acceptable current account imbalances—is outlined.

  • Research Project Reports | October 2012
    Interim Report
    In this interim report, we discuss the evolution of major macroeconomic variables for the Greek economy, focusing in particular on the sources of growth before and after the euro era, the causes and consequences of the continuing recession, and the likely results of the policies currently being implemented. Some preliminary suggestions for alternative policies are included. These alternatives will be tested in a more robust econometric framework in a subsequent report.

  • One-Pager No. 33 | September 2012
    Who’s Afraid of Greece?

    As the Greek summer comes to an end, the predatory austerity policies of the second bailout plan are in full swing, while the fiscal consolidation program continues to run its wayward course. Overall, what was once a modern democratic polity is beginning to resemble a feudal state. As the government seeks a broad agreement on its latest spending cuts, the Greek labor movement is set to embark on a new round of paralyzing strikes and demonstrations. This year, the truly hot season in Greece is only just beginning.

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  • Policy Note 2012/11 | September 2012
    As the decline in Greek GDP should indicate—a contraction of more than 20 percent since the onset of the sovereign debt crisis in late 2009—the economic situation in Greece today is catastrophic. The economy is in freefall, and the social consequences are being widely felt. The main reason for this awful situation is that the country has suffered for more than two years under a harsh austerity regime imposed by the European Union and the International Monetary Fund. The bailouts have proven to be a curse. The nation is literally under economic occupation and sinking deeper into the abyss—and there is very little reason to expect a turnaround in the foreseeable future.
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  • In the Media | August 2012
    Ian Masters Interviews Dimitri B. Papadimitriou

    Background Briefing, August 23, 2012. Copyright © 2012 KPFK. All Rights Reserved.

    Dimitri B. Papadimitriou joins Ian Masters to discuss the accelerating run on the euro, as poorer nations move their money to Germany. Full audio of the interview is available here.

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  • In the Media | August 2012
    By Dimitri B. Papadimitriou

    The Nation, August 21, 2012. Copyright © 2012 The Nation. All Rights Reserved.

    U.S. News and World Report, August 27, 2012. Copyright © U.S. News & World Report LP. All Rights Reserved.

    European policymakers are still enjoying their famously long, languorous summer holiday. The vacations will end in the coming days, with Germany’s Chancellor Angela Merkel scheduled for a series of meetings with leaders from France, Greece and Italy this month. Meanwhile, at a more rapid pace, Europe is in the midst of a massive run on bank deposits in Greece, Portugal, Spain, Italy and Ireland. While the last out-of-office auto-responses zip across the continent in multiple languages, the bank runs continue to accelerate.

    How did we get here? What can we expect next? And, most important, what is the way out?

    Europe’s trip down the highway to hell began with an original sin. At the birth of the euro, nations that adopted it and formed the European Monetary Union (EMU) gave up their national currencies. They could no longer “print” money to pay for expenses (despite the longtime use of keystrokes for this purpose, the image of stacked, crisp bills somehow hangs on). The European Central Bank, comparable to the US Federal Reserve, could increase the supply of euros, but individual nations could not.

    Like each of the US states, each nation in the EMU became a user, rather than an issuer, of money. But each country kept control of taxing and spending through its own treasury. The design flaw—think major miscalculation here—was the absence of a unifying body that could move resources from country to country in the event of local trouble, as the US government does between states.

    The single currency was intended to insure that capital could flow easily across borders. For banks, this meant the ability to buy assets and make loans wherever the euro was used. And did they ever. The Basel Accords, initially set up in 1988 to establish international standards of capital adequacy, ended up allowing banks to self-determine the weight of risky assets on their balance sheets, leaving them without any supervision or regulation in their calculation and pricing. This added more opportunities to take on Wall Street–like risks.

    Yet individual nations remained responsible for their own banks. Private “banks without borders” could, and did, run up fabulous debts that were easily several orders of magnitude greater than their host country’s total government spending or taxing. When the winning streak ended, the public had to pick up the tab. To visualize this debacle, picture a US state, any state, having to find the funds to settle a run on Bank of America because it happened to be headquartered there.

    Covering the bank losses ballooned national deficits and debt to previously unheard of levels. This is what happened in Ireland, for example, and it is emerging now in Spain, where during the first five months of this year about 163 billion euros left the Spanish banks.

    Finally, and key to the current cash exodus, depositors could shift their euros without cost from one bank to another throughout Euroland. Anyone with euros in, for example, a Spanish bank, can simply transfer them to a German bank.

    The killer is that once the shift has been made, Spain, through its central bank, has to back up the money with reserve funds, which then accumulate in Germany’s Bundesbank. Where would Spain find those funds? Its central bank would need to borrow—deeply—from the European Central Bank.

    This precise scenario is now playing out across Europe, as depositors in its poorer nations understandably move their money to relative safety in Germany. The cross-border mechanism is called TARGET2, for Trans-European Automated Real-time Gross settlement Express Transfer. The inelegant name is the least of its problems; it’s a system destined to crash and burn.

    The flight of capital from the south had already begun in slo-mo by 2010. Then, this past May, as millions of euros a day were pulled from Greece and a major Spanish bank tottered, the world braced itself. Nationalization of the troubled Spanish bank and some largely insignificant measures on the part of European leadership followed, in what was widely reported as a definitive step back from the brink.

    By this summer, optimism was replaced by increasingly frantic predictions of doom. When European Central Bank president Mario Draghi issued one in a string of we’ll-do-whatever-it-takes-to-save-the-euro statements in late July, the wheel turned again. Inaction followed, and the wheel lost traction.

    The migration of money into Germany is quickening. And under TARGET 2, the trillions of euros that the ECB has loaned out to finance this race will be uncollectable.

    How to counteract a disaster of these proportions? Unlimited deposit insurance for all euros in EMU banks, backed by the creation of a strong European federal treasury, would end the bank runs, just as deposit insurance in the United States has prevented them here ever since the Great Depression. The insurance liability would be on Europe’s central bank, which would become insolvent if Spain or Italy abandoned the euro. Since, unlike the United States, the ECB doesn’t have a unified European treasury to backstop it, Germany would presumably get the bill for a default.

    As Randall Wray and I predict in a new Levy Institute policy paper [“Euroland’s Original Sin], “That’s a bill Germany will not accept, hence, probably no deposit insurance.” And no future for the euro.

    Auto-response message to Europe’s banks: See you in September?

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  • Policy Note 2012/10 | August 2012
    Every crisis reveals unexpected consequences of economic policies. The current euro crisis should be no exception. As European Union governments search for a solution, there are already a number of lessons to be learned. Senior Scholar Jan Kregel outlines the top six.
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  • In the Media | July 2012
    By Martin Essex

    The Wall Street Journal, July 23, 2012. Copyright © 2012 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved.

    As the world’s financial markets begin to price in a total collapse of the euro project, there’s no shortage of economists and other experts saying they always knew it was doomed to failure. So who warned first?

    Well, only last week, a senior International Monetary Fund economist resigned and wrote a scathing letter to the board blaming management for suppressing staff warnings about the 2008 global financial crisis and for an alleged pro-European bias that he says exacerbated the euro-zone’s debt turmoil.

    But long before the 2008 crisis, many economists were warning there were structural problems in the euro set up. And now the Levy Economics Institute of Bard College has issued a policy note, provocatively headed “Euroland’s Original Sin,” which names five of them.

    There’s Stephanie Bell, writing as long ago as 2002, who warned that “the prospects for stabilization in the euro zone appear grim.”

    And the year before that, back in 2001, Warren Mosler wrote that history and logic dictate that the credit sensitive euro-12 national governments and banking system will be tested.

    “The market’s arrows will inflict an initially narrow liquidity crisis, which will immediately infect and rapidly arrest the entire euro payments system,” he said. “Only the inevitable, currently prohibited, direct intervention of the ECB will be capable of performing the resurrection, and from the ashes of that fallen flaming star an immortal sovereign currency will no doubt emerge.”

    But two years before that Mathew Forstater was highlighting the problem that “market forces can demand pro-cyclical fiscal policy during a recession, compounding recessionary influences.”

    Even earlier, in 1998, L. Randall Wray was concerned that the euro zone would be much like a U.S. operating with a Fed, but with only individual state treasuries. It will be as if each member country were to attempt to operate fiscal policy in a foreign currency; deficit spending will require borrowing in that foreign currency according to the dictates of private markets, he said.

    And the winner? According to the Levy Institute, that was Wynne Godley, as far back as 1997, who wrote: “The danger … is that the budgetary restraint to which governments are individually committed will impart a disinflationary bias that locks Europe as a whole into a depression it is powerless to lift.”

    Mind you, there were plenty of others not named by the Levy Institute. According to Public Service Europe, in the late 1990s, eminent economists queued up to explain the flaws in the euro project. Chief among them was Nobel Prize winner Milton Friedman, who in 1999—the year the euro was born—predicted that “sooner or later, when the global economy hits a real bump, Europe’s internal contradictions will tear it apart.”

    With Spanish bond yields surging while the euro and European stock prices tumble as the euro system creaks under austerity programs that have been imposed on governments that seem unable to cope with them, the words of Godley, Friedman and the rest echo through the years.

    But were they the first economists to issue warnings? You may know better.

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  • Policy Note 2012/8 | July 2012
    From the very start, the European Monetary Union (EMU) was set up to fail. The host of problems we are now witnessing, from the solvency crises on the periphery to the bank runs in Spain, Greece, and Italy, were built into the very structure of the EMU and its banking system. Policymakers have admittedly responded to these various emergencies with an uninspiring mix of delaying tactics and self-destructive policy blunders, but the most fundamental mistake of all occurred well before the buildup to the current crisis. What we are witnessing today are the results of a design flaw. When individual nations like Greece or Italy joined the EMU, they essentially adopted a foreign currency—the euro—but retained responsibility for their nation’s fiscal policy. This attempted separation of fiscal policy from a sovereign currency is the fatal defect that is tearing the eurozone apart.

  • In the Media | June 2012
    By Dimitri B. Papadimitriou

    Valor Econômico, June 22, 12. All rights reserved.

    Durou pouco o alívio do mercado financeiro com o resultado da eleição grega de domingo, que resultou na formação de um governo favorável ao pacote de resgate das finanças públicas do país. Não há dúvida de que a crise da dívida prossegue na Europa, atacando diretamente a Espanha—cujos bancos foram resgatados no início do mês—e talvez, em seguida, Itália e Portugal. O euro, moeda comum do continente, não desapareceu no começo da semana, mas ainda está fortemente ameaçado.

    O plano de resgate da Grécia não tem condições de funcionar, porque a austeridade que se exige é impossível. Antonis Samaras venceu as eleições com base na promessa de renegociação. O mercado tem a expectativa de soluções de longo prazo na reunião de cúpula da próxima semana, um plano coerente para resolver a crise da dívida. Mas a intransigência alemã vai prevalecer e não virá solução. A resposta dos mercados vai ser ainda mais dura e os líderes da França e da Itália vão pressionar a Alemanha por uma mudança de curso. Isso vai levar muito tempo até se chegar a algum resultado concreto.

    O presidente francês François Hollande quer mudar o curso da austeridade e incorporar uma política de crescimento. Estou otimista: com o tempo, acredito que mudanças virão. Mas temo que vão chegar um pouco tarde demais. Os eurobônus são necessários, assim como um fundo garantidor de depósitos que englobe todos os bancos de países da zona do euro. Minha expectativa é de que os problemas incontornáveis do sistema financeiro espanhol e, em seguida, possivelmente, também do italiano, podem ser os catalizadores do estabelecimento de um programa de títulos de dívida europeus.

     

    O sistema financeiro europeu é frágil. Só com união fiscal o sistema de pagamentos estará a salvo. É o único jeito de evitar corridas bancárias quando eventuais crises aparecerem. É tempo de que o BCE exerça o papel de um verdadeiro banco central e seja o emprestador de último recurso.

    Todas as tentativas de salvar o euro só valem a pena se conseguirmos chegar à união fiscal. Atualmente, o euro é um projeto incompleto e sua dissolução é uma possibilidade concreta. A única solução para o euro é uma união fiscal como a que chamamos de Estados Unidos da América. Se não, temo que o euro esteja em seus estertores.

    A Europa jamais deveria ter formado uma união monetária com países de estrutura econômica tão diversa. Para que a Alemanha tenha superávit comercial, os demais países precisam ter déficit. Os desequilíbrios vão continuar, porque uma união só monetária não pode lidar com eles. A Alemanha foi e continua sendo de longe a maior beneficiária do euro, porque conseguiu, graças a um sistema de baixos salários, ser mais produtiva e competitiva. Para a Alemanha, o euro é uma moeda subvalorizada, enquanto para os outros países, é uma moeda sobrevalorizada.

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  • Policy Note 2012/7 | June 2012
    Possible Costs and Likely Outcomes of a Grexit
    The European Union’s (EU) handling of the Greek crisis has been an unmitigated disaster. In fact, EU political leadership has been a failure of historic proportions, as its myopic, neoliberal bent and fear-driven policies have brought the eurozone to the brink of collapse. After more than two years of a “kicking the can down the road” policy response, it’s a do-or-die situation for Euroland. Greece has reached the point where an exit looks rather imminent (it’s really a matter of time, regardless of the June 17 election outcome), Portugal is bleeding heavily, Spain is about to go under, and Italy is in a state of despair. This Policy Note examines why the bailout policies failed to rescue Greece and boost the eurozone, and what effects a “Grexit” might possibly have—on Greece and the rest of Euroland.

  • Book Series | June 2012
    Edited by Dimitri B. Papadimitriou and Gennaro Zezza

    In the 1970s, at a time of shock, controversy and uncertainty over the direction of monetary and fiscal policy, Wynne Godley and the Cambridge Department of Applied Economics rose to prominence, challenging the accepted Keynesian wisdom of the time. This collection of essays brings together eminent scholars who have been influenced by Godley's enormous contribution to the field of monetary economics and macroeconomic modeling.

    Godley's theoretical, applied and policy work is explored in detail, including an analysis of the insightful New Cambridge 'three balances' model, and its use in showing the progression of real capitalist economies over time. Godley's prescient concerns about the global financial crash are also examined, demonstrating how his work revealed structural imbalances and formed the foundations of an economics relevant to the instability of finance.

    Published By: Palgrave MacMillan

  • One-Pager No. 32 | June 2012
    Ireland was at one time the poster child for fiscal austerity, but that country’s disappointing economic performance of late has left austerity apologists searching for a new model—and the Baltic economies appear to be next in line. But Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are as unsuited to stand as successful models of expansionary fiscal contraction and “internal devaluation” as their Irish predecessor.
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  • Policy Note 2012/5 | June 2012
    The Baltic States and the Crisis

    The commonly cited example of the successful application of “internal” devaluation as a strategy for economic recovery is that of the Baltic economies. In this Policy Note, we discuss whether the Baltic austerity plan worked, how it was designed to work—and, most important, whether it can be replicated anywhere else. We argue that the Baltic recovery has unique features that do not relate to domestic austerity policies, nor are they replicable elsewhere.

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  • Public Policy Brief No. 124 | May 2012
    The Link between the State and the Macroeconomy, and the Disastrous Effects of the European Policy of Austerity

    Conventional wisdom has calcified around the belief that the countries in the eurozone periphery are in trouble primarily because of their governments’ allegedly profligate ways. For most of these nations, however, the facts suggest otherwise. Apart from the case of Greece, the outbreak of the eurozone crisis largely preceded dramatic increases in public debt ratios, and as has been emphasized in previous Levy Institute publications, the roots of the crisis lie far more in the flawed design of the European Monetary Union and the imbalances it has generated.

    But as Research Associate and Policy Fellow C. J. Polychroniou demonstrates in this policy brief, domestic political developments should not be written out of the recent history of the eurozone’s stumbles toward crisis and possible dissolution. However, the part in this tale played by southern European political regimes is quite the opposite of that which is commonly claimed or implied in the press. Instead of out-of-control, overly generous progressive agendas, the countries at the core of the crisis in southern Europe—Greece, Spain, and Portugal—have seen their macroeconomic environments shaped by the dominance of regressive political regimes and an embrace of neoliberal policies; an embrace, says Polychroniou, that helped contribute to the unenviable position their economies find themselves in today.

  • One-Pager No. 31 | May 2012

    On June 17, Greece will hold a second round of elections, the outcome of which might force the European Union to halt all financial assistance to the debt-strapped country. What Greece desperately needs is a leadership with the ability to explore all possible options and to prepare the nation for the tough challenges that may lie ahead—and to make them aware of the opportunities available to a government in charge of its own currency.

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  • In the Media | May 2012
    Interview with Dimitri B. Papadimitriou

    Capital.gr, May 18, 2012. © All Rights Reserved.

    In an interview with Helen Artopoulou (DailyFX.gr/FXCM) that was posted on Capital.gr, Dimitri B. Papadimitriou, president of the Levy Economics Institute, discusses the failed policy of austerity that the European Union opted to enforce on Greece, and what it may take for Greece to overcome its current crisis.

    Q. The political impasse in Greece, largely the outcome of the recent elections, had led to some reconsideration of the austerity policy measures being currently implemented in the indebted countries of the Eurozone. In fact, it seems that a number of public officials have shifted their position, calling now for a growth-oriented economic policy. Given the reality of Greece, how easy is to stir economic growth, and why didn’t the EU follow the growth path to economic recovery in the first place but relied instead on fiscal consolidation and draconian austerity measures?

    Economic growth is dependent on public policy aiming at deploying the resources available, that is, labor and capital. Presently, in Greece, there is an abundance of labor, but no capital from either the private or public sectors. It will be some time before the economy becomes friendlier to private investment, markets offering increasing liquidity, and for the private sector to gain confidence in the country’s economic stability. The time horizon for these things to happen will be long so, the responsibility falls on the public sector to do the investing in the key sectors of the Greek economy. But the public sector is on the brink or bankrupt, and in effect restricted by the EU, ECB and IMF in investing for growth. When they call for a growth-oriented economic policy in response to the overwhelming election results in favor of the anti-austerity platform, they simultaneously insist on the implementation of the imposed austerity. This joint policy prescription, that growth and austerity can coexist, is the new “austerian” economics—a new frontier of economic nonsense. North European leaders believe that all member states in the Eurozone can be similar to Germany’s competitive export-led growth economy. But Germany’s competitive advantages that yield intra Eurozone better trade balances are dependent on other Eurozone’s countries worse balances.

    Austerity programs were imposed, first, to discipline the eurozone’s profligate citizens and, second and most importantly to calm the financial markets, both of which have failed miserably. The medicine of austerity has worsened the patient’s condition and markets, as has been observed time and time again, have a mind of their own.

    Q. Greece is facing once again the prospect of a forceful exit from the eurozone. How likely is this frightening scenario and is it manageable? Also, would it be as disastrous for the country as most people fear it would be?

    I don’t believe thus far, all options have been explored. Greece can remain in the Eurozone with a reworked out bail out plan. Reasonable people can be convinced, if serious alternatives are presented. Everyone in the EU recognizes the harshness of the austerity measures and their most disproportional burden to the Greek people. Many proposals has been suggested from very serious economists, but have not made their way to the negotiating table. So there may be still time to avoid doing the unthinkable.

    At the end, when all other options are exhausted then, the possibility of Greece exiting the euro remains the only options. This maybe a frightening scenario but it will have to be manageable, the inexorable difficulties notwithstanding. Exiting the euro will be accompanied with very serious challenges. We should expect to witness the workings of a dysfunctional economy and society characterized with bank runs, resulting in banks being nationalized, rapid devaluation of the domestic currency, immediate repudiation of all public debt and lender retaliation, closed financial markets for many years to come, and strong inflationary pressures. An economy with an under developed industrial base, like Greece, would be hard-hit on import prices, especially oil, natural gas, machinery and other necessary imports.

    On the positive side, having its own currency the government can embark on large emergency employment programs, as those presently in place for public service works, and others used by other countries, i.e., the US New Deal-type programs, South Korea’s programs during the Asian crisis as well as those implemented in some countries in Latin America. More importantly, there can be public investment and promotion toward exporting agricultural goods, technical services to non-European countries, etc. And, there maybe still structural funds available from the EU. What is absolutely critical, however, for the country to ultimately find its way to growth and prosperity is spectacular and visionary leadership.

    Q. The ECB has managed through different means to avoid a European credit crisis and to restore somewhat investors’ confidence in sovereign bond markets. Still, a lot of peripheral banks are on very shaky ground, with Spanish Bankia being the most recent case. What’s your assessment of the efforts undertaken so far by the ECB towards solving the eurozone crisis?

    The ECB has done a lot less that it could have to calm the markets. For it is unfortunate that its charter—a version of the German Bundesbank—limits its functions as a central bank. Central banks have the ability to use tools at their disposal at times of financial crises, one of which is functioning as lenders of last resort (LOLR). The ECB is prohibited in doing so even though, its LTRO program is nothing more than a timid attempt to function as a LOLR, too little and too late to significantly calm the financial markets. The spreads for Spain and Italy continue to be under assault and the urgings from the Bundesbank to exit from the program earlier than its original time horizon worsen matters. European policymakers are well aware that the European financial institutions are severely undercapitalized and shaky, but hope that their intended private recapitalization will be a satisfactory solution. But as it has become obvious by now the method of solving Europe’s problems is to get each country’s fiscal house and banking sector in order by applying a band aid that helps kick the can down the road and somehow grow its way out of trouble. But even if the omens are clear, the willingness to deal with them effectively is not.

    Q. It seems that the crisis in the European periphery is widening and deepening. Spain is set to be the next victim, but the bailout funds are hardly adequate given its size. Moreover, Germany continues to insist on the fiscal pact treaty as the only way out of the crisis. Is the European Union facing a dead-end? And is the current crisis essentially a structural crisis?

    The euro project is an incomplete project. It is impossible to have a monetary union of countries with very different fiscal structures and earnings potential that are yoked to the same currency without a fiscal union. Germany’s insistence on a fiscal pact treaty is simply thoughtless and will sooner rather than later lead to euro’s dissolution. Aside from Greece, Portugal and Ireland—Chancellor Merkel’s poster children are not meeting their deficit targets and both Spain and Italy, two very large economies are in recession and their citizens are refusing to take the austerity medicine. Consequently, the end of the euro may be near and it will be a blow not just to European pride but, to the whole idea of Europe.

    Q. During the last months the markets (including the US equity market) are showing signs that they are not in tune with the real economic conditions, which is to say that their performance does not seem to reflect what’s going in the global economy. Why is this happening, and have we faced a similar situation in the past?

    As I indicated earlier, markets have a mind of their own. As the late Paul Samuelson once quipped, financial markets forecasted five of the last three recessions. Financial markets are globally interconnected and what happens in Europe affects the US markets and in their turn the Asian markets irrespective of the prevailing economic conditions. For example, the recent run-up in the US equity markets was due to some marginal improvement in the US economy, and more importantly, the sizable increase in corporate profits. This and last weeks volatility is attributed to the results of the Greek elections and the chorus proclaiming the country’s impending exit from the euro and the possible contagion to the rest of the Eurozone with spillover effects to the US economy.

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  • In the Media | May 2012
    By Chris Isidore

    CNNMoney, May 14, 2012. © 2012 Cable News Network. A Time Warner Company. All Rights Reserved.

    Investors are getting increasingly worried about whether Greece will remain in the eurozone. And they should.

    There are a series of upcoming events that could spell the end of a deal, put in place nearly three months ago, to restructure Greee’s debt under strict terms dictated by the European Union, International Monetary Fund and European Central Bank, known as the troika.

    “The threat from Greece remains real, and Greece exiting the euro area would likely have contagion effects that cannot easily be addressed in the current set-up,” said Bank of America Merrill Lynch analysts in a note Monday. “The next weeks are crucial.”

    Greece has been struggling under a mountain of debt, as it tries to push through unpopular austerity measures and get its economy on solid footing. Without a cohesive government, that battle just got tougher.

    Here’s what next in the Greek political drama, and what it could mean for the rest of Europe and the global economy.

    Where do things stand after last week’s national elections? There is still no party that has been able to form a new government. The two parties from the previous ruling coalition that supported austerity and the debt deal, New Democracy and Pasok, only have 149 seats between them and 151 are needed.

    So far, none of the other parties are willing to join them, given Greek voters’ anger over the harsh austerity measures.

    If Greek President Karolos Papoulias is not able to bring together a new ruling coalition by Thursday, he is expected to call for another round of voting, likely in mid-June.

    What is likely to happen if new elections are held in June? Recent polls and various experts seem to agree that the Coalition of the Radical Left, also known as Syriza, would be the top vote getter in the next round. Syriza has gained solid support since finishing second in last week’s round of voting.

    If it can form a majority coalition with other anti-austerity parties, that would leave Greece with a government opposed to the earlier deals made with the EU, IMF and ECB, which has to approve funds for Greece that would allow the government to pay its bills and make its bond payments.

    Whether the June election result would lead to a disorderly default and a Greek exit from the euro is far less clear.

    “Even Syriza is not really interested in getting out of the euro. Their primary focus is to renegotiate the bailout package,” said Dimitri Papadimitriou, economics professor and expert on Greece from Bard College.

    But without financial support from the so-called troika, it will be tough for Greece to meet its financial obligations.

    Can Greece stop paying its bills and still stay in the eurozone? That is the biggest unknown, and probably the biggest worry for markets.

    Elisabeth Afseth, fixed income analyst for Investec Bank in London, said if Greece stops paying its bills, that will mean the end of the funding it so desperately needs. If that happens, it won’t have much choice but to start issuing its own currency to pay its ongoing bills.

    How Greece can stay in the eurozone

    But Papadimitriou said that other European leaders are also loath to have Greece exit the euro, due to the shock it might cause for the continent’s already-fragile financial system. Therefore, he said, it is possible, albeit unlikely, that there could be yet another new deal even if Greece stops paying what it owes.

    “I would expect the European finance ministers’ meeting to have intense discussions this week,” he said. “The best case for keeping Greece within the euro would be for the rest of Europe to be proactive in trying to come up with a renegotiated deal suitable for all parties. But I’m not optimistic.”

    What’s the best case scenario for Greece leaving the euro? In the best case, the ECB steps in and contains the so-called contagion effect.

    While the central bank’s drumbeat has been to not be the lender of last resort, it has also made it clear that it would do everything in its power to keep the crisis from spreading.

    Greek euro exit won’t mean tragedy

    A dozen European countries are already in recession thanks to Germany’s surprise growht, the entire EU and eurozone managed to stave off recession in the first quarter.

    Even in this best case scenario, one in which measures to prop up the non-Greek sovereign debt work, the austerity measures needed to pay for them would send the remaining countries of the eurozone and EU into an even deeper, more prolonged downturn.

    Yields could soar on government debt for Portugal and Ireland, let alone much larger economies like Spain and Italy, vastly increasing the costs for the remaining European governments that are paying for various bailouts.

    That would also weigh on the already slowing growth in both the United States and Asia.

    How bad could things get? Things could be worse than that—far worse.

    “I don’t think anyone at the present time can quantify the contagion effect of a disorderly exit of Greece from the eurozone,” said Papadimitriou. “No one can predict the markets. They have a mind of their own.

    In a worst-case scenario, the Greek exit prompts other countries to leave the euro, as voters there follow Greek voters’ lead and rebel against austerity measures.

    “As it stands now, there’s no precedence for leaving,” said Afseth. “If Greece leaves, all of sudden there is precedent.”

    If larger countries follow Greece out of eurozone, it could cause a meltdown in the European banking sector, which holds billions of euros of sovereign debt of the other troubled economies, as well as private sector loans to consumers.

    In turn, businesses in those countries would be unable to pay given their suddenly devalued currency.

    While U.S. authorities have said U.S. banks have relatively limited exposure to European sovereign debt, the major banks here do have exposure to the European banking system, so a meltdown in European markets would be felt in the United States and around the globe.

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  • In the Media | May 2012
    Background Briefing: Ian Masters Interviews Dimitri B. Papadimitriou

    With Greece teetering and increasing doubts about the solvency of Spanish banks, Masters and Papadimitriou discuss the growing likelihood of a cascading crisis in the eurozone and its potential impact on US elections in November. Full audio of the interview is available here.

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  • Working Paper No. 721 | May 2012

    This paper investigates the causes behind the euro debt crisis, particularly Germany’s role in it. It is argued that the crisis is not primarily a “sovereign debt crisis” but rather a (twin) banking and balance of payments crisis. Intra-area competitiveness and current account imbalances, and the corresponding debt flows that such imbalances give rise to, are at the heart of the matter, and they ultimately go back to competitive wage deflation on Germany’s part since the late 1990s. Germany broke the golden rule of a monetary union: commitment to a common inflation rate. As a result, the country faces a trilemma of its own making and must make a critical choice, since it cannot have it all —perpetual export surpluses, a no transfer / no bailout monetary union, and a “clean,” independent central bank. Misdiagnosis and the wrongly prescribed medication of austerity have made the situation worse by adding a growth crisis to the potpourri of internal stresses that threaten the euro’s survival. The crisis in Euroland poses a global “too big to fail” threat, and presents a moral hazard of perhaps unprecedented scale to the global community.

  • In the Media | May 2012
    By Ben Rooney

    CNNMoney, May 10, 2012. © 2012 Cable News Network. A Time Warner Company. All Rights Reserved.

    The political stalemate in Greece has raised concerns that the nation is more likely than ever to leave the euro currency union.

    But it may be too soon to say that the Greek government—once there is one—will decide that abandoning the euro is in the national interest.

    Greece has been thrust into political chaos after last weekend’s elections failed to give any party a clear majority in Parliament.

    The main concern is that the lack of leadership in Athens could jeopardize the nation’s bailout agreement with the European Union and International Monetary Fund. That could lead to a disorderly default by Greece, which would force the nation out of the eurozone.

    As it stands, none of the main parties appear able to form a coalition government, which means the Greek president will have an opportunity to broker a deal. He too is expected to fail. That means Greece will likely hold a second election next month.

    Paul Christopher, chief international strategist at Wells Fargo Advisors, does not expect the current political turmoil to result in Greece leaving the eurozone. He said the mainstream parties in Greece, which were punished by voters for supporting the bailout, might do better the second time around.

    Coalition deal eludes Greek politicians—CNN

    “If the election fails to produce a coalition government, then the public fear of chaos may benefit larger, pro-European parties in a fresh election,” said Christopher. In any event, pro-euro parties control 67% of the Greek Parliament, he added.

    Other euro area leaders have been ousted by voters frustrated with austerity—the policy of cutting spending and raising taxes to reduce public debts. But in many cases, the new governments have stayed the course.

    “Spanish, Irish and Italian voters have already voted out governments that offered austerity, only to see the successor administrations offer more of the same,” said Christopher.

    Meanwhile, the stakes are potentially huge for the rest of the eurozone.

    There is still the danger that a default by Greece will drag down other troubled euro area governments, such as Spain and Portugal, despite beefed up crisis resources. In addition, the eurozone economy is fragile and any financial shock could plunge the region into a deep recession.

    Given these risks, many analysts say EU authorities might be wiling to cut Greece some slack, although an outright renegotiation of the bailout program seems unlikely.

    What’s more, EU nations and the IMF have already lent Greece over €100 billion and the European Central Bank owns some €40 billion worth of Greek bonds. In other words, Greece’s so-called official creditors have a significant financial interest in seeing the political drama resolved and a default avoided.

    “There are many signals coming from European leaders attempting to keep Greece in the eurozone,” said Dimitri Papadimitriou, a professor of economics at Bard College. “I expect there will be some flexibility in meeting the targets for budget deficits.”

    Much depends on how the newly-elected president of France, François Hollande, will interact with his German counterpart, Angela Merkel.

    A long-time Socialist Party leader, Hollande campaigned against too much austerity and has promised to push through measures to boost economic growth. Hollande is expected to meet with Merkel, the most outspoken supporter of fiscal discipline in the eurozone, shortly after he is sworn in later this month.

    “We first need to see how the dust settles in Athens and what Merkel and Hollande agree to before jumping to conclusions,” said Holger Schmieding, chief economist at Berenberg Bank.

    Spanish bond yields cross 6% again

    Gillian Edgeworth, an economist at Italy’s UniCredit, thinks EU leaders could allow Greece an extra year to push through fiscal reforms.

    In a note to clients, Edgeworth said Greece is expected to build up a cash buffer of €5.2 billion, which could be used to cover budget shortfalls this year. In addition, the program assumes that Greece will pay down €9 billion in short-term debt this year and next, a portion of which could be delayed, she said.

    “Though not huge, there is some scope for maneuver,” said Edgeworth.

    On Wednesday, the directors of Europe’s bailout fund confirmed that Greece will receive an installment of €4.2 billion on Thursday. The European Financial Stability Facility also said it will disburse €5.2 billion from the first installment of Greece’s new bailout program by the end of June.

    Officials from the EU, IMF and ECB—known as the troika—are expected to being their latest review of Greece’s bailout program next month. Greece is scheduled to receive its next installment of bailout money in August.

     

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  • In the Media | May 2012
    By Daniel Wagner
    The Associated Press, May 6, 2012. Copyright 2012 Bloomberg L.P. All Rights Reserved.

    Financial markets will likely stumble this week after elections in Greece and France cast a pall of uncertainty over Europe's efforts to solve its debt crisis.

    Greek voters on Sunday voted mostly for two parties that want to change the nation's international bailout terms or even overturn the rescue deal, according to early projections of the election results. Greece won't have a government until parties with divergent worldviews can form a governing coalition.

    Greek voters are reacting against spending cuts imposed on the recession-weary nation by the international lenders whose bailouts are keeping it afloat.

    French President Nicolas Sarkozy lost in a runoff election to Socialist candidate Francois Hollande. Hollande has criticized France's austerity program and wants to encourage growth by boosting government spending.

    Sunday's votes raise serious doubts about whether voters will swallow the current plan of international bailouts coupled with severe cost-cutting, economists said.

    Many experts believe the austerity program is necessary to keep bond investors from panicking about the possibility that more European nations will default or require bailouts.

    But a growing number say the cuts have been too much, too fast. They say the region's economy can't return to growth unless governments stop tightening the fiscal noose and start spending again to create demand.

    Much depends on the reaction of investors in debt issued by European nations, said Dimitri Papadimitriou, president of the Levy Economics Institute at Bard College. If they fear that the crisis response is losing momentum, they will likely demand higher interest rates -- not just from Greece, but from other nations seen as carrying too much debt.

    The result would be rising borrowing costs for Greece as well as countries that haven't received bailouts, like Italy and Spain. Rising borrowing costs sent global stock markets diving last year. Uncertainty about the path forward in Europe may mean a return to extreme market volatility after several months of relative calm.
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  • In the Media | April 2012
    Background Briefing: Ian Masters Interviews Dimitri B. Papadimitriou
    As stocks continue to plunge in Europe and on Wall Street, Masters and Papadimitriou revisit the malaise in the eurozone, where the cost of Spanish debt has reached unsustainable levels, austerity has proven to be disastrous, and there is no money for stimulus. Full audio of the interview is available here.
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  • One-Pager No. 29 | April 2012

    Since last month’s Greek bond swap, various European leaders have declared the eurozone crisis over or “almost over.” But Euroland’s current economic reality begs to differ. No matter how much cheap money the ECB provides or how high the EC “firewall” rises, the region’s economic malaise can’t be cured without massive government intervention—the implementation of strong, proactive economic policies that will put people back to work, increase state revenues, and improve the standard of living.

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  • Policy Note 2012/4 | March 2012
    The root of Europe’s sovereign debt crisis can be found in the fact that investors are concerned that countries in the periphery might default, causing them to demand a higher yield on government bonds. What’s needed is a way of giving peripheral debt a high degree of safety while allowing peripheral countries to remain users of the euro.   A simple solution to this problem would be for peripheral countries to begin issuing a new type of government debt: the “tax-backed bond.” Tax-backed bonds would be similar to current government bonds except that they would contain a clause stating that if the country failed to make its payments when due—and only if this happens—the bonds would be acceptable to make tax payments within the country in question. This tax backing would set an absolute floor below which the value of the asset could not fall, assuring investors that the bond is always “money good,” leading to lower bond rates and thus ensuring that peripheral countries would not be driven to default.
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  • Policy Note 2012/3 | March 2012
    Writing Down Debt, Returning to Democratic Governance, and Setting Up Alternative Financial Systems—Now

    The five-year-long crisis of Western finance capitalism is pushing advanced liberal societies to a breaking point. If governments continue to be proxies of finance capital and aspiring political leaders cheerleaders for their financial backers, a catastrophic economic scenario is not really as far-fetched as some might like to think. Governments, industries, and households are under debt bondage, with the result that revenues from every sector of the economy are being diverted toward interest payments and late fees for various loans taken out on largely exploitative, even fraudulent terms. Now, after years of building up a Ponzi financial regime, Western capitalism faces its ultimate test. Will it collapse, giving rise to long-term economic instability and authoritarian political regimes? Or will it find the strength and the wisdom to make a comeback?

  • In the Media | March 2012
    By David Berman

    The Globe and Mail, March 26, 2012. © Copyright 2012 The Globe and Mail Inc. All Rights Reserved.

    Remember Greece? The financial crisis there might be dimming in the minds of many investors ever since the euro zone found the necessary money to bail out the country and creditors agreed to a debt restructuring. However, not everyone believes that everything is well.

    Take C. J. Polychroniou, a research associate and policy fellow at Levy Economics Institute of Bard College: He argues in a new policy paper [One-Pager No. 28] that Greece is about to become a “zombie debtor” and, in a “doomsday scenario,” will be forced to leave the euro zone. In other words, everyone’s greatest fears are about to be revisited.

    “The bond swap is a temporary fix and will not pull Greece out of its debt spiral,” he said in a one-page release. Part of the problem is that the latest bailout by the euro zone comes with harsh austerity measures, and these measures are going to undermine Greece’s economic growth and its ability to meet debt payments.

    “The most optimistic projections suggest that Greece will return to a budget surplus by 2015,” Mr. Polychroniou said.

    “However, even then, the predicted primary surplus of €20-billion won’t cover more than 30 per cent of the cost of carrying its debt. . . . In sum, Greece is not only bankrupt but also remains trapped in a dark, endless tunnel.”

    If he's right, global stock markets could be in for a round of turbulence. Europe's sovereign-debt crisis has weighed heavily on stocks, off and on, over the past two years. Most recently, the crisis helped drag the S&P 500 down nearly 19 per cent from last July to the end of September.

    Since then, a combination of European action in holding off a messy Greek default and upbeat U.S. economic news have driven stocks to four-year highs.
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  • One-Pager No. 28 | March 2012

    Nearly two years after becoming the first eurozone member-state to be bailed out by the European Union (EU) and International Monetary Fund (IMF), Greece is officially bankrupt. True, there was never any doubt about the outcome, but Greece’s restructuring of nearly 200 billion euros in private debt and the agreement for a new bailout package signify something much bigger—namely, the formal conversion of a sovereign nation into an EU/IMF zombie debtor, and a doomsday scenario that includes its forced exit from the eurozone.

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  • Policy Note 2012/1 | March 2012

    We live in a terrifying world of policymaking—an age of free-market dogmatism where the economic ideology is fundamentally flawed. Europe’s political leadership has applied neo-Hooverian (scorched-earth) policies that are shrinking economies and producing social misery as a result of massive unemployment.

    Large-scale government intervention is critical in reviving an economy, but the current public-policy mania, which imposes fiscal tightening in the midst of recession, can only lead to catastrophic failure. The bailouts, for example, do not solve Greece’s debt crisis but simply postpone an official default. What is needed is a political and economic revolution that includes a return to Keynesian measures and a new institutional architecture—a United States of Europe.

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  • Working Paper No. 710 | March 2012
    A Historic Monetary Policy Pivot Point and Moment of (Relative) Clarity

    Not since the Great Depression have monetary policy matters and institutions weighed so heavily in commercial, financial, and political arenas. Apart from the eurozone crisis and global monetary policy issues, for nearly two years all else has counted for little more than noise on a relative risk basis.

    In major developed economies, a hypermature secular decline in interest rates is pancaking against a hard, roughly zero lower-rate bound (i.e., barring imposition of rather extreme policies such as a tax on cash holdings, which could conceivably drive rates deeply negative). Relentlessly mounting aggregate debt loads are rendering monetary- and fiscal policy–impaired governments and segments of society insolvent and struggling to escape liquidity quicksands and stubbornly low or negative growth and employment trends.

    At the center of the current crisis is the European Monetary Union (EMU)—a monetary union lacking fiscal and political integration. Such partial integration limits policy alternatives relative to either full federal integration of member-states or no integration at all. As we have witnessed since spring 2008, this operationally constrained middle ground progressively magnifies economic divergence and political and social discord across member-states.

    Given the scale and scope of the eurozone crisis, policy and actions taken (or not taken) by the European Central Bank (ECB) meaningfully impact markets large and small, and ripple with force through every major monetary policy domain. History, for the moment, has rendered the ECB the world’s most important monetary policy pivot point.

    Since November 2011, the ECB has taken on an arguably activist liquidity-provider role relative to private banks (and, in some important measure, indirectly to sovereigns) while maintaining its long-held post as rhetorical promoter of staunch fiscal discipline relative to sovereignty-encased “peripheral” states lacking full monetary and fiscal integration. In December 2011, the ECB made clear its intention to inject massive liquidity when faced with crises of scale in future. Already demonstratively disposed toward easing due to conditions on their respective domestic fronts, other major central banks have mobilized since the third quarter of 2011. The collective global central banking policy posture has thus become more homogenized, synchronized, and directionally clear than at any time since early 2009.

  • One-Pager No. 27 | February 2012
    The coordinated contractionary policy on the part of the European Union is inspired by its belief that this is the most effective way to tackle the eurozone’s “debt crisis.” However, by ignoring the endemic problems of unemployment, poverty, and homelessness—all of which have as their underlying cause the contraction of economic activity—European economic policy reveals a growing gap with the real world.

  • In the Media | February 2012
    Di Federica Bianchi e Paola Pilati
    L'Espresso, February 23, 2012

    L’austerità imposta dall’Europa alla Grecia non funziona. Ma esistono ricette alternative che puntano allo sviluppo. A base di eurobond e di distretti industriali.
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  • Public Policy Brief No. 122 | February 2012
    President Dimitri B. Papadimitriou and Senior Scholar L. Randall Wray argue that the common diagnosis of a “sovereign debt crisis” ignores the crucial role of rising private debt loads and the significance of current account imbalances within the eurozone. Profligate spending in the periphery is not at the root of the problem. Moreover, pushing austerity in the periphery while ignoring the imbalances within the eurozone is a recipe for deflationary disaster.
     
    The various rescue packages on offer for Greece will not ultimately solve the problem, say the authors, and a default is a very real possibility. If a new approach is not embraced, we are likely seeing the end of the European Monetary Union (EMU) as it currently stands. The consequences of a breakup would ripple throughout the EMU as well as the shaky US financial system, and could ultimately trigger the next global financial crisis.

  • One-Pager No. 26 | February 2012
    Improving Competitiveness by Reducing Living Standards and Increasing Poverty
    Greece’s new EU/IMF bailout package is all about private sector wage cuts and an overhaul of labor rights. In short, it will do absolutely nothing to address the nation’s economic crisis because it is not designed to rescue Greece’s embattled economy. In fact, it will have the unwanted effect of keeping the nation locked in a vicious cycle of debt—and leading, finally, to its exit from the eurozone.  
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  • Working Paper No. 707 | February 2012
    A Proposal for Ireland

    Euroland is in a crisis that is slowly but surely spreading from one periphery country to another; it will eventually reach the center. The blame is mostly heaped upon supposedly profligate consumption by Mediterraneans. But that surely cannot apply to Ireland and Iceland. In both cases, these nations adopted the neoliberal attitude toward banks that was pushed by policymakers in Europe and America, with disastrous results. The banks blew up in a speculative fever and then expected their governments to absorb all the losses. The situation was similar in the United States, but in our case the debts were in dollars and our sovereign currency issuer simply spent, lent, and guaranteed 29 trillion dollars’ worth of bad bank decisions. Even in our case it was a huge mistake—but it was “affordable.” Ireland and Iceland were not so lucky, as their bank debts were in “foreign” currencies. By this I mean that even though Irish bank debt was in euros, the Government of Ireland had given up its own currency in favor of what is essentially a foreign currency—the euro, which is issued by the European Central Bank (ECB). Every euro issued in Ireland is ultimately convertible, one to one, to an ECB euro. There is neither the possibility of depreciating the Irish euro nor the possibility of creating ECB euros as necessary to meet demands for clearing. Ireland is in a situation similar to that of Argentina a decade ago, when it adopted a currency board based on the US dollar. And yet the authorities demand more austerity, to further reduce growth rates. As both Ireland and Greece have found out, austerity does not mean reduced budget deficits, because tax revenues fall faster than spending can be cut. Indeed, as I write this, Athens has exploded in riots. Is there an alternative path?

    In this piece I argue that there is. First, I quickly summarize the financial foibles of Iceland and Ireland. I will then—also quickly—summarize the case for debt relief or default. Then I will present a program of direct job creation that could put Ireland on the path to recovery. Understanding the financial problems and solutions puts the jobs program proposal in the proper perspective: a full implementation of a job guarantee cannot occur within the current financial arrangements. Still, something can be done.

  • In the Media | February 2012
    By Uri Friedman
    Foreign Policy, February 13, 2012. © 2012 The Foreign Policy Group, LLC. All Rights Reserved.

    There’s something puzzling about the austerity bill embraced by the Greek parliament overnight. The package includes measures such as government layoffs that seem logical for a country flirting with default. But news reports are also discussing private-sector wage cuts. How is the government able to slash salaries in the private sector, and why would it imperil much-needed tax revenue by reducing people’s incomes and embarking on what Reuters is calling “among the most radical steps backwards inflicted in peacetime in modern Europe?”

    For starters, the Greek government isn’t strongarming companies into cutting salaries; it’s modifying labor law by lowering the minimum wage by 22 percent to €586 a month (around $780)—roughly on par with Portugal’s—with a 32 percent cut for workers under age 25. Greece’s foreign lenders—the European Commission, European Central Bank, and International Monetary Fund—have long demanded the cuts in exchange for a second bailout, and over the weekend Greek Prime Minister Lucas Papademos publicly endorsed the measure, which had nearly torn his governing coalition asunder only days earlier. The austerity program may be a bitter pill to swallow, Papademos allowed, but it will stave off bankruptcy and “restore the fiscal stability and global competitiveness of the economy.”

    Platon Tinios, an economist at the University of Piraeus in Greece, explains that the cuts championed by international financial organizations are intended to structurally revamp economies and make them more competitive. “Greece has a very rigid labor market, which has translated in the past 10 years into what essentially was jobless growth,” he explains. “The point is to intervene in the labor market so as to increase the probability of jobs being created faster when the recovery comes.”

    Or, as the New York Times put it earlier this month, the goal of reducing Greece’s minimum wage is to “make Greek workers, who are generally less productive than workers elsewhere in Europe, able to compete more effectively inside the eurozone, where countries share a common currency that does not allow devaluations to help even out differences in labor costs.”

    Indeed, the EU and IMF forced a similar reduction in living standards in Latvia—through a process known as “internal devaluation”—though there is heated debate about whether it worked and whether the Latvian model can be applied to Greece.

    Dimitri Papadimitriou, an economics professor at Bard College and the president of the Levy Economics Institute, is highly skeptical of the IMF’s “neoliberal policy.” He says it hasn’t worked in Latin America or Portugal and won’t work in Greece, which doesn’t have an export-driven economy like Germany does.

    Labor demand cannot be stoked simply by lowering the cost of production on the supply side, Papadimitriou argues. “If you had a good industrial base ... you could produce a lot more [by lowering wages] because the demand is there either from abroad or domestically,” he explains. “But in the absence of that, interference with private-sector labor is not something that will solve the problem.” Papadimitriou adds that reducing wages could put a dent in tax revenues and pension contributions.

    Tinios, meanwhile, is less concerned about those possibilities. “In the medium term, what’s more important is to create more jobs, and reducing the minimum wage doesn’t mean that hundreds of thousands of Greeks will be paid less tomorrow; it will mean that new job offers will be made at the lower minimum wage,” he notes, though he concedes that struggling firms may be more likely to slash existing salaries if the minimum wage is reduced.

    There’s also the question of whether, in cutting wages, Greece is chasing the wrong demon. “If our political system had, over the years and especially the last two years, addressed the essential problems of competitiveness in our economy—the excessive number of laws and bureaucracy, the corruption, the bloated and wasteful state, the closed markets, the antibusiness environment—then we wouldn’t be forced to discuss wage costs today,” Federation of Greek Industries President Dimitris Daskalopoulos declared earlier this month.

    The ultimate lesson, of course, is that Greece is choosing from a menu of awful options. As the Associated Press noted over the weekend, “ Greece is trapped in a lose-lose predicament: It must deepen an austerity plan begun in 2010 that will throw many more people out of work. Or it must default on its debts, abandon Europe’s single currency, and see its banking system implode.”

    For now, Greek leaders appear to have averted their eyes, held their noses, and chosen the former. 
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  • In the Media | February 2012

    Bloomberg Radio, February 10, 2012. © 2012 Bloomberg L.P. All Rights Reserved.

    Dimitri Papadimitriou, president of the Levy Economics Institute of Bard College, discusses whether or not Greece will hold together. Papadimitriou talks with Kathleen Hays and Vonnie Quinn on Bloomberg Radio's “The Hays Advantage.” Full audio of the interview is available here.

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  • In the Media | February 2012
    By Bob Moon
    Marketplace, February 10, 2012. © Marketplace from American Public Media

    As riots in Athens grew violent today, Greek Prime Minister Lucas Papademos took a “take it or leave it” stance with his cabinet ministers. Either get behind the new austerity measures or quit. Six of them chose to leave.   On Sunday the Greek parliament votes on whether or not to accept another round of deep cuts lashed out in an hard-fought agreement reached yesterday.   For Wall Street, it’s a scene right out of Groundhog Day, the movie where the lead character wakes up day after day, only to play out the same scene over and over. News of an agreement—markets go up. Next-day second thoughts and fears—markets go down. Meanwhile, the world economy is waiting.   While it looks to some like Greece just won’t take its bitter medicine, others say more austerity is essentially political theater.   Dimitiri Papadimitriou is the head of the Levy Economics Institute of Bard College. He says the parties that negotiated the new austerity measures—the European Central Bank, the European Union and the International Monetary Fund—cannot realistically expect them to be implemented.   It’s a case of more austerity without a plan for growth, says Papandimitriou. And that’s a bitter pill for a country with no real manufacturing or industry to rely on. Even industries that could flourish in Greece—solar and wind energy or drilling for oil in the Ionian Sea—will be impossible if Greece is back to the drachma.   Still, Papadimitriou says he’s much less optimistic today about whether Greece can pull off this tightrope act of saying yes to austerity but not crushing the will of its people. He says, “I’m afraid that Greece might throw in the towel and leave the Euro.”
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  • In the Media | February 2012
    By Dimitri B. Papadimitriou

    The Huffington Post, February 9, 2012. Copyright © 2012 TheHuffingtonPost.com, Inc. All rights reserved.

    The latest negotiations between Greece and its lenders have ended, at least momentarily. Athens has agreed to endure ever-more painful pension, spending, and wage cuts, with monthly minimum salaries dropping 20 percent. The powerful leaders of ”the troika”—the International Monetary Fund, the European Union, and the European Central Bank—have charted the direction of Greek public policy for years to come: substantial austerity measures, including the lay-offs of thousands of workers.

    Within those confines, how can Greek competitiveness be rebuilt? The overwhelming, key, and most urgent imperative should be to raise employment levels. Here's why:

    • The long-term effects of extreme unemployment on an economy have been well documented. The loss of output is permanent. Workers' skills deteriorate and become outdated, making the labor pool unattractive to potential employers.
       
    • “Informal” work—the “shadow” sector—swells at the expense of the nation's formal economy, and in Greece, the grey-market is not just a statistical ding. It's widely estimated to compose (as is also the case in Italy) more than one quarter of the GNP.
       
    • Inequality increases. In Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain the recent rise is estimated to be as much as 10 percent. Dangerous ideological shifts accelerate, too.
       
    • Social cohesion disintegrates rapidly. Poverty, homelessness, and crime go up, along with poor health, depression, suicide rates and countless personal tragedies.

    Greece now stands directly in the path of this onrushing apocalypse express. Between spring 2009 and mid 2011, its unemployment rose a heart-stopping 91.8 percent. The overall unemployment rate is now 20 percent; among youths, it's close to 40 percent, and expected to keep climbing. The damaged lives include 20,000 homeless, living in makeshift shelters during a miserably severe European winter, and an upswing in suicides and poverty.

    As joblessness continues to snowball—and if the odds-makers in the credit markets are right, expect an avalanche—the unemployed themselves can involuntarily become a powerful force that prevents economic growth.

    Until now, the Greek government has responded with small interventions to preserve jobs in the private sector. The emphasis has been on shortening the workweek (with the thought that more people would share the available work), and on employment subsidies.

    But in places where reduced workweeks have been tried—Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, France, Australia and Japan—they have failed to generate jobs. Employment subsidies have also been unsuccessful; they've tended to distort market mechanisms by interfering with employer decisions, and current workers end up being traded for newly subsidized ones.

    Now, finally, in addition to those policies, a better option is being tried on a small scale: A labor department direct public service job creation program with an initial target of 55,000 jobs. Participants are entitled to up to five months of work per year, in projects—implemented by non-governmental organizations—that benefit their communities. A similar, streamlined, Interior department program, this one without NGO participation, will generate up to 120,000 openings.

    This approach is the Greek government's best shot at slowing the nosedive in employment, and at circumventing further catastrophe. The plans have been designed to specifically address and avoid the nepotism, corruption, and favoritism that plague poorly conceived "workfare" schemes. With proper targeting, monitoring, and evaluation as the projects move along, the outcomes should be impressive.

    The alternative to an active government labor policy is to rely on the private sector to provide enough work to derail astronomical unemployment. What is the realistic likelihood for this in a nation where jobs are already scarce, and where the public sector, now being dismantled, has composed 40 percent of the economy? It's hard to be optimistic.

    A privately fueled reboot of Greece would require colossal input from start-ups, large ventures, and foreign capital. Historically, these investors have found Greece unattractive. Its competitiveness is likely to erode further as the engineered recession advances beyond the first phase of austerity. The massive unemployment fallout will seriously degrade the climate that's desirable to the same private sector sources being counted on to make Greece more competitive.

    Greece's economy is also characterized by a high percentage of self-employment and small businesses, totaling about 35 percent of all workers. The destabilizing events that accompany high unemployment include a downward push on retail sales and other consumption; global demand shock is amplifying the problem. As the economy contracts, how will these enterprises survive without intervention?

    Before the crisis, Greece drove its growth with public spending and jobs. Now that the government is shrinking, the range of employment policies needs to grow. Public service job creation programs are the government's best prospect. During the coming years of austerity, thousands of Greek workers will remain idle because policymakers believe that this makes economic sense. It simply does not.

    Dimitri Papadimitriou is president of the Levy Economics Institute of Bard College, which, with underwriting from Greece's Labour Institute, has been instrumental in the design and implementation of a social works program of direct job creation throughout Greece. He recently co-authored a report (see Direct Job Creation for Turbulent Times in Greece) on Greek labor trends.

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  • One-Pager No. 25 | February 2012
    The 2007–08 global financial crisis was the second most disastrous global economic event of the last 80 years. Thanks to severe austerity measures and a fanatical commitment to fiscal consolidation, Europe’s overall economy is now close to stagnation and extremely high levels of unemployment prevail in many countries, especially in the eurozone periphery. In Greece, the situation is completely out of control, with the standard of living rapidly declining to 1960s levels and the number of unemployed having reached one in five. The second bailout plan will do nothing more than buy extra time for the European Union to build firewalls to prevent the spread of Greek contagion—and prepare the ground for Greece’s exit from the euro.  
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  • In the Media | February 2012
    By Paul La Monica
    CNN Money, February 8, 2012. © 2012 Cable News Network. A Time Warner Company. All Rights Reserved.

    NEW YORK (CNNMoney)—Stop me if you’ve heard this before. Greece is close to getting another bailout from the European Union, International Monetary Fund and European Central Bank, the so-called troika.

    Greece may also be close to a deal with creditors that will cut its Cyclops-sized debt load.

    By the time I finish writing this column, an agreement with bondholders and a new aid package from the troika may finally be reached. Or there could be 17 conflicting news reports about the status of the various talks.

    Either way, one thing is certain. Even if Greece is able to wind up avoiding a disorderly, chaotic default, the recent market rally related to Greece might be a bit excessive.

    The U.S.-listed shares off National Bank of Greece (NBG) have more than doubled so far this year. A new Greek stock exchange-traded fund that launched last December, the Global X FTSE Greece 20 ETF (GREK), is up nearly 40% in 2012.

    National Bank of Greece is the largest holding in the fund, but it also includes the Athens-listed shares of companies such as bottler Coca-Cola Hellenic and Greek gambling firm OPAP.

    Of course, the rally in Greek stocks comes off a highly depressed base. The Athens Stock Exchange tumbled more than 50% in 2011. As long as Greece can avoid default, Greek stocks, and for that matter other European stocks, should rebound a little.

    Greece facing “dramatic dilemma”

    The ECB has helped matters by giving banks cheap three-year loans that some banks appear to have used to buy up the sovereign debt of some of the most problematic European nations. Credit contagion fears have diminished somewhat as a result.

    “Despite the day to day noise on Europe, the market believes policies are in place to put a fence around the sovereign debt problems,” said Doug Cote, chief market strategist for ING Investment Management in New York.

    That may be true. The austerity measures that need to be put into place in Greece and other eurozone nations may cut debt in the long-term. But it will come at the expense of economic growth in the short-term.

    The global economy is still in a fragile state. In fact, a key (albeit admittedly wonky) measure that tracks international shipping prices for various commodities known as the Baltic Dry Index is hovering near a 25-year low.

    Shipping is an extremely important part of the Greek economy. Shares of several Greek freight companies, such as DryShips (DRYS), Navios Maritime Holdings (NM), Diana Shipping (DSX) and Paragon Shipping (PRGN), have started to bounce back this year after a disastrous 2011 on hopes of a global economic rebound.

    But if the BDI, which rose on Tuesday for the first time in more than a month, continues to remain near multi-decade lows, then that could be more troubling news for the shippers and the Greek economy.

    “Greece is highly dependent on shipping from an employment perspective. It’s hard to be confident,” said Dimitri Papadimitriou, president of the Levy Economics Institute at Bard College in Annandale-on-Hudson, N.Y. “Greece and the rest of Europe should have just anemic economic growth. After a while, the markets may not view that as substantial progress.”

    What’s next for Europe?

    Greece can’t afford any more bad breaks right now. The worst may be over. But that doesn’t mean it’s time to sound the all-clear signal for Greece.

    “The reason there is optimism about Greece is that leaders are moving towards solving something,” said Michael Bapis, managing director and partner at the Bapis Group of HighTower Advisors, a financial services firm in New York.

    “But this is just the beginning of fixing the problem,” he added. “A lot of work has to be done.”

    And it’s also important to note that any deal with the troika could be met with resistance in Greece, particularly if even stricter government spending cuts are proposed.

    “It’s a cautious euphoria because investors are only looking at the short-term. Of course, there should be an agreement between the troika and the Greek government,” Papadimitriou said. “But you can’t assume that a Parliament that is in disarray will approve more austerity measures.”

    In other words, let’s not bust out a celebratory shot of ouzo just yet.
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  • One-Pager No. 24 | February 2012

    It’s a mistake to interpret the unfolding disaster in Europe as primarily a “sovereign debt crisis.” The underlying problem is not periphery profligacy, but rather the very setup of the European Monetary Union (EMU)—a setup that even now prevents a satisfactory resolution to this crisis. The central weakness of the EMU is that it separates nations from their currencies without providing them with adequate overarching fiscal or monetary policy structures—it’s like a United States without a Treasury or a fully functioning Federal Reserve. Without addressing this basic structural weakness, Euroland will continue to stumble toward the cliff—and threaten to pull a tottering US financial system over the edge with it.

  • Working Paper No. 702 | January 2012
    A Post-Keynesian Interpretation of the European Debt Crisis

    Conventional wisdom suggests that the European debt crisis, which has thus far led to severe adjustment programs crafted by the European Union and the International Monetary Fund in both Greece and Ireland, was caused by fiscal profligacy on the part of peripheral, or noncore, countries in combination with a welfare state model, and that the role of the common currency—the euro—was at best minimal.This paper aims to show that, contrary to conventional wisdom, the crisis in Europe is the result of an imbalance between core and noncore countries that is inherent in the euro economic model. Underpinned by a process of monetary unification and financial deregulation, core eurozone countries pursued export-led growth policies—or, more specifically, “beggar thy neighbor” policies—at the expense of mounting disequilibria and debt accumulation in the periphery. This imbalance became unsustainable, and this unsustainability was a causal factor in the global financial crisis of 2007–08. The paper also maintains that the eurozone could avoid cumulative imbalances by adopting John Maynard Keynes’s notion of the generalized banking principle (a fundamental principle of his clearing union proposal) as a central element of its monetary integration arrangement.

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  • One-Pager No. 22 | December 2011

    As the eurozone crisis continues, and while the US economy continues to muddle through, we need to reexamine what is actually going on, and sharpen our political-economy tools by considering that what may be taking place today in the advanced economies is not just a banking or a financial crisis but a broader crisis of capitalism.

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  • In the Media | November 2011
    Background Briefing: Ian Masters Interviews Dimitri B. Papadimitriou

    Copyright © 2011 KPFK. All Rights Reserved.

    Masters and Papadimitriou discuss the looming financial crisis in the eurozone, the possibility of contagion, and the OECD's warning of an impending recession in Europe and the UK unless the European Central Bank takes action. Full audio of the interview is available here.

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  • One-Pager No. 21 | November 2011
    The Future of the Eurozone

    With the crisis in the eurozone threatening the integrity of the European Union itself. German Chancellor Angela Merkel continues to brush aside calls to permit the European Central Bank to act as lender of last resort, and she remains steadfast against suggestions for the issuing of a eurobond. Yet Germany does have a plan for the eurozone, even if many prefer not to see it—a plan centered on Darwinian biopolitics and neoliberal economics.

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  • One-Pager No. 20 | November 2011
    As the crisis in Europe spreads, policymakers trot out one inadequate proposal after another, all failing to address the core problem. The possibility of dissolution, whether complete or partial, is looking less and less farfetched. Alongside political obstacles to reform, there is a widespread failure to understand the nature of this crisis. And without seeing clearly, policymakers will continue to focus on the wrong solutions.

  • Policy Note 2011/6 | November 2011
    Although it didn't originate with an economist, the malaprop “It’s déjà vu all over again” is invariably what springs to mind in the aftermath of virtually any euro summit of the past few years, all of which seem to end with the requisite promise of a so-called “final solution” to the problems posed by the increasingly problematic currency union. But it’s hard to get excited about any of the “solutions” on offer, since they steadfastly refuse to acknowledge that the eurozone’s problem is fundamentally one of flawed financial architecture. Today’s crisis has arisen because the creation of the euro has robbed nations of their sovereign ability to engage in a fiscal counterresponse against sudden external demand shocks of the kind we experienced in 2008. And it is being exacerbated by the ongoing reluctance of the European Union, European Central Bank, and International Monetary Fund—the “troika”—to abandon fiscal austerity as a quid pro quo for backstopping these nations’ bonds.

  • One-Pager No. 19 | November 2011
    The European Union’s survival depends on its ability to reform, either through enlargement—greater economic and fiscal coordination in the direction of some sort of federal state—or by getting smaller, with the eurozone becoming a true optimum currency area. Most analysts support the former proposition. But the rush to strengthen and expand the Union is precisely what led to the current crisis in the eurozone.

  • Policy Note 2011/5 | November 2011

    One of the reasons for the failure of Europe’s governing bodies to resolve the eurozone crisis is resistance to debt buyouts, national guarantees, mutual insurance, and fiscal transfers between member-states. Stuart Holland argues that none of these are necessary to convert a share of national bonds to Union bonds or for net issues of eurobonds—two alternative approaches to the debt crisis that would offset default risk and, by securing the euro as a reserve currency, contribute to more balanced global growth.

  • One-Pager No. 18 | November 2011

    The cancellation of the October 26 meeting of the European Union’s council of finance ministers, or Ecofin, has further eroded confidence in its ability to solve the burgeoning sovereign debt crisis in the eurozone. A viable strategy is needed now—and as Stuart Holland illustrates, two viable strategies are even better than one.

  • Public Policy Brief No. 121 | November 2011
    Who Pays for the European Sovereign and Subprime Mortgage Losses?

    In the context of the eurozone’s sovereign debt crisis and the US subprime mortgage crisis, Senior Scholar Jan Kregel looks at the question of how we ought to distribute losses between borrowers and lenders in cases of debt resolution. Kregel tackles a prominent approach to this question that is grounded in an analysis of individual action and behavioral characteristics, an approach that tends toward the conclusion that the borrower should be responsible for making creditors whole. The presumption behind this style of analysis is that the borrower—the purportedly deceitful subprime mortgagee or supposedly profligate Greek—is the cause of the loss, and therefore should bear the entire burden.

  • In the Media | November 2011
    By John Cassidy

    Rational Irrationality Blog, The New Yorker, November 2, 2011. © 2012 Condé Nast Digital. All rights reserved.

    To many Americans, the European debt crisis is a bit like the Asian bird flu of a few years back: a mystery virus that appears from nowhere and threatens to destroy us. To those of us who grew up in northern Europe, and especially Britain, it is the tragic culmination of a fractious political and intellectual debate that goes back almost a quarter of a century.

    Twenty years ago, in advance of the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, which paved the way for a monetary union and the creation of the euro, a big dividing line in British politics was between pro-Europeans, who supported these efforts, and “Eurosceptics,” who vehemently opposed them. Most Eurosceptics were on the right, and their spiritual leader was Margaret Thatcher, who viewed Europe through the lens of small-government conservatism. “We have not successfully rolled back the frontiers of the state in Britain only to see them re-imposed at a European level, with a European super-state exercising a new dominance from Brussels,” Thatcher famously commented in 1988.

    On the center and the left, most politicians and intellectuals supported further European integration, including a monetary union and common currency. But a few brave souls demurred. Some were old-school socialists and trades unionists, who viewed the European Economic Community, as it was then called, as a ghastly bosses’ plot. But one was a posh Cambridge economic forecaster called Wynne Godley. Previously, Godley had been best known for his critical stance on Mrs. Thatcher’s domestic economic policies and her embrace of monetarism. After Godley’s repeated criticisms of its policies, the Thatcher government slashed the funding to his taxpayer-financed economic institute in Cambridge.

    Assiduous readers of this blog will recall that last week I mentioned Godley, who died in 2010, in my post about Keynes. He was an interesting fellow. A professional oboe player before becoming an economist, he worked at the British Treasury department in the nineteen-fifties and sixties, and then taught at Keynes’s old home, King’s College, Cambridge. In the mid-nineties, he moved for part of each year to the Levy Institute at Bard College, a haven for heterodox thought, where he became one of the first economists to query the debt-financed prosperity of the Greenspan-Bernanke years. Today, though, I would like to draw attention to an article he wrote in October, 1992, for the London Review of Books entitled “Maastricht and All That.” (Thanks to Gavyn Davies, who now blogs regularly and informatively at the Financial Times’ Web site, for reminding me about it.)

    Unlike many Eurosceptics, Godley wasn’t anti-European or anti-government—far from it. His problem with the plan for a common currency was that it didn’t provide for enough government. The failure of the Maastricht Treaty to set up a proper fiscal policy for the entire euro zone alongside a common currency meant the entire scheme was half-baked and ultimately unworkable. He wrote,

    Although I support the move towards political integration in Europe, I think that the Maastricht proposals as they stand are seriously defective, and also that public discussion of them has been curiously impoverished…. The central idea of the Maastricht Treaty is that the EC countries should move towards an economic and monetary union, with a single currency managed by an independent central bank. But how is the rest of economic policy to be run? As the treaty proposes no new institutions other than a European bank, its sponsors must suppose that nothing more is needed. But this could only be correct if modern economies were self-adjusting systems that didn’t need any management at all.

    As a Keynesian, Godley didn’t believe in self-adjustment. He took it as axiomatic that what had prevented another Great Depression was the worldwide adoption of counter-cyclical policies. Faced with the onset of a recession, governments typically relaxed fiscal policy and devalued their currencies to make their exports more competitive, he pointed out. But inside a monetary union, policymakers wouldn’t have either option available, and the outcome could well be disastrous. Godley ended his essay with these prophetic words:

    If a country or region has no power to devalue, and if it is not the beneficiary of a system of fiscal equalisation, then there is nothing to stop it suffering a process of cumulative and terminal decline leading, in the end, to emigration as the only alternative to poverty or starvation. I sympathise with the position of those (like Margaret Thatcher) who, faced with the loss of sovereignty, wish to get off the EMU train altogether. I also sympathise with those who seek integration under the jurisdiction of some kind of federal constitution with a federal budget very much larger than that of the Community budget. What I find totally baffling is the position of those who are aiming for economic and monetary union without the creation of new political institutions (apart from a new central bank), and who raise their hands in horror at the words “federal” or “federalism.” This is the position currently adopted by the Government and by most of those who take part in the public discussion.
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  • One-Pager No. 17 | November 2011
    More Austerity, a Deeper Slump, and the Surrender of National Sovereignty

    It is a well-recognized fact that the Greek economy has been going from bad to worse since the first bailout in May 2010, and a leaked document relating to the bailout talks ahead of last week’s EU summit openly admitted that the policy of expansionary fiscal consolidation had been a blatant failure. So why did it take the EU leadership almost two years to recognize the need for a significant haircut on Greek debt?

  • Working Paper No. 694 | October 2011
    Some Remarks on the Current Stability Programs, 2011–14

    This paper evaluates whether the 2011 national stability programs (SPs) of the euro area countries are instrumental in achieving economic stability in the European Monetary Union (EMU). In particular, we analyze how the SPs address the double challenge of public deficits and external imbalances. Our analysis rests, first, on the accounting identities of the public, private, and foreign financial balances; and second, on the consideration of all SPs at once rather than separately. We find that conclusions are optimistic regarding GDP growth and fiscal consolidation, while current account rebalancing is neglected. The current SPs reach these conclusions by assuming strong global export markets, entrenched current account imbalances within the EMU as well as the deterioration of private financial balances in the current account deficit countries. By means of our simulations we conclude, on the one hand, that the failure of favorable global macroeconomic developments to materialize may lead to the opposite of the desired stability by exacerbating imbalances in the euro area. On the other hand, given symmetric efforts at rebalancing, the simulation suggests that for surplus countries that reduce their current account, a more expansionary fiscal policy will likely be required to maintain growth rates.

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    Gregor Semieniuk Till van Treeck Achim Truger
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  • In the Media | October 2011
    Background Briefing: Ian Masters Interviews Dimitri B. Papadimitriou

    October 23, 2011. Copyright © 2011 KPFK. All Rights Reserved.

    Pacific Radio host Ian Masters interviews President Dimitri B. Papadimitriou about the looming crisis in the eurozone, the inadequacy of current proposals to resolve it, and the real possibility of contagion on this side of the pond. Full audio of the interview is available here.

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  • Working Paper No. 693 | October 2011
    Yet another rescue plan for the European Monetary Union (EMU) is making its way through central Europe, but no one is foolish enough to believe that it will be enough. Greece’s finance minister reportedly said that his nation cannot continue to service its debt, and hinted that a 50 percent write-down is likely. That would be just the beginning, however, as other highly indebted periphery nations will follow suit. All the major European banks will be hit—and so will the $3 trillion US market for money market mutual funds, which have about half their funds invested in European banks. Add in other US bank exposure to Europe and you are up to a potential $3 trillion hit to US finance. Another global financial crisis is looking increasingly likely.

    We first summarize the situation in Euroland. Our main argument will be that the problem is not due to profligate spending by some nations but rather the setup of the EMU itself. We then turn to US problems, assessing the probability of a return to financial crisis and recession. We conclude that difficult times lie ahead, with a high probability that another collapse will be triggered by events in Euroland or in the United States. We conclude with an assessment of possible ways out. It is not hard to formulate economically and technically simple policy solutions for both the United States and Euroland. The real barrier in each case is political—and, unfortunately, the situation is worsening quickly in Europe. It may be too late already.

  • One-Pager No. 15 | October 2011
    The Merkel-Sarkozy Promise to End the Eurozone Crisis

    Failure on the part of EU leaders to address the eurozone crisis is in large part due to the fact that Germany and France are at opposite poles—politically, economically, and culturally. In this context, the announcement by Germany’s Angela Merkel and French President Nicolas Sarkozy that they’ve agreed to a comprehensive package of proposals to solve the eurozone debt crisis is definitely a positive development. It indicates that they have set aside their disagreements—surely no small feat, since domestic political concerns have been pulling the two in completely opposite directions—in order to provide the leadership necessary for euro stability.

  • One-Pager No. 14 | October 2011
    Can the Blind Heal the Crippled?

    Whoever said that economic science is free of ideological bias and political prejudice? Three hundred years of financial and economic crises have meant nothing to die-hard neoliberals, who believe in (among other things) self-regulating markets and trickle-down theory. With so many incorrect assumptions guiding market liberalism, it’s no wonder neoliberals have failed to draw the proper lessons from the Great Depression and turned a blind eye to the real causes of the global financial crisis of 2007–08 and the ensuing recession.

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    C. J. Polychroniou
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  • Working Paper No. 688 | September 2011
    Greece’s Debt Crisis in Context

    According to author and journalist C. J. Polychroniou, Greece was unfit to join the euro: its entry was orchestrated by fabricating the true state of the country’s fiscal condition, and its subsequent “growth performance” rested upon heavy state borrowing and European Union (EU) transfers. Moreover, the Greek economic crisis is also a political and moral crisis, as financial scandals and corruption have been major sources of wealth creation.

    The EU and International Monetary Fund bailout plan (May 2010), which includes a structural adjustment program with harsh austerity measures, has been a social and economic catastrophe. Such policy ensures that Greece will default and be forced to exit the euro, says Polychroniou, but compelling Greek citizens to take charge of their own economic problems and national faults may be the best scenario. Extreme EU neoliberal policies also increase the risk of the eurozone’s dissolution.

  • In the Media | September 2011
    By Dimitri B. Papadimitriou

    Truthout, September 9, 2011. Copyright © 2011 Truthout. All Rights Reserved.

    “By 1970, the governments of the wealthy countries began to take it for granted that they had truly discovered the secret of cornucopia. Politicians of left and right alike believed that modern economic policy was able to keep economies expanding very fast—and endlessly. That left only the congenial question of dividing up the new wealth that was being steadily generated.”

    Those words, from a Washington Post editorial more than twenty-five years ago, echoed the beliefs not only of politicians and the press, but of mainstream economics professionals resistant to the idea that growth in a market economy would ever stagnate over a protracted period.

    And some of the data did fit nicely. Through several recessions and recoveries, inflation-adjusted GDP rose almost in tandem with a line of predicted growth expectations. But in November 2007, something changed. Real GDP dropped down from what was expected by more than 11 percent, and, as this summer’s data has shown, it hasn’t returned to its pre-recession trend.

    The unusual slump has provoked a stream of commentary that attempts to define the problem, but it hardly matters whether the downturn is identified as the second dip of a “double-dip” recession, a continuation of the “Great Recession,” a fast-moving slowdown, a slow nosedive, a long-term stall-out, or a confirmation that the economy has entered a Japanese-style “lost decade.” Growth during the 21st century is following a different trend line than it did in the 20th, and employment is also responding in new, different ways from earlier post–World War II recessions.

    A range of additional data also indicates that what we’re hearing is not the regular breathing of an economy as it contracts and expands. Annual growth rates and quarterly moving averages—when examined starting in the mid 1970s, as Greg Hannsgen and I did at the Levy Economics Institute [see One-Pager No. 12]—show a steady decline beginning in 2000.

    And the employment numbers make the case yet again. Look at the graph below, with separate lines for the past six recessions. It traces employment-to-population ratios, beginning with the first month of each recession. These ratios are used to measure, among other things, how well a nation utilizes its workforce—a kind of labor drop-out rate.

    You can see at a glance that the pink line indicating the current recession—yes, that one down near the bottom of the chart—is an outlier in the group. It shows that by the 43rd month of the downturn, the ratio stood at just over 58 percent, meaning that 58 percent of the population was employed. That figure is 4.6 percent less than at the recession’s start, when more than 62 percent were working. And it means that this employment decline is steeper, deeper, and longer than in any of the previous five recessions by a long shot.

    Even in the two worst recoveries during the past forty years, this ratio never before declined by more than three percent. By the time the five recessions were this far along, employment had returned either to pre-recession levels, or to a distance from the recession’s start that was, at worst, two percent, compared to the current more than four percent.

    Together, this data makes the case that we’re in a prolonged slump that’s highly unusual, and requires action that’s far more aggressive than the usual responses. Job creation should be the government’s urgent, first priority. The nation needs to recognize just how perilous the employment disaster is—and what a marked departure this recession is from any we’ve seen in the modern era.

    Dimitri B. Papadimitriou is President of the Levy Economics Institute of Bard College and Executive Vice President and Jerome Levy Professor of Economics at Bard College.

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  • Policy Note 2011/3 | May 2011

    This “Modest Proposal” by authors Varoufakis and Holland outlines a three-pronged, comprehensive solution to the eurozone crisis that simultaneously addresses the three main dimensions of the current crisis in the eurozone (sovereign debt, banking, and underinvestment), restructures both a share of sovereign debt and that of banks, and does not involve a fiscal transfer of taxpayers’ money. Additionally, it requires no moves toward federation, no fiscal union, and no transfer union. It is in this sense, say the authors, that it deserves the epithet modest.

    To stabilize the debt crisis, Varoufakis and Holland recommend a tranche transfer of the sovereign debt of each EU member-state to the European Central Bank (ECB), to be held as ECB bonds. Member-states would continue to service their share of debt, reducing the debt-servicing burden of the most exposed member-states without increasing the debt burden of the others. Rigorous stress testing and recapitalization through the European Financial Stability Facility (in exchange for equity) would cleanse the banks of questionable public and private paper assets, allowing them to turn future liquidity into loans to enterprises and households. And the European Investment Bank (EIB) would assume the role of effecting a “New Deal” for Europe, drawing upon a mix of its own bonds and the new eurobonds. In effect, the EIB would graduate into a European surplus-recycling mechanism—a mechanism without which no currency union can survive for long.

  • Working Paper No. 668 | May 2011
    Functional Finance and Full Employment

    Forty-five years ago, the A. Philip Randolph Institute issued “The Freedom Budget,” in which a program for economic transformation was proposed that included a job guarantee for everyone ready and willing to work, a guaranteed income for those unable to work or those who should not be working, and a living wage to lift the working poor out of poverty. Such policies were supported by a host of scholars, civic leaders, and institutions, including the Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.; indeed, they provided the cornerstones for King’s “Poor Peoples’ Campaign” and “economic bill of rights.”

    This paper proposes a “New Freedom Budget” for full employment based on the principles of functional finance. To counter a major obstacle to such a policy program, the paper includes a “primer” on three paradigms for understanding government budget deficits and the national debt: the deficit hawk, deficit dove, and functional finance perspectives. Finally, some of the benefits of the job guarantee are outlined, including the ways in which the program may serve as a vehicle for a variety of social policies.

  • Working Paper No. 664 | March 2011

    The creation of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) has not brought significant gains to the Portuguese economy in terms of real convergence with wealthier eurozone countries. We analyze the causes of the underperformance of the Portuguese economy in the last decade, discuss its growth prospects within the EMU, and make two proposals for urgent institutional reform of the EMU. We argue that, under the prevailing institutional framework, Portugal faces a long period of stagnation, high unemployment, and painful structural reform, and conclude that, in the absence of institutional reform of the EMU, getting out of the eurozone represents a serious political option for Portugal.

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    Pedro Leao Alfonso Palacio-Vera
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  • Working Paper No. 657 | March 2011

    For the past generation Norway has supplied Europe and other regions with oil, taking payment in euros or dollars. It then sends nearly all this foreign exchange abroad, sequestering its oil-export receipts—which are in foreign currency—in the “oil fund,” to invest mainly in European and US stocks and bonds. The fund now exceeds $500 billion, second in the world to that of Abu Dhabi.

    It is claimed that treating these savings as a mutual fund invested in a wide array of US, European, and other stocks and bonds (and now real estate) avoids domestic inflation that would result from spending more than 4 percent of the returns to this fund at home. But the experience of sovereign wealth funds in China, Singapore, and other countries has been that investing in domestic infrastructure serves to lower the cost of living and doing business, making the domestic economy more competitive, not less.

    This paper cites the debate that extends from US 19th-century institutional doctrine to the approach of long-time Russian Chamber of Commerce and Industry President Yevgeny Primakov to illustrate the logic behind spending central bank and other sovereign foreign-exchange returns on modernizing and upgrading the domestic economy rather than simply recycling the earnings to US and European financial markets in what looks like an increasingly risky economic environment, as these economies confront debt deflation and increasing fiscal tightness.

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  • Working Paper No. 651 | February 2011
    The Competitiveness Debate Again

    Current discussions about the need to reduce unit labor costs (especially through a significant reduction in nominal wages) in some countries of the eurozone (in particular, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain) to exit the crisis may not be a panacea. First, historically, there is no relationship between the growth of unit labor costs and the growth of output. This is a well-established empirical result, known in the literature as Kaldor’s paradox. Second, construction of unit labor costs using aggregate data (standard practice) is potentially misleading. Unit labor costs calculated with aggregate data are not just a weighted average of the firms’ unit labor costs. Third, aggregate unit labor costs reflect the distribution of income between wages and profits. This has implications for aggregate demand that have been neglected. Of the 12 countries studied, the labor share increased in one (Greece), declined in nine, and remained constant in two. We speculate that this is the result of the nontradable sectors gaining share in the overall economy. Also, we construct a measure of competitiveness called unit capital costs as the ratio of the nominal profit rate to capital productivity. This has increased in all 12 countries. We conclude that a large reduction in nominal wages will not solve the problem that some countries of the eurozone face. If this is done, firms should also acknowledge that unit capital costs have increased significantly and thus also share the adjustment cost. Barring solutions such as an exit from the euro, the solution is to allow fiscal policy to play a larger role in the eurozone, and to make efforts to upgrade the export basket to improve competitiveness with more advanced countries. This is a long-term solution that will not be painless, but one that does not require a reduction in nominal wages.

  • Policy Note 2011/1 | February 2011

    Like marriage, membership in the eurozone is supposed to be a lifetime commitment, “for better or for worse.” But as we know, divorce does occur, even if the marriage was entered into with the best of intentions. And the recent turmoil in Europe has given rise to the idea that the euro itself might also be reversible, and that one or more countries might revert to a national currency. The prevailing thought has been that one of the weak periphery countries would be the first to call it a day. It may not, however, work out that way: suddenly, the biggest euro-skeptics in Europe are not the perfidious English but the Germans themselves.

  • One-Pager No. 4 | November 2010
    The Rescue Plan Cannot Address the Central Problem

    The trillion-dollar rescue package European leaders aimed at the continent’s growing debt crisis in May might well have been code-named Panacea. Stocks rose throughout the region, but the reprieve was short-lived: markets fell on the realization that the bailout would not improve government finances going forward. The entire rescue plan rests on the assumption that the eurozone’s “problem children” can eventually get their fiscal houses in order. But no rescue plan can address the central problem: that countries with very different economies are yoked to the same currency.

  • Public Policy Brief Highlights No. 113A | September 2010
    Without Major Restructuring, the Eurozone is Doomed

    Critics argue that the current crisis has exposed the profligacy of the Greek government and its citizens, who are stubbornly fighting proposed social spending cuts and refusing to live within their means. Yet Greece has one of the lowest per capita incomes in the European Union (EU), and its social safety net is modest compared to the rest of Europe. Since implementing its austerity program in January, it has reduced its budget deficit by 40 percent, largely through spending cuts. But slower growth is causing revenues to come in below targets, and fuel-tax increases have contributed to growing inflation. As the larger troubled economies like Spain and Italy also adopt austerity measures, the entire continent could find government revenues collapsing.

    No rescue plan can address the central problem: that countries with very different economies are yoked to the same currency. Lacking a sovereign currency and unable to devalue their way out of trouble, they are left with few viable options—and voters in Germany and France will soon tire of paying the bill. A more far-reaching solution is needed.

  • Public Policy Brief No. 113 | July 2010
    Without Major Restructuring, the Eurozone Is Doomed

    Critics argue that the current crisis has exposed the profligacy of the Greek government and its citizens, who are stubbornly fighting proposed social spending cuts and refusing to live within their means. Yet Greece has one of the lowest per capita incomes in the European Union (EU), and its social safety net is modest compared to the rest of Europe. Since implementing its austerity program in January, it has reduced its budget deficit by 40 percent, largely through spending cuts. But slower growth is causing revenues to come in below targets, and fuel-tax increases have contributed to growing inflation. As the larger troubled economies like Spain and Italy also adopt austerity measures, the entire continent could find government revenues collapsing.

    No rescue plan can address the central problem: that countries with very different economies are yoked to the same currency. Lacking a sovereign currency and unable to devalue their way out of trouble, they are left with few viable options—and voters in Germany and France will soon tire of paying the bill. A more far-reaching solution is needed.

  • Working Paper No. 595 | May 2010
    The recycling problem is general, and is not confined to a multicurrency setting: whenever there are surplus and deficit units—that is, everywhere—adjustment in real terms can be either upward or downward. The question is, Which? An attempt is made to formulate the problem in terms of the European Monetary Union. While the problem seems clear, the resolution is not. It is proposed to engage the issue through a detour consistent with the Maastricht rules. Inadequate as this is, it highlights the limits of technical arrangements when governments are confronted with political economy—namely, the inability to set the rules of the larger game from within a set of axiomatically predetermined rules dependent on the fact and practice of sovereignty. Even so, an attempt at persuasion through clarification of the issues—in particular, by highlighting the distinction between recycling and transfers—may be a useful preliminary. Some of the paper’s evocations, notably on oligopoly, may be taken as merely heuristic.

  • Working Paper No. 415 | November 2004
    A Cointegration Method

    This paper derives measures of potential output and capacity utilization for a number of OECD countries, using a method based on the cointegration relation between output and the capital stock. The intuitive idea is that economic capacity (potential output) is the aspect of output that co-varies with the capital stock over the long run. We show that this notion can be derived from a simple model that allows for a changing capital-capacity ratio in response to partially exogenous, partially embodied, technical change. Our method provides a simple and general procedure for estimating capacity utilization. It also closely replicates a previously developed census-based measure of US manufacturing capacity-utilization. Of particular interest is that our measures of capacity utilization are very different from those based on aggregate production functions, such as the ones provided by the IMF.

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Asia

  • Working Paper No. 1047 | April 2024
    Analyzing the Tax Buoyancy of the Extractive Sector
    Against the backdrop of fiscal transition concomitant to energy transition policies with climate change commitments, revenue from the extractive sector needs a recalibration in the subnational fiscal space. Extractive tax is the payment due to the government in exchange for the right to extract the mineral substance. Extractive tax has been fixed and paid in multiple tax regimes, sometimes on the measures of ad valorem (value-based) or profits or as the unit of the mineral extracted. Using the ARDL methodology, this paper analyzes the buoyancy of extractive revenue across the states in India, for the period 1991–92 to 2022–23 and analyzes the short- and long-run coefficients and their speed of adjustment. There are no identified structural breaks in the series predominantly because of the homogenous extractive policy regime shift to ad valorem from a unit-based regime. Our findings revealed that extractive tax is a buoyant source of own revenue, though there are distinct state-specific differentials. The policy implication of our study is crucial for a “just transition” related to climate change commitments where extractive industries’ tax buoyancy is compared to other tax buoyancy across Indian states, and can be used as the base scenario to estimate the loss of revenue when fiscal transition sets in with “just transition” policies.

  • Working Paper No. 1040 | February 2024
    Against the backdrop of COP28, this paper investigates the impact of intergovernmental fiscal transfers (IGFT) on climate change commitments in India. Within the analytical framework of environmental federalism, we tested the evidence for the Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC) using a panel model covering 27 Indian states from 2003 to 2020. The results suggest a positive and significant relationship between IGFT and the net forest cover (NFC) across Indian states. The analysis also suggests an inverse-U relationship between Gross State Domestic Product (GSDP) and the environmental quality, indicating a potential EKC for India. The findings substantiate the fiscal policy impacts for climate change commitments within the fiscal federal frameworks of India, and the significance of IGFT in increasing the forest cover in India. This has policy implications for the Sixteenth Finance Commission of India in integrating a climate change–related criterion in the tax-transfer formula in a sustainable manner. 
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    Lekha S. Chakraborty Amandeep Kaur Ranjan Kumar Mohanty Divy Rangan Sanjana Das
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  • Working Paper No. 1039 | February 2024
    An Assessment Based on the Estimation of the Balance-of-Payments–Constrained Growth Rate
    We expand the standard balance-of-payments–constrained (BOPC) growth rate model in three directions. First, we take into account the separate contributions of exports in goods, exports in services, overseas remittances, and foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows. Second, we use state-space estimation techniques to obtain time-varying parameters of the relevant coefficients. Third, we test for the endogeneity of output in the import equation. We apply this framework to assess the feasibility of the target set by the new Philippine administration of President Marcos (elected in 2022) to attain an annual GDP growth rate of 6.5–8 percent during 2024–28. We obtain an estimate of the growth rate consistent with equilibrium in the basic balance of the Philippines of about 6.5 percent in 2021 (and declining during the years prior to it). This BOPC growth rate is below the 6.5–8 percent target. We also find that exchange-rate depreciations will not lead to an improvement in the BOPC growth rate. The Philippines must lift the constraints that impede a higher growth of exports. In particular, it must shift its export structure toward more sophisticated products with a higher income elasticity of demand.
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    Jesus Felipe Manuel L. Albis
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  • Working Paper No. 1030 | October 2023
    An Analysis of Political Settlements, Rents, and Deals
    The main gateway for the Philippines to develop and become an upper-middle-income economy—and eventually, a high-income economy—is to expedite the shift of workers out of agriculture and to produce and export more complex products with a higher income elasticity of demand. The actual growth rate is constrained by the balance-of-payments equilibrium growth rate, about 6 percent—the maximum the country can attain without incurring balance-of-payments problems. We use the Pritchett-Sen-Werker political-economy framework to analyze the roles of different types of firms and the deals environment from successive Philippine administrations until the current one. Due to their economic size and political power, only the nation’s conglomerates will be able to lead the transformation of the economy. However, the country’s large groups do not have incentives nor do they see the need to shift to the production and export of tradables. Without this transformation, the country will be able to register positive growth but will not become an internationally competitive economy, and will not be able to achieve, and especially maintain, the growth rate targeted by the current administration: 6.5–8 percent per annum during 2023–28.
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    Author(s):
    Jesus Felipe Edgar Desher Empeño Brendan Miranda
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    Asia

  • Working Paper No. 1029 | September 2023
    The year 2023 commemorates the 30th anniversary of the publication of the influential, yet controversial, study The East Asian Miracle report by the World Bank (1993). An important part of the report’s analysis was concerned with the sources of growth in East Asia. This was based on the neoclassical decomposition of growth into productivity and factor accumulation. At about the same time, the publication of Alwyn Young’s (1992, 1995) and J. I. Kim and Lawrence Lau’s (1994) studies, and Paul Krugman’s (1994) popularization of the “zero total factor productivity growth” thesis, led to a very important debate within the profession, on the sources of growth in East Asia. The emerging literature on China’s growth during the 1990s also used the neoclassical growth model to decompose overall growth into total factor productivity growth and factor accumulation. This survey reviews what the profession has learned during the last 30 years about East Asia’s growth, using growth-accounting exercises and estimations of production functions. It demystifies this literature by pointing out the significant methodological problems inherent in the neoclassical growth-accounting approach. We conclude that the analysis of growth within the framework of the neoclassical model should be seriously questioned. Instead, we propose that researchers look at other approaches, for example, the balance-of-payments–constrained growth rate approach of Thirlwall (1979) or the product space of Hidalgo et al. (2007), together with the notion of complexity of Hidalgo and Hausmann (2009).
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    Author(s):
    Jesus Felipe John McCombie
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  • Policy Note 2023/4 | August 2023
    Nischal Dhungel examines the impact of India’s demonetization experiment—an effort at “forced formalization” of the economy. He urges a more organic approach to formalization, pairing efforts to bring the unbanked population into the banking system with greater funding and accessibility for India’s signature employment guarantee program.

  • Working Paper No. 1018 | April 2023
    How to Deal with the “Demographic Time Bomb”
    The aging of the global population is in the headlines following a report that China’s population fell as deaths surpassed births. Pundits worry that a declining Chinese workforce means trouble for other economies that have come to rely on China’s exports. France is pushing through an increase of the retirement age in the face of what is called a demographic “time bomb” facing rich nations, created by rising longevity and low birthrates. As we approach the debt limit in the US, while President Biden has promised to protect Social Security, many have returned to the argument that the program is financially unsustainable. This paper argues that most of the discussion and policy solutions proposed surrounding aging of populations are misfocused on supposed financial challenges when they should be directed toward the challenges facing resource provision. From the resource perspective, the burden of caring for tomorrow’s seniors seems far less challenging. Indeed, falling fertility rates and an end to global population growth should be welcomed. With fewer children and longer lives, investment in the workers of the future will ensure growth of productivity that will provide the resources necessary to support a higher ratio of retirees to those of working age. Global population growth will peak and turn negative, reducing demands on earth’s biosphere and making it easier to transition to environmental sustainability. Rather than facing a demographic “time bomb,” we can welcome the transition to a mature-aged profile.

  • Working Paper No. 999 | January 2022
    Does Financial “Bonanza” Cause Premature Deindustrialization?
    The outbreak of COVID-19 brought back to the forefront the crucial importance of structural change and productive development for economic resilience to economic shocks. Several recent contributions have already stressed the perverse relationship that may exist between productive backwardness and the intensity of the COVID-19 socioeconomic crisis. In this paper, we analyze the factors that may have hindered productive development for over four decades before the pandemic. We investigate the role of (non-FDI) net capital inflows as a potential source of premature deindustrialization. We consider a sample of 36 developed and developing countries from 1980 to 2017, with major emphasis on the case of emerging and developing economies (EDE) in the context of increasing financial integration. We show that periods of abundant capital inflows may have caused the significant contraction of manufacturing share to employment and GDP, as well as the decrease of the economic complexity index. We also show that phenomena of “perverse” structural change are significantly more relevant in EDE countries than advanced ones. Based on such evidence, we conclude with some policy suggestions highlighting capital controls and external macroprudential measures taming international capital mobility as useful tools for promoting long-run productive development on top of strengthening (short-term) financial and macroeconomic stability.
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    Author(s):
    Alberto Botta Giuliano Toshiro Yajima Gabriel Porcile
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    United States, Latin America, Europe, Middle East, Africa, Asia

  • Working Paper No. 938 | October 2019
    Nominal yields for Japanese government bonds (JGBs) have been remarkably low for several decades. Japanese government debt ratios have continued to increase amid a protracted period of stagnant nominal GDP, low inflation, and deflationary pressures. Many analysts are puzzled by the phenomenon of JGBs’ low nominal yields because Japanese government debt ratios are elevated. However, this paper shows that the Bank of Japan’s (BoJ) highly accommodative monetary policy is primarily responsible for keeping JGB yields low for a protracted period. This is consistent with Keynes’s view that the short-term interest rate is the key driver of the long-term interest rate. This paper also relates the BoJ’s monetary policy and economic developments in Japan to the evolution of JGBs’ long-term interest rates.

  • Book Series | October 2019
    The principle of fiscal federalism enshrined in India's Constitution is under severe strain today. This book is a key addition to understanding the challenges involved. The authors capture the implications of the abolition of the Planning Commission, the introduction of the controversial Goods and Services Tax regime, and formulation of Terms of Reference of the 15th Finance Commission. These include the increase in vertical fiscal inequity, distortion of fairness in inter-State distribution, and erosion of policy autonomy at the level of the States.

    Published by: Leftword Press
  • Policy Note 2019/2 | May 2019
    Against the background of an ongoing trade dispute between the United States and China, Senior Scholar Jan Kregel analyzes the potential for achieving international adjustment without producing a negative impact on national and global growth. Once the structure of trade in the current international system is understood (with its global production chains and large imbalances financed by international borrowing and lending), it is clear that national strategies focused on tariff adjustment to reduce bilateral imbalances will not succeed. This understanding of the evolution of the structure of trade and international finance should also inform our view of how to design a new international financial system capable of dealing with increasingly large international trade imbalances.

  • Working Paper No. 906 | May 2018
    This paper employs a Keynesian perspective to explain why Japanese government bonds’ (JGBs) nominal yields have been low for more than two decades. It deploys several vector error correction (VEC) models to estimate long-term government bond yields. It shows that the low short-term interest rate, induced by the Bank of Japan’s (BoJ) accommodative monetary policy, is mainly responsible for keeping long-term JGBs’ nominal yields exceptionally low for a protracted period. The results also demonstrate that higher government debt and deficit ratios do not exert upward pressure on JGBs’ nominal yields. These findings are relevant to ongoing policy debates in Japan and other advanced countries about government bond yields, fiscal sustainability, fiscal policy, functional finance, monetary policy, and financial stability.

  • Working Paper No. 881 | January 2017

    This paper investigates the long-term determinants of Indian government bonds’ (IGB) nominal yields. It examines whether John Maynard Keynes’s supposition that short-term interest rates are the key driver of long-term government bond yields holds over the long-run horizon, after controlling for various key economic factors such as inflationary pressure and measures of economic activity. It also appraises whether the government finance variable—the ratio of government debt to nominal income—has an adverse effect on government bond yields over a long-run horizon. The models estimated here show that in India, short-term interest rates are the key driver of long-term government bond yields over the long run. However, the ratio of government debt and nominal income does not have any discernible adverse effect on yields over a long-run horizon. These findings will help policymakers in India (and elsewhere) to use information on the current trend in short-term interest rates, the federal fiscal balance, and other key macro variables to form their long-term outlook on IGB yields, and to understand the implications of the government’s fiscal stance on the government bond market.

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    Tanweer Akram Anupam Das
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  • Working Paper No. 872 | August 2016
    Do Fiscal Rules Impose Hard Budget Constraints?

    The primary objective of rule-based fiscal legislation at the subnational level in India is to achieve debt sustainability by placing a ceiling on borrowing and the use of borrowed resources for public capital investment by phasing out deficits in the budget revenue account. This paper examines whether the application of fiscal rules has contributed to an increase in fiscal space for public capital investment spending in major Indian states. Our analysis shows that, controlling for other factors, there is a negative relationship between fiscal rules and public capital investment spending at the state level under the rule-based fiscal regime.

  • Working Paper No. 862 | March 2016

    Japan has experienced stagnation, deflation, and low interest rates for decades. It is caught in a liquidity trap. This paper examines Japan’s liquidity trap in light of the structure and performance of the country’s economy since the onset of stagnation. It also analyzes the country’s liquidity trap in terms of the different strands in the theoretical literature. It is argued that insights from a Keynesian perspective are still quite relevant. The Keynesian perspective is useful not just for understanding Japan’s liquidity trap but also for formulating and implementing policies that can overcome the liquidity trap and foster renewed economic growth and prosperity. Paul Krugman (1998a, b) and Ben Bernanke (2000; 2002) identify low inflation and deflation risks as the cause of a liquidity trap. Hence, they advocate a credible commitment by the central bank to sustained monetary easing as the key to reigniting inflation, creating an exit from a liquidity trap through low interest rates and quantitative easing. In contrast, for John Maynard Keynes (2007 [1936]) the possibility of a liquidity trap arises from a sharp rise in investors’ liquidity preference and the fear of capital losses due to uncertainty about the direction of interest rates. His analysis calls for an integrated strategy for overcoming a liquidity trap. This strategy consists of vigorous fiscal policy and employment creation to induce a higher expected marginal efficiency of capital, while the central bank stabilizes the yield curve and reduces interest rate volatility to mitigate investors’ expectations of capital loss. In light of Japan’s experience, Keynes’s analysis and proposal for generating effective demand might well be a more appropriate remedy for the country’s liquidity trap.

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    Tanweer Akram
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  • In the Media | June 2015
    Economia, June 23, 2015. All Rights Reserved.

    All'interno del quadro economico internazionale, Jan Kregel, direttore del programma “Politica Monetaria” presso il Levy Economic Institute negli USA, analizza qual è stato il ruolo degli Stati Uniti all'interno della crisi economica. Uno degli elementi che viene messo maggiormente in evidenza, è l' importanza data al settore finanziario, rispetto all'economia reale: ciò ha portando ad una minore attenzione a problemi come la disoccupazione, che rappresenta ancora una delle questioni irrisolte dell'Europa, ma soprattutto dell'Italia. 

    Una volta che la crisi economica è scoppiata negli Usa, si è diffusa a macchia d'olio specie nel continente europeo, dove la forbice presente tra europa meridionale e settentrionale, si è notevolmente ampliata.   A tale ritratto, Kregel, aggiunge anche un'attenta le politiche economiche messe in atto da Cina e Giappone e dalle loro ripercussioni sul sistema economico mondiale.

    intervista videoregistrata:
    http://www.economia.rai.it/articoli/la-crisi-negli-usa-il-punto-di-vista-di-jan-kregel/30575/default.aspx
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    Jan Kregel
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    United States, Asia
  • Working Paper No. 834 | March 2015

    John Maynard Keynes held that the central bank’s actions determine long-term interest rates through short-term interest rates and various monetary policy measures. His conjectures about the determinants of long-term interest rates were made in the context of advanced capitalist economies, and were based on his views on ontological uncertainty and the formation of investors’ expectations. Are these conjectures valid in emerging markets, such as India? This paper empirically investigates the determinants of changes in Indian government bonds’ nominal yields. Changes in short-term interest rates, after controlling for other crucial variables such as changes in the rates of inflation and economic activity, take a lead role in driving changes in the nominal yields of Indian government bonds. This vindicates Keynes’s theories, and suggests that his views on long-term interest rates are also applicable to emerging markets. Higher fiscal deficits do not appear to raise government bond yields in India. It is further argued that Keynes’s conjectures about investors’ outlooks, views, and expectations are fairly robust in a world of ontological uncertainty.

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    Tanweer Akram Anupam Das
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  • Working Paper No. 813 | August 2014
    For Economic Stimulus, or for Austerity and Volatility?

    The implementation of economic reforms under new economic policies in India was associated with a paradigmatic shift in monetary and fiscal policy. While monetary policies were solely aimed at “price stability” in the neoliberal regime, fiscal policies were characterized by the objective of maintaining “sound finance” and “austerity.” Such monetarist principles and measures have also loomed over the global recession. This paper highlights the theoretical fallacies of monetarism and analyzes the consequences of such policy measures in India, particularly during the period of the global recession. Not only did such policies pose constraints on the recovery of output and employment, with adverse impacts on income distribution; but they also failed to achieve their stated goal in terms of price stability. By citing examples from southern Europe and India, this paper concludes that such monetarist policy measures have been responsible for stagnation, with a rise in price volatility and macroeconomic instability in the midst of the global recession.

  • In the Media | April 2014
    By Panos Mourdoukoutas

    Forbes, April 14, 2014. All Rights Reserved.

    For years, China has been enjoying robust economic growth that has turned it into the world’s second largest economy.

    The problem is, however, that China’s growth is in part driven by over investment in construction and manufacturing sectors, fueling asset bubbles that parallel those of Japan in the late 1980s. With one major difference: China’s overinvestment is directed by the systematic efforts of local governments to preserve the old system of central planning, through massive construction and manufacturing projects for the purpose of employment creation rather than for addressing genuine consumer needs.

    Major Chinese cities are filled with growing numbers of new vacant buildings. They were built under government mandates to provide jobs for the hundreds of thousands of people leaving the countryside for a better life in the cities, rather than to house genuine business tenants.

    China’s real estate bubble is proliferating like an infectious disease from the eastern cities to the inner country. It has spread beyond real estate to other sectors of the economy, from the steel industry to electronics and toys industries.  Local governments rush and race to replicate each other’s policies, especially local governments of the inner regions, where corporate managers have no direct access to overseas markets, and end up copying the policies of their peers in the coastal areas.

    We all know how the Japanese bubble ended. What should Chinese policy makers do? How can they burst their bubble?

    There is  a bad way and a good way, according to L. Randall Wray and Xinhua Liu, writing in "Options for China in a Dollar Standard World: A Sovereign Currency Approach.” (Levy Economics Institute, Working Paper No 783, January 2014).

    The bad way is to pursue European-style austerity, which reins in central government deficits.

    We all know what that means–the Chinese economy is almost certain to be placed in a downward spiral that will jeopardize employment growth. Besides, as the authors observe, China’s fiscal imbalances aren’t with central government, but with local governments. In fact, China’s main imbalance “appears to be a result of loose local government budgets and overly tight central government budgets.”

    That’s why the authors propose fiscal restructuring rather than austerity. Rein in local government spending, and expand central government spending.

    That’s the good way to burst the bubble. But is it politically feasible? Can Beijing reign over local governments?

    That remains to be seen. 

  • Working Paper No. 783 | January 2014
    A Sovereign Currency Approach
    This paper examines the fiscal and monetary policy options available to China as a sovereign currency-issuing nation operating in a dollar standard world. We first summarize a number of issues facing China, including the possibility of slower growth, global imbalances, and a number of domestic imbalances. We then analyze current monetary and fiscal policy formation and examine some policy recommendations that have been advanced to deal with current areas of concern. We next outline the sovereign currency approach and use it to analyze those concerns. We conclude with policy recommendations consistent with the policy space open to China.

  • One-Pager No. 44 | December 2013
    Reorienting Fiscal Policy to Reduce Financial Fragility
    Since adopting a policy of gradually opening its economy more than three decades ago, China has enjoyed rapid economic growth and rising living standards for much of its population. While some argue that China might fall into the middle-income “trap,” they are underestimating the country’s ability to continue to grow at a rapid pace. It is likely that China’s growth will eventually slow, but the nation will continue on its path to join the developed high-income group—so long as the central government recognizes and uses the policy space available to it. 

  • Working Paper No. 714 | April 2012
    China and India

    The narrative as well as the analysis of global imbalances in the existing literature are incomplete without the part of the story that relates to the surge in capital flows experienced by the emerging economies. Such analysis disregards the implications of capital flows on their domestic economies, especially in terms of the “impossibility” of following a monetary policy that benefits domestic growth. It also fails to recognize the significance of uncertainty and changes in expectation as factors in the (precautionary) buildup of large official reserves. The consequences are many, and affect the fabric of growth and distribution in these economies. The recent experiences of China and India, with their deregulated financial sectors, bear this out.

    Financial integration and free capital mobility, which are supposed to generate growth with stability (according to the “efficient markets” hypothesis), have not only failed to achieve their promises (especially in the advanced economies) but also forced the high-growth developing economies like India and China into a state of compliance, where domestic goals of stability and development are sacrificed in order to attain the globally sanctioned norm of free capital flows.

    With the global financial crisis and the specter of recession haunting most advanced economies, the high-growth economies in Asia have drawn much less attention than they deserve. This oversight leaves the analysis incomplete, not only by missing an important link in the prevailing network of global trade and finance, but also by ignoring the structural changes in these developing economies—many of which are related to the pattern of financialization and turbulence in the advanced economies.

  • Working Paper No. 675 | July 2011

    This paper traces the rise of export-led growth as a development paradigm and argues that it is exhausted owing to changed conditions in emerging market (EM) and developed economies. The global economy needs a recalibration that facilitates a new paradigm of domestic demand-led growth. Globalization has so diversified global economic activity that no country or region can act as the lone locomotive of global growth. Political reasoning suggests that EM countries are not likely to abandon export-led growth, nor will the international community implement the international arrangements needed for successful domestic demand-led growth. Consequently, the global economy likely faces asymmetric stagnation.

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    Thomas I. Palley
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    United States, Latin America, Asia

  • Working Paper No. 642 | December 2010

    China occupies a unique position among developing countries. Its success in achieving relative stability in the financial sector since the institution of reforms in 1979 has given way to relative instability since the beginning of the current global financial crisis. Over the last few years, China has been on a path of capital account opening that has drawn larger inflows of capital from abroad, both foreign-direct and portfolio investment. Of late, a surge in these inflows has introduced problems for the monetary authorities in continuing with an autonomous monetary policy in China, especially with large additions to official reserves, the latter in a bid to avoid further appreciation of the country’s domestic currency. Like other developing countries, China today faces the “impossible trilemma” of managing the exchange rate with near-complete capital mobility and an autonomous monetary policy. Facing problems in devising and sustaining this policy, China has been using expansionary fiscal policy to tackle the impact of shrinking export demand. The recent drive on the part of Chinese authorities to boost real demand in the countryside and to revamp the domestic market shows a promise far different from that of the financial rescue packages in many advanced nations.

    The close integration of China with the world economy over the last two decades has raised concerns from different quarters that relate both to (1) the possible effects of the recent global downturn on China and (2) the second-round effects of a downturn in China for the rest of world.

     

  • Working Paper No. 619 | September 2010
    Recovery Prospects and the Future

    The global crisis of 2007–09 affected developing Asia largely through a decline in exports to the developed countries and a slowdown in remittances. This happened very quickly, and by 2009 there were already signs of recovery (except on the employment front). This recovery was led by China’s impressive performance, aided by a large stimulus package and easy credit. But China needs to make efforts toward rebalancing its economy. Although private consumption has increased at a fast pace during the last decades, investment has done so at an even faster pace, with the consequence that the share of consumption in total output is very low. The risk is that the country may fall into an underconsumption crisis.

    Looking at the medium and long term, developing Asia’s future is mixed. There is one group of countries with a highly diversified export basket. These countries have an excellent opportunity to thrive if the right policies are implemented. However, there is another group of countries that relies heavily on natural resources. These countries face a serious challenge, since they must diversify.

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  • Working Paper No. 617 | September 2010
    The Risk of Unraveling the Global Rebalancing

    This paper investigates China’s role in creating global imbalances, and the related call for a massive renminbi revaluation as a (supposed) panacea to forestall their reemergence as the world economy recovers from severe crisis. We reject the prominence widely attributed to China as a cause of global imbalances and the exclusive focus on the renminbi-dollar exchange rate as misguided. And we emphasize that China's response to the global crisis has been exemplary. Apart from acting as a growth leader in the global recovery by boosting domestic demand to offset the slump in exports, China has in the process successfully completed the first stage in rebalancing its economy, which is in stark contrast to other leading trading nations that have simply resumed previous policy patterns. The second stage in China’s rebalancing will consist of further strengthening private consumption. We argue that this will be best supported by continued reliance on renminbi stability and capital account management, so as to assure that macroeconomic policies can be framed in line with domestic development requirements.

  • Working Paper No. 611 | August 2010
    The key factor underlying China’s fast development during the last 50 years is its ability to master and accumulate new and more complex capabilities, reflected in the increase in diversification and sophistication of its export basket. This accumulation was policy induced and not the result of the market, and began before 1979. Despite its many policy mistakes, if China had not proceeded this way, in all likelihood it would be a much poorer country today. During the last 50 years, China has acquired revealed comparative advantage in the export of both labor-intensive products (following its factor abundance) and sophisticated products, although the latter does not indicate that there was leapfrogging. Analysis of China’s current export opportunity set indicates that it is exceptionally well positioned (especially taking into account its income per capita) to continue learning and gaining revealed comparative advantage in the export of more sophisticated products. Given adequate policies, carefully thought-out and implemented reforms, and skillful management of constraints and risks, China has the potential to continue thriving. This does not mean, however, that high growth will continue indefinitely.
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    Author(s):
    Jesus Felipe Utsav Kumar Norio Usui Arnelyn Abdon
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  • In the Media | October 2008
    By Martin Wolf

    October 8, 2008. Copyright 2008 The Financial Times Limited. “FT” and “Financial Times” are trademarks of the Financial Times.

    “Things that can’t go on forever, don’t.” —Herbert Stein, former chairman of the US presidential Council of Economic Advisers

    What confronts the world can be seen as the latest in a succession of financial crises that have struck periodically over the last 30 years. The current financial turmoil in the US and Europe affects economies that account for at least half of world output, making this upheaval more significant than all the others. Yet it is also depressingly similar, both in its origins and its results, to earlier shocks.

    To trace the parallels—and help in understanding how the present pressing problems can be addressed—one needs to look back to the late 1970s. Petrodollars, the foreign exchange earned by oil exporting countries amid sharp jumps in the crude price, were recycled via western banks to less wealthy emerging economies, principally in Latin America.

    This resulted in the first of the big crises of modern times, when Mexico’s 1982 announcement of its inability to service its debt brought the money-centre banks of New York and London to their knees.

    Carmen Reinhart of the University of Maryland and Kenneth Rogoff of Harvard University identify the similarities in a paper published earlier this year.* They focus on previous crises in high-income countries. But they also note characteristics that are shared with financial crises that have occurred in emerging economies.

    This time, most emerging economies have been running huge current account surpluses. So a “large chunk of money has effectively been recycled to a developing economy that exists within the United States’ own borders,” they point out. “Over a trillion dollars was channelled into the subprime mortgage market, which is comprised of the poorest and least creditworthy borrowers within the US. The final claimaint is different, but in many ways the mechanism is the same.”

    The links between the financial fragility in the US and previous emerging market crises mean that the current banking and economic traumas should not be seen as just the product of risky monetary policy, lax regulation and irresponsible finance, important though these were. They have roots in the way the global economy has worked in the era of financial deregulation. Any country that receives a huge and sustained inflow of foreign lending runs the risk of a subsequent financial crisis, because external and domestic financial fragility will grow. Precisely such a crisis is now happening to the US and a number of other high-income countries including the UK.

    These latest crises are also related to those that preceded them—particularly the Asian crisis of 1997–98. Only after this shock did emerging economies become massive capital exporters. This pattern was reinforced by China’s choice of an export-oriented development path, partly influenced by fear of what had happened to its neighbours during the Asian crisis. It was further entrenched by the recent jumps in the oil price and the consequent explosion in the current account surpluses of oil exporting countries.

    The big global macroeconomic story of this decade was, then, the offsetting emergence of the US and a number of other high-income countries as spenders and borrowers of last resort. Debt-fuelled US households went on an unparalleled spending binge by dipping into their housing “piggy banks.”

    In explaining what had happened, Ben Bernanke, when still a governor of the Federal Reserve rather than chairman, referred to the emergence of a “savings glut.” The description was accurate. After the turn of the millennium, one of the striking features became the low level of long-term nominal and real interest rates at a time of rapid global economic growth. Cheap money encouraged an orgy of financial innovation, borrowing and spending.

    That was also one of the initial causes of the surge in house prices across a large part of the high-income world, particularly in the US, the UK and Spain.

    What lay behind the savings glut? The first development was the shift of emerging economies into a large surplus of savings over investment. Within the emerging economies, the big shifts were in Asia and in the oil exporting countries (see chart). By 2007, according to the International Monetary Fund, the aggregate savings surpluses of these two groups of countries had reached around 2 per cent of world output.

    figures

    Despite being a huge oil importer, China emerged as the world’s biggest surplus country: its current account surplus was $372bn (£215bn, €272bn) in 2007, which was not only more than 11 per cent of its gross domestic product, but almost as big as the combined surpluses of Japan ($213bn) and Germany ($185bn), the two largest high-income capital exporters.

    Last year, the aggregate surpluses of the world’s surplus countries reached $1,680bn, according to the IMF. The top 10 (China, Japan, Germany, Saudi Arabia, Russia, Switzerland, Norway, Kuwait, the Netherlands and the United Arab Emirates) generated more than 70 per cent of this total. The surpluses of the top 10 countries represented at least 8 per cent of their aggregate GDP and about one-quarter of their aggregate gross savings.

    Meanwhile, the huge US deficit absorbed 44 per cent of this total. The US, UK, Spain and Australia—four countries with housing bubbles—absorbed 63 per cent of the world’s current account surpluses.

    That represented a vast shift of capital—but unlike in the 1970s and early 1980s, it went to some of the world’s richest countries. Moreover, the emergence of the surpluses was the result of deliberate policies—shown in the accumulation of official foreign currency reserves and the expansion of the sovereign wealth funds over this period.

    Quite reasonably, the energy exporters were transforming one asset—oil—into another—claims on foreigners. Others were recycling current account surpluses and private capital inflows into official capital outflows, keeping exchange rates down and competitiveness up. Some described this new system, of which China was the most important proponent, as “Bretton Woods II,” after the pegged adjustable exchange rates set-up that collapsed in the early 1970s. Others called it “export-led growth” or depicted it as a system of self-insurance.

    Yet the justification is less important than the consequences. Between January 2000 and April 2007, the stock of global foreign currency reserves rose by $5,200bn. Thus three-quarters of all the foreign currency reserves accumulated since the beginning of time have been piled up in this decade. Inevitably, a high proportion—probably close to two-thirds—of these sums were placed in dollars, thereby supporting the US currency and financing US external deficits.

    The savings glut had another dimension, related to a second financial shock—the bursting of the dot-com bubble in 2000. One consequence was the move of the corporate sectors of most high-income countries into financial surplus. In other words, their retained earnings came to exceed their investments. Instead of borrowing from banks and other suppliers of capital, non-financial corporations became providers of finance.

    In this world of massive savings surpluses in a range of important countries and weak demand for capital from non-financial corporations, central banks ran easy monetary policies. They did so because they feared the possibility of a shift into deflation. The Fed, in particular, found itself having to offset the contractionary effects of the vast flow of private and, above all, public capital into the US.

    A simple way of thinking about what has happened to the global economy in the 2000s is that high-income countries with elastic credit systems and households willing to take on rising debt levels offset the massive surplus savings in the rest of the world. The lax monetary policies facilitated this excess spending, while the housing bubble was the vehicle through which it worked.

    The charts show what happened, as a result, to “financial balances”—the difference between expenditure and income inside the US economy. If one looks at three sectors—foreign, government and private—it is evident that the first has had a huge surplus this decade—offset, as it has to be, by deficits in the other two.

    In the early 2000s, the US fiscal deficit was the main offset. In the middle years of the decade, the private sector ran a large deficit while the government’s shrank. Now that the recession-hit private sector is moving back into balance at enormous speed, the government deficit is exploding once again.

    Looking at what happened inside the private sector, a striking contrast can be seen between the corporate and household realms. Households moved into a huge financial deficit, which peaked at just under 4 per cent of GDP in the second quarter of 2005. Then, as the housing bubble burst, housebuilding collapsed and households started saving more. With remarkable speed, the household financial deficit disappeared. Today’s explosion in the fiscal deficit is the offset.

    Inevitably, huge household financial deficits also mean huge accumulations of household debt. This was strikingly true in the US and UK. In the process, the financial sector accumulated an ever greater stock of claims not just on other sectors but on itself. This frightening complexity, which lies at the root of many of the current difficulties, was facilitated by the environment of easy borrowing and search for high returns in an environment of low real rates of interest. These linked dangers between external and internal imbalances, domestic debt accumulations and financial fragility were foretold by a number of analysts. Foremost among them was Wynne Godley of Cambridge University in his prescient work for the Levy Economics Institute of Bard College, which has laid particular stress on the work of the late Hyman Minsky.**

    So what might—and should—happen now? The big danger, evidently, is of a financial collapse. The principal offset, in the short run, to the inevitable cuts in spending in the private sector of the crisis-afflicted economies will also be vastly bigger fiscal deficits.

    Fortunately, the US and the other afflicted high-income countries have one advantage over the emerging economies: they borrow in their own currencies and have creditworthy governments. Unlike emerging economies, they can therefore slash interest rates and increase fiscal deficits.

    Yet the huge fiscal boosts and associated government recapitalisation of shattered financial systems are only a temporary solution. There can be no return to business as usual. It is, above all, neither desirable nor sustainable for global macroeconomic balance to be achieved by recycling huge savings surpluses into the excess consumption of the world’s richest consumers. The former point is self-evident, while the latter has been demonstrated by the recent financial collapse.

    So among the most important tasks ahead is to create a system of global finance that allows a more balanced world economy, with excess savings being turned into either high-return investment or consumption by the world’s poor, including in capital-exporting countries such as China. A part of the answer will be the development of local-currency finance in emerging economies, which would make it easier for them to run current account deficits than proved to be the case in the past three decades.

    It is essential in any case for countries in a position to do so to expand domestic demand vigorously. Only in this way can the recessionary impulse coming from the corrections in the debt-laden countries be offset.

    Yet there is a still bigger challenge ahead. The crisis demonstrates that the world has been unable to combine liberalised capital markets with a reasonable degree of financial stability. A particular problem has been the tendency for large net capital flows and associated current account and domestic financial balances to generate huge crises. This is the biggest of them all.

    Lessons must be learnt. But those should not just be about the regulation of the financial sector. Nor should they be only about monetary policy. They must be about how liberalised finance can be made to support the global economy rather than destabilise it.

    This is no little local difficulty. It raises the deepest questions about the way forward for our integrated world economy. The learning must start now.

    *“Is the 2007 US subprime financial crisis so different? An international historical comparison.” Working paper 13761, www.nber.org

    **The US economy: Is there a way out of the woods? November 2007, www.levyinstitute.org

    The writer is the FT’s chief economics commentator and author of Fixing Global Finance, published in the US this month by Johns Hopkins University Press and forthcoming in the UK through Yale University Press.

    Associated Program:
    Region(s):
    Asia

Latin America

  • Working Paper No. 1031 | October 2023
    This study aims to develop an ecological stock-flow consistent (SFC) model based on the Latin American–stylized facts regarding economic, financial, and environmental features. We combine the macro-financial theoretical framework by Pérez-Caldentey et al. (2021, 2023) and the ecological modeling of Carnevali et al. (2020) and Dafermos et al. (2018). We discuss two scenarios that test exogenous climate-related shocks. The first scenario presents the case in which international regulation on commodity trade becomes more stringent due to environmental concerns, thus worsening the balance-of-payment constraint of the region. The second scenario concerns the increase in frequency and intensity of adverse climate events in the region. Both scenarios show that the financial external constraint that determines the growth path of Latin American economies may be further exacerbated due to environmental-related issues.
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    Associated Program(s):
    Author(s):
    Lorenzo Nalin Giuliano Toshiro Yajima Leonardo Rojas Rodriguez Esteban Pérez Caldentey José Eduardo Alatorre
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    Region(s):
    Latin America

  • Policy Note 2022/3 | May 2022
    In the second round of the Chilean presidential elections, the coalition led by Gabriel Boric secured a victory under the premise of delivering long-awaited reforms to a financially volatile, structurally fragile, and deeply unequal economic structure. In this policy note, Giuliano Toshiro Yajima sheds light on these three aspects of the Chilean economy, showing that its external and internal fragility feeds back on the excessive specialization and heterogeneity of the productive sectors, which in turn influence income and wealth distribution.
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    Associated Program:
    Author(s):
    Region(s):
    Latin America

  • Working Paper No. 999 | January 2022
    Does Financial “Bonanza” Cause Premature Deindustrialization?
    The outbreak of COVID-19 brought back to the forefront the crucial importance of structural change and productive development for economic resilience to economic shocks. Several recent contributions have already stressed the perverse relationship that may exist between productive backwardness and the intensity of the COVID-19 socioeconomic crisis. In this paper, we analyze the factors that may have hindered productive development for over four decades before the pandemic. We investigate the role of (non-FDI) net capital inflows as a potential source of premature deindustrialization. We consider a sample of 36 developed and developing countries from 1980 to 2017, with major emphasis on the case of emerging and developing economies (EDE) in the context of increasing financial integration. We show that periods of abundant capital inflows may have caused the significant contraction of manufacturing share to employment and GDP, as well as the decrease of the economic complexity index. We also show that phenomena of “perverse” structural change are significantly more relevant in EDE countries than advanced ones. Based on such evidence, we conclude with some policy suggestions highlighting capital controls and external macroprudential measures taming international capital mobility as useful tools for promoting long-run productive development on top of strengthening (short-term) financial and macroeconomic stability.
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    Associated Program:
    Author(s):
    Alberto Botta Giuliano Toshiro Yajima Gabriel Porcile
    Related Topic(s):
    Region(s):
    United States, Latin America, Europe, Middle East, Africa, Asia

  • Policy Note 2021/2 | May 2021
    The Impact of the Emergency Benefit on Poverty and Extreme Poverty in Brazil
    Research Scholar Luiza Nassif-Pires, Luísa Cardoso, and Ana Luíza Matos de Oliveira analyze the importance of the “emergency benefit” (Auxílio Emergencial) in containing the increase in poverty and extreme poverty in Brazil during the COVID-19 pandemic. They find the emergency benefit mitigated the loss of income, brought the poverty rate to historically low levels, and reduced inequality: poverty gaps in terms of gender and (to a lesser degree) race narrowed in 2020. However, their simulations show that a planned reduction in transfer levels for 2021 will result in the emergency benefit providing substantially less social protection against loss of income than its more robust 2020 version.
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    Associated Program(s):
    Author(s):
    Luiza Nassif Pires Luísa Cardoso Ana Luíza Matos de Oliveira
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    Region(s):
    Latin America

  • Working Paper No. 980 | December 2020
    A Stock-Flow Consistent Framework for Mexico
    This working paper empirically and theoretically analyzes the exchange rate’s role in Mexico’s development for the period 2004–19. We test the hypothesis of the re(emergence) of the balance sheet effect due to an increase in external debt in the nonfinancial corporate sector; higher foreign debt would affect private investment after episodes of real currency depreciation, in the spirit of the literature put forward by Gertler, Gilchrist, and Natalucci (2007) and Céspedes, Chang, and Velasco (2004). We build a stock-flow consistent (SFC) model, following the OPENFLEX model proposed in Godley and Lavoie (2006), to explore the balance sheet implications from a theoretical perspective. We simulate the 2014 fall in the Mexican peso generated by the drop in oil prices to replicate stylized facts for Mexico for the period under investigation. The scenario analysis points to a hysteresis effect of the real exchange rate (RER) depreciation on investment flows. That is, firms’ investment ratio does not completely recover from negative shocks in the currency.

  • Working Paper No. 975 | November 2020
    Some Insights from an Empirical Stock-Flow Consistent Model
    The Argentinean economy has just ended another lost decade. After the peak registered in 2011, the per capita GDP has oscillated with a decreasing trend, leaving the economy poorer than it was ten years before. During these ten years, different governments with conflicting macroeconomic programs were in power, none of them able to save the economy from stagflation. The goal of this paper is to address to what extent the economic performance would have been better had other policy combinations been implemented. The analysis is made through an empirical quarterly stock-flow consistent (SFC) model for the period 2007–19 in order to ensure the coherence of the results and to give the outcomes of the simulations a holistic and dynamically consistent interpretation. From the results of the simulations it seems that the problem that is keeping Argentina in stagflation goes beyond the domain of macroeconomics. The fact that in practice two divergent macroeconomic programs were implemented—neither of them being able to produce good and sustainable macroeconomic performance—is a first symptom that favors the case for that hypothesis. When the model is used to counterfactually test the policy recommendations of these approaches with the external conditions that prevailed while the opposite program was implemented, none of them yield results that can be deemed sustainable. Yet, the model developed in this paper can be useful for studying the different policy combinations that, given a specific context, can bring about more stable and sustainable dynamics for the Argentinean economy.
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    Associated Program:
    Author(s):
    Sebastian Valdecantos
    Related Topic(s):
    Region(s):
    Latin America

  • Public Policy Brief No. 153 | September 2020
    After spending over 6 percent of GDP responding to the COVID-19 crisis, Brazil has suffered among the worst per capita numbers in the world in terms of cases and deaths. In this policy brief, Luiza Nassif-Pires, Laura Carvalho, and Eduardo Rawet explore how stark inequalities along racial, regional, and class lines can help account for why the pandemic has had such a damaging impact on Brazil. Although they find that fiscal policy measures have so far neutralized the impact of the crisis with respect to income inequality, the existence of structural inequalities along racial lines in particular have resulted in an unequally shared public health burden. Broader policy changes are necessary for addressing dimensions of inequality that are rooted in structural racism.
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    Associated Program(s):
    Author(s):
    Luiza Nassif Pires Laura Carvalho Eduardo Rawet
    Related Topic(s):
    Region(s):
    Latin America

  • Working Paper No. 960 | July 2020
    Fiscal policy is useful as a government instrument for supporting the economy, contributing to an increase in employment, and reducing inequality through more egalitarian income distribution. Over the past 30 years, developing countries have failed to increase their real wages due to the lack of domestic value-added in the era of globalization, where global supply chains are the driving factor for attracting foreign direct investment. Under such circumstances, the role of fiscal policy has become an important factor in creating the necessary conditions for boosting the economy. With the end of commodity-export-led growth, Mexico experienced a moderate reduction of 5 percent in poverty between 2014 and 2018 due to the structural adjustment of social policies and its economic and trade relationship with the United States; during the same period there has been no change in poverty in Argentina, and Brazil has suffered a rise in poverty. Following the global financial crisis, greater attention has been paid to fiscal policy in developed and developing countries—specifically Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico (ABM)—in order to attain macroeconomic stability. One of the consequences of the financial crisis is rising income inequality and its negative effects on economic growth. Over the past decade, fiscal policy has been adopted for the economic recovery. However, the recovery has been accompanied by a decrease in real wages of the middle class. The purpose of the present research is to critically examine the results of fiscal policy in ABM and the United Nations’ 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.

  • Working Paper No. 919 | January 2019
    While the literature on theoretical macroeconomic models adopting the stock-flow-consistent (SFC) approach is flourishing, few contributions cover the methodology for building a SFC empirical model for a whole country. Most contributions simply try to feed national accounting data into a theoretical model inspired by Wynne Godley and Marc Lavoie (2007), albeit with different degrees of complexity.
     
    In this paper we argue instead that the structure of an empirical SFC model should start from a careful analysis of the specificities of a country’s sectoral balance sheets and flow of funds data, given the relevant research question to be addressed. We illustrate our arguments with examples for Greece, Italy, and Ecuador.
     
    We also provide some suggestions on how to consistently use the financial and nonfinancial accounts of institutional sectors, showing the link between SFC accounting structures and national accounting rules.

  • Working Paper No. 904 | May 2018
    This paper provides an empirical analysis of nonfinancial corporate debt in six large Latin American countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru), distinguishing between bond-issuing and non-bond-issuing firms, and assessing the debt’s macroeconomic implications. The paper uses a sample of 2,241 firms listed on the stock markets of their respective countries, comprising 34 sectors of economic activity for the period 2009–16. On the basis of liquidity, leverage, and profitability indicators, it shows that bond-issuing firms are in a worse financial position relative to non-bond-issuing firms. Using Minsky’s hedge/speculative/Ponzi taxonomy for financial fragility, we argue that there is a larger share of firms that are in a speculative or Ponzi position relative to the hedge category. Also, the share of hedge bond-issuing firms declines over time. Finally, the paper presents the results of estimating a nonlinear threshold econometric model, which demonstrates that beyond a leverage threshold, firms’ investment contracts while they increase their liquidity positions. This has important macroeconomic implications, since the listed and, in particular, bond-issuing firms (which tend to operate under high leverage levels) represent a significant share of assets and investment. This finding could account, in part, for the retrenchment in investment that the sample of countries included in the paper have experienced in the period under study and highlights the need to incorporate the international bond market in analyses of monetary transmission mechanisms.
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    Associated Program(s):
    Author(s):
    Esteban Pérez Caldentey Nicole Favreau-Negront Luis Méndez Lobos
    Related Topic(s):
    Region(s):
    Latin America

  • Conference Proceedings | April 2018
    A conference organized by the Levy Economics Institute of Bard College

    The proceedings include the 2017 conference program, transcripts of keynote speakers’ remarks, synopses of the panel sessions, and biographies of the participants.
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    Associated Program(s):
    Author(s):
    Michael Stephens
    Related Topic(s):
    Region(s):
    United States, Latin America, Europe

  • Public Policy Brief No. 143 | February 2017

    Since inheriting the Brazilian presidency five months ago, the new Temer administration has successfully ratified a constitutional amendment imposing a radical, two-decades-long public spending freeze, purportedly aimed at sparking an increase in business confidence and investment. In this policy brief, Fernando Cardim de Carvalho explains why this fiscal strategy is based not only on a flawed conception of the drivers of private-sector confidence and investment but also on a mistaken view of the roots of the current Brazilian economic crisis. The hoped-for “expansionary fiscal consolidation” is not likely to be achieved.

  • Policy Note 2016/2 | April 2016

    Brazil is mired in a joint economic and political crisis, and the way out is unclear. In 2015 the country experienced a steep contraction of output alongside elevated inflation, all while the fallout from a series of corruption scandals left the policymaking apparatus paralyzed. Looking ahead, implementing a policy strategy that has any hope of addressing the Brazilian economy’s multilayered problems would make serious demands on a political system that is most likely unable to bear it.

  • Working Paper No. 860 | February 2016
    Brazil at the Mid-2010s

    The Brazilian economy in 2015 was afflicted by a lethal combination of decelerating activity and accelerating inflation. Expectations for 2016 are equally or even more adverse, since the effects of rising unemployment emerge only after a lag. The domestic debate has pitted analysts who believe the crisis is due exclusively to past policy mistakes against those who believe that all was well until the government decided to implement austerity policies in 2015. A closer examination of the evidence shows that, in fact, both causes contributed to the crisis. But it also suggests that its depth has a more proximate cause in the political collapse of the federal government in 2015, which led Brazilian society to an impasse for which one cannot yet visualize the solution.

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    Latin America

  • Working Paper No. 853 | November 2015
    The Case of Colombia

    In recent years, Colombia has grown relatively rapidly, but it has been a biased growth. The energy sector (the “locomotora minero-energetica,” to use the rhetorical expression of President Juan Manuel Santos) grew much faster than the rest of the economy, while the manufacturing sector registered a negative rate of growth. These are classic symptoms of the well-known “Dutch disease,” but our purpose here is not to establish whether or not the Dutch disease exists, but rather to shed some light on the financial viability of several, simultaneous dynamics: (1) the existence of a traditional Dutch disease being due to a large increase in mining exports and a significant exchange rate appreciation; (2) a massive increase in foreign direct investment, particularly in the mining sector; (3) a rather passive monetary policy, aimed at increasing purchasing power via exchange rate appreciation; (4) and more recently, a large distribution of dividends from Colombia to the rest of the world and the accumulation of mounting financial liabilities. The paper shows that these dynamics constitute a potential danger for the stability of the Colombian economy. Some policy recommendations are also discussed.

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    Associated Program(s):
    Author(s):
    Alberto Botta Antoine Godin Marco Missaglia
    Related Topic(s):
    Region(s):
    Latin America

  • In the Media | September 2015
    By Fermin Koop
    Buenos Aires Herald, September 27, 2015. All Rights Reserved.

    Jan Kregel, one of the world’s most eminent Post-Keynesian economists specialized in financial crises and structural problems of developing economies, has written several papers on Argentina’s economy after the 2001–2002 economic meltdown. The director of research at the Levy Economics Institute at Bard College in upstate New York, Kregel served as rapporteur of the president of the UN General Assembly’s Commission on Reform of the International Financial System.

    In Buenos Aires for a conference, Kregel met with the Herald and discussed the country’s economy, highlighting that the currency is in desperate need of a devaluation. At the same time, he said the country shouldn’t take action regarding the “vulture” funds, which he linked to late special AMIA prosecutor Alberto Nisman....

    Read more: http://www.buenosairesherald.com/article/199670/kregel-‘do-nothing-about-vulture-funds-let-the-case-sit-there’
    Associated Program:
    Region(s):
    Latin America
  • In the Media | September 2015
    Página|12, 26 Septiembre 2015. Reservados todos los derechos.

    “No se puede mirar el crecimiento económico sin empleo. Si se va a desarrollar la economía, no importa la tasa de inversión o de crecimiento si no se genera empleo”, destacó el prestigioso economista estadounidense Jan Kregel, durante su intervención en el Congreso sobre Pensamiento Económico Latinoamericano. El investigador poskeynesiano compartió el panel junto con el especialista francés Pascal Petit, quien advirtió que hacia fin de año habrá 19 millones de desempleados en la Eurozona, unos siete millones más que durante 2008....

    Lee más: http://www.pagina12.com.ar/diario/economia/2-282499-2015-09-26.html
    Associated Program:
    Region(s):
    Latin America
  • In the Media | June 2015
    Genaro Grasso
    Tiempo, 07 de Junio de 2015. Todos los derechos reservados.

    El economista griego señala que los especuladores deberían estar regulados de la misma manera que las entidades financieras, tanto en forma global como a nivel país.

    Apunta contra los efectos de la globalización en tanto ha sido el canal de difusión de una nueva ola de determinismo neoliberal, en los países en desarrollo y también en los desarrollados....

    Leer más:
    http://tiempo.infonews.com/nota/154525/los-fondos-buitre-deben-ser-abolidos-del-sistema
    Associated Program:
    Author(s):
    Region(s):
    Latin America, Europe
  • In the Media | August 2014
    Etorno Inteligente, August 22, 2014. All Rights Reserved.

    Portafolio
     / Colombia comete un gran error en perseguir el objetivo de entrar a la Organización para la Cooperación y el Desarrollo Económicos (Ocde), porque eso debe ser para países con un grado similar de desarrollo, dice el economista Jan Kregel, investigador del Levy Economics Institute of Board College de Estados Unidos.

    El experto, relator de la Comisión de la ONU sobre la reforma al sistema financiero internacional, participa en la Décima Semana Económica de la Universidad Central.

    Colombia ha basado su crecimiento en productos básicos. ¿Cómo mantener esa tendencia a largo plazo? 

    Lo que se puede predecir para una economía como la colombiana es una crisis externa sustantiva porque, si se mira el déficit externo, algo así como el 50 por ciento de las exportaciones de Colombia provienen del petróleo. Si hay una disminución de los precios, el primer impacto es empeorar el déficit externo y reducir los flujos financieros y habrá una presión fuerte sobre la tasa de cambio y la posición de los exportadores empeorará.

    ¿Qué debe el país hacer para reactivar la industria? 

    Hay un impacto de la enfermedad holandesa. Las exportaciones de materias primas han tenido una elevación de precios y han apreciado la tasa de cambio. Por eso, otras exportaciones son menos competitivas. Otro factor es la redistribución de las manufacturas globalmente. Si uno mira el impacto de las importaciones en la economía colombiana, hay un gran incremento de las compras a Asia.

    ¿Colombia tiene enfermedad holandesa? 

    Absolutamente sí. La enfermedad holandesa se puede clasificar de dos maneras: una es simplemente el impacto de los productos básicos, creando una mejora en los términos de comercio y un aumento de los ingresos del país. Pero el impacto de la tasa de cambio en la competitividad acaba con un incremento de los ingresos nacionales y al mismo tiempo se abaratan los bienes importados.

    El peligro real de la enfermedad holandesa no está solamente en la tasa de cambio, sino que se ve en la distribución del consumo de productos nacionales a importados.

    Una mejora en los precios de las materias primas es lo mismo que un incremento en los ingresos nacionales pero, al mismo tiempo, esto causa una apreciación en la tasa de cambio y el ingreso doméstico incrementado se va a gastar en bienes más baratos y estos son los importados. Entonces es un factor doble.

    ¿Es sano para Colombia ingresar a la Ocde? 

    Es un gran error. México y Corea cometieron el mismo error y ambos sufrieron crisis financieras sustantivas como resultado de esto. Si nos remontamos a las viejas teorías de los economistas estructuralistas, se alegó que una de las condiciones básicas para ingresar a cualquier tipo de acuerdo de esta naturaleza es que hubiese un nivel similar de desarrollo, de productividad y de competitividad.

    Colombia va a entrar a la Ocde sin preocuparnos por competir con Estados Unidos, y estamos hablando de competir con México. La pregunta es si Colombia va a ser capaz de competir en los mercados internacionales con otros países en desarrollo que ya están en la Ocde y no parece prometedor. ¿Por qué se quiere entrar a la Ocde? Es básicamente para darles confianza a los inversionistas extranjeros para que inviertan en Colombia, pero esto implica empoderar más la enfermedad holandesa.

    Pero Colombia es hoy uno de los países de Latinoamérica que más crece. 

    Es un crecimiento que desilusiona. No se puede mirar crecimiento sin empleo. Si se va a desarrollar la economía no importa qué tan alta sea la tasa de inversión ni qué tan alto sea el crecimiento si no se genera empleo. Si no se reduce el sector informal no se está generando desarrollo.

    Pero el desempleo ha bajado… 

    Ha bajado, pero no es mucho y sigue siendo sumamente alto. Hay un problema de desempleo disfrazado que debe ser de 40 por ciento. La pregunta es ¿Por qué? La explicación proviene de la enfermedad holandesa y del impacto sobre el sector de manufacturas.

    ¿HAY QUE REGULAR MERCADOS? 

    La dificultad es que nunca habrá una regulación que dé estabilidad a los mercados financieros en el mundo, porque estos siempre van adelante de los reguladores.

    La reglamentación está para reducir la rentabilidad de los bancos y estos existen solo si pueden tener utilidades sustanciales en su negocio.

    Fernando González P. Subeditor Economía y Negocios 

    −−> Colombia comete un gran error en perseguir el objetivo de entrar a la Organización para la Cooperación y el Desarrollo Económicos (Ocde), porque eso debe ser para países con un grado similar de desarrollo, dice el economista Jan Kregel, investigador del Levy Economics Institute of Board College de Estados Unidos.

    El experto, relator de la Comisión de la ONU sobre la reforma al sistema financiero internacional, participa en la Décima Semana Económica de la Universidad Central.

    Colombia ha basado su crecimiento en productos básicos. ¿Cómo mantener esa tendencia a largo plazo? 

    Lo que se puede predecir para una economía como la colombiana es una crisis externa sustantiva porque, si se mira el déficit externo, algo así como el 50 por ciento de las exportaciones de Colombia provienen del petróleo. Si hay una disminución de los precios, el primer impacto es empeorar el déficit externo y reducir los flujos financieros y habrá una presión fuerte sobre la tasa de cambio y la posición de los exportadores empeorará.

    ¿Qué debe el país hacer para reactivar la industria? 

    Hay un impacto de la enfermedad holandesa. Las exportaciones de materias primas han tenido una elevación de precios y han apreciado la tasa de cambio. Por eso, otras exportaciones son menos competitivas. Otro factor es la redistribución de las manufacturas globalmente. Si uno mira el impacto de las importaciones en la economía colombiana, hay un gran incremento de las compras a Asia.

    ¿Colombia tiene enfermedad holandesa? 

    Absolutamente sí. La enfermedad holandesa se puede clasificar de dos maneras: una es simplemente el impacto de los productos básicos, creando una mejora en los términos de comercio y un aumento de los ingresos del país. Pero el impacto de la tasa de cambio en la competitividad acaba con un incremento de los ingresos nacionales y al mismo tiempo se abaratan los bienes importados.

    El peligro real de la enfermedad holandesa no está solamente en la tasa de cambio, sino que se ve en la distribución del consumo de productos nacionales a importados.

    Una mejora en los precios de las materias primas es lo mismo que un incremento en los ingresos nacionales pero, al mismo tiempo, esto causa una apreciación en la tasa de cambio y el ingreso doméstico incrementado se va a gastar en bienes más baratos y estos son los importados. Entonces es un factor doble.

    ¿Es sano para Colombia ingresar a la Ocde? 

    Es un gran error. México y Corea cometieron el mismo error y ambos sufrieron crisis financieras sustantivas como resultado de esto. Si nos remontamos a las viejas teorías de los economistas estructuralistas, se alegó que una de las condiciones básicas para ingresar a cualquier tipo de acuerdo de esta naturaleza es que hubiese un nivel similar de desarrollo, de productividad y de competitividad.

    Colombia va a entrar a la Ocde sin preocuparnos por competir con Estados Unidos, y estamos hablando de competir con México. La pregunta es si Colombia va a ser capaz de competir en los mercados internacionales con otros países en desarrollo que ya están en la Ocde y no parece prometedor. ¿Por qué se quiere entrar a la Ocde? Es básicamente para darles confianza a los inversionistas extranjeros para que inviertan en Colombia, pero esto implica empoderar más la enfermedad holandesa.

    Pero Colombia es hoy uno de los países de Latinoamérica que más crece. 

    Es un crecimiento que desilusiona. No se puede mirar crecimiento sin empleo. Si se va a desarrollar la economía no importa qué tan alta sea la tasa de inversión ni qué tan alto sea el crecimiento si no se genera empleo. Si no se reduce el sector informal no se está generando desarrollo.

    Pero el desempleo ha bajado… 

    Ha bajado, pero no es mucho y sigue siendo sumamente alto. Hay un problema de desempleo disfrazado que debe ser de 40 por ciento. La pregunta es ¿Por qué? La explicación proviene de la enfermedad holandesa y del impacto sobre el sector de manufacturas.

    ¿HAY QUE REGULAR MERCADOS? 

    La dificultad es que nunca habrá una regulación que dé estabilidad a los mercados financieros en el mundo, porque estos siempre van adelante de los reguladores.

    La reglamentación está para reducir la rentabilidad de los bancos y estos existen solo si pueden tener utilidades sustanciales en su negocio.
    Associated Program:
    Author(s):
    Jan Kregel
    Region(s):
    Latin America
  • In the Media | April 2014
    Por Alfredo Zaiat
    Fracasos Múltiples Internacionales está regresando al escenario político y económico argentino. La moción de censura y la amenaza de iniciar el camino de la expulsión del país de esa institución por la calidad de las estadísticas públicas colocó al Gobierno en una situación incómoda. La opción era romper con ese organismo internacional, convirtiéndose en el único país del mundo en quedar fuera de esa entidad multilateral, lo que hubiera derivado en la marginación del G-20, en la clausura al acceso de créditos del Banco Mundial, el BID y del mercado, y en deteriorar la reputación internacional frente a otros países, o negociar el espacio de intervención de sus técnicos. Esta última fue la elección del gobierno de CFK. Implicó una primera evaluación silenciosa del FMI sobre el sistema financiero local el año pasado y luego la cooperación técnica para la elaboración del nuevo índice de precios al consumidor y la actualización del indicador PBI. La evaluación general de la economía (el conocido artículo IV del convenio constitutivo del Fondo, en cuya sección 3 establece “la supervisión de las políticas de tipo de cambio de los países miembros”) es la única cuestión de tensión en la relación Argentina-FMI.

    Aceptar la revisión anual es una decisión política, de carácter simbólico, más que económico. En Washington, en el marco de la Asamblea Anual conjunta del FMI-BM Axel Kicillof le reiteró a David Lipton, subdirector gerente del Fondo Monetario Internacional, que el país no analiza volver a aceptar las auditorías anuales. Argentina no registra deuda con el FMI después de que el 5 de enero de 2006 cancelara el total por 9530 millones de dólares, y no está negociando ni requiere de un crédito del organismo atado a condicionalidades en la política económica. Instrumenta una estrategia heterodoxa que no es simpática al staff del Fondo, como quedó expresado en el último Perspectivas Económicas Mundiales. Estos técnicos consideran a la Argentina como un mal ejemplo por su política económica de crecimiento, inclusión social y autonomía del mercado de capitales. También es resistida por la persistente crítica a las recetas ortodoxas realizada por CFK en foros internacionales.

    Después de ocho años de esa tensa relación, para las autoridades del Fondo les resulta satisfactorio retomar el vínculo con el país, como lo dijo su director gerente, Christine Lagarde, para mostrar que todas las ovejas están en el rebaño. Mientras, para el Gobierno le resulta necesario para despejar el frente externo en un contexto de escasez de divisas, y para facilitar la negociación del default de doce años con el Club de París. Incluso sin revisión anual de la economía es una reconciliación por conveniencia mutua.

    El entusiasmo que manifiestan analistas y economistas del establishment por cada comentario de funcionarios del Fondo o del Banco Mundial, excitación exacerbada si incluye algún componente crítico, es una particularidad argentina. En general las observaciones del Fondo no son tomadas con seriedad, puesto que ya ha habido suficiente experiencia global para comprobar el fracaso de sus recomendaciones. En los hechos, el FMI es esencialmente un actor político para condicionar políticas económicas en función de garantizar el pago de la deuda a los acreedores, además de preservar los intereses económicos de las potencias (Estados Unidos y Europa).

    Sobre ese rol del Fondo, la ex presidenta del Banco Central, Mercedes Marcó del Pont, señaló que “frente a los datos que muestran una desaceleración en las economías de la región el FMI, una vez más con serios problemas de diagnóstico, recomienda medidas que profundizarían los problemas. El desafío para América latina es utilizar el espacio de política ganado en estos años para sostener los niveles de actividad y empleo, con políticas anticíclicas, fundamentalmente en el terreno fiscal, para sostener la demanda interna”. Lo afirmó el miércoles pasado en la Minsky Conference, en Washington, siendo la primera vez que habló en público desde que dejó el cargo, ratificando que es diferente a otros ex funcionarios que cuando dejaron el gobierno se dedicaron a castigar a la Argentina en foros internacionales. Marcó Del Pont destacó la solvencia de la economía argentina en el 23rd Annual Hyman P. Minsky Conference on the State of the US and World Economics, organizado por el Levy Economics Institute. Participó del panel Financial re-regulation to support growth and employment (re-regulación financiera para impulsar el crecimiento y el empleo). Los principales conceptos de Marcó del Pont sobre la situación económica de América latina y, en particular, de Argentina, fueron los siguientes:

    - No puede ignorarse que los dos factores clave que han promovido a nivel agregado el crecimiento de la región, el denominado viento de cola (precios de los commodities y flujos de capital) han acentuado, salvo casos excepcionales como el de Argentina, la primarización de sus estructuras productivas.

    - América latina deberá lidiar con estos fenómenos en un contexto internacional que se presenta menos benévolo para nuestras naciones ya que ni las condiciones de liquidez internacional ni los términos del intercambio se proyectan tan favorables como hasta ahora.

    - El desafío pasa entonces por delinear estrategias anticíclicas que al mismo tiempo que busquen sostener los niveles de actividad y empleo, actúen también en la transformación de sus estructuras productivas, alentando la diversificación e industrialización. Para ello deben maximizar el uso del espacio de política ganado durante la década.

    - La región tiene márgenes de maniobra para encarar ese desafío. En gran medida ello quedó de manifiesto durante lo peor de la crisis de 2008-2009. Disponen, por un lado, de mercados internos dinámicos que han constituido la base de sustentación del crecimiento durante los últimos años. Y a diferencia de lo ocurrido en las décadas del ’80 y ’90 América latina no atraviesa en general por situaciones de fragilidad financiera o elevada exposición en materia de endeudamiento externo. Ambos rasgos son particularmente ciertos en el caso de Argentina.

    - Ahora bien, esta descripción no supone ignorar que en la gran mayoría de los países de la región (ciertamente no en Argentina) persiste un elevado grado de integración con los mercados financieros internacionales, lo cual potencia su exposición a los ciclos de liquidez internacional. Recordemos que la cuenta capital y financiera de América latina registra el más elevado grado de apertura de todas las economías del mundo en desarrollo.

    - El diagnóstico predominante y las recomendaciones subsecuentes que surgen del main stream no toman en cuenta estos fenómenos estructurales, complejos, que caracterizan a nuestras economías. Persiste, en cambio, una unilateral preocupación por la ausencia de “reformas estructurales” (léase mayor flexibilización del mercado de trabajo) o por la presencia de la “dominancia fiscal” (léase ajuste fiscal) como uno de los principales fenómenos explicativos de inestabilidad macroeconómica y de crisis. Se soslaya en el debate la importancia de la “dominancia de la balanza de pagos” como factor que históricamente ha truncado los procesos de desarrollo de América latina.

    - Abordar las condiciones de la re-regulación financiera para el crecimiento y el empleo requiere incorporar a la regulación de los flujos de capital dentro del instrumental permanente de política económica de los países en desarrollo. Y los bancos centrales deberían jugar un rol activo en ese terreno.

    - Esa regulación de la cuenta capital incluyó, a partir de 2011, restricciones a la compra de moneda extranjera para fines de ahorro por parte de los argentinos, la cual se había constituido en una fuente desestabilizadora del mercado de cambios y en canal de fuga del excedente económico por fuera del circuito de inversión y consumo. En efecto, el elevado bimonetarismo que todavía caracteriza a nuestra economía es un condicionante no menor para la administración del mercado de cambios.

    - Ahora bien, ¿cómo se ubica Argentina frente al ya mencionado escenario internacional menos favorable? Sin duda alguna el haber regulado el ingreso de capitales de portafolio nos torna menos vulnerables a los cambios que se presentan en el ciclo de liquidez, no sólo en términos de volúmenes sino, en un futuro no tan lejano, de tasas de interés. Frente a la aparición en los últimos años de un ligero desequilibrio externo el desafío de la política económica es garantizar las fuentes de recursos externos que nos permitan sostener los niveles de actividad y empleo, y en paralelo abordar los déficit sectoriales que impactan en las cuentas externas. Y en ese sentido el desequilibrio industrial y energético deben ubicarse en el centro de las prioridades.

    - Argentina tiene, entonces, espacio para buscar recursos externos que se orienten hacia los destinos estratégicos que remuevan los obstáculos estructurales y garanticen capacidad de repago.

    - Vale la pena insistir, el carácter virtuoso o no que asuma el acceso de Argentina, ya sea de su soberano como de sus empresas, a corrientes de inversión directa o de financiamiento depende de manera decisiva en la asignación de esos recursos y su capacidad para remover las causas estructurales del estrangulamiento externo. Dicho en otros términos en la capacidad para promover el proceso de desarrollo, esto es, de transformación productiva y una más equitativa distribución del ingreso. Este conjunto de ideas puede actuar de buen antídoto ante tanta contaminación en el debate económico, al que ahora se ha vuelto a incorporar en forma activa el FMI. 
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  • In the Media | October 2013
    Agência Brasil
    DCI, 26 Setembro 2013. © 2013 DCI - Diário Comércio Indústria & Serviços. Todos os direitos reservados.

    RIO DE JANEIRO - Batista citou como dado favorável a força do mercado de trabalho brasileiro, que vem apresentando números positivos, apesar da crise econômica mundial...

    RIO DE JANEIRO - O diretor executivo do Fundo Monetário Internacional (FMI), Paulo Nogueira Batista, que representa o Brasil e mais dez países no órgão, disse nesta quinta-feira (26) que os fundamentos da economia brasileira estão razoáveis e que o ponto que merece mais atenção são as contas externas.

    “Os [fundamentos] fiscais estão bastante razoáveis, a política monetária também, a regulação do sistema financeiro boa. No setor externo, a deterioração da conta corrente preocupa um pouco, mas as reservas são altas e a entrada de investimentos diretos é alta. Então, eu diria que está razoável. Acho que tem de ficar de olho [nas contas externas], porque não convém ter déficit em conta corrente muito alto. É um ponto preocupante, mas não é alarmante”, avaliou Batista, que frisou estar declarando opinião própria, e não do fundo.

    Batista participou do seminário Governança Financeira Depois da Crise, promovido pelo Multidisciplinary Institute on Development and Strategie (Minds) e o Levy Economics Institute.

    Sobre a reportagem da revista britânica The Economist intitulada Has Brazil blown up? (Será que o Brasil estragou tudo?, em tradução livre), que foi às bancas hoje, questionando se o país fracassou na política econômica atual, depois de ter ido bem nos anos anteriores, Batista acredita que o país está apresentando recuperação progressiva.

    “O Brasil passou por uma fase de grande sucesso, era moda e referência. Havia um certo exagero naquela época, até 2011. Agora houve uma reavaliação mais negativa e está indo para o extremo oposto. Acho que o Brasil está crescendo menos do que o esperado, menos do que pode crescer. Na verdade, a desaceleração de 2011 foi desejada e planejada pelo governo brasileiro, porque havia a percepção, correta, de que em 2010 o país estava superaquecendo. Houve medidas deliberadas para desaquecer a economia, isso provocou uma queda na taxa de crescimento, o que não foi surpresa. O que foi uma surpresa negativa foi a dificuldade de se recuperar em 2012 e em 2013. Mas eu creio que agora estamos vivendo uma recuperação mais clara, ainda incipiente, mas os dados estão mostrando que a economia está se reativando”, disse.

    O diretor do FMI citou como dado favorável a força do mercado de trabalho brasileiro, que vem apresentando números positivos, apesar da crise econômica mundial, o que pode sinalizar um início de recuperação. “O mercado de trabalho é uma surpresa positiva nesse período todo. Apesar da desaceleração forte da economia, o mercado de trabalho continua forte. A taxa de desemprego aberta está bastante baixa, os salários continuam crescendo. O desempenho não é tão favorável quanto se esperava, mas eu acho que vem uma recuperação”, acrescentou.
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  • In the Media | September 2013
    Marcos Barbosa
    RBV News, 27 Setembro 2013. © 2012 www.rbvnews.com.br. Todos os Direitos Reservados.

    O diretor executivo do Fundo Monetário Internacional (FMI), Paulo Nogueira Batista, que representa o Brasil e mais dez países no órgão, disse hoje (26) que os fundamentos da economia brasileira estão razoáveis e que o ponto que merece mais atenção são as contas externas.

    “Os [fundamentos] fiscais estão bastante razoáveis, a política monetária também, a regulação do sistema financeiro boa. No setor externo, a deterioração da conta corrente preocupa um pouco, mas as reservas são altas e a entrada de investimentos diretos é alta. Então, eu diria que está razoável. Acho que tem de ficar de olho [nas contas externas], porque não convém ter déficit em conta corrente muito alto. É um ponto preocupante, mas não é alarmante”, avaliou Batista, que frisou estar declarando opinião própria, e não do fundo.

    Batista participou do seminário Governança Financeira Depois da Crise, promovido pelo Multidisciplinary Institute on Development and Strategie (Minds) e o Levy Economics Institute.

    Sobre a reportagem da revista britânica The Economist intitulada Has Brazil blown up? (Será que o Brasil estragou tudo?, em tradução livre), que foi às bancas hoje, questionando se o país fracassou na política econômica atual, depois de ter ido bem nos anos anteriores, Batista acredita que o país está apresentando recuperação progressiva.

    “O Brasil passou por uma fase de grande sucesso, era moda e referência. Havia um certo exagero naquela época, até 2011. Agora houve uma reavaliação mais negativa e está indo para o extremo oposto. Acho que o Brasil está crescendo menos do que o esperado, menos do que pode crescer. Na verdade, a desaceleração de 2011 foi desejada e planejada pelo governo brasileiro, porque havia a percepção, correta, de que em 2010 o país estava superaquecendo. Houve medidas deliberadas para desaquecer a economia, isso provocou uma queda na taxa de crescimento, o que não foi surpresa. O que foi uma surpresa negativa foi a dificuldade de se recuperar em 2012 e em 2013. Mas eu creio que agora estamos vivendo uma recuperação mais clara, ainda incipiente, mas os dados estão mostrando que a economia está se reativando”, disse.

    O diretor do FMI citou como dado favorável a força do mercado de trabalho brasileiro, que vem apresentando números positivos, apesar da crise econômica mundial, o que pode sinalizar um início de recuperação. “O mercado de trabalho é uma surpresa positiva nesse período todo. Apesar da desaceleração forte da economia, o mercado de trabalho continua forte. A taxa de desemprego aberta está bastante baixa, os salários continuam crescendo. O desempenho não é tão favorável quanto se esperava, mas eu acho que vem uma recuperação”, acrescentou. 
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    Latin America, Europe
  • In the Media | September 2013
    Fator Brasil, 27 Setembro 2013. © Copyright 2006 - 2013 Fator Brasil.

    Rio de Janeiro – O diretor executivo do Fundo Monetário Internacional (FMI), Paulo Nogueira Batista, que representa o Brasil e mais dez países no órgão, disse no dia 26 de setembro (quinta-feira), que os fundamentos da economia brasileira estão razoáveis e que o ponto que merece mais atenção são as contas externas. 

    “Os [fundamentos] fiscais estão bastante razoáveis, a política monetária também, a regulação do sistema financeiro boa. No setor externo, a deterioração da conta corrente preocupa um pouco, mas as reservas são altas e a entrada de investimentos diretos é alta. Então, eu diria que está razoável. Acho que tem de ficar de olho [nas contas externas], porque não convém ter déficit em conta corrente muito alto. É um ponto preocupante, mas não é alarmante”, avaliou Batista, que frisou estar declarando opinião própria, e não do fundo. 

    Batista participou do seminário Governança Financeira Depois da Crise, promovido pelo Multidisciplinary Institute on Development and Strategie (Minds) e o Levy Economics Institute. 

    Sobre a reportagem da revista britânica The Economist intitulada Has Brazil blown up? (Será que o Brasil estragou tudo?, em tradução livre), que foi às bancas hoje, questionando se o país fracassou na política econômica atual, depois de ter ido bem nos anos anteriores, Batista acredita que o país está apresentando recuperação progressiva.  “O Brasil passou por uma fase de grande sucesso, era moda e referência. Havia um certo exagero naquela época, até 2011. Agora houve uma reavaliação mais negativa e está indo para o extremo oposto. Acho que o Brasil está crescendo menos do que o esperado, menos do que pode crescer. Na verdade, a desaceleração de 2011 foi desejada e planejada pelo governo brasileiro, porque havia a percepção, correta, de que em 2010 o país estava superaquecendo. Houve medidas deliberadas para desaquecer a economia, isso provocou uma queda na taxa de crescimento, o que não foi surpresa. O que foi uma surpresa negativa foi a dificuldade de se recuperar em 2012 e em 2013. Mas eu creio que agora estamos vivendo uma recuperação mais clara, ainda incipiente, mas os dados estão mostrando que a economia está se reativando”, disse. 

    O diretor do FMI citou como dado favorável a força do mercado de trabalho brasileiro, que vem apresentando números positivos, apesar da crise econômica mundial, o que pode sinalizar um início de recuperação. “O mercado de trabalho é uma surpresa positiva nesse período todo. Apesar da desaceleração forte da economia, o mercado de trabalho continua forte. A taxa de desemprego aberta está bastante baixa, os salários continuam crescendo. O desempenho não é tão favorável quanto se esperava, mas eu acho que vem uma recuperação”, acrescentou.
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    Latin America, Europe
  • In the Media | September 2013
    Lucianne Carneiro
    O Globo Econômico, 26 Setembro 2013.  © 1996–2013. Todos direitos reservados a Infoglobo Comunicação e Participações S.A. 

    RIO – Professor da Universidade de Buenos Aires e pesquisador do Centro de Estudos de Estado e de Sociedade (Cedes), Roberto Frenkel afirma que os países emergentes, especialmente na América do Sul, não escaparão de um processo de desvalorização cambial para se ajustar ao novo cenário mundial, com elevação das taxas de juros nos Estados Unidos e menor ritmo de expansão da economia chinesa. A atual situação do câmbio muito apreciado tende a dificultar esse ajuste, com consequências como inflação.

    — Peru, Colômbia, Chile, Brasil e Argentina são alguns dos países que apreciaram demais suas moedas e agora terão que subir o câmbio — diz Frenkel, que está no Rio para participar do seminário “Governança Financeira depois da Crise”, promovido pelo Minds, Instituto Multidisciplinar de Desenvolvimento e Estratégia, em parceria com o Levy Economics Institute.

    Na avaliação de Frenkel, a vulnerabilidade externa dos países sul-americanos recuou e não se deve ver uma crise como no passado. A região não aproveitou integralmente, no entanto, o bom momento da economia mundial nos últimos anos. Crítico às políticas do governo de Cristina Kirchner, Frenkel diz que a Argentina tem um grave desequilíbrio em seu balanço de pagamentos, além de uma inflação “insustentável”.

    Alguns economistas afirmam que a recuperação da economia mundial está forte, outros dizem que o movimento não é sustentável. Qual é a sua avaliação?

    Os Estados Unidos estão se recuperando lentamente. Aliás, é isso que tem provocado o ajuste na política monetária. A Europa, por sua vez, continua na crise, a situação não está resolvida para nenhum país. Houve um incremento do Produto Interno Bruto (PIB, soma dos bens e riquezas de um país), mas a União Europeia vai continuar com sua grande crise. O que se vê de diferente é o ritmo de crescimento econômico dos países emergentes. Os países emergentes continuam crescendo mais rápido que os desenvolvidos, mas a taxa de expansão desacelerou. Aquele ganho mais rápido dos emergentes acabou.

    Países emergentes tiveram um certo alívio quando o Federal Reserve (Fed, o banco central americano) manteve os estímulos à economia na última semana. O que veremos agora?

    A decisão do Federal Reserve (Fed, banco central americano) de manter os estímulos é temporária. É certo que em algum momento as taxas de juros dos Estados Unidos vão subir. Essa perspectiva é bem concreta, mesmo que o Fed diga que vai manter o estímulo. É certo que a política monetária vai mudar. E a China também está mudando seu ritmo de crescimento para permitir a transição de seu modelo de crescimento de uma base de exportações para ser puxado pelo consumo interno. O que vemos é um novo ritmo de crescimento da economia mundial, e é preciso se ajustar a isso.

    Como os emergentes devem ficar nesse cenário?

    O crescimento menor da China afeta principalmente os exportadores de minerais e metais, já que o investimento será menor. E muitos emergentes estão com o câmbio apreciado e terão que se ajustar. A Índia, com um déficit grande em conta corrente e saída de capitais, tem uma situação mais complicada.

    A vulnerabilidade externa dos países da América do Sul está menor?

    A situação hoje na maioria dos países é robusta, existe um endividamento menor e esse ajustamento (ao novo ritmo da economia) não vai gerar crise como no passado. A vulnerabilidade externa foi muito reduzida. Mas o que na verdade se viu é que quase uma década excepcionalmente boa para a economia (entre 2002 e 2012) não foi aproveitada pelos países da América do Sul. A Argentina vive hoje tomada pelo forte populismo. O Brasil, por sua vez, alcançou um crescimento baixo. A região precisa de um crescimento econômico maior, que seja suficiente para alcançar um novo nível de desenvolvimento.

    Como os países da América do Sul terão que lidar com o câmbio?

    O tema central da economia da América do Sul hoje é como lidar com a desvalorização do câmbio neste momento de ajustamento ao novo cenário mundial, que complica a política econômica. Os países da região estão com o câmbio muito apreciado. Os exportadores foram beneficiados pela melhora do preço de exportações. Houve uma desvalorização transitória, mas seguiu-se uma apreciação cambial. Nessa situação de câmbio apreciado, fica mais difícil se ajustar a um novo cenário mundial. Esse ajuste se faz pelo câmbio mais alto. Quanto mais apreciado o câmbio, mais custoso é o ajustamento. E a desvalorização cambial traz consequências como o impacto na inflação e a queda salarial a curto prazo. Peru, Colômbia, Chile, Brasil, Argentina são alguns dos países que apreciaram demais suas moedas e agora terão que subir o câmbio.

    Quais as principais dificuldades hoje da economia argentina?

    Há um problema grave no balanço de pagamentos. Nós estamos perdendo reservas e, por causa do risco político, não temos acesso ao financiamento do mercado externo. E nesse contexto temos um controle forte do câmbio. Há o câmbio paralelo e o fixo, com uma diferença de cerca de 60%. Esse câmbio paralelo é o sintoma do grande desequilíbrio atual. Vamos ter que sair dessa situação.

    É possível esperar um ajuste pelo governo?

    Está claro que o governo de Cristina Kirchner não deve ser reeleito. A dúvida é se esse governo vai fazer esse ajuste antes de sair ou deixar os problemas para o próximo presidente.

    A desvalorização do câmbio deve ter impacto maior na Argentina por causa de uma inflação já elevada?

    A inflação na Argentina está muito distante dos números oficiais, o governo falsifica os dados. É uma situação insustentável. Nós temos uma inflação de 25% ao ano. No Brasil, os economistas estão preocupados com o efeito do câmbio na inflação. Agora imagine o impacto na Argentina. O país vai enfrentar uma aceleração inflacionária grande por causa do câmbio, que terá que passar por uma desvalorização significativa.
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  • In the Media | September 2013
    Ana Paula Grabois
    Brasil Econômico, 26 Setembro 2013. © Copyright 2009–2012 Brasil Econômico. Todos os Direitos Reservados.

    Dimitri Papadimitriou defende uma regulação do sistema financeiro mais forte: “A vigente não foi capaz de evitar o colapso de 2008.”

    Pesidente do Instituto Levy Economics, de Nova York, Dimitri Papadimitriou, é um crítico feroz da autorregulação do mercado financeiro. O economista grego, radicado há 45 anos nos Estados Unidos, dirige o instituto que elabora pesquisas sobre os mercados financeiros e sobre o que se pode fazer para evitar crises, como a de 2008. Papadimitriou defende uma regulação financeira mais forte que se antecipe aos choques. "Precisamos re-regular o sistema financeiro. Porque a regulação vigente não foi capaz de evitar o colapso de 2008".

    Em sua primeira visita ao Brasil, para participar da conferência "Governança financeira depois da crise", organizada pelo instituto que preside em parceria com o Instituto Multidisciplinar de Desenvolvimento e Estratégia (Minds), o economista diz que a instabilidade é inexorável ao sistema capitalista. "O aspecto mais importante é como regular esse sistema para prevenir que esse tipo de coisa aconteça de novo. Ou se entende as crises como acasos que ocorrem por choques e que não podem ser regulados", afirma o economista, ao Brasil Econômico, na véspera da conferência, que ocorre hoje e amanhã, no Rio.

    Para o economista, é possível prever eventos que determinam instabilidades futuras, e assim, evitar crises mais complexas. Apesar de governos espalhados pelo mundo defenderem a ampliação dos mecanismos de regulação financeira, Papadimitriou diz que muito pouco foi feito.

    "Desde o colapso de Lehman Brothers, nós ainda não tivemos nenhum progresso para prevenir que isso aconteça de novo", afirma. Parte do progresso quase nulo diz respeito à concentração das transações financeiras mas mãos de um grupo pequeno de grandes bancos. "É mais fácil regular os bancos pequenos porque você sabe o que realmente ele faz. Algumas vezes, é difícil entender o que os grandes bancos fazem e precificar o risco. A tendência desde 2008 é subprecificar os riscos dos bancos".

    Com tantos tipos de transações, entre depósitos, empréstimos, títulos, investimento, derivativos em poucos bancos, a atual estrutura regulatória - seja nos Estados Unidos, na Europa ou na América Latina - é ineficaz. "É preciso saber quem regula e supervisiona quem e o quê", completa.

    Na sua avaliação, os grandes bancos atingidos pela crise e depois ajudados pelo governo americano, como Citibank, JPMorgan e Chase Manhattan, continuam no controle das transações financeiras no mundo, sem avanços na regulação de suas atividades. "As restrições foram incapazes, por exemplo, de controlar questões como o caso da Baleia de Londres. O JP Morgan perdeu US$ 6 bilhões para seus clientes e teve US 1 bilhão de multa. Isso mostra que ainda falta regulação", diz. O escândalo do JP Morgan envolveu operações de alto risco com papeis derivativos.

    O presidente do Levy Economics afirma que num mundo onde as transações financeiras equivalem a 35 vezes o valor do comércio de bens e serviços entre os países, a complexidade das transações aumenta, o que dificulta ainda mais a supervisão do mercado. Papadimitriou defende a modificação das estruturas de regulação no mundo, a começar pelos Estados Unidos. "O grande problema é o lobby dos bancos no Congresso, que querem evitar a regulação. O governo Obama não é muito agressivo em implementar novas regulamentações", complementa.

    Totalmente favorável ao controle de capitais, o economista do instituto de pesquisa ressalta a conexão entre as crises financeiras e a economia real de vários países no ambiente globalizado atual.

    "Wall Street não é isolado da economia real", diz. Uma crise financeira pode aumentar desemprego, retrair o crescimento da atividade econômica de vários países, além de forçar o corte de gastos do governo para evitar déficits de orçamento. "Isso significa menos infraestrutura, menos educação, menos seguridade social", afirma.
    Associated Program:
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    Latin America, Europe
  • In the Media | September 2013
    Agência Brasil
    Correio Braziliense, 20 Setembro 2013.

    O diretor executivo do Fundo Monetário Internacional (FMI), Paulo Nogueira Batista, que representa o Brasil e mais dez países no órgão, disse nesta quinta-feira (26/9) que os fundamentos da economia brasileira estão razoáveis e que o único ponto que merece mais atenção são as contas externas.

    “Os [fundamentos] fiscais estão bastante razoáveis, a política monetária também, a regulação do sistema financeiro boa. No setor externo, a deterioração da conta corrente preocupa um pouco, mas as reservas são altas e a entrada de investimentos diretos é alta. Então, eu diria que está razoável. Acho que tem de ficar de olho [nas contas externas], porque não convém ter déficit em conta corrente muito alto. É um ponto preocupante, mas não é alarmante”, avaliou Batista, que frisou estar declarando opinião própria, e não do fundo.

    Batista participou do seminário Governança Financeira Depois da Crise, promovido pelo Multidisciplinary Institute on Development and Strategie (Minds) e o Levy Economics Institute.

    Sobre a reportagem da revista britânica The Economist intitulada Has Brazil blown up? (O Brasil estragou tudo?, em tradução livre), que foi às bancas hoje, questionando se o país fracassou na política econômica atual, depois de ter ido bem nos anos anteriores, Batista acredita que o país está apresentando recuperação progressiva.

    “O Brasil passou por uma fase de grande sucesso, era moda e referência. Havia um certo exagero naquela época, até 2011. Agora houve uma reavaliação mais negativa e está indo para o extremo oposto. Acho que o Brasil está crescendo menos do que o esperado, menos do que pode crescer. Na verdade, a desaceleração de 2011 foi desejada e planejada pelo governo brasileiro, porque havia a percepção, correta, de que em 2010 o país estava superaquecendo. Houve medidas deliberadas para desaquecer a economia, isso provocou uma queda na taxa de crescimento, o que não foi surpresa. O que foi uma surpresa negativa foi a dificuldade de se recuperar em 2012 e em 2013. Mas eu creio que agora estamos vivendo uma recuperação mais clara, ainda incipiente, mas os dados estão mostrando que a economia está se reativando”, disse.

    O diretor do FMI citou como dado favorável a força do mercado de trabalho brasileiro, que vem apresentando números positivos, apesar da crise econômica mundial, o que pode sinalizar um início de recuperação. “O mercado de trabalho é uma surpresa positiva nesse período todo. Apesar da desaceleração forte da economia, o mercado de trabalho continua forte. A taxa de desemprego aberta está bastante baixa, os salários continuam crescendo. O desempenho não é tão favorável quanto se esperava, mas eu acho que vem uma recuperação”, acrescentou. 
    Associated Program:
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    Latin America, Europe
  • In the Media | September 2013
    Jornal do Brasil, 26 Setembro 2013. Copyright © 1995-2013 | Todos os direitos reservados

    Paulo Nogueira Batista ressalta que o único ponto que merece atenção são as contas externas

    O diretor executivo do Fundo Monetário Internacional (FMI), Paulo Nogueira Batista, que representa o Brasil e mais dez países no órgão, disse hoje (26) que os fundamentos da economia brasileira estão razoáveis e que o único ponto que merece mais atenção são as contas externas.

    “Os [fundamentos] fiscais estão bastante razoáveis, a política monetária também, a regulação do sistema financeiro boa. No setor externo, a deterioração da conta corrente preocupa um pouco, mas as reservas são altas e a entrada de investimentos diretos é alta. Então, eu diria que está razoável. Acho que tem de ficar de olho [nas contas externas], porque não convém ter déficit em conta corrente muito alto. É um ponto preocupante, mas não é alarmante”, avaliou Batista, que frisou estar declarando opinião própria, e não do fundo.

    Batista participou do seminário Governança Financeira Depois da Crise, promovido pelo Multidisciplinary Institute on Development and Strategie (Minds) e o Levy Economics Institute.

    Sobre a reportagem da revista britânica The Economist intitulada Has Brazil blown up? (O Brasil estragou tudo?, em tradução livre), que foi às bancas hoje, questionando se o país fracassou na política econômica atual, depois de ter ido bem nos anos anteriores, Batista acredita que o país está apresentando recuperação progressiva.

    “O Brasil passou por uma fase de grande sucesso, era moda e referência. Havia um certo exagero naquela época, até 2011. Agora houve uma reavaliação mais negativa e está indo para o extremo oposto. Acho que o Brasil está crescendo menos do que o esperado, menos do que pode crescer. Na verdade, a desaceleração de 2011 foi desejada e planejada pelo governo brasileiro, porque havia a percepção, correta, de que em 2010 o país estava superaquecendo. Houve medidas deliberadas para desaquecer a economia, isso provocou uma queda na taxa de crescimento, o que não foi surpresa. O que foi uma surpresa negativa foi a dificuldade de se recuperar em 2012 e em 2013. Mas eu creio que agora estamos vivendo uma recuperação mais clara, ainda incipiente, mas os dados estão mostrando que a economia está se reativando”, disse.

    O diretor do FMI citou como dado favorável a força do mercado de trabalho brasileiro, que vem apresentando números positivos, apesar da crise econômica mundial, o que pode sinalizar um início de recuperação. “O mercado de trabalho é uma surpresa positiva nesse período todo. Apesar da desaceleração forte da economia, o mercado de trabalho continua forte. A taxa de desemprego aberta está bastante baixa, os salários continuam crescendo. O desempenho não é tão favorável quanto se esperava, mas eu acho que vem uma recuperação”, acrescentou. 
    Associated Program:
    Region(s):
    Latin America, Europe
  • In the Media | September 2013
    Vladimir Platonow / Agência Brasil
    Exame, 26 Setembro 2013. Copyright © Editora Abril - Todos os direitos reservados

    Rio de Janeiro – O diretor executivo do Fundo Monetário Internacional (FMI), Paulo Nogueira Batista, que representa o Brasil e mais dez países no órgão, disse hoje (26) que os fundamentos da economia brasileira estão razoáveis e que o ponto que merece mais atenção são as contas externas.

    “Os [fundamentos] fiscais estão bastante razoáveis, a política monetária também, a regulação do sistema financeiro boa. No setor externo, a deterioração da conta corrente preocupa um pouco, mas as reservas são altas e a entrada de investimentos diretos é alta.

    Então, eu diria que está razoável. Acho que tem de ficar de olho [nas contas externas], porque não convém ter déficit em conta corrente muito alto. É um ponto preocupante, mas não é alarmante”, avaliou Batista, que frisou estar declarando opinião própria, e não do fundo.

    Batista participou do seminário Governança Financeira Depois da Crise, promovido pelo Multidisciplinary Institute on Development and Strategie (Minds) e o Levy Economics Institute.

    Sobre a reportagem da revista britânica The Economist intitulada Has Brazil blown up? (Será que o Brasil estragou tudo?, em tradução livre), que foi às bancas hoje, questionando se o país fracassou na política econômica atual, depois de ter ido bem nos anos anteriores, Batista acredita que o país está apresentando recuperação progressiva.

    “O Brasil passou por uma fase de grande sucesso, era moda e referência. Havia um certo exagero naquela época, até 2011. Agora houve uma reavaliação mais negativa e está indo para o extremo oposto. Acho que o Brasil está crescendo menos do que o esperado, menos do que pode crescer. Na verdade, a desaceleração de 2011 foi desejada e planejada pelo governo brasileiro, porque havia a percepção, correta, de que em 2010 o país estava superaquecendo. Houve medidas deliberadas para desaquecer a economia, isso provocou uma queda na taxa de crescimento, o que não foi surpresa. O que foi uma surpresa negativa foi a dificuldade de se recuperar em 2012 e em 2013. Mas eu creio que agora estamos vivendo uma recuperação mais clara, ainda incipiente, mas os dados estão mostrando que a economia está se reativando”, disse.

    O diretor do FMI citou como dado favorável a força do mercado de trabalho brasileiro, que vem apresentando números positivos, apesar da crise econômica mundial, o que pode sinalizar um início de recuperação. “O mercado de trabalho é uma surpresa positiva nesse período todo. Apesar da desaceleração forte da economia, o mercado de trabalho continua forte. A taxa de desemprego aberta está bastante baixa, os salários continuam crescendo. O desempenho não é tão favorável quanto se esperava, mas eu acho que vem uma recuperação”, acrescentou.
    Associated Program:
    Region(s):
    Latin America, Europe
  • In the Media | September 2013
    Vladimir Platonow, Agência Brasil
    Brasil 247, 26 de Setembro de 2013.  © Brasil 247. Todos os direitos reservados.

    Segundo Paulo Nogueira Batista, que representa o Brasil e mais dez países no órgão, os fundamentos fiscais estão bastante razoáveis, a política monetária também, a regulação do sistema financeiro boa; "no setor externo, a deterioração da conta corrente preocupa um pouco, mas as reservas são altas e a entrada de investimentos diretos é alta", afirma

    Rio de Janeiro
    – O diretor executivo do Fundo Monetário Internacional (FMI), Paulo Nogueira Batista, que representa o Brasil e mais dez países no órgão, disse hoje (26) que os fundamentos da economia brasileira estão razoáveis e que o ponto que merece mais atenção são as contas externas.

    “Os [fundamentos] fiscais estão bastante razoáveis, a política monetária também, a regulação do sistema financeiro boa. No setor externo, a deterioração da conta corrente preocupa um pouco, mas as reservas são altas e a entrada de investimentos diretos é alta. Então, eu diria que está razoável. Acho que tem de ficar de olho [nas contas externas], porque não convém ter déficit em conta corrente muito alto. É um ponto preocupante, mas não é alarmante”, avaliou Batista, que frisou estar declarando opinião própria, e não do fundo.

    Batista participou do seminário Governança Financeira Depois da Crise, promovido pelo Multidisciplinary Institute on Development and Strategie (Minds) e o Levy Economics Institute.

    Sobre a reportagem da revista britânica The Economist intitulada Has Brazil blown up? (O Brasil estragou tudo?, em tradução livre), que foi às bancas hoje, questionando se o país fracassou na política econômica atual, depois de ter ido bem nos anos anteriores, Batista acredita que o país está apresentando recuperação progressiva.

    “O Brasil passou por uma fase de grande sucesso, era moda e referência. Havia um certo exagero naquela época, até 2011. Agora houve uma reavaliação mais negativa e está indo para o extremo oposto. Acho que o Brasil está crescendo menos do que o esperado, menos do que pode crescer. Na verdade, a desaceleração de 2011 foi desejada e planejada pelo governo brasileiro, porque havia a percepção, correta, de que em 2010 o país estava superaquecendo. Houve medidas deliberadas para desaquecer a economia, isso provocou uma queda na taxa de crescimento, o que não foi surpresa. O que foi uma surpresa negativa foi a dificuldade de se recuperar em 2012 e em 2013. Mas eu creio que agora estamos vivendo uma recuperação mais clara, ainda incipiente, mas os dados estão mostrando que a economia está se reativando”, disse.

    O diretor do FMI citou como dado favorável a força do mercado de trabalho brasileiro, que vem apresentando números positivos, apesar da crise econômica mundial, o que pode sinalizar um início de recuperação. “O mercado de trabalho é uma surpresa positiva nesse período todo. Apesar da desaceleração forte da economia, o mercado de trabalho continua forte. A taxa de desemprego aberta está bastante baixa, os salários continuam crescendo. O desempenho não é tão favorável quanto se esperava, mas eu acho que vem uma recuperação”, acrescentou. 
    Associated Program:
    Region(s):
    Latin America, Europe
  • In the Media | September 2013
    Vladimir Platonow / Agência Brasil
    RedeTV, 26 Setembro 2013. Copyright © 2013 - RedeTV! Todos os direitos reservados.

    O diretor executivo do Fundo Monetário Internacional (FMI), Paulo Nogueira Batista, que representa o Brasil e mais dez países no órgão, disse nesta quinta-feira (26) que os fundamentos da economia brasileira estão razoáveis e que o ponto que merece mais atenção são as contas externas.

    “Os [fundamentos] fiscais estão bastante razoáveis, a política monetária também, a regulação do sistema financeiro boa. No setor externo, a deterioração da conta corrente preocupa um pouco, mas as reservas são altas e a entrada de investimentos diretos é alta. Então, eu diria que está razoável. Acho que tem de ficar de olho [nas contas externas], porque não convém ter déficit em conta corrente muito alto. É um ponto preocupante, mas não é alarmante”, avaliou Batista, que frisou estar declarando opinião própria, e não do fundo.

    Batista participou do seminário Governança Financeira Depois da Crise, promovido pelo Multidisciplinary Institute on Development and Strategie (Minds) e o Levy Economics Institute.

    Sobre a reportagem da revista britânica The Economist intitulada "Has Brazil blown up" ("Será que o Brasil estragou tudo", em tradução livre), que foi às bancas hoje, questionando se o país fracassou na política econômica atual, depois de ter ido bem nos anos anteriores, Batista acredita que o país está apresentando recuperação progressiva.

    “O Brasil passou por uma fase de grande sucesso, era moda e referência. Havia um certo exagero naquela época, até 2011. Agora houve uma reavaliação mais negativa e está indo para o extremo oposto. Acho que o Brasil está crescendo menos do que o esperado, menos do que pode crescer. Na verdade, a desaceleração de 2011 foi desejada e planejada pelo governo brasileiro, porque havia a percepção, correta, de que em 2010 o país estava superaquecendo. Houve medidas deliberadas para desaquecer a economia, isso provocou uma queda na taxa de crescimento, o que não foi surpresa. O que foi uma surpresa negativa foi a dificuldade de se recuperar em 2012 e em 2013. Mas eu creio que agora estamos vivendo uma recuperação mais clara, ainda incipiente, mas os dados estão mostrando que a economia está se reativando”, disse.

    O diretor do FMI citou como dado favorável a força do mercado de trabalho brasileiro, que vem apresentando números positivos, apesar da crise econômica mundial, o que pode sinalizar um início de recuperação. “O mercado de trabalho é uma surpresa positiva nesse período todo. Apesar da desaceleração forte da economia, o mercado de trabalho continua forte. A taxa de desemprego aberta está bastante baixa, os salários continuam crescendo. O desempenho não é tão favorável quanto se esperava, mas eu acho que vem uma recuperação”, acrescentou. 
    Associated Program:
    Region(s):
    Latin America, Europe
  • In the Media | September 2013
    Vladimir Platonow
    Vio Mundo, 26 Setembro 2013. Copyright 2005-2013 - Todos os direitos reservados

    Fundamentos da economia estão razoáveis e país está em recuperação, diz diretor do FMI

    Rio de Janeiro – O diretor executivo do Fundo Monetário Internacional (FMI), Paulo Nogueira Batista, que representa o Brasil e mais dez países no órgão, disse hoje (26) que os fundamentos da economia brasileira estão razoáveis e que o ponto que merece mais atenção são as contas externas.

    “Os [fundamentos] fiscais estão bastante razoáveis, a política monetária também, a regulação do sistema financeiro boa. No setor externo, a deterioração da conta corrente preocupa um pouco, mas as reservas são altas e a entrada de investimentos diretos é alta. Então, eu diria que está razoável. Acho que tem de ficar de olho [nas contas externas], porque não convém ter déficit em conta corrente muito alto. É um ponto preocupante, mas não é alarmante”, avaliou Batista, que frisou estar declarando opinião própria, e não do fundo.

    Batista participou do seminário Governança Financeira Depois da Crise, promovido pelo Multidisciplinary Institute on Development and Strategie (Minds) e o Levy Economics Institute.

    Sobre a reportagem da revista britânica The Economist intitulada Has Brazil blown up? (Será que o Brasil estragou tudo?, em tradução livre), que foi às bancas hoje, questionando se o país fracassou na política econômica atual, depois de ter ido bem nos anos anteriores, Batista acredita que o país está apresentando recuperação progressiva.

    “O Brasil passou por uma fase de grande sucesso, era moda e referência. Havia um certo exagero naquela época, até 2011. Agora houve uma reavaliação mais negativa e está indo para o extremo oposto. Acho que o Brasil está crescendo menos do que o esperado, menos do que pode crescer. Na verdade, a desaceleração de 2011 foi desejada e planejada pelo governo brasileiro, porque havia a percepção, correta, de que em 2010 o país estava superaquecendo. Houve medidas deliberadas para desaquecer a economia, isso provocou uma queda na taxa de crescimento, o que não foi surpresa. O que foi uma surpresa negativa foi a dificuldade de se recuperar em 2012 e em 2013. Mas eu creio que agora estamos vivendo uma recuperação mais clara, ainda incipiente, mas os dados estão mostrando que a economia está se reativando”, disse.

    O diretor do FMI citou como dado favorável a força do mercado de trabalho brasileiro, que vem apresentando números positivos, apesar da crise econômica mundial, o que pode sinalizar um início de recuperação. “O mercado de trabalho é uma surpresa positiva nesse período todo. Apesar da desaceleração forte da economia, o mercado de trabalho continua forte. A taxa de desemprego aberta está bastante baixa, os salários continuam crescendo. O desempenho não é tão favorável quanto se esperava, mas eu acho que vem uma recuperação”, acrescentou.
    Associated Program:
    Region(s):
    Latin America, Europe
  • In the Media | September 2013
    Lucianne Carneiro
    O Globo Economia, 26 Setembro 2013. © 1996 - 2013. Todos direitos reservados a Infoglobo Comunicação e Participações S.A.

    RIO - O diretor executivo para o Brasil e outros países do Fundo Monetário Internacional, Paulo Nogueira Batista Jr., afirmou nesta quinta-feira que a economia brasileira já está se recuperando e há um exagero da imprensa internacional sobre a situação do Brasil, ao comentar a capa da revista britânica “The Economist”.

    - O Brasil passou por uma fase de grande sucesso, era moda, referência, havia um certo exagero. Agora (a percepção) está indo para o extremo oposto. O Brasil está crescendo menos do que poderia (...), mas agora estamos vendo uma recuperação clara. O desempenho não é tão favorável, mas a recuperação já começou - disse Nogueira Batista, ao participar do seminário “Governança Financeira depois da Crise”, promovido pelo Minds, Instituto Multidisciplinar de Desenvolvimento e Estratégia, em parceria com o Levy Economics Institute e a Fundação Ford.

    Na avaliação do economista, os fundamentos fiscais e a política monetária do Brasil vão bem. Embora a deterioração do déficit em contas correntes preocupe, apontou, as reservas internacionais são elevadas. Na contramão da opinião de Nogueira Batista, o professor da Universidade de Georgetown Albert Keidel afirmou mais cedo, no mesmo evento, que o Brasil tem um nível baixo de reservas internacionais, considerando a ausência de mecanismos de controle de capitais.

    Pressão por melhora nas moedas emergentes
    Nogueira Batista negou que o fim dos estímulos do Federal Reserve (Fed, o banco central americano) à economia vá provocar uma crise nos países emergentes.

    Acho que há muito exagero (sobre a reação dos emergentes ao fim da política do Fed).

    A situação hoje é muito diferente da época da crise asiática. As reservas estão muito mais altas, a situação fiscal teve muita melhora, com a dívida líquida caindo. É claro que a situação não é perfeita, mas acho exagerado dizer que podemos ter uma crise - afirmou o economista, destacando que falava em seu próprio nome e não como diretor do Fundo.

    Nogueira Batista disse que o alívio nos mercados com a decisão do banco central americano não suspender por enquanto seus estímulos já se refletiu em uma pressão de valorização das moedas emergentes, como o real. E que é preciso minimizar esses efeitos.

    - O programa de intervenção do Banco Central lançado no momento de tensão deu impacto para segurar o câmbio, o Brasil está apertando a política monetária. Apesar das capas das revistas, as pessoas veem isso lá fora.

    Em sua apresentação, Nogueira Batista afirmou que os emergentes ganharam espaço na governança global, mas que as mudanças nessa estrutura estão estagnadas desde 2011 e algumas metas no âmbito do Fundo Monetário Internacional (FMI) já passaram dos prazos estabelecidos, como a redistribuição dos votos e das cotas.

    - Após o Lehman Brothers, o G-20 emergiu com um importante fórum de líderes. No âmbito do FMI, fizemos algumas mudanças no sistema de votos. (...) Desde 2011, no entanto, o processo de mudanças na governança global vive uma certa estagnação. A implementação de acordos já assinados, por exemplo, têm sido adiada - disse o economista.

    Ele alertou sobre o risco de “uma tentação” de se voltar ao formato antigo, em que apenas Estados Unidos e europeus tinham peso forte nas decisões internacionais.

    Para combater este retrocesso, defende Paulo Nogueira, é preciso aprofundar ainda mais a cooperação entre os países dos Brics (Brasil, Rússia, Índia, China e África do Sul). Ele ressaltou os avanços tanto na criação de um fundo de reservas internacionais dos países dos Brics - para proteger contra oscilações cambiais e também de um banco de desenvolvimento. O primeiro rascunho do projeto de um fundo de reservas dos Brics será apresentado em uma reunião dos Brics em Washington, em duas semanas.

    O economista lembrou as dificuldades ainda existentes para uma participação maior dos emergentes no Fundo. Em 2011, quando Dominique Strauss-Khan deixou a entidade, os europeus defenderam a candidatura de Christine Lagarde antes mesmo do fim do período de inscrição de candidatos, disse Nogueira Batista.

    Segundo ele, até que se mude a estrutura dos votos no Fundo será difícil conseguir uma candidatura vitoriosa de um país emergentes. Hoje, Estados Unidos, europeus e Japão têm peso de mais de 50% nos votos.

    - Se o cargo de diretor-geral ficar vago em breve, pode ser que tenhamos o mesmo tipo de dificuldades que tivemos em 2011.

    Cálculo da dívida bruta será discutido em outubro
    Sobre o atraso na divulgação de algumas partes do Relatório Artigo IV do FMI sobre o Brasil, Nogueira Batista explicou que o país pediu a revisão de alguns aspectos do documento, como faz todos os anos, mas que a equipe do Fundo está demorando a responder. Sua expectativa é que isso pode ser concluído em breve.

    O relatório é divulgado para os diferentes países e analisa o desempenho macroeconômico das nações. Revisões podem ser pedidas no caso de erros factuais e passagens que podem ser consideradas ambíguas, entre outros aspectos.

    A questão sobre o cálculo da dívida bruta - que foi alterado pelo Brasil, mas vem sendo questionado pelo Fundo - será tratado em outubro, com uma equipe do Ministério da Fazenda que vai ao FMI. 
    Associated Program:
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    Latin America, Europe
  • In the Media | September 2013
    Lucianne Carneiro
    Ex-secretário executivo da Fazenda acredita que governo pode trazer a taxa para o centro da meta, de 4,5%, até 2015

    O Globo Economia, 26 Setembro 2013. © 1996 - 2013. Todos direitos reservados a Infoglobo Comunicação e Participações S.A.

    RIO – Na primeira aparição pública no Brasil desde que deixou o governo, o ex-secretário-executivo do Ministério da Fazenda e hoje professor da UFRJ, Nelson Barbosa Filho, afirmou que não existe mais espaço para apreciar o câmbio de maneira a ajudar no controle da inflação. O câmbio se apreciou demais nos últimos anos, segundo ele, e é preciso atingir a meta de inflação mesmo num cenário de taxa de câmbio estável ou até mesmo de depreciação. 

    - Todos os anos em que o Brasil cumpriu a meta da inflação, a taxa de câmbio se apreciou, com exceção do ano passado. O ajuste já começou. Estamos numa fase da economia brasileira de cumprir a meta de inflação sem depender tanto da apreciação cambial. Só que aí fica mais difícil a inflação cair mais rápido - disse Barbosa, ao participar do seminário "Governança Financeira depois da Crise", promovido pelo Minds, Instituto Multidisciplinar de Desenvolvimento e Estratégia, em parceria com o Levy Economics Institute e a Fundação Ford. 

    Sua avaliação é que o cenário com que o governo trabalha de trazer a inflação para 4,5% ao ano, que é o centro da meta, até 2015, é possível. O que vai influenciar esse resultado é a desvalorização cambial e a magnitude de um eventual aumento nos preços de combustíveis. Para Barbosa, a discussão sobre a necessidade de reduzir a atual meta da inflação brasileira só deve ocorrer depois que a taxa for mantida em 4,5% por um ou dois anos. 

    O governo vai trazer a inflação para 4,5% mas talvez leve um pouco mais de tempo porque houve esses choques recentemente. O principal esforço para isso é o aumento da produtividade - apontou. 

    Barbosa defendeu a manutenção do câmbio flutuante no país, lembrando que tanto depreciação quanto apreciação cambial excessiva têm consequências para a economia. A depreciação pressiona a inflação, enquanto a apreciação ajuda no cumprimento mais rápido da meta de inflação, mas prejudica a longo prazo a competitividade da economia. 

    Para o ex-secretário-executivo do Ministério da Fazenda, o câmbio ideal no momento deve variar entre R$ 2,20 e R$ 2,50, embora destaque que essa taxa de câmbio ideal para a economia está em constante mudança:

    - Um câmbio muito apreciado ou muito depreciado é ruim para a economia. Ir para muito abaixo de R$ 2,20 neste momento não é muito recomendável, assim como ficar acima de R$ 2,50 seria muito excessivo comparado com o que aconteceu com outros países.

    O economista, que deixou o governo em junho, disse que embora o país não tenha uma meta de taxa de câmbio, a oscilação cambial tem sido controlada por causa da meta de inflação. Quando a taxa de câmbio é elevada, a inflação também tende a ser elevada. Se a taxa de câmbio é mais baixa, a tendência é de uma inflação menor. 

    Barbosa explicou que existem três alternativas teóricas para reduzir o custo unitário do trabalho e aumentar a competitvidade. A primeira é uma desvalorização interna, com desaceleração do crescimento econômico e redução de salário. A segunda é uma desvalorização externa, com elevação da taxa de câmbio. A terceira é por aumento de produtividade. 

    - Na prática, o ajuste acontece nas três coisas. Na Europa, tem sido um pouco no salário. No Brasil, o que o governo tem tentado fazer é que seja mais na produtividade, para que seja menos via câmbio e desemprego - disse.
    Associated Program:
    Region(s):
    Latin America, Europe
  • In the Media | September 2013
    La Sinistra per Gualdo, 25 Settembre 2013. Tutti i diritti riservati.

    La crisi economica in Europa continua a distruggere posti di lavoro. Alla fine del 2013 i disoccupati saranno 19 milioni nella sola zona euro, oltre 7 milioni in più rispetto al 2008: un incremento che non ha precedenti dal secondo dopoguerra e che proseguirà anche nel 2014. La crisi occupazionale affligge soprattutto i paesi periferici dell’Unione monetaria europea, dove si verifica anche un aumento eccezionale delle sofferenze bancarie e dei fallimenti aziendali; la Germania e gli altri paesi centrali dell’eurozona hanno invece visto crescere i livelli di occupazione. Il carattere asimmetrico della crisi è una delle cause dell’attuale stallo politico europeo e dell’imbarazzante susseguirsi di vertici dai quali scaturiscono provvedimenti palesemente inadeguati a contrastare i processi di divergenza in corso. Una ignavia politica che può sembrare giustificata nelle fasi meno aspre del ciclo e di calma apparente sui mercati finanziari, ma che a lungo andare avrà le più gravi conseguenze.

    Come una parte della comunità accademica aveva previsto, la crisi sta rivelando una serie di contraddizioni nell’assetto istituzionale e politico dell’Unione monetaria europea. Le autorità europee hanno compiuto scelte che, contrariamente agli annunci, hanno contribuito all’inasprimento della recessione e all’ampliamento dei divari tra i paesi membri dell’Unione. Nel giugno 2010, ai primi segni di crisi dell’eurozona, una lettera sottoscritta da trecento economisti lanciò un allarme sui pericoli insiti nelle politiche di “austerità”: tali politiche avrebbero ulteriormente depresso l’occupazione e i redditi, rendendo ancora più difficili i rimborsi dei debiti, pubblici e privati. Quell’allarme rimase tuttavia inascoltato. Le autorità europee preferirono aderire alla fantasiosa dottrina dell’“austerità espansiva”, secondo cui le restrizioni dei bilanci pubblici avrebbero ripristinato la fiducia dei mercati sulla solvibilità dei paesi dell’Unione, favorendo così la diminuzione dei tassi d’interesse e la ripresa economica. Come ormai rileva anche il Fondo Monetario Internazionale, oggi sappiamo che in realtà le politiche di austerity hanno accentuato la crisi, provocando un tracollo dei redditi superiore alle attese prevalenti. Gli stessi fautori della “austerità espansiva” adesso riconoscono i loro sbagli, ma il disastro è in larga misura già compiuto.

    C’è tuttavia un nuovo errore che le autorità europee stanno commettendo. Esse appaiono persuase dall’idea che i paesi periferici dell’Unione potrebbero risolvere i loro problemi  attraverso le cosiddette “riforme strutturali”. Tali riforme dovrebbero ridurre i costi e i prezzi, aumentare la competitività e favorire quindi una ripresa trainata dalle esportazioni e una riduzione dei debiti verso l’estero. Questa tesi coglie alcuni problemi reali, ma è illusorio pensare che la soluzione prospettata possa salvaguardare l’unità europea. Le politiche deflattive praticate in Germania e altrove per accrescere l’avanzo commerciale hanno contribuito per anni, assieme ad altri fattori, all’accumulo di enormi squilibri nei rapporti di debito e credito tra i paesi della zona euro. Il riassorbimento di tali squilibri richiederebbe un’azione coordinata da parte di tutti i membri dell’Unione. Pensare che i soli paesi periferici debbano farsi carico del problema significa pretendere da questi una caduta dei salari e dei prezzi di tale portata da determinare un crollo ancora più accentuato dei redditi e una violenta deflazione da debiti, con il rischio concreto di nuove crisi bancarie e di una desertificazione produttiva di intere regioni europee.

    Nel 1919 John Maynard Keynes contestò il Trattato di Versailles con parole lungimiranti: «Se diamo per scontata la convinzione che la Germania debba esser tenuta in miseria, i suoi figli rimanere nella fame e nell’indigenza […], se miriamo deliberatamente alla umiliazione dell’Europa centrale, oso farmi profeta, la vendetta non tarderà». Sia pure a parti invertite, con i paesi periferici al tracollo e la Germania in posizione di relativo vantaggio, la crisi attuale presenta più di una analogia con quella tremenda fase storica, che creò i presupposti per l’ascesa del nazismo e la seconda guerra mondiale. Ma la memoria di quegli anni sembra persa: le autorità tedesche e gli altri governi europei stanno ripetendo errori speculari a quelli commessi allora. Questa miopia, in ultima istanza, è la causa principale delle ondate di irrazionalismo che stanno investendo l’Europa, dalle ingenue apologie del cambio flessibile quale panacea di ogni male fino ai più inquietanti sussulti di propagandismo ultranazionalista e xenofobo.

    Occorre esser consapevoli che proseguendo con le politiche di “austerità” e affidando il riequilibrio alle sole “riforme strutturali”, il destino dell’euro sarà segnato: l’esperienza della moneta unica si esaurirà, con ripercussioni sulla tenuta del mercato unico europeo. In assenza di condizioni per una riforma del sistema finanziario e della politica monetaria e fiscale che dia vita a un piano di rilancio degli investimenti pubblici e privati, contrasti le sperequazioni tra i redditi e tra i territori e risollevi l’occupazione nelle periferie dell’Unione, ai decisori politici non resterà altro che una scelta cruciale tra modalità alternative di uscita dall’euro.

    Promosso da Emiliano Brancaccio e Riccardo Realfonzo (Università del Sannio), il “monito degli economisti” è sottoscritto da Philip Arestis (University of Cambridge), Georgios Argeitis (Athens University), Wendy Carlin (University College of London), Jesus Ferreiro (University of the Basque Country), Giuseppe Fontana (Università del Sannio), James Galbraith (University of Texas), Mauro Gallegati (Università Politecnica delle Marche), Eckhard Hein (Berlin School of Economics and Law), Alan Kirman (University of Aix-Marseille III), Jan Kregel (University of Tallin), Heinz Kurz (Graz University), Alfonso Palacio-Vera (Universidad Complutense Madrid), Dimitri Papadimitriou (Levy Economics Institute), Pascal Petit (Université de Paris Nord), Dani Rodrik (Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton), Malcolm Sawyer (Leeds University), Willi Semmler (New School University, New York), Felipe Serrano (University of the Basque Country), Engelbert Stockhammer (Kingston University), Tony Thirlwall (University of Kent). 
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    Region(s):
    Latin America, Europe
  • In the Media | September 2013
    Léa De Luca
    Brasil Econômico, 24 Setembro 2013. © Copyright 2009-2012 Brasil Econômico. Todos os Direitos Reservados.


    Para Leonardo Burlamaqui lobby dessas instituições impede o avanço de uma governança financeira global

    São Paulo - Cinco anos depois da crise financeira internacional, as coisas mudaram muito pouco no mercado financeiro. Para Leonardo Burlamaqui, diretor da Fundação Ford, e Rogério Silveira, diretor executivo do Minds (Instituto multidisciplinar para desenvolvimento e estratégias, na sigla em inglês), a saída para evitar novas crises seria estabelecer uma governança financeira global. Entre as propostas, estão aumentar a regulação (inclusive de funcionamento dos fundos de "hedge"), adotar o controle de entrada de capitais como uma rotina e acabar com os paraísos fiscais, por exemplo.

    Mas a ideia de um novo conjunto de regras para o sistema financeiro global enfrenta dificuldades para avançar e uma das razões, segundo eles, é o forte poder político e econômico das instituições financeiras. "Elas não querem mais regulação. Vivemos uma governança movida pelo lobby dessas instituições. É uma ameaça à democracia", diz Burlamaqui.

    Silveira concorda, mas acredita que, ao menos, a crise de 2008 abriu espaço para discussão, apesar das resistências. "Pode não acontecer de forma orgânica e organizada, mas confio que caminharemos sim para mais regulação", diz. Para ele, a defesa da autorregulação das instituições financeiras, somada ao "mantra" de que a desregulamentação seria benéfica e aumentaria a eficiência do mercado, reduzindo custos de intermediação, foi uma combinação desastrosa. "A ideia de que a desregulamentação tornaria mais eficiente a intermediação na transferência de recursos, de quem poupa para os que investem, mostrou-se equivocada com a crise", diz Silveira. Para ele, a falta de leis não aumentou a eficiência, e pior : aumentou a especulação. "Os bancos não vivem só de intermediação. O que dá dinheiro mesmo é a especulação. E como instituições privadas, visam lucrar mais".

    Burlamaqui lembra que países como Brasil e China, com forte presença dos bancos públicos no sistema - e também leis mais rígidas - foram os que menos sofreram com a crise. "Não adianta querer eliminar os bancos públicos, como fizeram os Estados Unidos. Os bancos privados não tem apetite para fazer o que eles fazem", diz Silveira. Para ele, é urgente resgatar o que chama de "funcionalidade" dos bancos - financiar o sistema produtivo. "No Brasil, apenas um banco fornece recursos de longo prazo para investimentos, que é o BNDES", completa Burlamaqui.

    O diretor da Fundação Ford lembra ainda que até hoje não existe nenhuma entidade global para cuidar da governança financeira. Tanto ele quanto Silveira consideram as regras da terceira fase do acordo de capitais entre bancos, conhecido como Basileia III (cujo objetivo é reforçar o capital das instituições e protegê-las contra crises) são "o mínimo do mínimo necessário". Para ele, o acordo anterior (Basileia II) era "irresponsável, permitia muita margem de manobra". Burlamaqui diz que ao contrário do que defendiam alguns, a globalização financeira foi prejudicial: "Criou-se um cassino em escala global", diz. "Se não for possível estabelecer uma governança financeira global, melhor será promover uma ‘desglobalização' dos mercados", acredita.

    Na próxima quinta-feira, no Rio de Janeiro, Burlamaqui e Silveira farão os discursos de abertura de um evento promovido pelo Minds e o Levy Economics Institute, sobre a governança financeira pós-crise. O evento é parte de um programa patrocinado pela Fundação Ford desde 2006.
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    Region(s):
    Latin America, Europe
  • Working Paper No. 760 | March 2013

    As domestic exports usually require imported inputs, the value of exports differs from the domestic value added contained in exports. The higher the domestic value added contained in exports, the higher the domestic national income created by exports will be. In this case, exports will expand the domestic market. Therefore, exports will push economic growth in two ways: through their direct effect on aggregate demand, and through their effect on the domestic market. For these reasons, the estimate of the magnitude of the domestic value added contained in exports helps explain the capacity of exports to lead economic growth.

    Domestic exports may be classified as direct and indirect exports. Direct exports are the goods sold to other countries; indirect exports are the domestically produced inputs incorporated in direct exports. The distinction between direct and indirect exports leads to a distinction between direct and indirect domestic value added contained in exports. The income of the factors directly involved in the production of exports constitutes direct domestic value added; the income contained in domestically produced inputs incorporated into exports constitutes the indirect domestic value added. Therefore, the magnitude of indirect value added depends on the density of the domestic intersectorial linkages.

    The aim of this paper is to present an estimation of the domestic indirect value added contained in Mexico’s manufacturing exports in two ways. The first derives from the fact that a direct exporting sector may be the vehicle through which other sectors export in an indirect way; this leads us to estimate the indirect value added contained in exports by sector of origin. The second refers to the destination of this indirect value added—that is, to the direct exporting sectors in which the value added contained in indirect exports of each sector appears.  

    Based on the input-output table for Mexico (National Institute of Statistics and Geography–INEGI 2008), we estimate the domestic value added contained in inputs used to produce Mexican manufacturing exports. We show separately the domestic value added from maquiladoraexports and from exports produced by the rest of the manufacturing sector. In order to distinguish the indirect value added in exports by sector of origin and destination of the intermediate inputs, we work with square matrices of indirect domestic value–added multipliers.

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    Author(s):
    Gerardo Fujii-Gambero Rosario Cervantes-Martínez
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    Region(s):
    Latin America

  • Working Paper No. 728 | July 2012
    A Post-Keynesian Approach

    Conventional wisdom about the business cycle in Latin America assumes that monetary shocks cause deviations from the optimal path, and that the triggering factor in the cycle is excess credit and liquidity. Further, in this view the origin of the contraction is ultimately related to the excesses during the expansion. For that reason, it follows that avoiding the worst conditions during the bust entails applying restrictive economic policies during the expansion, including restrictive fiscal and monetary policies. In this paper we develop an alternative approach that suggests that fiscal restraint may not have a significant impact in reducing the risks of a crisis, and that excessive fiscal conservatism might actually exacerbate problems. In the case of Central America, the efforts to reduce fiscal imbalances, in conjunction with the persistent current account deficits, implied that financial inflows, with remittances being particularly important in some cases, allowed for an expansion of a private spending boom that proved unsustainable once the Great Recession led to a sharp fall in external funds. In the case of South America, the commodity boom created conditions for growth without hitting the external constraint. Fiscal restraint in the South American context has resulted, in some cases, in lower rates of growth than what otherwise would have been possible as a result of the absence of an external constraint. Yet the lower reliance on external funds made South American countries less vulnerable to the external shock waves of the Great Recession than Central American economies.

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    Associated Program:
    Author(s):
    Esteban Pérez Caldentey Matías Vernengo
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    Region(s):
    Latin America

  • Working Paper No. 675 | July 2011

    This paper traces the rise of export-led growth as a development paradigm and argues that it is exhausted owing to changed conditions in emerging market (EM) and developed economies. The global economy needs a recalibration that facilitates a new paradigm of domestic demand-led growth. Globalization has so diversified global economic activity that no country or region can act as the lone locomotive of global growth. Political reasoning suggests that EM countries are not likely to abandon export-led growth, nor will the international community implement the international arrangements needed for successful domestic demand-led growth. Consequently, the global economy likely faces asymmetric stagnation.

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    Author(s):
    Thomas I. Palley
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    Region(s):
    United States, Latin America, Asia

Russia and Eastern Europe

  • Working Paper No. 909 | July 2018
    Applying Minsky’s Theory of Financial Fragility to International Markets
    This inquiry argues that the successful completion of the transition process in the post-Soviet economies is constrained by the prevailing social structure and low levels of technological progress, both of which require institutional reforms aimed at increasing growth in national income, productivity, and the degree of export competitiveness. Domestic policy implementation has not shown significant improvements on these fronts, given its short-term orientation, but instead resulted in stagnating growth rates, continuously accumulating levels of external debt, and decreasing living standards. The key to a successful completion of the transition process is therefore a combination of policies targeted at the dynamic transformation of production structures within an environment of financial stability and favorable macroeconomic conditions.

Pacific Rim

  • Working Paper No. 910 | August 2018
    An Empirical Analysis
    The short-term interest rate is the main driver of the Commonwealth of Australia government bonds’ nominal yields. This paper empirically models the dynamics of government bonds’ nominal yields using the autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) approach. Keynes held that the central bank exerts decisive influence on government bond yields because the central bank’s policy rate and other monetary policy actions determine the short-term interest rate, which in turn affects long-term government bonds’ nominal yields. The models estimated here show that Keynes’s conjecture applies in the case of Australian government bonds’ nominal yields. Furthermore, the effect of the budget balance ratio on government bond yields is small but statistically significant. However, there is no statistically discernable effect of the debt ratio on government bond yields.
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    Author(s):
    Tanweer Akram Anupam Das
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    Pacific Rim

Middle East

  • Working Paper No. 999 | January 2022
    Does Financial “Bonanza” Cause Premature Deindustrialization?
    The outbreak of COVID-19 brought back to the forefront the crucial importance of structural change and productive development for economic resilience to economic shocks. Several recent contributions have already stressed the perverse relationship that may exist between productive backwardness and the intensity of the COVID-19 socioeconomic crisis. In this paper, we analyze the factors that may have hindered productive development for over four decades before the pandemic. We investigate the role of (non-FDI) net capital inflows as a potential source of premature deindustrialization. We consider a sample of 36 developed and developing countries from 1980 to 2017, with major emphasis on the case of emerging and developing economies (EDE) in the context of increasing financial integration. We show that periods of abundant capital inflows may have caused the significant contraction of manufacturing share to employment and GDP, as well as the decrease of the economic complexity index. We also show that phenomena of “perverse” structural change are significantly more relevant in EDE countries than advanced ones. Based on such evidence, we conclude with some policy suggestions highlighting capital controls and external macroprudential measures taming international capital mobility as useful tools for promoting long-run productive development on top of strengthening (short-term) financial and macroeconomic stability.
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    Associated Program:
    Author(s):
    Alberto Botta Giuliano Toshiro Yajima Gabriel Porcile
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    Region(s):
    United States, Latin America, Europe, Middle East, Africa, Asia

Africa

  • Working Paper No. 999 | January 2022
    Does Financial “Bonanza” Cause Premature Deindustrialization?
    The outbreak of COVID-19 brought back to the forefront the crucial importance of structural change and productive development for economic resilience to economic shocks. Several recent contributions have already stressed the perverse relationship that may exist between productive backwardness and the intensity of the COVID-19 socioeconomic crisis. In this paper, we analyze the factors that may have hindered productive development for over four decades before the pandemic. We investigate the role of (non-FDI) net capital inflows as a potential source of premature deindustrialization. We consider a sample of 36 developed and developing countries from 1980 to 2017, with major emphasis on the case of emerging and developing economies (EDE) in the context of increasing financial integration. We show that periods of abundant capital inflows may have caused the significant contraction of manufacturing share to employment and GDP, as well as the decrease of the economic complexity index. We also show that phenomena of “perverse” structural change are significantly more relevant in EDE countries than advanced ones. Based on such evidence, we conclude with some policy suggestions highlighting capital controls and external macroprudential measures taming international capital mobility as useful tools for promoting long-run productive development on top of strengthening (short-term) financial and macroeconomic stability.
    Download:
    Associated Program:
    Author(s):
    Alberto Botta Giuliano Toshiro Yajima Gabriel Porcile
    Related Topic(s):
    Region(s):
    United States, Latin America, Europe, Middle East, Africa, Asia