Publications

9 publications found, searching for 'Bernard Shull '

• Working Paper No. 784 January 16, 2014

  Financial Crisis Resolution and Federal Reserve Governance

  Bernard Shull
  Abstract

  The Federal Reserve has been criticized for not forestalling the financial crisis of 2007–09, and for its unconventional monetary policies that have followed. Its critics have raised questions as to whom, if anyone, reins in the Federal Reserve if and when its policies are misguided or abusive. This paper traces the principal changes in governance […]

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• One-Pager No. 36 January 11, 2013

  Expansion of Federal Reserve Authority in the Recent Financial Crisis Raises Questions about Governance

  Bernard Shull
  Abstract

  Several years before the onset of the recent financial crisis, ex – Federal Reserve Board Member Lawrence Meyer wrote that the Fed “is often called the most powerful institution in America,” its key decisions made by 19 people whose names are known by few, meeting regularly behind closed doors. Bernard Shull examines the origin and […]

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• One-Pager No. 36 January 11, 2013

  Η επέκταση της εξουσίας του Ομοσπονδιακού Αποθεματικού στην πρόσφατη χρηματοοικονομική κρίση εγείρει ερωτήματα διακυβέρνησης

  Bernard Shull
  Abstract

  Αρκετά χρόνια πριν από το ξέσπασμα της πρόσφατης χρηματοοικονομικής κρίσης, ο Lawrence Meyer, πρώην διοικητικό μέλος του Ομοσπονδιακού Αποθεματικού, έγραψε ότι η Ομοσπονδιακή Τράπεζα «αναφέρεται συχνά ως ο ισχυρότερος θεσμός στην Αμερική». Οι «αποφάσεις κλειδιά λαμβάνονται από 19 άτομα—τα ονόματα των οποίων ελάχιστοι γνωρίζουν—τα οποία συνεδριάζουν τακτικά πίσω από κλειστές πόρτες». Ο Bernard Shull εξετάζει […]

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• Working Paper No. 735 November 14, 2012

  The Impact of Financial Reform on Federal Reserve Autonomy

  Bernard Shull
  Abstract

  The Federal Reserve has been criticized for not preventing the risky behavior of large financial companies prior to the financial crisis of 2008–09, for approving mergers that aggravated the “too big to fail” problem, and for its substantial contribution to bailouts when their risk management failed. The Dodd-Frank Act of 2010, in attempting to diminish […]

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• Working Paper No. 709 February 28, 2012

  Too Big to Fail

  Bernard Shull
  Abstract

  Government forbearance, support, and bailouts of banks and other financial institutions deemed “too big to fail” (TBTF) are widely recognized as encouraging large companies to take excessive risk, placing smaller ones at a competitive disadvantage and influencing banks in general to grow inefficiently to a “protected” size and complexity. During periods of financial stress, with […]

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• Working Paper No. 709 February 28, 2012

  «Πάρα πολύ μεγάλες για να καταρρεύσουν»

  Bernard Shull
  Abstract

  Οι κρατικές πολιτικές χαλαρής αντιμετώπισης, στήριξης και διάσωσης των τραπεζών και άλλων χρηματοπιστωτικών οργανισμών που θεωρούνται «πολύ μεγάλοι για να καταρρεύσουν» αναγνωρίζονται ευρέως ως πολιτικές που ενθαρρύνουν τις μεγάλες επιχειρήσεις να αναλαμβάνουν υπερβολικούς κινδύνους, θέτουν τις μικρότερες επιχειρήσεις σε μειονεκτική κατάσταση στον ανταγωνισμό, και γενικά επηρεάζουν με αρνητικό τρόπο τις λειτουργίες των τραπεζών (οι τράπεζες […]

  Download Επιστημονική εργασία υπό εξέλιξη (Working Paper) No. 709 PDF (300.83 KB)
• Working Paper No. 601 June 04, 2010

  Too Big to Fail in Financial Crisis

  Bernard Shull
  Abstract

  Regulatory forbearance and government financial support for the largest US financial companies during the crisis of 2007–09 highlighted a "too big to fail" problem that has existed for decades. As in the past, effects on competition and moral hazard were seen as outweighed by the threat of failures that would undermine the financial system and […]

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• Public Policy Brief No. 5 May 05, 1993

  The Limits of Prudential Supervision

  Bernard Shull
  Abstract

  According to Bernard Shull, although the recent round of banking legislation—most notably the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act (FIRREA) and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA)—did take steps toward preventing financial crises, it did not go far enough in the area of unifying the regulatory structure. Shull proposes unifying federal bank […]

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• Working Paper No. 88 March 10, 1993

  Limits of Prudential Supervision

  Bernard Shull
  Abstract

  Bank supervision typically receives little if any attention when banks are operating without difficulty. But when banks fail in large numbers, or large banks fail, and the system itself is threatened, supervision becomes a focal point for criticism and reform (see, for example, Conference Report, 1998, Title I, IX; Pecchioli, 1987, pp. 11 ff.; and […]

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