Research Programs

The State of the US and World Economies

The State of the US and World Economies

This program's central focus is the use of Levy Institute macroeconomic models in generating strategic analyses of the US and world economies. The outcomes of alternative scenarios are projected and analyzed, with the results—published as Strategic Analysis reports—serving to help policymakers understand the implications of various policy options.

The Levy Institute macroeconomic models, created by Distinguished Scholar Wynne Godley, are accounting based. The US model employs a complete and consistent system (in that all sectors “sum up,” with no unaccounted leakages) of stocks and flows (such as income, production, and wealth). The world model is a “closed” system, in which 11 trading blocs—of which the United States, China, Japan, and Western Europe are four—are represented. This model is based on a matrix in which each bloc’s imports are described in terms of exports from the other 10 blocs. From this information, and using alternative assumptions (e.g., growth rates, trade shares, and energy demands and supplies), trends are identified and patterns of trade and production analyzed.

The projections derived from the models are not presented as short-term forecasts. The aim is to display, based on analysis of the recent past, what it seems reasonable to expect if current trends, policies, and relationships continue. To inform policy, it is not necessary to establish that a particular projection will come to pass, but only that it is something that must be given serious consideration as a possibility. The usefulness of such analyses is strategic: they can serve to warn policymakers of potential dangers and serve as a guide to policy instruments that are available, or should be made available, to deal with those dangers, should they arise.



United States

Europe

Asia

  • Working Paper No. 881 | January 2017

    This paper investigates the long-term determinants of Indian government bonds’ (IGB) nominal yields. It examines whether John Maynard Keynes’s supposition that short-term interest rates are the key driver of long-term government bond yields holds over the long-run horizon, after controlling for various key economic factors such as inflationary pressure and measures of economic activity. It also appraises whether the government finance variable—the ratio of government debt to nominal income—has an adverse effect on government bond yields over a long-run horizon. The models estimated here show that in India, short-term interest rates are the key driver of long-term government bond yields over the long run. However, the ratio of government debt and nominal income does not have any discernible adverse effect on yields over a long-run horizon. These findings will help policymakers in India (and elsewhere) to use information on the current trend in short-term interest rates, the federal fiscal balance, and other key macro variables to form their long-term outlook on IGB yields, and to understand the implications of the government’s fiscal stance on the government bond market.

    Download:
    Associated Program(s):
    Author(s):
    Tanweer Akram Anupam Das
    Related Topic(s):
    Region(s):
    Asia

  • Working Paper No. 872 | August 2016
    Do Fiscal Rules Impose Hard Budget Constraints?

    The primary objective of rule-based fiscal legislation at the subnational level in India is to achieve debt sustainability by placing a ceiling on borrowing and the use of borrowed resources for public capital investment by phasing out deficits in the budget revenue account. This paper examines whether the application of fiscal rules has contributed to an increase in fiscal space for public capital investment spending in major Indian states. Our analysis shows that, controlling for other factors, there is a negative relationship between fiscal rules and public capital investment spending at the state level under the rule-based fiscal regime.

  • Working Paper No. 862 | March 2016

    Japan has experienced stagnation, deflation, and low interest rates for decades. It is caught in a liquidity trap. This paper examines Japan’s liquidity trap in light of the structure and performance of the country’s economy since the onset of stagnation. It also analyzes the country’s liquidity trap in terms of the different strands in the theoretical literature. It is argued that insights from a Keynesian perspective are still quite relevant. The Keynesian perspective is useful not just for understanding Japan’s liquidity trap but also for formulating and implementing policies that can overcome the liquidity trap and foster renewed economic growth and prosperity. Paul Krugman (1998a, b) and Ben Bernanke (2000; 2002) identify low inflation and deflation risks as the cause of a liquidity trap. Hence, they advocate a credible commitment by the central bank to sustained monetary easing as the key to reigniting inflation, creating an exit from a liquidity trap through low interest rates and quantitative easing. In contrast, for John Maynard Keynes (2007 [1936]) the possibility of a liquidity trap arises from a sharp rise in investors’ liquidity preference and the fear of capital losses due to uncertainty about the direction of interest rates. His analysis calls for an integrated strategy for overcoming a liquidity trap. This strategy consists of vigorous fiscal policy and employment creation to induce a higher expected marginal efficiency of capital, while the central bank stabilizes the yield curve and reduces interest rate volatility to mitigate investors’ expectations of capital loss. In light of Japan’s experience, Keynes’s analysis and proposal for generating effective demand might well be a more appropriate remedy for the country’s liquidity trap.

    Download:
    Associated Program(s):
    Author(s):
    Tanweer Akram
    Related Topic(s):
    Region(s):
    Asia

  • In the Media | June 2015
    Economia, June 23, 2015. All Rights Reserved.

    All'interno del quadro economico internazionale, Jan Kregel, direttore del programma “Politica Monetaria” presso il Levy Economic Institute negli USA, analizza qual è stato il ruolo degli Stati Uniti all'interno della crisi economica. Uno degli elementi che viene messo maggiormente in evidenza, è l' importanza data al settore finanziario, rispetto all'economia reale: ciò ha portando ad una minore attenzione a problemi come la disoccupazione, che rappresenta ancora una delle questioni irrisolte dell'Europa, ma soprattutto dell'Italia. 

    Una volta che la crisi economica è scoppiata negli Usa, si è diffusa a macchia d'olio specie nel continente europeo, dove la forbice presente tra europa meridionale e settentrionale, si è notevolmente ampliata.   A tale ritratto, Kregel, aggiunge anche un'attenta le politiche economiche messe in atto da Cina e Giappone e dalle loro ripercussioni sul sistema economico mondiale.

    intervista videoregistrata:
    http://www.economia.rai.it/articoli/la-crisi-negli-usa-il-punto-di-vista-di-jan-kregel/30575/default.aspx
    Associated Program:
    Author(s):
    Region(s):
    United States, Asia
  • Working Paper No. 834 | March 2015

    John Maynard Keynes held that the central bank’s actions determine long-term interest rates through short-term interest rates and various monetary policy measures. His conjectures about the determinants of long-term interest rates were made in the context of advanced capitalist economies, and were based on his views on ontological uncertainty and the formation of investors’ expectations. Are these conjectures valid in emerging markets, such as India? This paper empirically investigates the determinants of changes in Indian government bonds’ nominal yields. Changes in short-term interest rates, after controlling for other crucial variables such as changes in the rates of inflation and economic activity, take a lead role in driving changes in the nominal yields of Indian government bonds. This vindicates Keynes’s theories, and suggests that his views on long-term interest rates are also applicable to emerging markets. Higher fiscal deficits do not appear to raise government bond yields in India. It is further argued that Keynes’s conjectures about investors’ outlooks, views, and expectations are fairly robust in a world of ontological uncertainty.

    Download:
    Associated Program(s):
    Author(s):
    Tanweer Akram Anupam Das
    Related Topic(s):
    Region(s):
    Asia

  • Working Paper No. 813 | August 2014
    For Economic Stimulus, or for Austerity and Volatility?

    The implementation of economic reforms under new economic policies in India was associated with a paradigmatic shift in monetary and fiscal policy. While monetary policies were solely aimed at “price stability” in the neoliberal regime, fiscal policies were characterized by the objective of maintaining “sound finance” and “austerity.” Such monetarist principles and measures have also loomed over the global recession. This paper highlights the theoretical fallacies of monetarism and analyzes the consequences of such policy measures in India, particularly during the period of the global recession. Not only did such policies pose constraints on the recovery of output and employment, with adverse impacts on income distribution; but they also failed to achieve their stated goal in terms of price stability. By citing examples from southern Europe and India, this paper concludes that such monetarist policy measures have been responsible for stagnation, with a rise in price volatility and macroeconomic instability in the midst of the global recession.

  • In the Media | April 2014
    By Panos Mourdoukoutas

    Forbes, April 14, 2014. All Rights Reserved.

    For years, China has been enjoying robust economic growth that has turned it into the world’s second largest economy.

    The problem is, however, that China’s growth is in part driven by over investment in construction and manufacturing sectors, fueling asset bubbles that parallel those of Japan in the late 1980s. With one major difference: China’s overinvestment is directed by the systematic efforts of local governments to preserve the old system of central planning, through massive construction and manufacturing projects for the purpose of employment creation rather than for addressing genuine consumer needs.

    Major Chinese cities are filled with growing numbers of new vacant buildings. They were built under government mandates to provide jobs for the hundreds of thousands of people leaving the countryside for a better life in the cities, rather than to house genuine business tenants.

    China’s real estate bubble is proliferating like an infectious disease from the eastern cities to the inner country. It has spread beyond real estate to other sectors of the economy, from the steel industry to electronics and toys industries.  Local governments rush and race to replicate each other’s policies, especially local governments of the inner regions, where corporate managers have no direct access to overseas markets, and end up copying the policies of their peers in the coastal areas.

    We all know how the Japanese bubble ended. What should Chinese policy makers do? How can they burst their bubble?

    There is  a bad way and a good way, according to L. Randall Wray and Xinhua Liu, writing in "Options for China in a Dollar Standard World: A Sovereign Currency Approach.” (Levy Economics Institute, Working Paper No 783, January 2014).

    The bad way is to pursue European-style austerity, which reins in central government deficits.

    We all know what that means–the Chinese economy is almost certain to be placed in a downward spiral that will jeopardize employment growth. Besides, as the authors observe, China’s fiscal imbalances aren’t with central government, but with local governments. In fact, China’s main imbalance “appears to be a result of loose local government budgets and overly tight central government budgets.”

    That’s why the authors propose fiscal restructuring rather than austerity. Rein in local government spending, and expand central government spending.

    That’s the good way to burst the bubble. But is it politically feasible? Can Beijing reign over local governments?

    That remains to be seen. 

  • Working Paper No. 783 | January 2014
    A Sovereign Currency Approach
    This paper examines the fiscal and monetary policy options available to China as a sovereign currency-issuing nation operating in a dollar standard world. We first summarize a number of issues facing China, including the possibility of slower growth, global imbalances, and a number of domestic imbalances. We then analyze current monetary and fiscal policy formation and examine some policy recommendations that have been advanced to deal with current areas of concern. We next outline the sovereign currency approach and use it to analyze those concerns. We conclude with policy recommendations consistent with the policy space open to China.

  • One-Pager No. 44 | December 2013
    Reorienting Fiscal Policy to Reduce Financial Fragility
    Since adopting a policy of gradually opening its economy more than three decades ago, China has enjoyed rapid economic growth and rising living standards for much of its population. While some argue that China might fall into the middle-income “trap,” they are underestimating the country’s ability to continue to grow at a rapid pace. It is likely that China’s growth will eventually slow, but the nation will continue on its path to join the developed high-income group—so long as the central government recognizes and uses the policy space available to it. 

  • Working Paper No. 714 | April 2012
    China and India

    The narrative as well as the analysis of global imbalances in the existing literature are incomplete without the part of the story that relates to the surge in capital flows experienced by the emerging economies. Such analysis disregards the implications of capital flows on their domestic economies, especially in terms of the “impossibility” of following a monetary policy that benefits domestic growth. It also fails to recognize the significance of uncertainty and changes in expectation as factors in the (precautionary) buildup of large official reserves. The consequences are many, and affect the fabric of growth and distribution in these economies. The recent experiences of China and India, with their deregulated financial sectors, bear this out.

    Financial integration and free capital mobility, which are supposed to generate growth with stability (according to the “efficient markets” hypothesis), have not only failed to achieve their promises (especially in the advanced economies) but also forced the high-growth developing economies like India and China into a state of compliance, where domestic goals of stability and development are sacrificed in order to attain the globally sanctioned norm of free capital flows.

    With the global financial crisis and the specter of recession haunting most advanced economies, the high-growth economies in Asia have drawn much less attention than they deserve. This oversight leaves the analysis incomplete, not only by missing an important link in the prevailing network of global trade and finance, but also by ignoring the structural changes in these developing economies—many of which are related to the pattern of financialization and turbulence in the advanced economies.

Latin America

  • Conference Proceedings | April 2018
    A conference organized by the Levy Economics Institute of Bard College

    The proceedings include the 2017 conference program, transcripts of keynote speakers’ remarks, synopses of the panel sessions, and biographies of the participants.
    Download:
    Associated Program(s):
    Author(s):
    Michael Stephens
    Related Topic(s):
    Region(s):
    United States, Latin America, Europe

  • Public Policy Brief No. 143 | February 2017

    Since inheriting the Brazilian presidency five months ago, the new Temer administration has successfully ratified a constitutional amendment imposing a radical, two-decades-long public spending freeze, purportedly aimed at sparking an increase in business confidence and investment. In this policy brief, Fernando Cardim de Carvalho explains why this fiscal strategy is based not only on a flawed conception of the drivers of private-sector confidence and investment but also on a mistaken view of the roots of the current Brazilian economic crisis. The hoped-for “expansionary fiscal consolidation” is not likely to be achieved.

  • Policy Note 2016/2 | April 2016

    Brazil is mired in a joint economic and political crisis, and the way out is unclear. In 2015 the country experienced a steep contraction of output alongside elevated inflation, all while the fallout from a series of corruption scandals left the policymaking apparatus paralyzed. Looking ahead, implementing a policy strategy that has any hope of addressing the Brazilian economy’s multilayered problems would make serious demands on a political system that is most likely unable to bear it.

  • Working Paper No. 860 | February 2016
    Brazil at the Mid-2010s

    The Brazilian economy in 2015 was afflicted by a lethal combination of decelerating activity and accelerating inflation. Expectations for 2016 are equally or even more adverse, since the effects of rising unemployment emerge only after a lag. The domestic debate has pitted analysts who believe the crisis is due exclusively to past policy mistakes against those who believe that all was well until the government decided to implement austerity policies in 2015. A closer examination of the evidence shows that, in fact, both causes contributed to the crisis. But it also suggests that its depth has a more proximate cause in the political collapse of the federal government in 2015, which led Brazilian society to an impasse for which one cannot yet visualize the solution.

    Download:
    Associated Program:
    Author(s):
    Related Topic(s):
    Region(s):
    Latin America

  • Working Paper No. 853 | November 2015
    The Case of Colombia

    In recent years, Colombia has grown relatively rapidly, but it has been a biased growth. The energy sector (the “locomotora minero-energetica,” to use the rhetorical expression of President Juan Manuel Santos) grew much faster than the rest of the economy, while the manufacturing sector registered a negative rate of growth. These are classic symptoms of the well-known “Dutch disease,” but our purpose here is not to establish whether or not the Dutch disease exists, but rather to shed some light on the financial viability of several, simultaneous dynamics: (1) the existence of a traditional Dutch disease being due to a large increase in mining exports and a significant exchange rate appreciation; (2) a massive increase in foreign direct investment, particularly in the mining sector; (3) a rather passive monetary policy, aimed at increasing purchasing power via exchange rate appreciation; (4) and more recently, a large distribution of dividends from Colombia to the rest of the world and the accumulation of mounting financial liabilities. The paper shows that these dynamics constitute a potential danger for the stability of the Colombian economy. Some policy recommendations are also discussed.

    Download:
    Associated Program(s):
    Author(s):
    Alberto Botta Antoine Godin Marco Missaglia
    Related Topic(s):
    Region(s):
    Latin America

  • In the Media | September 2015
    By Fermin Koop
    Buenos Aires Herald, September 27, 2015. All Rights Reserved.

    Jan Kregel, one of the world’s most eminent Post-Keynesian economists specialized in financial crises and structural problems of developing economies, has written several papers on Argentina’s economy after the 2001–2002 economic meltdown. The director of research at the Levy Economics Institute at Bard College in upstate New York, Kregel served as rapporteur of the president of the UN General Assembly’s Commission on Reform of the International Financial System.

    In Buenos Aires for a conference, Kregel met with the Herald and discussed the country’s economy, highlighting that the currency is in desperate need of a devaluation. At the same time, he said the country shouldn’t take action regarding the “vulture” funds, which he linked to late special AMIA prosecutor Alberto Nisman....

    Read more: http://www.buenosairesherald.com/article/199670/kregel-‘do-nothing-about-vulture-funds-let-the-case-sit-there’
    Associated Program:
    Region(s):
    Latin America
  • In the Media | September 2015
    Página|12, 26 Septiembre 2015. Reservados todos los derechos.

    “No se puede mirar el crecimiento económico sin empleo. Si se va a desarrollar la economía, no importa la tasa de inversión o de crecimiento si no se genera empleo”, destacó el prestigioso economista estadounidense Jan Kregel, durante su intervención en el Congreso sobre Pensamiento Económico Latinoamericano. El investigador poskeynesiano compartió el panel junto con el especialista francés Pascal Petit, quien advirtió que hacia fin de año habrá 19 millones de desempleados en la Eurozona, unos siete millones más que durante 2008....

    Lee más: http://www.pagina12.com.ar/diario/economia/2-282499-2015-09-26.html
    Associated Program:
    Region(s):
    Latin America
  • In the Media | June 2015
    Genaro Grasso
    Tiempo, 07 de Junio de 2015. Todos los derechos reservados.

    El economista griego señala que los especuladores deberían estar regulados de la misma manera que las entidades financieras, tanto en forma global como a nivel país.

    Apunta contra los efectos de la globalización en tanto ha sido el canal de difusión de una nueva ola de determinismo neoliberal, en los países en desarrollo y también en los desarrollados....

    Leer más:
    http://tiempo.infonews.com/nota/154525/los-fondos-buitre-deben-ser-abolidos-del-sistema
    Associated Program:
    Author(s):
    Region(s):
    Latin America, Europe
  • In the Media | August 2014
    Etorno Inteligente, August 22, 2014. All Rights Reserved.

    Portafolio
     / Colombia comete un gran error en perseguir el objetivo de entrar a la Organización para la Cooperación y el Desarrollo Económicos (Ocde), porque eso debe ser para países con un grado similar de desarrollo, dice el economista Jan Kregel, investigador del Levy Economics Institute of Board College de Estados Unidos.

    El experto, relator de la Comisión de la ONU sobre la reforma al sistema financiero internacional, participa en la Décima Semana Económica de la Universidad Central.

    Colombia ha basado su crecimiento en productos básicos. ¿Cómo mantener esa tendencia a largo plazo? 

    Lo que se puede predecir para una economía como la colombiana es una crisis externa sustantiva porque, si se mira el déficit externo, algo así como el 50 por ciento de las exportaciones de Colombia provienen del petróleo. Si hay una disminución de los precios, el primer impacto es empeorar el déficit externo y reducir los flujos financieros y habrá una presión fuerte sobre la tasa de cambio y la posición de los exportadores empeorará.

    ¿Qué debe el país hacer para reactivar la industria? 

    Hay un impacto de la enfermedad holandesa. Las exportaciones de materias primas han tenido una elevación de precios y han apreciado la tasa de cambio. Por eso, otras exportaciones son menos competitivas. Otro factor es la redistribución de las manufacturas globalmente. Si uno mira el impacto de las importaciones en la economía colombiana, hay un gran incremento de las compras a Asia.

    ¿Colombia tiene enfermedad holandesa? 

    Absolutamente sí. La enfermedad holandesa se puede clasificar de dos maneras: una es simplemente el impacto de los productos básicos, creando una mejora en los términos de comercio y un aumento de los ingresos del país. Pero el impacto de la tasa de cambio en la competitividad acaba con un incremento de los ingresos nacionales y al mismo tiempo se abaratan los bienes importados.

    El peligro real de la enfermedad holandesa no está solamente en la tasa de cambio, sino que se ve en la distribución del consumo de productos nacionales a importados.

    Una mejora en los precios de las materias primas es lo mismo que un incremento en los ingresos nacionales pero, al mismo tiempo, esto causa una apreciación en la tasa de cambio y el ingreso doméstico incrementado se va a gastar en bienes más baratos y estos son los importados. Entonces es un factor doble.

    ¿Es sano para Colombia ingresar a la Ocde? 

    Es un gran error. México y Corea cometieron el mismo error y ambos sufrieron crisis financieras sustantivas como resultado de esto. Si nos remontamos a las viejas teorías de los economistas estructuralistas, se alegó que una de las condiciones básicas para ingresar a cualquier tipo de acuerdo de esta naturaleza es que hubiese un nivel similar de desarrollo, de productividad y de competitividad.

    Colombia va a entrar a la Ocde sin preocuparnos por competir con Estados Unidos, y estamos hablando de competir con México. La pregunta es si Colombia va a ser capaz de competir en los mercados internacionales con otros países en desarrollo que ya están en la Ocde y no parece prometedor. ¿Por qué se quiere entrar a la Ocde? Es básicamente para darles confianza a los inversionistas extranjeros para que inviertan en Colombia, pero esto implica empoderar más la enfermedad holandesa.

    Pero Colombia es hoy uno de los países de Latinoamérica que más crece. 

    Es un crecimiento que desilusiona. No se puede mirar crecimiento sin empleo. Si se va a desarrollar la economía no importa qué tan alta sea la tasa de inversión ni qué tan alto sea el crecimiento si no se genera empleo. Si no se reduce el sector informal no se está generando desarrollo.

    Pero el desempleo ha bajado… 

    Ha bajado, pero no es mucho y sigue siendo sumamente alto. Hay un problema de desempleo disfrazado que debe ser de 40 por ciento. La pregunta es ¿Por qué? La explicación proviene de la enfermedad holandesa y del impacto sobre el sector de manufacturas.

    ¿HAY QUE REGULAR MERCADOS? 

    La dificultad es que nunca habrá una regulación que dé estabilidad a los mercados financieros en el mundo, porque estos siempre van adelante de los reguladores.

    La reglamentación está para reducir la rentabilidad de los bancos y estos existen solo si pueden tener utilidades sustanciales en su negocio.

    Fernando González P. Subeditor Economía y Negocios 

    −−> Colombia comete un gran error en perseguir el objetivo de entrar a la Organización para la Cooperación y el Desarrollo Económicos (Ocde), porque eso debe ser para países con un grado similar de desarrollo, dice el economista Jan Kregel, investigador del Levy Economics Institute of Board College de Estados Unidos.

    El experto, relator de la Comisión de la ONU sobre la reforma al sistema financiero internacional, participa en la Décima Semana Económica de la Universidad Central.

    Colombia ha basado su crecimiento en productos básicos. ¿Cómo mantener esa tendencia a largo plazo? 

    Lo que se puede predecir para una economía como la colombiana es una crisis externa sustantiva porque, si se mira el déficit externo, algo así como el 50 por ciento de las exportaciones de Colombia provienen del petróleo. Si hay una disminución de los precios, el primer impacto es empeorar el déficit externo y reducir los flujos financieros y habrá una presión fuerte sobre la tasa de cambio y la posición de los exportadores empeorará.

    ¿Qué debe el país hacer para reactivar la industria? 

    Hay un impacto de la enfermedad holandesa. Las exportaciones de materias primas han tenido una elevación de precios y han apreciado la tasa de cambio. Por eso, otras exportaciones son menos competitivas. Otro factor es la redistribución de las manufacturas globalmente. Si uno mira el impacto de las importaciones en la economía colombiana, hay un gran incremento de las compras a Asia.

    ¿Colombia tiene enfermedad holandesa? 

    Absolutamente sí. La enfermedad holandesa se puede clasificar de dos maneras: una es simplemente el impacto de los productos básicos, creando una mejora en los términos de comercio y un aumento de los ingresos del país. Pero el impacto de la tasa de cambio en la competitividad acaba con un incremento de los ingresos nacionales y al mismo tiempo se abaratan los bienes importados.

    El peligro real de la enfermedad holandesa no está solamente en la tasa de cambio, sino que se ve en la distribución del consumo de productos nacionales a importados.

    Una mejora en los precios de las materias primas es lo mismo que un incremento en los ingresos nacionales pero, al mismo tiempo, esto causa una apreciación en la tasa de cambio y el ingreso doméstico incrementado se va a gastar en bienes más baratos y estos son los importados. Entonces es un factor doble.

    ¿Es sano para Colombia ingresar a la Ocde? 

    Es un gran error. México y Corea cometieron el mismo error y ambos sufrieron crisis financieras sustantivas como resultado de esto. Si nos remontamos a las viejas teorías de los economistas estructuralistas, se alegó que una de las condiciones básicas para ingresar a cualquier tipo de acuerdo de esta naturaleza es que hubiese un nivel similar de desarrollo, de productividad y de competitividad.

    Colombia va a entrar a la Ocde sin preocuparnos por competir con Estados Unidos, y estamos hablando de competir con México. La pregunta es si Colombia va a ser capaz de competir en los mercados internacionales con otros países en desarrollo que ya están en la Ocde y no parece prometedor. ¿Por qué se quiere entrar a la Ocde? Es básicamente para darles confianza a los inversionistas extranjeros para que inviertan en Colombia, pero esto implica empoderar más la enfermedad holandesa.

    Pero Colombia es hoy uno de los países de Latinoamérica que más crece. 

    Es un crecimiento que desilusiona. No se puede mirar crecimiento sin empleo. Si se va a desarrollar la economía no importa qué tan alta sea la tasa de inversión ni qué tan alto sea el crecimiento si no se genera empleo. Si no se reduce el sector informal no se está generando desarrollo.

    Pero el desempleo ha bajado… 

    Ha bajado, pero no es mucho y sigue siendo sumamente alto. Hay un problema de desempleo disfrazado que debe ser de 40 por ciento. La pregunta es ¿Por qué? La explicación proviene de la enfermedad holandesa y del impacto sobre el sector de manufacturas.

    ¿HAY QUE REGULAR MERCADOS? 

    La dificultad es que nunca habrá una regulación que dé estabilidad a los mercados financieros en el mundo, porque estos siempre van adelante de los reguladores.

    La reglamentación está para reducir la rentabilidad de los bancos y estos existen solo si pueden tener utilidades sustanciales en su negocio.
    Associated Program:
    Author(s):
    Region(s):
    Latin America