Working Paper No. 557 | March 2009

Background Considerations to a Regulation of the US Financial System

Third Time a Charm? Or Strike Three?

United States financial regulation has traditionally made functional and institutional regulation roughly equivalent. However, the gradual shift away from Glass-Steagall and the introduction of the Financial Modernization Act (FMA) generated a disorderly mix of functions and products across institutions, creating regulatory gaps that contributed to the recent crisis. An analysis of this history suggests that a return to regulation by function or product would strengthen regulation. The FMA also made a choice in favor of financial holding companies over universal banks, but without recognizing that both types of structure require specific regulatory regimes. The paper reviews the specific regime that has been used by Germany in regulating its universal banks and suggests that a similar regime adapted to holding companies should be developed.

Publication Highlight

Working Paper No. 909
External Instability in Transition
Applying Minsky’s Theory of Financial Fragility to International Markets
Author(s): Liudmila Malyshava
July 2018

Quick Search

Search in: