Publications

7 publications found, searching for 'Thorvald Grung Moe '

• Working Paper No. 802 May 21, 2014

  Shadow Banking

  Thorvald Grung Moe
  Abstract

  Central banks responded with exceptional liquidity support during the financial crisis to prevent a systemic meltdown. They broadened their tool kit and extended liquidity support to nonbanks and key financial markets. Many want central banks to embrace this expanded role as “market maker of last resort” going forward. This would provide a liquidity backstop for […]

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• One-Pager No. 37 January 30, 2013

  Lessons from an Unconventional Central Banker

  Thorvald Grung Moe
  Abstract

  The global financial crisis has generated renewed interest in the 1951 Treasury – Federal Reserve Accord and its lessons for central bank independence. A broader interpretation of the Accord and of Marriner S. Eccles’s role at the Federal Reserve should teach central bankers that independence can be crucial for fighting inflation, but also encourage them […]

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• One-Pager No. 37 January 30, 2013

  Διδάγματα από έναν μη συμβατικό κεντρικό τραπεζίτη

  Thorvald Grung Moe
  Abstract

  Η παγκόσμια χρηματοοικονομική κρίση έχει προκαλέσει ανανεωμένο ενδιαφέρον στη Συμφωνία Υπουργείου Οικονομικών-Ομοσπονδιακής Τράπεζας του 1951 και στα διδάγματα αυτής της διαπραγμάτευσης για την ανεξαρτησία της κεντρικής τράπεζας. Μια ευρύτερη ερμηνεία της Συμφωνίας και του ρόλου του Marriner Eccles στην Ομοσπονδιακή Τράπεζα Αποθεματικών θα διδάξει στους κεντρικούς τραπεζίτες ότι η ανεξαρτησία μπορεί να είναι ζωτικής σημασίας […]

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• Working Paper No. 747 January 17, 2013

  Marriner S. Eccles and the 1951 Treasury – Federal Reserve Accord

  Thorvald Grung Moe
  Abstract

  The 1951 Treasury – Federal Reserve Accord is an important milestone in central bank history. It led to a lasting separation between monetary policy and the Treasury’s debt-management powers, and established an independent central bank focused on price stability and macroeconomic stability. This paper revisits the history of the Accord and elaborates on the role […]

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• Working Paper No. 713 April 09, 2012

  Control of Finance as a Prerequisite for Successful Monetary Policy

  Thorvald Grung Moe
  Abstract

  Henry Simons’s 1936 article “Rules versus Authorities in Monetary Policy” is a classical reference in the literature on central bank independence and rule-based policy. A closer reading of the article reveals a more nuanced policy prescription, with significant emphasis on the need to control short-term borrowing; bank credit is seen as highly unstable, and price […]

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• Working Paper No. 713 April 09, 2012

  Ο έλεγχος του χρηματικού κεφαλαίου ως προϋπόθεση για μια επιτυχημένη νομισματική πολιτική

  Thorvald Grung Moe
  Abstract

  To άρθρο του Henry Simons, με τίτλο «Rules versus Authorities in Monetary Policy» («Κανόνες έναντι εξουσιών στη νομισματική πολιτική»), που δημοσιεύθηκε το 1936, αποτελεί κεντρικό σημείο αναφοράς στη διεθνή βιβλιογραφία για την ανεξαρτησία της κεντρικής τράπεζας και τη διαμόρφωση της νομισματικής πολιτικής γύρω από κανόνες. Όμως, μια πιο προσεκτική ανάγνωση του άρθρου αποκαλύπτει μια πιο […]

  Download Επιστημονική εργασία υπό εξέλιξη (Working Paper) No. 713 PDF (364.78 KB)
• Working Paper No. 712 April 03, 2012

  Shadow Banking and the Limits of Central Bank Liquidity Support

  Thorvald Grung Moe
  Abstract

  Global liquidity provision is highly procyclical. The recent financial crisis has resulted in a flight to safety, with severe strains in key funding markets leading central banks to employ highly unconventional policies to avoid a systemic meltdown. Bagehot’s advice to “lend freely at high rates against good collateral” has been stretched to the limit in […]

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